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Dan Burton, Health Catalyst CEO (HBS Baker Scholar), and Tom Burton, Health Catalyst Senior Vice President of Product Development and co-founder closed on a $41 million investment round. Their firm was one of the hottest companies in the health information technology field. They provided core data warehouse technology to enable analytics from electronic health record systems. Still, they faced significant competition in this space. Could they execute against their vision?

In 2009, two young entrepreneurs created Convene, a New York-based company with an innovative business model that catered to an underserved segment of the local meetings industry. They were in the unique position of having no real direct competitors and a tight grip on a niche market within a US$15 billion industry. However, to achieve their growth ambitions for the company, the duo had to deftly navigate the changing competitive landscape, identifying which players could become real competitors and which could be co-opted into becoming partners and clients. They also needed to adapt their business model to capture these opportunities. Over time, their expensive expansion standards and operating costs began to present a nagging concern: With only so much capital available each year, just how quickly could Convene really grow? Would the capital intensiveness of their current model stymie the rapid growth that they so desperately wanted (and needed) to achieve in order to establish a nationally recognized brand?

In 2012, All Nippon Airways diversified into Japan’s emerging low-cost carrier market by launching two new low-cost carriers: Peach Aviation and AirAsia Japan. After one year, Peach Aviation experienced financial losses and operations failures; after two years, the company announced cancellation of many flights. The second carrier, AirAsia Japan, ended its operations in 2013, and was later restructured as Vanilla Air, a wholly owned subsidiary of All Nippon Airways. Why was a highly successful flag and legacy carrier unable to successfully run a low-cost carrier in Japan?

Having previously raised pigs on his farm with unsuccessful results, a Canadian farmer has always dreamed of reintroducing pigs to his cash crop farm. The decision is particularly difficult, as he must consider not only the financial viability of his options, but also the environmental costs, benefits, and the welfare of the animals and workers — collectively referred to as the Four Ps (profits, planet, people, and pigs). Although the market for organic meat remains comparatively limited, it is a growing segment, and one that the farmer wants to tap into to maximize a first-mover advantage. However, the transition poses many risks as well. Will he be able to achieve his dream of re-introducing pigs to his family farm? Or will the attempt to transition to organic pork bury his currently profitable cash crop business?

In 2012, All Nippon Airways diversified into Japan's emerging low-cost carrier market by launching two new low-cost carriers: Peach Aviation and AirAsia Japan. After one year, Peach Aviation experienced financial losses and operations failures; after two years, the company announced cancellation of many flights. The second carrier, AirAsia Japan, ended its operations in 2013, and was later restructured as Vanilla Air, a wholly-owned subsidiary of All Nippon Airways. Why was a highly successful flag and legacy carrier unable to successfully run a low-cost carrier in Japan?

In December 2014, the chairman of Agarwal Packers and Movers Limited (APML) prepared for a meeting with his senior management team. APML was a family-managed business and the largest branded player in the fragmented and largely unorganized house-movers segment of the Indian logistics industry. The company was taking advantage of the Indian economy's growth, government infrastructure spending, and goods and services tax changes that would bring beneficial changes to the industry. While the company had achieved sales of US$62.6 million in 2013/14 and had been lauded for its safety practices and achievements, the industry had low barriers to entry. APML was faced with several large, and numerous small, moving companies that were fighting for business. Moreover, many small companies fraudulently co-opted the company's name to steal customers. APML's chief financial officer had put forth a proposal to increase prices for inter-city relocations. The chairman had to consider the proper price strategy to employ, because any price increase could cost the company customers.

In 2014, FotoNation, an international venture previously located in Ireland, produced innovative solutions for digital photography from its headquarters in California. At the core of FotoNation's technology were its proprietary algorithms, which were embedded in software and used in over 2 billion digital devices such as the cameras in smartphones. The company placed an emphasis on research, and it had its research and development units in Romania, Ireland, and the Western United States. However, after being acquired by Tessera Technologies in 2008, FotoNation had to relocate its top management team from Ireland to the headquarters of Tessera Technologies in the United States. FotoNation's management had some difficult decisions to make in light of the acquisition. How would a research-based product fit into the grand scheme of Tessera Technologies? How would FotoNation compete with larger industrial players, while coping with the relocation of its top-tier staff?

In December 2014, the chairman of Agarwal Packers and Movers Limited (APML) prepared for a meeting with his senior management team. APML was a family-managed business and the largest branded player in the fragmented and largely unorganized house-movers segment of the Indian logistics industry. The company was taking advantage of the Indian economy’s growth, government infrastructure spending, and goods and services tax changes that would bring beneficial changes to the industry. While the company had achieved sales of US$62.6 million in 2013/14 and had been lauded for its safety practices and achievements, the industry had low barriers to entry. APML was faced with several large, and numerous small, moving companies that were fighting for business. Moreover, many small companies fraudulently co-opted the company’s name to steal customers. APML’s chief financial officer had put forth a proposal to increase prices for inter-city relocations. The chairman had to consider the proper price strategy to employ, because any price increase could cost the company customers.

In 2015, Downingtown Area School District (DASD), a suburban school district near Philadelphia, entered its second year implementing Ivy Academy, a blended learning program in its two traditional high schools. Superintendent Larry Mussoline, having for several years worked to incorporate technology into student learning hoped that Ivy Academy would deepen student learning, provide more rigorous courses, introduce more scheduling flexibility, and change the culture among teachers in his district. In Ivy Academy, classes meet two out of every six days in-person, and students are expected to work asynchronously online during the other days. In the first year, 341 students (out of 3,800 eligible) and 19 teachers (out of 240 eligible) participated in Ivy Academy; in the second year, the program grew. However, final exam results for students participating in the Ivy Academy are mixed, and certain staff and parents remain skeptical of its effectiveness. This case explores whether DASD is ready to scale Ivy Academy and make it the primary way in which students learn.

John Muthee and Justus Paul are recent graduates of medical school and a unique program in clinical inforamtics. They return to Nairobi, Kenya with a passion to make a difference in their community. They have a team they know well, but need to find a project concept for a new company. Eventually, they focus on what they believe to be a significant opportunity-supporting health insurance with an electronic eligibility verification and claim submission. They develop a business concept, but have challenges breaking into the market and attracting investment. They finally land a grant (non-dilutive financing) from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and build their product. Having proven that the technology works, can they scale their solution?

CEO David Kenny led the transformation of the Weather Company from a television business to a Big Data technology company from 2012 until 2016, when IBM acquired its digital assets. This case discusses major decisions taken by Kenny starting in 2014 as he sought to reorient the company amidst changes in media, digital, and mobile technologies. Kenny balances promoting new stream digital business growth with managing difficult legacy television industry realities. He faces key strategic decisions about whether to integrate businesses or separate them completely; whether to pursue business partners, and if so, what those partners should look like; and whether IBM, a large, established technology company, is the right partner for Weather Company. Finally, how would Weather Company's fast, innovative culture fit in at giant IBM?

By 2015, the HNA Group had grown from its roots as Hainan Airlines, a small airline founded in 1993 into a global conglomerate that ranked #464 in the Global 500. Much of this success it had achieved by cross-industry expansion within China, but since 2008, it had increasingly looked to expand globally. The HNA Group in general and Hainan Airlines in particular were recognized for their quality of service within China. However, this high reputation had yet to be translated across borders. Would HNA Group be able to bring its unique characteristics that made it successful within China to bear on the global marketplace?

Tsinghua University is one of the most prominent universities in China, and, increasingly, in the world. Its evolution to this position reflects the major developments in Chinese history--outward looking internationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, creative survival in the 1940s, Sovietization in the 1950s and 1960s, chaos in the 1970s, rebuilding in the 1980s, and, since the 1990s, a laser focus on becoming one of the best higher education institutions in the world. This case study traces this institutional history and then examines Tsinghua University's recent attempts at reform in faculty governance, curriculum, and funding as it seeks "world-class" status.

ScaleneWorks People Solutions LLP (ScaleneWorks), is a Bangalore-based talent management company, which commenced its operations in the summer of 2010 with a vision to build an organization of great value and be among the most respected talent acquisition solution providers globally. Sanjay Shelvankar, CEO of ScaleneWorks was considering the use of an analytical approach to predict renege. Past data from Indian IT companies revealed that 30% of the candidates did not join the company after offer acceptance, which significantly increased the overall cost of recruitment. Sanjay wondered if Analytics could possibly help in identifying the key drivers that influence a candidate in either joining/not-joining a company after accepting the offer, as it would largely help clients save both cost and time. However, there was a risk involved: any error in this prediction could turn out to be a costly affair, as the client could ''wrongly'' reject a potential candidate even without interviewing him/her.

ScaleneWorks People Solutions LLP (ScaleneWorks), is a Bangalore-based talent management company, which commenced its operations in the summer of 2010 with a vision to build an organization of great value and be among the most respected talent acquisition solution providers globally. Sanjay Shelvankar, CEO of ScaleneWorks was considering the use of an analytical approach to predict renege. Past data from Indian IT companies revealed that 30% of the candidates did not join the company after offer acceptance, which significantly increased the overall cost of recruitment. Sanjay wondered if Analytics could possibly help in identifying the key drivers that influence a candidate in either joining/not-joining a company after accepting the offer, as it would largely help clients save both cost and time. However, there was a risk involved: any error in this prediction could turn out to be a costly affair, as the client could ''wrongly'' reject a potential candidate even without interviewing him/her.

Consumer transactions will eventually go digital, but retailers and consumers alike need to learn how to make this work. Unlike most Millennials, most Boomers and Gen-Xers had to be coerced into switching to digital music. According to a recent consumer sentiment study on mobile usage, more coercion will be required before digital commerce reaches its potential. While more than 60 per cent of Americans have a smartphone, only 14 per cent surveyed prefer shopping online, and privacy concerns of customers limit the appeal of firms going digital. Such firms must make serious financial commitments, not to mention decisions about what platforms to bet the budget on. There is also a significant outlay of resources needed to train employees on how to use and maintain new systems and equipment. Much of the push to get retailers to invest in digital offerings has hinged on the value associated with compiling customer spending data, yet most retailers don’t know what to do with this data once it is collected. Businesses need to take advantage of the relatively slow adoption of digital transactions to first learn the new technology that they are deploying, and then use this expertise to serve their customers by helping them learn how to use their devices in new ways — while gaining more trust in their transactions rather than increased frustrations.

Enabled by enterprise social software (ESS), online corporate communities are shaking up the management world by revolutionizing many core organizational activities. By creating new channels of interaction among employees, customers and managerial echelons, ESS solutions are democratizing the decision-making process. Many prominent companies see this favourably, which is why they actively use ESS platforms such as Yammer — a private social network that helps employees collaborate across departments, locations and business apps — to transform innovation, talent management, marketing and CSR practices. But democracy in business is a double-edged sword. And when it comes to empowering the corporate masses to heavily influence the decision-making process via ESS, it remains unclear when the C-suite benefits and when it doesn’t. <br><br> This article aims to raise awareness of the perils associated with decision democratization and help managers identify the conditions in which ESS platforms complement the decision-making process and those conditions in which online communities fall short in making a true contribution. We provide a framework to discuss the optimum role of ESS platform functionality for three different types of decision making: operational, tactical and strategic. Our research indicates that there is no question that ESS should indeed be exploited for some intra-firm decision making, but that companies need to be very wary of democratizing the strategic decision-making process.

When M Power Micro Finance was founded in 2009 in the Indian state of Gujarat, a number of challenges in the microfinance market made it difficult for the company to survive. Just months after M Power’s founding, the microfinance industry was hit by a repayment crisis that eroded both profitability and confidence in the industry. With public sentiment turning against microfinance institutions, M Power’s bright growth prospects suddenly disappeared and its CEO struggled to keep the business afloat. The flow of funding into the microfinance sector dried up, and the management of funds had to be closely monitored on a monthly basis. The CEO’s woes were not over: some of his business partners left the organization as the situation worsened. The company’s future was uncertain. As the industry began to show signs of recovery in 2013, though, the CEO hoped to secure a financing deal and persevere.

Mexican electric appliances company Mabe had grown from being a leading national firm in its field to an international company with presence in most of the Americas and Russia. It had ventured into emerging markets and intended to continue its expansion to other countries. The company gathered together five directors to form an Action Learning team that would evaluate its entry into India together with directors from its potential partner, Italian company Indesit. The Action Learning team had to analyze the company’s prospects and make its recommendations with respect to entering the Indian market. However, despite being a market with great potential, India also posed a series of problems, including a lack of transportation infrastructure, an excess of industry capacity for electric appliances and the cultural challenge of a multinational Mexican company marketing to Indian consumers. Should Mabe go ahead with its move into India? If so, what would be the best way to enter the market?<br><br><br><br>This case can be taught on its own, or in combination with Mabe: Learning to Be a Multinational (A) 9B13M042.