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CircusTrix Trampoline Parks (CircusTrix) was started in San Francisco, California, in 2011 after the founder first experienced an indoor trampoline park. Less than five years later, the business had grown to more than 28 facilities worldwide, grossing US$24.5 million in 2014 alone. The company had originally expanded internationally to maintain its first-mover status in the emerging extreme recreation industry, but was now facing a problem that could derail the company's international growth for years to come. A customer in the brand new CircusTrix park in Edinburgh, Scotland, had injured himself and blamed CircusTrix. As a result, city officials had shut down the facility, with another park scheduled to open in just over two weeks in Glasgow. The public relations issue was threatening to cost the founder not only his brand new operations in the United Kingdom, but likely also the additional upcoming locations in Germany, France, and Holland.

The founder of a digital media firm had to decide whether to list or to sell his company, PacificLink iMedia (PacificLink) in 2015. The founder had fielded more than 20 offers from various companies to acquire PacificLink since 2007–2008. He rejected all these past offers, because he was working to position the company to list on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. However, in 2015, the founder received an offer from Accenture that appealed to him because PacificLink was finally in a position to satisfy all listing requirements for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. He knew that he must consider many criteria in making his critical decision to sell or list PacificLink. See also the first and second cases in the three-part series, 9B00M024 and 9B09M023.

In April 2016, the owner of Kreative Works, a small-scale furniture manufacturer in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India, decided to expand his company’s product line in response to increased market competition and a shift in consumers’ buying patterns and preferences. The intent was to extend the company’s market reach from its traditional target of educational institutes and offices to a consumer market by marketing a premium lounge chair and a family of dining chairs. The owner also wanted to expand the market geographically. Kreative Works did not have the capacity to open multiple retail outlets. Given these circumstances, should the company market its new product line in a single retail outlet or through an exclusive dealer or distributor (a centralized channel structure), or by distributing its products through multiple distributors or retailers (a decentralized channel structure)?

CircusTrix Trampoline Parks (CircusTrix) was started in San Francisco, California, in 2011 after the founder first experienced an indoor trampoline park. Less than five years later, the business had grown to more than 28 facilities worldwide, grossing US$24.5 million in 2014 alone. The company had originally expanded internationally to maintain its first-mover status in the emerging extreme recreation industry, but was now facing a problem that could derail the company’s international growth for years to come. A customer in the brand new CircusTrix park in Edinburgh, Scotland, had injured himself and blamed CircusTrix. As a result, city officials had shut down the facility, with another park scheduled to open in just over two weeks in Glasgow. The public relations issue was threatening to cost the founder not only his brand new operations in the United Kingdom, but likely also the additional upcoming locations in Germany, France, and Holland.

In 2012, a former crown attorney for Canada’s Department of Justice started Timeless Herbal Care, a company that was intended to capitalize on Jamaica’s deregulation of marijuana for medical purposes. The entrepreneur and his family relied on their ties to Jamaica and his legal expertise to create a legislative framework for Jamaica’s medical marijuana industry to meet international standards. Concurrently, Canada was readying legislation to allow qualified individuals to purchase and use medical marijuana. As one of about a dozen Health Canada-authorized licensed producers of the product, the new venture was entering uncharted space where legal and business issues would likely emerge within the next few years. The entrepreneur needed a strategy to combat the misconceptions about the use of marijuana for medical purposes and concerns regarding the importation of Jamaican marijuana product into Canada.

The Canadian brand manager of Zelboraf had to decide how to introduce and price Zelboraf in the Canadian market. Zelboraf was a breakthrough discovery in treatment for melanoma cancer patients. Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche) began developing Zelboraf in 2005. During the clinical trials, the drug yielded such positive results in targeting late-stage (metastatic) melanoma cancer that Roche ended clinical trials early in order to expedite FDA approval and market launch. A competitor was developing a drug—Dabrafenib—that targeted the same segment of patients with B-RAF genes. It was unclear if this specific market segment could support two similar products. It was also unclear whether Dabrafenib’s Canadian market launch would affect the likelihood that Zelboraf got on the approved drug list to secure government reimbursement. The brand manager and her team also needed to determine the right price point for Zelboraf. Roche had to set a price that ensured profitability, but did not compromise Zelboraf’s competitive position.

In June 2001, after winning the UK general elections by a landslide, which gave him a second term, Tony Blair invited Michael Barber (case protagonist) to establish and lead the Prime Minister Delivery Unit (PMDU): a small, dedicated performance management structure charged with driving improvements of a few, well-specified service delivery outcomes. Having become keenly aware of the chasm between policy ideas and outcomes on the ground during his first term, Blair wanted to strengthen the British government's ability to deliver results that mattered to citizens. This case provides background on the delivery approach, developed by Barber and his team, designed to improve government performance. It tracks Barber's experience as the Head of the PMDU during Blair's second mandate. The case focuses on the processes involved in establishing foundations, planning, implementing and monitoring delivery, as well as the outcomes achieved during the PMDU's first four years of operation. The goal of reducing accident and emergency wait times in the National Health System is investigated as an exemplar of how the delivery approach worked in practice. This case is designed to enable discussions on the challenges of implementing an innovative performance management system in the public sector, designed to achieve demonstrable results to citizens and embed a cultural change in government.

Audi has taken the lead in sales and dominated the luxury car market at the beginning of its entry in China. During the second stage (2001-2011), the localization of true Audi standard has experienced a shallow-to-deep and easy-to-difficult process. Moreover, FAW-Volkswagen reforms the marketing channel and establishes independent sales network for Audi A6 to start top-grade brand strategy of Audi. This is also the period that a large number of international competitors began to enter and compete in Chinese markets. To outperform competitors, Audi adopted such-called "localization of the whole value chain" strategy, i.e., realizing localization in product R&D, procurement, production, marketing and other links. The strategy allowed the quality to be more stable and the cost to be reduced effectively. With this strategy, by 2012, Audi became the most popular car brand, and its sales volume grew at the speed of 100,000 vehicles per year. Audi defines the concept and image of Chinese "luxury car" in a real sense and an all-around manner.

Audi is one of Germany's great automobile manufacturers that have the longest history. Its principle of adhering to high-tech level, high-quality standards and high-powered criteria has led the Audi brand to becoming the landmark among the most notable luxury cars. Audi's history in China can be traced back to 1988, when FAW and Audi signed the "Technology Transfer License Contract on the Production of Audi FAW". In 1991, FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as FAW-Volkswagen) was founded. With 25 years of development, FAW-Volkswagen has set up three bases in the cities of Changchun, Chengdu and Foshan, which are respectively located in the Northeast, Southwest and South of China, as well as seven large-scale plants that are specialized in production. Audi is the first luxury car brand stepping into the Chinese market. Over the past 30 years, it has made remarkable achievements. The FAW-Volkswagen Audi "trilogy" case has described Audi's development history in China, and the situation as well as the strategies of FAW-Volkswagen Audi during three stages. The first stage (1987-2000) of development for FAW-Volkswagen Audi in China has laid a foundation for its leading position among luxury car brands. The case describes the founding of joint ventures, the conflicts among partners, and the strategies adopted to initiate and lead Chinese luxury car industry, all of which are very typical for most foreign entrants into Chinese markets during the beginning of China's 'opening up'.

In 2015, Britannia Industries — India’s most recognized biscuit brand — had overtaken Parle as the market leader in the biscuit (cookie) category and faced stiff competition from Parle, ITC’s Sunfeast, and many regional competitors. Britannia had to devise a strategy that would allow it to further consolidate its leadership position without losing market share; increasing the price alone was not an option in this highly competitive market. What could Britannia do to remain India’s number-one biscuit maker? How could it stay ahead of its rivals in the area of product innovation? In a market swamped with near-identical product packaging, it had to devise a strategy that would help it avoid an identity crisis and make it the consumer’s first choice. The company’s senior management needed to chart a clear roadmap for the future.

The founder of a digital media firm had to decide whether to list or to sell his company, PacificLink iMedia (PacificLink) in 2015. The founder had fielded more than 20 offers from various companies to acquire PacificLink since 2007-2008. He rejected all these past offers, because he was working to position the company to list on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. However, in 2015, the founder received an offer from Accenture that appealed to him because PacificLink was finally in a position to satisfy all listing requirements for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. He knew that he must consider many criteria in making his critical decision to sell or list PacificLink. See also the first and second cases in the three-part series.

On 2012, Gary Taubes lunched the Nutrition Science initiative (NuSI), a not for profit organization aiming to question the mainstream scientific paradigm regarding obesity and dietary recommendations. This case provides a brief scientific background on obesity and its causes, comorbidities and the economic cost of this epidemic. It then discusses the two main hypotheses of diet, and the formation of NuSI. Finally, it describes the unique challenges and hurdles NuSI has faced both with funding and with impacting the mainstream scientific community. Could this NGO model of funding the "right" clinical trials be successful? Could it be duplicated across other scientific areas? What can be learned from NuSI's experience? And what is the roadmap for NuSI going forward?

Since the flood of child migrants from Central America burst upon the southern United States in the summer of 2014-a vast rise in arrivals dubbed "the Surge"-Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) had been facing overwhelming demand for its legal services. Wendy Young, KIND's president, explained that the organization's primary mission was to ensure that no child appears alone in immigration court, but KIND also wanted to provide leadership, research, and advocacy to protect these "children on the move" from laws and practices that threatened their fundamental human rights. Ms. Young was facing a critical juncture in the organizational life of KIND: where and how should it focus its resources for greatest effectiveness in protecting child migrants? What limits must the organization set on its activities when facing an almost unlimited need for legal, social, health, and educational support of these vulnerable children?

When it comes to selecting a new CEO, judgment really matters. The choice may devastate a company or create enormous value. In his work advising companies, Charan has observed that some board members are especially great at succession decisions. In this article he describes how they go about picking the right candidate. Directors who excel at selection zero in on the two or three distinct capabilities that a CEO will need to thrive at the firm in question. (Charan calls this the "pivot" because the succession decision turns on it.) For example, when IBM was conducting a CEO search in 1993, many thought it should hire a technologist, but two directors saw that what the company really needed was an executive with business acumen, a customer orientation, and execution skills. At their urging, the board brought in Lou Gerstner, who quickly turned IBM's $8 billion loss into a $3 billion profit. Astute directors also keep an open mind about where the best candidate will come from; they shed assumptions about insiders and outsiders and may even consider a leader a few levels below the CEO. They go deep to understand which person is the best fit with the pivot, doing their own due diligence. Finally, they allow for the imperfections in the chosen candidate, figuring out which gaps can be filled by other executives or corrected with coaching.

A startling percentage of new CEOs fail within their first 18 months, according to many estimates--whether they come from outside or are promoted from within. Sometimes the new leader makes poor strategic moves, and sometimes the board makes an imperfect choice, overestimating a candidate's abilities or hiring someone whose skill set doesn't fit the context. But when succession fails, the responsibility is almost always shared. New leaders may be unable to read the political situation clearly or achieve the cultural changes their strategic and operational agendas require. Boards and key executives may not grasp the complex nature of CEO succession or consider the likely political and cultural challenges the new leader will face. A CEO transition is not the same as onboarding, which is a formal, short-term, agenda-driven orientation program of briefings and meetings. It is a longer process of interactions both formal and informal, planned and impromptu; it should begin when the board's choice accepts the position and last for months after he or she arrives. The outgoing CEO, the chief human resources officer, and the board all have key roles to play in the process, writes the author, who describes best practices for each. The article includes an interview with Mark Thompson, CEO of The New York Times Company, about his own succession process in 2012.

At least half of all employees have quit a job at some point because of their supervisor. People complain of bosses who bully them, micromanage, steal credit, hoard information, and otherwise make them unhappy--which threatens their productivity and the organization's success. But don't despair if you don't get along with your boss. This article lays out steps you can take to improve the situation: (1) Practice empathy. Behavioral research and neuroscience suggest that being mindful of the pressures on your boss and responding empathetically can trigger reciprocal support. (2) Examine your role. Consider how you might be contributing to a negative dynamic, and seek training or advice to help you change your behavior. (3) Talk to your boss. Start by asking how you can improve your performance and the relationship. If that isn't fruitful, launch a frank conversation about the dysfunction in your interactions. (4) Go to HR. As a last resort--and only if you have evidence to show that your boss is unfit--file a formal complaint. (5) Leave. If you see no potential for change, it's probably time to start job hunting.

One of the founding members of the Beach Boys discusses innovation, collaboration, and overcoming obstacles ranging from stage fright to mental illness.

Most leaders recognize that in today's innovation-obsessed economy, they need to look beyond their own walls and collaborate externally with other organizations in their ecosystem to create new products and solutions. While the need for collaboration has been well-documented in the business-to-consumer (B2C) context, it is less so in the business-to-business (B2B) space. The authors show that, when done right, B2B collaborative innovation can generate benefits in four distinct areas, including decreased risk and increased trust. Based on their work with leading companies like BASF, Daimler and VentureMed, they describe the four 'traps' that collaborators face, and how to surmount them.

When researchers tracked the performance of 444 celebrated U.S. CEOs, they discovered that companies run by MBAs underperformed the rest. The reason? The MBAs were more likely to engage in risky strategies. And while those strategies led to temporary gains, which increased the CEOs' compensation, they hurt the companies in the long run.