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Netflix, a subscription-based movie and television show rental service, offered content to subscribers either via DVDs delivered by mail, or through Internet-based streaming. After splitting the two services, the company lost subscribers, and its stock price plummeted. Most observers were skeptical that Netflix could maintain its profit margins, given the increased cost of acquiring streamable content. However, Netflix not only reduced its cost per user but also increased its subscriber growth both in the United States and internationally. Were these moves sufficient to deliver the growth needed to support its rising stock price? Netflix also faced increased streaming costs because it used disproportionately more bandwidth than other streaming companies. Would these costs mean that the Netflix business model was no longer viable? This is a follow-up case to "Netflix," which describes the company's innovative business model of delivering DVDs by mail, and "Netflix Inc.: The Second Act-Moving into Streaming," which describes the after-effects of the dual-subscription model.

Through an in-depth case study of Cisco Systems, this Executive Digest finds that companies face two broad challenges when transitioning to the agile product development model. The first is identifying and helping business units and engineering teams adopt this method; the second is developing new management practices that are compatible with and can sustain the agile development practices. Although extant literature has conducted many analyses on these two challenges, there still exist gaps in the research of the agile development method. Herein, we explore how Cisco Systems addressed these two challenges followed by a discussion of the broad implications of adopting the agile development method. This research deepens our understanding of how to adopt and lead the agile development process.

The sharing economy, a rising pattern in consumption behavior that is essentially based on accessing and reusing products to utilize idle capacity, presents both tremendous possibilities and significant threats for emerging as well as incumbent businesses. As of today, it is unclear whether this economy is merely another ephemeral trend in consumption or whether we are experiencing a real shift in how goods are accessed, distributed, and used. Furthermore, little is known about how existing business models are affected by the sharing economy. These two issues represent the central motivation for the development of this article. Consequently, an examination of why the sharing economy has the potential to produce a long-term transformation in consumption behavior is followed by a consideration of how this change might affect companies' business models. Based on a renowned business model framework and a variety of current illustrative examples, we propose central questions managers have to ask themselves in order to be prepared to respond to changes brought about by this new economic trend.

Enterprise risk management (ERM) began to take root in the late 1990s and has since become generally recognized as an expectation of good management and corporate governance. However, as evidenced by surveys and research, many companies still struggle with ERM implementation. This article explores the challenges companies face when implementing ERM and offers solutions for firms struggling with the concepts and execution. We draw upon Hydro One's experience in achieving ERM maturity as a best practice case study. The company's ERM methods have been researched and documented extensively. With over 15 years of ERM success, Hydro One is an excellent organization to benchmark for ERM best practices.

This article presents methods to help companies build processes that emphasize consumer ethnography, customer ethnography, and commercialization planning as components for innovation within mature, well-established consumer or industrial markets. It is written for multifunctional innovation teams and senior management toward increasing the success rates of new product innovations.

In late 2010,the director general of the Industrial Sectors Directorate at Environment Canada, was reviewing a draft work plan for the Air Quality Management System (AQMS), a regulatory project to deal with Canada’s transboundary air pollution problems. Though some of the key elements of AQMS were in place and director general had the support of co-chairs from Alberta and Ontario, she had to develop a series of briefings on her strategy before the end of 2010 so that she could gain approval from her deputy minister and minister.

In 2016, the founder and chief executive officer of West Paw Design (WPD) was faced with a growth dilemma: how could he align WPD’s socially responsible ethos with his desire to expand business activities in the growing pet products market? Based in Bozeman, Montana, WPD developed, manufactured, and distributed pet products. The company was a certified “B Corporation,” meaning its social and environmental credentials had been verified by an external organization, B Lab. The founder had to consider his options very carefully, because some of them could undermine or negate WPD’s growth objectives, as well as its cherished B Corporation principles.

In 2013, the chief executive officer of Porter Airlines, a Toronto-based regional airline, announced an expansion project to expand the airline’s destinations. The project required that Porter Airlines expand its fleet of jets to accommodate longer distances, and that its transport hub, the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, be renovated. The airport was governed by a tripartite agreement between the federal government, the City of Toronto, and PortsToronto; any amendments to the agreement required a consensus of the three governing parties. Despite active petitioning, the federal government announced in 2015 it would not support an amendment to the agreement. Should Porter Airlines continue to petition? Or should it consider alternative options to achieve growth?

In late 2010,the director general of the Industrial Sectors Directorate at Environment Canada, was reviewing a draft work plan for the Air Quality Management System (AQMS), a regulatory project to deal with Canada's transboundary air pollution problems. Though some of the key elements of AQMS were in place and director general had the support of co-chairs from Alberta and Ontario, she had to develop a series of briefings on her strategy before the end of 2010 so that she could gain approval from her deputy minister and minister.

In 2013, the chief executive officer of Porter Airlines, a Toronto-based regional airline, announced an expansion project to expand the airline's destinations. The project required that Porter Airlines expand its fleet of jets to accommodate longer distances, and that its transport hub, the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, be renovated. The airport was governed by a tripartite agreement between the federal government, the City of Toronto, and PortsToronto; any amendments to the agreement required a consensus of the three governing parties. Despite active petitioning, the federal government announced in 2015 it would not support an amendment to the agreement. Should Porter Airlines continue to petition? Or should it consider alternative options to achieve growth?

In late May 2009, New Vine Logistics ("New Vine"), a Napa-based wine shipping and fulfillment company, abruptly closed its doors, leaving hundreds of clients scrambling for information on their orders and inventory. Six days after New Vine's closure, Inertia Beverage Group (IBG), a provider of solutions for the creation and expansion of online wine marketplaces, agreed in principle to acquire New Vine and provide interim cash funding to revitalize operations. The resulting organization provided the industry's only fully integrated direct-to-market solution incorporating e-commerce, compliance, and logistics capabilities. Nine months later, in March 2010, Joseph Waechter, who had spent 15 years at DHL and was credited with the growth and expansion of the company into the world's largest express shipment company, was appointed CEO of IBG. Under Waechter's direction, the company set out a new strategy to expand access to new markets. Despite operating in a highly regulated industry, WineDirect facilitated winery direct-to-consumer fulfillment in 45 states, enabling the company to reach 90 percent of the U.S. wine-drinking public. In 2015 alone, WineDirect enabled more than $1 billion in direct wine sales and shipped more than 8 million bottles of wine through its three fulfillment centers. Still, Waechter thought about the greatest current business opportunities as a supply chain management firm. Further, he wondered what types of existing or new wine businesses could and should be leveraging WineDirect's supply chain management capabilities. This case describes the challenges faced by the growth of the direct-to-consumer segment of the wine industry. It covers growth, trends, and regulatory matters within the wine industry, as well as WineDirect's competitive offering, customers, and brief economics.

In 2016, the millennial generation (those age 19 to 35 in 2016), the largest generation by population in the U.S., was entering its prime home buying, family forming, earning and spending years. This generation was showing different beliefs and behaviors than previous generations-beliefs and behaviors that were having a significant impact on the overall economy and in particular on the food industry. This note explores the millennial generation, how it differs from previous generations, and examples of how it is impacting the food industry.

In February 2014, the chairman and chief executive officer of the third-largest law firm in Canada, Gowlings LLP, was examining his options for taking the firm global. On the verge of retirement, he hoped to establish an enduring platform for international expansion based on three aspects: a new global location, a new global partner, and a new organizational structure. Each point was interlinked, and each presented its own managerial dilemmas. Gowlings had already established offices in three locations outside Canada: Moscow, London, and Beijing. The company had been ranked as the top legal advisor based on deal volume for Canadian mergers and acquisitions in both 2012 and 2013. Gowlings was primed to build on these attributes and move to the next level in positioning itself as an international law firm.

In 2007, the emergency department at Kaiser Permanente's South Sacramento Medical Center was experiencing extremely long patient wait times, and it became clear that a new and better way of doing business was needed. The chief of the emergency department was inspired to change things and became the leader of the lean program-a system of management methods and tools widely used for over 25 years in the manufacturing sector. Changes were made over a six-year period to significantly improve key performance measures of the department. The goal was to create capacity and continuous flow in a health-care setting without negative implications to the emergency department and patients.

When Bruce Wayne hired Anthony Starks, he thought he had hit a homerun by getting the most brilliant and passionate scientist-leader in the field to be his CSO. But a few months in, Wayne and Starks begin to clash over crucial forward-looking decisions about the direction of the company. As CEO, Wayne needs to make tough decisions about how to manage his passionate but increasingly unpredictable CSO.

This case accompanies the (A) case from Anthony Starks's perspective.

In March 2016, eEquity, a small firm providing online training and software to corporate human resource professionals, faced a dilemma. A year after new ownership and management took over, the channel sales strategy that was expected to support the growth of the promising Software as a Service division failed, and cash was running out. Management had devised a new sales and marketing strategy that it believed would be successful, but lacked the funds to implement the strategy. This same management team identified four options to acquire the necessary funds, each of which had inherent strengths and weaknesses. The firm's success depended on making a good choice under conditions of incomplete information and a short time frame.

To improve its profitability, NKT Photonics A/S (NKT), a small Danish company operating in the global photonics industry, was getting ready to undertake the commercialization process of its highly advanced optical fibre technology. NKT’s chief executive officer (CEO) was considering two options for accomplishing this goal: (1) establishing strategic partnerships with system integrators in order to gain access to commercial customers, or (2) repositioning NKT as a system integrator by embarking on an acquisition strategy. Turning the company into a more commercial entity would mean a complete change of culture. It might also result in the loss of some top engineering and scientific minds and perhaps even the company's reputation. The CEO wondered if there a way to effectively introduce a business mindset to the organization while still preserving its innovation-based DNA.

In May 2014, Julie Hallman was about to assume the presidency of the struggling non-profit arts organization, the Falaise Foundation, which offered a residence for small groups of artists and scholars from around the world to work on creative endeavours at its extensive property in the South of France. The foundation was suffering financially due to a combination of weak fundraising, high operating costs, an ineffective board of trustees, and a murky relationship between the founding family and the foundation. Complicating matters was Hallman’s personal situation: she was the daughter of the foundation’s founder, who had run the organization his own way for decades until health issues forced him to step down. As a documentary filmmaker with a degree in Fine Arts, Julie Hallman had no business background. She had to develop an understanding of the root causes of the foundation’s problems and identify a set of strategies and actions to effect a successful turnaround.

Online social network service provider Five One Network Development Co. Ltd. (51.com) was founded in August 2005 and entered the online game industry in 2011, when browser games became popular in China. Although it continuously invested in developing online games, it had failed to reach its goal of becoming one of the top 10 companies in China. The online game industry had seen fierce competition and was finding it difficult to retain talented employees, who were leaving to start their own businesses. This problem, referred to as a “brain drain,” was also increasing the number of emerging profitable start-ups, especially in the mobile game segment. To overcome these internal and external challenges, 51.com decided to apply a new strategic approach: launching a series of new spin-off businesses from within the company. However, competition between the spin-offs seemed unavoidable. How would 51.com manage the relationships between the new spin-off businesses?