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In January 2017, the Midea Group Co. Ltd. (Midea), a China-based large manufacturer of electrical appliances, completed its acquisition of German-based KUKA AG (KUKA), a large manufacturer of industrial robots. To ease concerns about technologies falling into foreign hands, Midea entered into an alliance with KUKA that ensured KUKA's independence until 2023. However, within less than a year, KUKA experienced problems in its European and Asian markets. In China, it needed to lower costs. In Europe, a price war slowed down the orders, and the company had insufficient workers to meet demand in the United States and Asia. Some German automotive clients were losing trust in KUKA, and German employees worried about their job security. How could the two companies operate sufficiently independently to maintain their clients' trust, while being integrated enough to improve their efficiencies? How should they be prepared for the expiration of the alliance in 2023?

In January 2017, the Midea Group Co. Ltd. (Midea), a China-based large manufacturer of electrical appliances, completed its acquisition of German-based KUKA AG (KUKA), a large manufacturer of industrial robots. To ease concerns about technologies falling into foreign hands, Midea entered into an alliance with KUKA that ensured KUKA’s independence until 2023. However, within less than a year, KUKA experienced problems in its European and Asian markets. In China, it needed to lower costs. In Europe, a price war slowed down the orders, and the company had insufficient workers to meet demand in the United States and Asia. Some German automotive clients were losing trust in KUKA, and German employees worried about their job security. How could the two companies operate sufficiently independently to maintain their clients' trust, while being integrated enough to improve their efficiencies? How should they be prepared for the expiration of the alliance in 2023?

In July 2015, Tassal Group Limited (Tassal) announced the acquisition of De Costi Seafoods Company (De Costi) in a combination deal of cash and shares. The acquisition would allow Tassal to address a A$4.3 billion Australian seafood market that was much larger than the previously addressable salmon market of $700 million. Tassal had previous experience in species diversification. However, the environmental impacts of its major operations in Macquarie Harbour had been under the scrutiny of the Australian authority. Given the critical harbour issues, should Tassal continue to expand overseas? What were the motives to acquire De Costi? Did Tassal have sufficient capabilities and resources to cope with the high demand for Tasmanian salmon, particularly in the Asian market?

In July 2015, Tassal Group Limited (Tassal) announced the acquisition of De Costi Seafoods Company (De Costi) in a combination deal of cash and shares. The acquisition would allow Tassal to address a A$4.3 billion Australian seafood market that was much larger than the previously addressable salmon market of $700 million. Tassal had previous experience in species diversification. However, the environmental impacts of its major operations in Macquarie Harbour had been under the scrutiny of the Australian authority. Given the critical harbour issues, should Tassal continue to expand overseas? What were the motives to acquire De Costi? Did Tassal have sufficient capabilities and resources to cope with the high demand for Tasmanian salmon, particularly in the Asian market?

In August 2016, Foxconn Technology Group (Foxconn) acquired a majority stake for US$3.8 billion in Sharp Corporation (Sharp), which was on the verge of bankruptcy. In addition to gaining more liquid crystal display (LCD) capacity, Foxconn was combining Sharp’s advanced technology and marketing resources with its own to expand and move up the value chain in both research and development and brand building. However, the post-acquisition integration to realize such value-creation potentials faced several challenges, including the probability that Sharp’s Japanese style of management might not assimilate well within Foxconn’s organization. Now in 2018, what should Foxconn do to seamlessly integrate the two entities? How could Foxconn achieve its efficiency, cost, and innovation goals while moving toward becoming the technology leader and successfully creating its own global brand?

In August 2016, Foxconn Technology Group (Foxconn) acquired a majority stake for US$3.8 billion in Sharp Corporation (Sharp), which was on the verge of bankruptcy. In addition to gaining more liquid crystal display (LCD) capacity, Foxconn was combining Sharp's advanced technology and marketing resources with its own to expand and move up the value chain in both research and development and brand building. However, the post-acquisition integration to realize such value-creation potentials faced several challenges, including the probability that Sharp's Japanese style of management might not assimilate well within Foxconn's organization. Now in 2018, what should Foxconn do to seamlessly integrate the two entities? How could Foxconn achieve its efficiency, cost, and innovation goals while moving toward becoming the technology leader and successfully creating its own global brand?

In 2017, the French film producer and distributor EuropaCorp S.A. (EuropaCorp) announced a historical record loss of €119.9 million. The company had almost doubled its revenues between 2001 and 2010 by using an integrated studio model, but the recent losses had been substantial. After entering into a number of international joint production and marketing ventures, the company reported its highest revenues to date in 2015, only to announce in July 2016 that the company had incurred significant losses and that its revenues were the lowest since 2008. Once again, the company tried to turn itself around, strengthening its position by focusing on the founder’s core business and making some financial adjustments. A capital increase resulted in a positive shift in EuropaCorp’s shareholding structure; however, the company was still experiencing losses and was anticipating a continuing loss into the next year. Was there anything more EuropaCorp could do to change its position?

In 2017, the French film producer and distributor EuropaCorp S.A. (EuropaCorp) announced a historical record loss of €119.9 million. The company had almost doubled its revenues between 2001 and 2010 by using an integrated studio model, but the recent losses had been substantial. After entering into a number of international joint production and marketing ventures, the company reported its highest revenues to date in 2015, only to announce in July 2016 that the company had incurred significant losses and that its revenues were the lowest since 2008. Once again, the company tried to turn itself around, strengthening its position by focusing on the founder's core business and making some financial adjustments. A capital increase resulted in a positive shift in EuropaCorp's shareholding structure; however, the company was still experiencing losses and was anticipating a continuing loss into the next year. Was there anything more EuropaCorp could do to change its position?

In 2016, the Japanese company Toyota Tsusho Corporation (TTC) acquired the remaining shares of the French trading company Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), which was operating in Africa. That same year, TTC registered its first financial loss in 16 years. Several years earlier, in 2012, TTC had participated in CFAO’s equity as its majority shareholder. These strategic moves were all part of TTC’s corporate campaign Vision 2015, "Lead the Next", which aimed specifically to reduce its dependence on its parent group by diversifying to increase earnings from non-automotive businesses, rather than targeting African markets as a long-term sustainability plan. What were the motivations of TTC and CFAO in pursuing these transactions? Was the positive performance that followed the acquisition a result of synergies or just a simple sum of the consolidation and an industry trend? Why did TTC move from preserving CFAO’s operational autonomy in 2012 to delisting and fully internalizing it in 2016? Was there a link between poor performance in 2016 and the acquisition of CFAO? How should CFAO solve the conflict between its existing automotive customers and the Toyota Group as its main rival? How could CFAO defend its leader position from the entry of major competitors from South Korea, India, and China? Although the Vision 2015 campaign was validated, should TTC revise its global vision strategy and 10-year plan in the future, given its bad year in 2016?

In 2017, the French automaker Groupe PSA (PSA) agreed to buy loss-making Opel/Vauxhall units from General Motors Company. PSA had just recovered one year earlier from losses it had sustained since the global financial crisis. With the recovery, PSA had launched a new strategic plan with aggressive goals for sustainable profitable growth. However, PSA's sales were continuing to drop in the important Chinese market due to fierce competition, and the newly acquired units were still making losses. The use of electric cars was on the rise, and the European Commission had proposed a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. PSA was planning to re-enter the United States, and in Britain, it was facing ambiguous Brexit negotiations, raising concerns about increased costs with importing and exporting parts and finished vehicles. In light of all of these challenges, how could PSA still reach its aggressive goals for sustainable growth?

In January 2017, Banro Corporation, a Canadian gold mining company in the Democratic Republic of Congo, underwent recapitalization to cope with financial distress, and to optimize its operations of mining assets. Since the commencement of commercial mining in 2009, unexpected social conflicts and operational challenges had led to significantly lower production than expected, with a large cost overrun, while the price of gold declined sharply from 2012. Would the recapitalization enable Banro Corporation to carry out its medium-term strategic plan of incremental growth by operational improvements, through cost reduction and throughput expansion over a five-year horizon? How could the company achieve its long-term goal of being a model of excellence in sustainability?

In 2017, the French automaker Groupe PSA (PSA) agreed to buy loss-making Opel/Vauxhall units from General Motors Company. PSA had just recovered one year earlier from losses it had sustained since the global financial crisis. With the recovery, PSA had launched a new strategic plan with aggressive goals for sustainable profitable growth. However, PSA’s sales were continuing to drop in the important Chinese market due to fierce competition, and the newly acquired units were still making losses. The use of electric cars was on the rise, and the European Commission had proposed a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. PSA was planning to re-enter the United States, and in Britain, it was facing ambiguous Brexit negotiations, raising concerns about increased costs with importing and exporting parts and finished vehicles. In light of all of these challenges, how could PSA still reach its aggressive goals for sustainable growth?

In April 2016, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) acquired the cash-strapped German e-commerce company Lazada Group (Lazada) to enter the Southeast Asian market and gain an additional source of revenue. Lazada's value proposition of an effortless shopping experience, combined with rising competition, had caused Lazada to over-invest in logistics infrastructure. The cash injection from Alibaba's acquisition would allow Lazada to continue to pursue its strategic imperatives while leveraging Alibaba's online experience and other resources in China. Given the competitive environment in China, was the entry into Southeast Asia through the acquisition of Lazada an appropriate strategy for Alibaba? Had Lazada made the appropriate decision to sell its company to Alibaba? How should Alibaba implement its post-merger integration in 2017?

In April 2016, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) acquired the cash-strapped German e-commerce company Lazada Group (Lazada) to enter the Southeast Asian market and gain an additional source of revenue. Lazada’s value proposition of an effortless shopping experience, combined with rising competition, had caused Lazada to over-invest in logistics infrastructure. The cash injection from Alibaba’s acquisition would allow Lazada to continue to pursue its strategic imperatives while leveraging Alibaba’s online experience and other resources in China. Given the competitive environment in China, was the entry into Southeast Asia through the acquisition of Lazada an appropriate strategy for Alibaba? Had Lazada made the appropriate decision to sell its company to Alibaba? How should Alibaba implement its post-merger integration in 2017?

In January 2017, Banro Corporation, a Canadian gold mining company in the Democratic Republic of Congo, underwent recapitalization to cope with financial distress, and to optimize its operations of mining assets. Since the commencement of commercial mining in 2009, unexpected social conflicts and operational challenges had led to significantly lower production than expected, with a large cost overrun, while the price of gold declined sharply from 2012. Would the recapitalization enable Banro Corporation to carry out its medium-term strategic plan of incremental growth by operational improvements, through cost reduction and throughput expansion over a five-year horizon? How could the company achieve its long-term goal of being a model of excellence in sustainability?

Since its founding in 1951, Chinese state-owned Jinjiang International (Group) Company Limited (Jinjiang) had become a leading international company in the travel and hospitality industry with business divisions in hotels, transportation, travel, realty, investments, and finance. The Jinjiang brand was well-known in China, and the group had been pursuing a conservative investment approach. However, in response to the Chinese government’s “Going Global” and “One Belt and One Road” policies, and in order to strengthen the firm’s international competitiveness, Jinjiang made a series of aggressive mergers and acquisitions between 2014 and 2016. The acquisitions—especially those of two large hotel groups—had worsened Jinjiang’s debt position, while integration was proving difficult due to the acquired firms’ different corporate cultures and values. The hospitality market was also becoming mature and highly competitive; host-country governments were increasingly wary of foreign state-owned companies acquiring domestic assets. How could Jinjiang overcome these challenges to achieve its aspiration of building a world-class brand, while fulfilling the Chinese government’s political agendas through a series of aggressive globalization efforts?

Since its founding in 1951, Chinese state-owned Jinjiang International (Group) Company Limited (Jinjiang) had become a leading international company in the travel and hospitality industry with business divisions in hotels, transportation, travel, realty, investments, and finance. The Jinjiang brand was well-known in China, and the group had been pursuing a conservative investment approach. However, in response to the Chinese government's "Going Global" and "One Belt and One Road" policies, and in order to strengthen the firm's international competitiveness, Jinjiang made a series of aggressive mergers and acquisitions between 2014 and 2016. The acquisitions-especially those of two large hotel groups-had worsened Jinjiang's debt position, while integration was proving difficult due to the acquired firms' different corporate cultures and values. The hospitality market was also becoming mature and highly competitive; host-country governments were increasingly wary of foreign state-owned companies acquiring domestic assets. How could Jinjiang overcome these challenges to achieve its aspiration of building a world-class brand, while fulfilling the Chinese government's political agendas through a series of aggressive globalization efforts?

In 2016, the Japanese company Toyota Tsusho Corporation (TTC) acquired the remaining shares of the French trading company Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), which was operating in Africa. That same year, TTC registered its first financial loss in 16 years. Several years earlier, in 2012, TTC had participated in CFAO's equity as its majority shareholder. These strategic moves were all part of TTC's corporate campaign Vision 2015, "Lead the Next", which aimed specifically to reduce its dependence on its parent group by diversifying to increase earnings from non-automotive businesses, rather than targeting African markets as a long-term sustainability plan. What were the motivations of TTC and CFAO in pursuing these transactions? Was the positive performance that followed the acquisition a result of synergies or just a simple sum of the consolidation and an industry trend? Why did TTC move from preserving CFAO's operational autonomy in 2012 to delisting and fully internalizing it in 2016? Was there a link between poor performance in 2016 and the acquisition of CFAO? How should CFAO solve the conflict between its existing automotive customers and the Toyota Group as its main rival? How could CFAO defend its leader position from the entry of major competitors from South Korea, India, and China? Although the Vision 2015 campaign was validated, should TTC revise its global vision strategy and 10-year plan in the future, given its bad year in 2016?

In September 2015, Groupe Fnac (Fnac), a large French retail chain, announced it had acquired long-time competitor Darty Limited (Darty) in an effort to counter competition from online retailers, particularly American e-commerce giant Amazon.com, Inc. Fnac’s first offer had been declined, but Fnac and Darty negotiated and agreed on a new offer in November 2015. Unexpectedly, in March 2016, a South African-based retail holding company, Steinhoff International Holdings N.V., made a bigger offer. After an intense bidding war, Fnac successfully acquired Darty in April 2016 for 60 per cent over its first offer. The new company, Groupe Fnac Darty, faced several challenges. It needed to convince its stakeholders that the two emblematic competitors could create better value for them, despite their different identities and corporate cultures. How should the combined entity achieve the announced €130 million in annual synergies by 2019? And would the new entity survive the aggressive competition of e-commerce?

In September 2015, Groupe Fnac (Fnac), a large French retail chain, announced it had acquired long-time competitor Darty Limited (Darty) in an effort to counter competition from online retailers, particularly American e-commerce giant Amazon.com, Inc. Fnac's first offer had been declined, but Fnac and Darty negotiated and agreed on a new offer in November 2015. Unexpectedly, in March 2016, a South African-based retail holding company, Steinhoff International Holdings N.V., made a bigger offer. After an intense bidding war, Fnac successfully acquired Darty in April 2016 for 60 per cent over its first offer. The new company, Groupe Fnac Darty, faced several challenges. It needed to convince its stakeholders that the two emblematic competitors could create better value for them, despite their different identities and corporate cultures. How should the combined entity achieve the announced €130 million in annual synergies by 2019? And would the new entity survive the aggressive competition of e-commerce?