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For the board of The We Company-better known as WeWork-August 14, 2019 promised to be a pivotal day. It was then that WeWork's IPO prospectus, known as an S-1 filing, would be made public, giving potential investors, the media, and the general public a window into the company's inner workings. Under U.S. securities laws, a company planning to offer new securities for sale to the public was required to file a Form S-1, or registration statement, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whose mandate was to evaluate companies' compliance with SEC disclosure rules, not the quality of the investment. In anticipation of that day, WeWork's directors had an opportunity to review the S-1-as presented in a series of some two dozen excerpts from the S-1 in the exhibits to the case-and offer the management team any final comments and suggestions for changes.

In 2018, China was the biggest market for Internet services in the world. Along with the country's huge market size, its comparatively low penetration made it an immensely attractive market for search engine services. To capture this market, Google was planning to re-enter the Chinese market—after leaving in 2010—with a censored search engine codenamed “Dragonfly.” The move was opposed by human rights activists, Google’s own employees, and the U.S. government. Google had the opportunity to improve its share in the global search-engine segment if it could somehow tap into the vast Chinese market. But the tight control over Internet services by the Chinese government on one hand, and the protests by various interest groups on the other, had put Google in a tight spot. Google had to decide if it should go ahead with the plan to offer Dragonfly in China. Should Google instead explore other market and non-market strategies to re-enter the Chinese market?

In 2014, the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) had just taken over operations of the Delhi Airport Metro (DAM), which connected the Indira Gandhi International Airport to the New Delhi railway station. However, high capital expenditures, excess operational expenditures, and low ridership meant that the concessionaire, which had been operating since 2011 on a public–private partnership model, was continuously reporting losses and therefore decided to quit the project in June 2013. When project operations were transferred to the DMRC, the metro’s overall capacity utilization was a very low 5 per cent and the line had few riders and operational losses. The DMRC’s director of operations had the challenging task of making the DAM operationally viable. There were several available options. Should he consider rationalizing the fares; increasing ridership by connecting the Delhi Metro Airport Express Line to passenger hubs; improving the amenities or attractions at the metro stations; or offering hassle-free travel for different groups of customers?

This case is designed to support a lively discussion about the relative merits of shareholder vs. stakeholder perspectives in the context of a company that provides a vital public service that has important environmental implications. The 2007 purchase of TXU, the largest utility in Texas, was the largest leveraged buyout in history. Yet, within seven years TXU was bankrupt. TXU (A) examines the spectacular turnaround of TXU from 2004 through 2007, in which shareholders received a tenfold increase in the share price and the CEO was rewarded with nearly $280 million in compensation in four years. But other stakeholders objected to the company's strategy of aggressive price increases and building new coal-fired power plants. Amidst growing pressure from regulators, elected officials, and consumer groups the board decided to sell the company to the private equity firms KKR and TPG. TXU (B) covers the period after the transaction and the reasons for the buy out's failure, including its enormous financial leverage and a "one-way bet" on natural gas prices that exceeded the exposure of any of the world's largest integrated energy companies.

In July 2017, the government of India implemented goods and services tax (GST), which brought uniformity in the tax rates on all types of biscuits. Compared to the pre-GST regime, the uniform tax rate resulted in a higher tax rate on mass-market biscuits and a lower tax rate on premium biscuits. Parle-G, the most popular brand of Parle Products Private Limited (Parle), fell into the mass-market biscuit category. The Parle-G brand had 75 to 80 per cent market share in the mass-market biscuit category, and it contributed nearly 33 per cent of Parle’s total revenue. The brand was sold at a very low price point and was highly price sensitive. To mitigate the tax rate increase, one option was to raise Parle-G prices; however, any price increase or change in package size for a product in the highly price-sensitive category could reduce company revenue. Therefore, new business strategies were needed under the new tax regime and amid the country’s overall changing business and economic scenario so that Parle’s margins and leading position were retained.

Unlike any other European airline, Ryanair DAC had long experienced impressive growth and performance thanks to its well-designed and ruthlessly executed low-cost carrier business model. However, the limits of growth did begin to appear, at which time the company adjusted its business model with an increased emphasis on customer orientation. As a result, cracks in the business model appeared and labour issues came to the fore. While the media and industry analysts were focused on these challenges, Ryanair was undergoing a quiet digital revolution, shifting the airline’s business model toward a technology-based travel platform. With the problems in the business model and a shifting business strategy, could Ryanair achieve the ambitious growth targets it set for 2024?

In 2012, Mountain Equipment Co-op, a members-only Canadian consumers’ co-operative that sold outdoor recreational gear and clothing, underwent a major revamp of its strategic focus, which involved a change of its logo. The shift was away from the co-operative's core, outdoors-focused customer base to a wider target group that included urban and rural customers who were new to outdoor sports. The change was significant and the co-operative realized that many of its core customers—all of whom were shareholders—were upset by the shift in strategy and logo change. Mountain Equipment Co-op needed a communications plan to ease the transition.

Norlha Textiles was a yak wool enterprise located on the Tibetan Plateau in China. Founded in 2007, the company designed and produced yak wool textiles made by Tibetan nomads and sold globally to customers that included such luxury brands as Hermès, Louis Vuitton, and Yves Saint Laurent. In 2015, the company employed 120 local people, enabling them to adapt to the modern world while preserving their local traditions. Also in 2015, the local government invited the company to expand its model to another nomadic community on the Tibetan Plateau. Although this seemed to be a good opportunity to grow the company’s influence, the chief executive officer hesitated, reflecting on the pros and cons. Was such a partnership the right opportunity to grow the company?

Mattelsa was an urban fashion manufacturer and retailer based in Medellín, Colombia. With a disruptive business model - a warehouse with locked doors, no sign, no shop window, no mannequins, and no traditional advertising - Mattelsa had achieved remarkable results in terms of growth and profitability compared to others in the fashion industry. The company's purpose ("We are a community devoted to enjoying and respecting life; our hobby is to make the best clothes in the world") and philosophy (as expressed in the five pillars: food, sports, leisure, socializing, and knowledge) reflected Mattelsa's commitment to personal well-being and environmental responsibility. The case shows how Mattelsa's values, philosophy, and pillars influenced its business decisions and day-to-day activities, while its management practices challenged industry paradigms and best practices. Students will analyze an unconventional business model, evaluating its sustainability and estimating how transferable it would be to other organizations or even industries. The case also enables students to explore the concept of corporate social responsibility, to identify the key elements of conscious capitalism, and to consider the challenges associated with its implementation. Although the company discussed is Colombian, the themes and issues are universal.

In June 2018, the wedding dress industry in Suzhou, China, was confronted with "the harshest clampdown," which required all unqualified wedding dress factories to move out within one week. The initiative from the local government had been expected, although its speed and force were surprising to the founder and chief executive officer of Suzhou Beibao E-Commerce Co. Ltd. (Babyonline). Established in 2012 and engaged in cross-border e-commerce of wedding dresses, Babyonline was unlikely to be affected by the clampdown. However, changes across the wedding dress industry as a result of the initiative had started the founder thinking about issues in the management of his company. At the end of 2015, Babyonline had moved to a make-to-stock system, which lowered costs but seemed to have raised inventory issues. Particularly in recent times, selective selling by some sales representatives had led to structural inventory problems. The founder wondered how he should resolve the inventory issue.

A social entrepreneur running a business in Khayelitsha, near Cape Town, South Africa, made and distributed healthy bread-based products for consumers in a poor community through his social enterprise, the Spinach King. His aim was to improve consumers’ eating habits and help them improve their health. In early 2014, after facing and overcoming many difficulties related to starting this social enterprise start-up in a resource-constrained context, this entrepreneur had a successful business. The business model had evolved over time, and while it was still small in scale, the owner was convinced that it was ready to scale. He needed to determine what business model would be most appropriate going forward and how he could implement it.

MoviePass provided a subscription-based service that allowed its users to see films in theatres for a monthly fee. The company rose to stardom between 2016 and 2017, but in mid-2018, it suffered crushing financial losses when operating costs increased and ancillary revenues were too slow to materialize. The company’s subscription base shrank sharply following the introduction of restrictions on its service and an announcement of a price increase. Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. (H&M), MoviePass’s parent company, would be de-listed if its stock price remained below the threshold stipulated by the NASDAQ Composite Index (i.e., US$1 per share). The chief executive officer of MoviePass and its management team had to keep the company afloat while trying to regain MoviePass’s lost momentum. How could they revitalize the once-promising upstart and prevent H&M from being de-listed?

In 1993, when the Chinese economy was in a major recession, Beijing’s Greatwall Enterprise Institute was founded by six consultants. The company eventually found its niche providing strategic and operational consulting to the governmental agencies (administrative committees) that managed science and technology parks. These agencies had witnessed explosive growth in China since the early 1990s. In 2019, with more than 350 consultants, headquarters in Beijing, 12 branch offices throughout China, and an annual revenue greater than ¥200 million (US$30 million), Greatwall Enterprise Institute faced new threats and opportunities: its success with so many government administrative committees meant that there was little room for it to grow in this area. The company wondered if it should expand to other local governments and their agencies in China. Or would business firm clients and the international market offer new opportunities?

Novartis' Genesis Labs program, launched in 2016 as part of Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research (NIBR), hosted pitch competitions where teams of NIBR scientists proposed ideas to explore that aimed to revolutionize drug discovery. The goal was to break down barriers between functions and regions that slow innovation. After advancing to the pitch stage, a panel selected a handful of winning proposals. Winning teams left their roles for 18 months and received the resources and laboratory space to pursue their ideas. By 2018, two cohorts of winners had been selected-one almost at the end of its 18-month tenure and the other soon to begin. Genesis Labs had already overcome several hurdles-for example, scientists at first worried that stepping out of their ordinary role or pitching ideas that were not chosen could end their careers at Novartis. Though the Genesis Labs program ultimately succeeded in attracting many candidates, the company wondered how to further refine it to foster greater agility in Novartis R&D. Should they expand the call for entries? Did it encourage true shoot-the-moon ideas? How often should the program run, and how disruptive should it be to existing teams? What was the best way to reintegrate scientists to prior roles after their 18-month stint as part of Genesis Labs was over? Finally, could such contests be adapted and rolled out in other functions in the organization?

GLAMI was launched in October 2013 in the Czech Republic as a fashion search engine with a focus on providing consumers with an accessible platform. It operated a neatly organized online fashion catalogue that consisted of combined products from fashion e-shops that functioned throughout various countries. Through its five years of existence, GLAMI had expanded throughout Europe and Asia. Fashion retailers and e-shops partnered with GLAMI as free or priority members, and had their items placed throughout GLAMI’s website. The company’s business model functioned through a cost-per-click (CPC) model, where GLAMI would charge priority members according to how much they were willing to pay per click. In August 2018, due to its success and the increasing size of the fashion industry and the online retail space, GLAMI was looking to expand beyond its current boundaries to a high-growth area—Latin America. However, considering the vast differences among Latin American countries, GLAMI was finding it difficult to narrow down the list of countries in which to explore international expansion.

In 2015, a Shanghai businessman contacted the director of ObiSoft, an American software company, to request becoming the company’s partner in China. Over the next two years, they proceeded to develop the partnership and grow ObiSoft's business in China. The Shanghai businessman became ObiSoft’s partner and master reseller in China. In 2018, the Shanghai businessman proposed moving the company's research and development on software to China, and ObiSoft scheduled an August 2018 board meeting to discuss this issue. What should ObiSoft’s board decide regarding the company’s software development and future in China?

WittyFeed, an emerging digital content and technology company, was launched in September 2014 by three friends in the small Indian town of Indore. Within four years, the company had become one of the world’s largest creators and distributors of content that was followed and circulated online. In the process of scaling up and becoming larger, WittyFeed’s founders faced many challenges in areas like technology, distribution, and talent. These internal and external market issues interacted in a constantly changing environment. In January 2018, the founders were in the process of finding strategic solutions that would help their company double its existing number of monthly impressions to achieve 1 billion touchpoints, while becoming independent of its dominant revenue source, Facebook. What strategies could the founders deploy to reach this target?