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Conference designer Richard Saul Wurman describes his approach to assembling a memorable and inspirational gathering.

In 2002, both the Edmonton Symphony Orchestra and the Calgary Philharmonic faced financial crises that threatened their existence. Both organizations provided similar programming, had approximately the same revenues, and were rooted in their communities, which were of similar populations. However, the turnaround approaches taken by the boards of the two organizations were starkly different. The Calgary Philharmonic sought bankruptcy protection, dismissed the CEO, hired consultants, sought emergency funding from government, and suspended operations for four months during a restructuring period. In the end, it emerged successfully from bankruptcy. The Edmonton Symphony Orchestra scraped through the crisis, continuing to pay its musicians for ongoing performances while negotiating new contracts, retaining its CEO, and not soliciting emergency funding from the government. Three years after the crisis both organizations were flourishing, with new music directors, balanced budgets, and growing endowment funds. Outlines the stories of the two orchestras and their turnarounds.

lululemon athletica is on track to exceed $2 million in sales for 2001, a remarkable achievement considering it was founded in 1999. To achieve his targets of rapid growth, Chip Wilson, founder of lululemon athletica, is considering franchising his concept. But concerns remain, including control over branding and store-level operations. On the other hand, franchising would allow Wilson to rapidly expand and capture market share, as competitors are starting to take notice. This case is the fourth in a series of seven lululemon athletica cases that focus on decision-making using real-options analysis. Other cases in the series are: 906M36, 906M37, 906M38, 906M40, 906M41 and 906M42.

The quest for information and research-based insight is an obsession in the capital markets. There is a veritable industry of analysts, investment bankers, portfolio managers, and investors who seek any informational advantage, which is one reason that academics who study finance have been recruited to work on Wall Street and with money managers. Yet, the potential payoff for using valid evidence is even greater when it comes to managing organizations. At the same time, however, imitation is much slower and less effective in the world of management practices, in part because such practices depend on tacit knowledge and implementation skill, on knowing not just what to do but how to do it. In addition, management practices and logic resist copying because of the power of precedent and ideology. Most managers actually try to act on the best evidence. They follow the business press, buy business books, hire consultants, and attend seminars featuring business experts. Although companies sometimes benefit from these efforts, there is surprisingly little rigorous use or serious appreciation of evidence-based management. Explores these obstacles and offers guidelines to enable managers to practice evidence-based management better.

The true role of performance measurement is to provide a means of management learning, rather than simply a means of management control. It is widely believed performance measures are essential if managers are to track progress and establish whether their organization is moving in the desired direction. In essence, this is the basic philosophy that underpins ideas of management control. However, the power of measurement extends far beyond simply tracking progress to three other areas. First, the act of deciding what to measure helps clarify the organization's strategy. Second, clear measures, underpinned by an explicit theory of how the business works, assist in the process of communicating strategy and achieving organizational alignment. Third, measurement data can be used to generate performance insights. These, in turn, can be used to challenge the tacit or explicit assumptions that are held about how the business operates. Makes explicit the hidden potential of performance measurement by highlighting how measurement systems can contribute to the organization's systems for management learning as well as management control. Also illustrates how more value can be extracted from the data that exist in organizations than has traditionally been recognized.

Ongoing efforts to reduce medical errors and enhance quality of patient care focus primarily on technological innovations. However, important management issues that underlie about two-thirds of adverse events have commanded insufficient attention. Examines two alternative management philosophies--control based and commitment based--premised on opposite sets of assumptions about human motivation, and develops a model linking the overall management philosophy with medical errors and quality of care. The current control-based culture and management systems in health care organizations are inherently inadequate in delivering high-quality patient care and safety. To bring further improvements in clinical outcomes, it is necessary to transform them. Implementing commitment-based management will foster collaboration, communication, coordination, and teamwork--the essential mechanisms for reducing medical errors and rendering high-quality health care.

This month, all of Harvard Business Review's Forethought contributions address avian influenza, its potential to become a pandemic, and the red flags this possibility raises for businesses. Jeffrey Staples warns that the H5N1 strain of the avian flu represents a new class of global threat and urges companies to plan accordingly. Scott F. Dowell and Joseph S. Bresee show how mutations of the virus could boost its ability to spread from person to person. If a human pandemic does strike, Nitin Nohria explains, the most adaptive organizations have the best chance of surviving. Warren G. Bennis says that such times call for a leader who can articulate the common threat and inspire people to overcome it together. Baruch Fischhoff, too, emphasizes the importance of risk communication, warning that managers who dismiss it may endanger the people they're responsible for and force stakeholders to look elsewhere for information. Fischhoff also demonstrates, in another article, how managers can map out their companies' vulnerabilities. Larry Brilliant tells us what people worldwide can expect from their governments. Peter Susser views the threat of a pandemic from a legal perspective, examining several HR-related issues businesses could face. Sherry Cooper points out the social and economic lessons we should have learned from Toronto's 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome. William MacGowan explains how Sun Microsystems is building a continuity plan to keep its global workforce healthy in the event of a pandemic. Wendy Dobson and Brian R. Golden caution that if a pandemic begins in China, as many scientists expect, the global impact will be immediate because China is so integral to the world economy. HBR also provides pandemic planning guidelines adapted from a checklist compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as a list of recommended avian flu resources.

Health care in the United States--and in most other developed countries--is ailing. Medical treatment has made astonishing advances, but the packaging and delivery of health care are often inefficient, ineffective, and user unfriendly. Problems ranging from costs to medical errors beg for ingenious solutions--and, indeed, there have been enormous investments in innovation. But too many efforts fail. To find out why, it's necessary to break down the problem, look at the different types of innovation, and examine the forces that affect them. Three kinds of innovation can make health care better and cheaper: One changes the way in which consumers buy and use health care, another taps into technology, and the third generates new business models. However, the health care system erects an array of barriers to each type of innovation. More often than not, organizations can overcome the barriers by managing the six forces that have an impact on health care innovation: players--the friends and foes who can bolster or destroy; funding--the revenue-generation and capital-acquisition processes, which differ from those in other industries; policy--the regulations that pervade the industry; technology--the foundation for innovations that can make health care delivery more efficient and convenient; customers--the empowered and engaged consumers of health care; and accountability--the demand from consumers, payers, and regulators that innovations be safe, effective, and cost effective. The analytical framework the author describes can also be used to examine other industries.

Asking the question, "What makes a great COO?" is akin to asking "What makes a great candidate for U.S. vice president?" It all depends on the first name on the ticket-the CEO. New research sheds light on this most contingent, and most mysterious, of C-suite jobs. After in-depth conversations with dozens of executives who have held the position and with CEOs who have worked with COOs, the authors have concluded that different views of the COO role arise from the different motives behind creating the position in the first place. There are seven basic reasons why companies decide to hire a COO: to implement the CEO's strategy; to lead a particular initiative, such as a turnaround; to mentor a young, inexperienced CEO; to complement the strengths or make up for the weaknesses of the CEO; to provide a partner to the CEO; to test out a possible successor; or to stave off the defection of a highly valuable executive, particularly to a rival. This tremendous variation implies that there is no standard set of great COO attributes, which makes finding suitable candidates difficult for companies and recruiters alike. Still, certain common success factors came up consistently in the interviews, the most important being building a high level of trust between CEO and COO. Trust comes from meeting obligations on both sides: The COO must truly support the CEO's vision; keep ego in check; and exhibit strong execution, coaching, and coordination skills. The CEO must communicate faithfully, grant real authority and decision rights, and not stymie the COO's career. It's surprising that COOs are not more common. They would be, the authors contend, if there were less confusion surrounding the role. As we continue to demystify that role, more companies will benefit from more effective leadership.

In the complex sport of American football, teams rely on playbooks as thick as the Manhattan phone directory. But when it comes to creating innovative growth businesses--which is at least as complicated as professional football--most companies have not developed detailed game plans. Indeed, many managers have concluded that a fog enshrouds the world of innovation, obscuring high-potential opportunities. The authors believe that companies can penetrate that fog by developing growth strategies based on disruptive innovations, as defined by Clayton Christensen. Such innovations conform to a pattern: They offer an entirely new solution; they perform adequately along traditional dimensions and much better along other dimensions that matter more to target customers; and they are not initially appealing to powerful incumbents. Companies can develop customized checklists, or playbooks, by combining this basic pattern with analysis of major innovations in their markets. The key early on is to focus not on detailed financial estimates--which will always guide companies toward the markets most hostile to disruptive innovations--but on how well the innovation fits the pattern of success. It's also crucial to encourage flexibility: Companies must be willing to kill projects that are going nowhere, exempt innovations from standard development processes, and avoid burdening project teams with extra financing, which can keep them heading in the wrong direction. Companies can create competitive advantage by becoming champions at defining the pattern of successful innovations and executing against it. But as that pattern becomes obvious--and others emerge--building a sustainable advantage on innovation competencies will again prove elusive.

Most cases on M&As focus on the value of an individual deal (synergies, price, integration issues). In the case series "Acquisition Wave in the Fine Chemicals Industry", we take another perspective. We aim to describe how managers' decisions to make an acquisition and to determine the acquisition price are likely to be influenced by the merger activity in their industry and their competitors' actions. Driven by shareholder pressure to focus their portfolios, leading specialty and fine chemicals players such as Degussa, Clariant and Rhodia entered into major fine chemicals acquisition in 2000 and overpaid. Subsequently, this led to decreasing stock prices and financial turmoil. The fact that the other firms overpaid, despite publicly available signals from stock markets indicating the overpayment, and the nature of the chemicals industry and management, are clear indicators for irrational herd behavior.

Are hedge funds heroes or villains? Management of Blockbuster, Time Warner, Six Flags, Knight-Ridder, and Bally Total Fitness might prefer the "villain" appellation, but Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth shareholders might view management as the real villains and hedge funds as vehicles to oust incompetent corporate managers before they run companies into the ground or steal them through fraudulent transactions. Could the pressure exerted by activist hedge funds on targeted companies result in increased share prices, management accountability, and better communication with shareholders? Or does it distract management from its primary goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value?

A senior manager at Laurel Upholstery learns from an unexpected meeting with a former senior manager at the firm's Montreal factory that only managers of a certain origin - regardless of seniority or performance - were being promoted into top management positions. Although the former manager alleged he had no interest in pursuing the matter, he was frustrated enough to leave the firm, and indicated the matter seemed serious enough to warrant further investigation.

Hugo Chavez often pointed to Simon Bolivar as the model for his political philosophy, centered on Bolivar's vision of a unified and independent Latin America. In 1998, Chavez ran in the presidential election, on a platform that opposed what he termed the "savage neoliberalism" of the 1990s. Chavez's speeches in the presidential election campaign emphasized the importance of "national sovereignty" and "economic justice." As president, Chavez passed a new Hydrocarbons Law to enhance the share oil revenue that would be owed to the government; he created a new government-owned bank; he introduced a radical land reform law; and he encouraged takeovers by the government and employees of privately-owned factories. Venezuela sold oil to Cuba at reduced prices in return for professionals, especially doctors who created health missions in many low-income areas. Chavez sought to foment socialist anti-American revolutions throughout Latin America. In the context of this socialist agenda, analysts expected that Venezuela's economy would experience serious challenges in the coming years. The combination of high inflation, fiscal pressure, and slow growth would be a boiling political cauldron in which violent opposition could ferment.

An entrepreneur has received additional information on the Cartridge World franchising concept - a store focused on the refilling of printer cartridges. The idea for Cartridge World began in Australia in 1988 and has grown to almost 200 locations in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The entrepreneur must look at the market opportunity in Canada and decide whether he should apply for the country's master franchise, a single franchise, or abandon the concept altogether. Students will evaluate a franchise concept based on market opportunity and the franchise contract.

Resina is a global manufacturer of resins and surfacing solutions headquartered in Helsinki, Finland, and has three production facilities and 12 sales offices in China. The head of Asia Pacific for Resina needs to decide what should be done about Beijing and Guangdong. Should Beijing remain in operation, be shut down, or moved to another area where demand for liquid bulk resins is stronger. Similar options exist in Guangdong. In aiming towards profitable operations, he needs to consider the buoyancy of local demand, Resina's partner in Beijing, local and foreign competitors and appropriate managers in each operation.

Star Leather Product Co., Ltd. is a privately-owned shoemaking company with more than 1,000 staff and a factory of 8,800 square metres. It developed from a family-based shoemaking workshop and has expanded to the international market within six years. The quick expansion of this company was mainly a consequence of the blossoming of the shoemaking industry in China. With increasing competition and a saturated market, problems of management and quality-control have arisen. The founder and general manager of the company was actively seeking help from consultants.

Franchising in China is a relatively new and growing phenomenon. Among the franchising pioneers in China are the large and well-known food and beverage brands such as Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's. Less known, but equally important, are the non-food retailing and service industries, such as The Athlete's Foot company. This U.S. born company made early entry into China using master international franchising. As the industry continues to grow, The Athlete's Foot franchise is losing its first-mover advantage and faces increased competition from department stores and brand-specific retailers, among other challenges. The case describes franchising in China, the Athlete's Foot company, and the experiences of the Chinese master franchisee.

The chief executive officer (CEO) of a multi-site and multi-business YMCA must determine how to more than double participation levels in the next five years. The case describes how the London YMCA has grown in both participation and size. However, the corporate level strategy has become complicated and the board of directors, CEO and senior management team need to consider a new M-form structure. This has many implications for the CEO, the senior managers and the future growth of the YMCA London.

For the first five years, Malaysia's Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) pursued its original mission and vision, seeking to create a research and design corridor (Multimedia Super Corridor - MSC) that would be at the leading edge of the new economy. However, many analysts criticized key elements of the MDC. Some analysts feared that civil servants lacked the technical capability. Others feared the MDC lacked the ability to encourage a risk-taking culture. Many pointed to the lack of entrepreneurial activity. Stan Shih concluded that there were simply not enough knowledge workers in Malaysia. By 2003, the MDC had shifted its focus to the development of labor-intensive IT-related activities at the low end of value chains, taking advantage of Malaysia's low costs and its geographical position as a potential Asian hub. This is a supplement to Malaysia's Multimedia Development Corporation (A), product 9A98G001.