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For most of the 1990's, Thailand's economy was one of the fastest growing in the world. Thailand was popular with foreign investors, and the country's currency was stable due to the central bank's currency peg. However, overspeculation, high interest rates, lower than expected exports and job losses were causing speculation that the central bank would abandon the currency peg. The Bank of Thailand must decide whether to continue or to abandon the peg of the baht to the U.S. dollar. Was the country through the worst of the economic problems or was there more to come? The supplementary cases enable role plays designed to provide an understanding of the forces influencing a decision about appropriate monetary policy as importer (9B01M022 - Exclusive Autos of Bangkok), exporter (9B01M023 - Thai Shoes PCL), investor (9B01M027 - International Assets Investment Company), lender (9B01M026 - Hokkaido Bank), currency speculator (9B01M029 - Quantile Investment Fund), the IMF (9B01M028 - International Monetary Fund), and the Bank of Thailand (9B01M025 - Bank of Thailand in June 1997).

Bureaucrats from the Thailand central bank and Ministry of Finance meet to discuss the implications of abandoning the peg of the baht to the U.S. dollar. This is a role play supplement to Thailand, 1997, product 9B01M024.

The manager of a Japanese bank is concerned about extending loans to Thai customers because of Thailand's currency instability. This is a role play supplement to Thailand, 1997, product 9B01M024.

A U.S. investor owns shares in a Thai developer. If the baht devalues, the dollar value of this investment will decline. This supplement is the investor role in the role play surrounding Thailand, 1997, product 9B01M024.

This role play supplement to Thailand, 1997 (product 9B01M024), discusses the International Monetary Fund conditions that will be put in effect should Thailand request assistance.

A currency speculator has shorted the baht, hoping it will devalue. This is a role play supplement to Thailand, 1997, product 9B01M024.

Kodak's Health Imaging division is the second largest business unit within Kodak, a worldwide provider of consumer, professional and health imaging products. The regional manager of the Health Imaging division is preparing her presentation for the company's senior management retreat. The East Asian Crisis and its impact on the division are on the agenda. The regional manager reflects on the magnitude of the crisis, and she wonders if the company's responses were reactive instead of strategic. There will be some tough questions to rake through at the meeting. Did the Health Imaging department respond effectively to the crisis? Is Kodak better off because of the crisis? What will the short-term and long-term effects be? Will Kodak's response to the East Asian Crisis preserve customer relationships for the years to come? Information pertaining to Health Imaging's strategic view of the region, the company's organizational structure and the levers employed by Kodak in response to the crisis all serve to produce some answers for the division's future consideration. A supplementary (B) case is available, product 9B01M056.

Lucent Technologies is a worldwide provider of telecom network infrastructures. The government of India has deregulated the state-run control of the telecom sector presenting significant opportunities for telecommunication providers. India appeared to be a nation of enormous investment opportunity, with a population of one billion and a relatively high growth rate. Lucent Technologies must evaluate the opportunities in this changing market and decide whether they should invest more resources in this area or withdraw completely.

Pibrex is one of the world's largest developers of petrochemical-based polymers for the plastics market. The company has purchased a plant in Russia and after three years of serious operating losses has appointed a new general manager of the plant. The plant lacks a strong organizational culture; communications within and between departments are poor; inequity in wages, working conditions, and training exist but motivation and retention problems are prevalent, Pibrex headquarters is losing interest in the Russian operation; and two sub-cultures exist within the Pibrex Russia organization. The general manager must develop an action plan that can turn operations around with minimal expense to Pibrex. A supplement, Managing Pibrex Russia (B): Developing Organizational Strategies to Ensure Sustainable Profitability (product 9B01M021) discusses issues facing the company two years later.

Pibrex is one of the world's largest developers of petrochemical-based polymers for the plastics market. In the Managing Pibrex Russia (A) case, (9B01M020) a new general manager inherits serious problems and develops an action plan to address the issues. This supplement illustrates what the management team has done to begin a turnaround of the firm and also highlights the many problems that remain. In particular, the company must reassess its management strategies and take steps to maintain its competitive position.

Newfoundland-based Fishery Products International (FPI) is one of the largest seafood companies in North America. FPI has experienced its best performance in a decade and has recently survived a hostile takeover bid by three competitors who acted in concert. The chief executive officer (CEO) has just returned from New Zealand where he was visiting a major competitor to see if there was the possibility of a strategic alliance. The CEO knew he had to do something to prevent another hostile takeover and to continue to grow shareholder value while still maintaining the social conscience of FPI. Some of the issues facing FPI were: performance, strategic leadership and corporate governance, and implementing an integrated product differentiation/cost leadership strategy.

In 1998 it appeared that Japanese auto companies could be forced to pay duty on their non-NAFTA imports into Canada. The U.S. Big Three auto makers (GM, Ford and Chrysler), in contrast did not have to pay such a tariff on their offshore imports such as those made by Ford-owned Jaguar (United Kingdom) and GM's Saab (Sweden). The Japanese and U.S. firms were treated differently because of the 1966 Auto Pact that made all Big Three imports duty-free. However, in the early 1980's, in order to encourage auto investment, the Canadian government granted virtual Auto-Pact status to Japanese firms (Toyota and Honda) that located in Ontario. This eliminated tariffs on the Japan-made models they sold in Canada. Public debate arose during the Free Trade Agreement (1989) and North American Free Trade Agreement (1994) trade negotiations. The U.S., under the Big Three influence, pushed Canada to withdraw the Pact-like benefits it used to attract the Japanese factories. Canada eventually complied with the U.S. demands, while leaving the Pact in place for U.S. automakers. This led the Japanese government to challenge the fairness of the proposed tariff at the World Trade Organization (WTO). While waiting for the WTO process to unfold, the Japanese and U.S. automakers were considering how to respond to the forthcoming judgement.

Dunes Inc. is a concept for a tanning salon and healthy lifestyle retail store on a university campus. Two students have developed and refined a business plan, and are about to present their proposal to the manager of the university's community centre. The two partners must thoroughly assess the potential costs of operation, determine whether the profits will justify their equity investment, and decide whether the business will be an attractive investment for future potential buyers.

If you want to know what your customers really want, don't ask how they'd make your products and services better. Ask what they'd wish for if they could have anything.

In April 2000, Yahoo! was sued by a French anti-racist group, on the grounds that Yahoo!'s online auctions of nazi items on its U.S. site violate French law. Yahoo! Inc. finally removed these items from its site in January 2001. The cases and its annexes present the economic, legal, technical, philosophical, cultural and managerial issues.

The case describes the development of Alibaba.com, an Internet start-up originated from China that had become the world's largest online business-to-business (B2B) marketplace for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) conducting international trade. In particular, it highlights the changing business environments in China, and the dynamic interaction of Chinese culture, Internet culture and Western management practices.

The difficult task of achieving worldly success while also storing up spiritual treasure is perennially with us, in good times and in bad. Today, however, as the economy has cooled and companies have demonstrated their mortality, questions about meaning and value appear more relevant, even urgent. HBR associate editor David A. Light recently spoke with the Reverend Peter J. Gomes, one of the nation's best-known preachers and the minister at Harvard University's Memorial Church, about why and how it is both possible and necessary to reconcile a life of success with a life of faith. To do so, says Gomes, you must first "get used to it"--come to terms with the age-old tension between being rich in spirit and rich in worldly goods. Second, you should "get over it"--arrive at an understanding of the value and responsibilities associated with power and wealth. Finally, "get on with it"--figure out how you can live your life spiritually while continuing to lead in the business world. For those wondering how to get on with spiritual development, Gomes cites the growing phenomenon of senior executives gathering with peers--out of shared need, not shared accomplishment--to pray, study sacred texts, and share their religious life together. He counsels that it's never too late to get on with it. Gomes concludes that business will continue to be one of the most significant forces in American culture, but it will always struggle against people's need for a perspective that is beyond this world's.

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And, finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.

For at least the past decade, the holy grail for companies has been innovation. Managers have gone after it with all the zeal their training has instilled in them, using a full complement of tried and true management techniques. The problem is that none of these practices, well suited for cashing in on old, proven products and business models, works very well when it comes to innovation. Instead, managers should take most of what they know about management and stand it on its head. In this article, Robert Sutton outlines several ideas for managing creativity that are clearly odd but clearly effective: Place bets on ideas without much heed to their projected returns. Ignore what has worked before. Goad perfectly happy people into fights among themselves. Good creativity management means hiring the candidate you have a gut feeling against. And as for the people who stick their fingers in their ears and chant, "I'm not listening, I'm not listening" when customers make suggestions--praise and promote them. Using vivid examples from more than a decade of academic research to illustrate his points, the author discusses new approaches to hiring, managing creative people, and dealing with risk and randomness in innovation. His conclusions? The practices in this article succeed because they increase the range of a company's knowledge, allow people to see old problems in new ways, and help companies break from the past.

Most executives think of decision making as a singular event that occurs at a particular point in time. In reality, though, decision making is a process fraught with power plays, politics, personal nuances, and institutional history. Leaders who recognize this make far better decisions than those who persevere in the fantasy that decisions are events they alone control. That said, some decision-making processes are far more effective than others. Most often, participants use an advocacy process, possibly the least productive way to get things done. They view decision making as a contest, arguing passionately for their preferred solutions, presenting information selectively, withholding relevant conflicting data so they can make a convincing case, and standing firm against opposition. Much more powerful is an inquiry process, in which people consider a variety of options and work together to discover the best solution. Moving from advocacy to inquiry requires careful attention to three critical factors: fostering constructive, rather than personal, conflict; making sure everyone knows that their viewpoints are given serious consideration even if they are not ultimately accepted; and knowing when to bring deliberations to a close. The authors discuss in detail strategies for moving from an advocacy to an inquiry process, as well as for fostering productive conflict, true consideration, and timely closure. And they offer a framework for assessing the effectiveness of your process while you're still in the middle of it. Decision making is a job that lies at the very heart of leadership and one that requires a genius for balance: the ability to embrace the divergence that may characterize early discussions and to forge the unity needed for effective implementation.