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In September 2016, German-based Bayer AG (Bayer) and U.S.-based Monsanto Company (Monsanto) agreed to merge entities to create a global leader in agriculture. The combined entity would benefit from Monsanto’s expertise in seeds and traits, and from Bayer’s wide range of crop protection products. Bayer would acquire Monsanto for $128 per share, a high 44 per cent premium in an all-cash transaction. There were issues with the deal, which included antitrust concerns, which could require subsequent divestments, and Monsanto’s brand image, owing to its involvement in controversial business operations. Given these issues, would Bayer’s diversification into agrochemicals by merging with Monsanto be able to create sufficient synergies and deliver economic benefits to shareholders, while meeting expectations from other stakeholders at different levels?

In September 2016, German-based Bayer AG (Bayer) and U.S.-based Monsanto Company (Monsanto) agreed to merge entities to create a global leader in agriculture. The combined entity would benefit from Monsanto's expertise in seeds and traits, and from Bayer's wide range of crop protection products. Bayer would acquire Monsanto for $128 per share, a high 44 per cent premium in an all-cash transaction. There were issues with the deal, which included antitrust concerns, which could require subsequent divestments, and Monsanto's brand image, owing to its involvement in controversial business operations. Given these issues, would Bayer's diversification into agrochemicals by merging with Monsanto be able to create sufficient synergies and deliver economic benefits to shareholders, while meeting expectations from other stakeholders at different levels?

In response to its shrinking domestic market, Japanese liquor company Suntory Holdings Limited acquired American liquor conglomerate Beam Inc. in 2014 to expand into the promising U.S. market. Although the acquisition price was high, executives of both companies were confident in the deal. However, as the new combined entity, Beam Suntory Inc., began the integration process, it encountered significant friction, particularly from its separate corporate cultures. By 2016, the new entity had not integrated to a satisfactory level. The high acquisition price had left the parent company with monumental debt, while the consolidated operations struggled to establish trust and efficiency. Had Suntory Holdings Limited made a wise decision in acquiring Beam Inc.? How should it cope with the monumental debt? How should the combined entity resolve conflicts and integrate to realize potential synergies?

In response to its shrinking domestic market, Japanese liquor company Suntory Holdings Limited acquired American liquor conglomerate Beam Inc. in 2014 to expand into the promising U.S. market. Although the acquisition price was high, executives of both companies were confident in the deal. However, as the new combined entity, Beam Suntory Inc., began the integration process, it encountered significant friction, particularly from its separate corporate cultures. By 2016, the new entity had not integrated to a satisfactory level. The high acquisition price had left the parent company with monumental debt, while the consolidated operations struggled to establish trust and efficiency. Had Suntory Holdings Limited made a wise decision in acquiring Beam Inc.? How should it cope with the monumental debt? How should the combined entity resolve conflicts and integrate to realize potential synergies?

For 30 years, Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda) partnered with Ford Motor Company (Ford), helping Ford in small-car engineering and lean manufacturing in exchange for finance and marketing know-how; however, this alliance was terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, Mazda entered into another long-term partnership to share technologies and cope with cost pressures—this time with Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota). According to its 2016 Structural Reform Plan, Mazda aimed to achieve a global sales volume of 1.65 million units, an operating income ratio of at least 7 per cent, an equity ratio of at least 45 per cent, and a dividend payout ratio of at least 20 per cent by 2019. Given the highly competitive domestic and global automotive markets, to what extent could the partnership with Toyota and the Structural Reform Plan allow Mazda to achieve these goals? Would Mazda need to make any changes to its competitive strategies to keep the company driving forward?

On April 1, 2016, fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) announced the departure of its creative director who had been responsible for successfully reviving the struggling YSL brand since 2012. Three days after this surprising departure, the company announced that its next creative director would be a relatively inexperienced, 36-year-old designer. After decades of leadership turmoil and financial instability at YSL, the incoming creative director was facing increasing pressure from stakeholders to build off the success that his predecessor had achieved. The global luxury fashion industry had become increasingly competitive, with multiple brands competing for the industry’s estimated value of €265 billion in 2017. Had YSL made the right decision in selecting this young director? To help YSL remain one of the top brands in the fashion industry, should the new director implement a strategy that builds upon the successful foundation created by his predecessor, or should he develop new strategies?

On April 1, 2016, fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) announced the departure of its creative director who had been responsible for successfully reviving the struggling YSL brand since 2012. Three days after this surprising departure, the company announced that its next creative director would be a relatively inexperienced, 36-year-old designer. After decades of leadership turmoil and financial instability at YSL, the incoming creative director was facing increasing pressure from stakeholders to build off the success that his predecessor had achieved. The global luxury fashion industry had become increasingly competitive, with multiple brands competing for the industry's estimated value of €265 billion in 2017. Had YSL made the right decision in selecting this young director? To help YSL remain one of the top brands in the fashion industry, should the new director implement a strategy that builds upon the successful foundation created by his predecessor, or should he develop new strategies?

For 30 years, Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda) partnered with Ford Motor Company (Ford), helping Ford in small-car engineering and lean manufacturing in exchange for finance and marketing know-how; however, this alliance was terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, Mazda entered into another long-term partnership to share technologies and cope with cost pressures-this time with Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota). According to its 2016 Structural Reform Plan, Mazda aimed to achieve a global sales volume of 1.65 million units, an operating income ratio of at least 7 per cent, an equity ratio of at least 45 per cent, and a dividend payout ratio of at least 20 per cent by 2019. Given the highly competitive domestic and global automotive markets, to what extent could the partnership with Toyota and the Structural Reform Plan allow Mazda to achieve these goals? Would Mazda need to make any changes to its competitive strategies to keep the company driving forward?

In December 2016, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), the largest online retailer, entered the offline retailing industry by launching its first Amazon Go store in Seattle. Previously, the company had entered the food, diaper, and housekeeping product manufacturing industries with its Amazon Elements brand. The company had not been profitable until 2001 and was still facing some financial difficulties, but it was named the fourth most valuable public company in the United States in 2016. In 2015, it surpassed Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart) as the most valuable online retailer in the country. Given its current competitive advantages in the online retail business, could Amazon reproduce this success in offline markets? Did Amazon’s diversification into offline retailing make sense considering its existing resources and capabilities, the presence of established traditional retailers such as Walmart, and a market trend that was increasingly moving toward online stores?

In December 2016, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), the largest online retailer, entered the offline retailing industry by launching its first Amazon Go store in Seattle. Previously, the company had entered the food, diaper, and housekeeping product manufacturing industries with its Amazon Elements brand. The company had not been profitable until 2001 and was still facing some financial difficulties, but it was named the fourth most valuable public company in the United States in 2016. In 2015, it surpassed Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart) as the most valuable online retailer in the country. Given its current competitive advantages in the online retail business, could Amazon reproduce this success in offline markets? Did Amazon's diversification into offline retailing make sense considering its existing resources and capabilities, the presence of established traditional retailers such as Walmart, and a market trend that was increasingly moving toward online stores?

Ferrero Group (Ferrero) operated in the chocolate confectionery industry. The industry was facing challenges with changes in consumer needs, and price volatility and scarcity of raw ingredients. To achieve its ambitious economic goals in this environment, Ferrero integrated various sustainability initiatives in its supply chain and grew the company through vertical and horizontal integration. Advocating a vision of “sharing values to create value,” the company set sustainability goals for 2020, which included controlling and being able to trace the supply of raw ingredients. Could Ferrero maintain its leading position in the industry and achieve its sustainability goals? To what extent could the sustainability goals strengthen the company’s competitive position and move it toward achieving its financial goals?

Ferrero Group (Ferrero) operated in the chocolate confectionery industry. The industry was facing challenges with changes in consumer needs, and price volatility and scarcity of raw ingredients. To achieve its ambitious economic goals in this environment, Ferrero integrated various sustainability initiatives in its supply chain and grew the company through vertical and horizontal integration. Advocating a vision of "sharing values to create value," the company set sustainability goals for 2020, which included controlling and being able to trace the supply of raw ingredients. Could Ferrero maintain its leading position in the industry and achieve its sustainability goals? To what extent could the sustainability goals strengthen the company's competitive position and move it toward achieving its financial goals?

In September 2013, Tokyo Electron Limited announced a merger with Applied Materials Inc. The deal would place the new entity in the leader position in the highly consolidated global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, which counted Intel Corporation and Samsung Group as major customers. Due to antitrust issues, the deal was eventually cancelled. Shortly after, in October 2015, Lam Research Corporation announced a merger with KLA-Tencor Corporation. If this deal was accepted, the market would be led by three companies-Applied Materials Inc., ASML Holding, and Lam/KLA-Tencor-while Tokyo Electron would be marginalized. Given the tremendous cost pressures from the consolidated competitors and powerful customers, should Tokyo Electron initiate another merger to consolidate its position? Were there other effective competitive options? What could it learn from its failed merger with Applied Materials Inc.?

In September 2013, Tokyo Electron Limited announced a merger with Applied Materials Inc. The deal would place the new entity in the leader position in the highly consolidated global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, which counted Intel Corporation and Samsung Group as major customers. Due to antitrust issues, the deal was eventually cancelled. Shortly after, in October 2015, Lam Research Corporation announced a merger with KLA-Tencor Corporation. If this deal was accepted, the market would be led by three companies—Applied Materials Inc., ASML Holding, and Lam/KLA-Tencor—while Tokyo Electron would be marginalized. Given the tremendous cost pressures from the consolidated competitors and powerful customers, should Tokyo Electron initiate another merger to consolidate its position? Were there other effective competitive options? What could it learn from its failed merger with Applied Materials Inc.?

In 2016, Chinese telecommunications equipment firm Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei) aspired to be the world's top smartphone manufacturer. The company had identified German camera company Leica Camera AG (Leica) as a long-term partner to reinvent Huawei's smartphone photography to beat an influx of domestic rivals and the market leaders, Apple and Samsung. The flagship dual camera smartphone that was co-engineered by Huawei and Leica, the P9, contained a camera module that was actually made by a Chinese manufacturer, Sunny Optical Technology Co., under Leica's authorization. As a result, Huawei's motives for the partnership with Leica were criticized as a quick fix to beat Apple in the dual camera market and repair negative publicity the company had suffered earlier. Was the long-term alliance really the best solution for both Huawei and Leica? Was it the right alliance in an emerging market?

In 2016, Chinese telecommunications equipment firm Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei) aspired to be the world’s top smartphone manufacturer. The company had identified German camera company Leica Camera AG (Leica) as a long-term partner to reinvent Huawei’s smartphone photography to beat an influx of domestic rivals and the market leaders, Apple and Samsung. The flagship dual camera smartphone that was co-engineered by Huawei and Leica, the P9, contained a camera module that was actually made by a Chinese manufacturer, Sunny Optical Technology Co., under Leica’s authorization. As a result, Huawei’s motives for the partnership with Leica were criticized as a quick fix to beat Apple in the dual camera market and repair negative publicity the company had suffered earlier. Was the long-term alliance really the best solution for both Huawei and Leica? Was it the right alliance in an emerging market?

Brooks Sports, Inc. (Brooks) strove to inspire and promote an active lifestyle through its innovative gear, enabling its customers to run longer, farther, and faster. The shoe company had endured a number of growths and declines in its 100 years of operations. Nearly bankrupt by 2000 because of its attempt to compete with diversified athletic brands, Brooks had finally found a strategy to compete in the sports market. Operating as an independent subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Brooks focused entirely on the niche running market, transforming into a brand that generated over $500 million in 2014. Now Brooks had set its sights on becoming a $1 billion brand by 2020. In the past, few companies had focused on the small but growing running industry; however, with the running market becoming increasingly competitive, would Brooks's runner-focused strategy carry the company to its $1 billion goal by 2020, or would it be forced to shift back to a diversified approach as the running market became more crowded?

Brooks Sports, Inc. (Brooks) strove to inspire and promote an active lifestyle through its innovative gear, enabling its customers to run longer, farther, and faster. The shoe company had endured a number of growths and declines in its 100 years of operations. Nearly bankrupt by 2000 because of its attempt to compete with diversified athletic brands, Brooks had finally found a strategy to compete in the sports market. Operating as an independent subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Brooks focused entirely on the niche running market, transforming into a brand that generated over $500 million in 2014. Now Brooks had set its sights on becoming a $1 billion brand by 2020. In the past, few companies had focused on the small but growing running industry; however, with the running market becoming increasingly competitive, would Brooks’s runner-focused strategy carry the company to its $1 billion goal by 2020, or would it be forced to shift back to a diversified approach as the running market became more crowded?

Facing a decline in the company's core camera business as a result of the aggressive entry of smartphones, Canon identified the network security industry as a potential growth market, with expected revenues of US$23 billion by 2020. Canon opted to pursue this kind of growth potential outside its core competency by acquiring Milestone Systems in 2014 and Axis Communications in 2015. Canon paid a 50-per-cent premium to acquire Axis in a cash-only offer, while choosing to allow its two acquired companies to continue operating as independent entities. Should Canon have instead created a strategic alliance with these two companies? Would these acquisitions allow Canon to achieve synergies and secure its goal of $1 billion in sales from the network securities market by 2020?

Facing a decline in the company’s core camera business as a result of the aggressive entry of smartphones, Canon identified the network security industry as a potential growth market, with expected revenues of US$23 billion by 2020. Canon opted to pursue this kind of growth potential outside its core competency by acquiring Milestone Systems in 2014 and Axis Communications in 2015. Canon paid a 50-per-cent premium to acquire Axis in a cash-only offer, while choosing to allow its two acquired companies to continue operating as independent entities. Should Canon have instead created a strategic alliance with these two companies? Would these acquisitions allow Canon to achieve synergies and secure its goal of $1 billion in sales from the network securities market by 2020?