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In 2008, Starbucks was in crisis as a result of undisciplined growth and loss of focus, and its stock declined almost 70%. In August of that year, Howard Schultz, the founder of Starbucks, came out of retirement to take over as the CEO. The company regained its footing by refocusing on its core and driving strong organic growth. By 2014, the stock price had reached $40, an all-time high. To prevent history from repeating itself, Schultz wanted to ensure that Starbucks' growth strategies not only addressed market opportunities, but also were aligned with the company's brand image, assets, and capabilities. Starbucks announced a five-year growth plan in December 2014 with ambitious goals that included nearly doubling its revenues from $16 billion to $30 billion, doubling operating income, and expanding its footprint to more than 30,000 stores globally by 2019. The growth plan consisted of seven specific growth strategies, one of which was the New Occasions strategy. The objective of New Occasions was to drive growth by diversifying Starbucks' revenues beyond breakfast to the lunch, afternoon, and evening dayparts. Starbucks created specific offerings for each daypart, called the Lunch, Sunset, and Evenings programs. The case focuses on evaluating these three occasions-based growth opportunities and identifying the best path forward.

In 2016, Blue Apron was the leading meal kit delivery business in the United States. The initial registration form it filed in advance of its initial public offering (IPO) showed a successful business in a rapidly growing industry. Meal kit sales had grown to $5 billion in 2017 and were expected to grow at a 20% annual rate in the years to come and Blue Apron held a commanding 53% market share. But Blue Apron's customer metrics indicated long-term trouble. Focused on sales growth, the company was acquiring more customers but at a higher cost. Additionally, the new customers generated less revenue on average than customers acquired earlier in Blue Apron's history. This case focuses on measuring customer lifetime value (CLV) and using it to make customer management decisions. Students will follow new Blue Apron CEO Brad Dickerson as he tries to determine how to manage customer relationships to improve profitability. The case also presents customer retention curves and a segment-based approach to calculating customer value. Students can obtain the curves by using the estimates and financial data provided in the spreadsheets accompanying the case.

Spreadsheet supplement for case W73C09.

Literature in food marketing provides many examples of implicit associations and tensions of which marketers should be aware. For example, a brand that positions its product as healthy and tasty may struggle to gain traction in the market because consumers tend to associate good-tasting food with low health value, and therefore assume healthy food tastes bad. Often, consumers make purchases based on heuristics and perceptions. This note provides insights on some of the main tension in the literature. The note can be used alone, but fits nicely with the cases "Just: Positioned to Target Mainstream Tastes?" (A) and (B) (UVA-M-0956 and UVA-M-0957).

Işıl Akdemir Evlioğlu, executive vice president of marketing at Garanti Payment Systems (GPS), a subsidiary of Garanti Bank, is grappling with three questions. First, should GPS create its own mobile app for credit card customers or leverage the bank's already successful mobile banking app? Second, if a separate app was developed, then who should manage it? GPS managed the bank's credit card business and was as a separate entity, but the bank's digital assets were managed exclusively by the bank. Third, if a separate app was not developed, then would the required breadth and depth of functionality for the credit card customers be delivered? If a separate app was not developed, then would GPS be able to design one when they had never done so before? The credit card business included a popular loyalty program and GPS leadership was very focused on customer engagement and experience for program enrollees, but how best to do that was a critical question.

The case opens with three questions that Işıl Akdemir Evlioğlu, the executive vice president of marketing at Garanti Payment Systems (GPS), a subsidiary of Garanti Bank, is grappling with in January 2015. First, should GPS, create its own mobile app instead of capitalizing on the Bank's successful banking mobile app? Second, if a separate app was developed, then who should manage it? GPS managed the Bank's credit card business and was as a separate entity. But, the Bank's digital assets were managed exclusively by the Bank. Third, if a separate app was not developed, then how did the breadth and depth of functionality for the credit card customers need to be resolved? GPS employed nontraditional marketing techniques for managing the credit card business of the Bank. It was more of a loyalty program than a pure credit card business and had high focus on customer engagement and experience. GPS generated revenues from its customers (consumers and merchants) by managing installments and other features of credit cards. However, in 2013 and 2014, the banking watchdog of Turkey instituted a series of regulations on credit card providers to curb the prevailing consumer indebtedness in the country. As was the case for all Turkish retail banks and credit card businesses, GPS's profitability was hit severely. Evlioğlu immediately shifted her focus to the idea of transferring GPS's campaign management to a mobile app and driving down costs. But, how best to do that was a critical question.

Using proprietary artificial intelligence technology, startup Tailor Brands set out to democratize branding by allowing small businesses to create their brand identities by automatically generating logos in just minutes at minimal cost with no branding or design skills required. As it sets out to raise its Series B, the founders make some critical changes to their business model, moving to a subscription model and adding additional products and services to automate other parts of the branding and marketing process. Can algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence help Tailor Brands outperform graphic designers and branding agencies in developing brand identities? And, can Tailor Brands differentiate itself from the many other logo generators popping up in the market?

In January 2018, the regional manager of Fairdeal Appliances (Fairdeal) was deliberating the merits of continuing with a selective distribution strategy in Denpasar, Bali. Abdul Electronics, Denpasar’s biggest retail outlet for Fairdeal appliances, had just taken on a dealership for Technica, which was a strong competitor to Fairdeal. However, if Fairdeal responded by approaching additional retail outlets to carry its appliances, it risked an increase in intra-channel competition, which could result in less dealer motivation to sell Fairdeal appliances and an overall reduction in Fairdeal sales in Denpasar. The regional manager also knew that if Fairdeal did not increase its presence through additional retail outlets, it would likely continue to lose sales from Abdul Electronics, but would have no possibility of making up the shortfall. In future, other retailers who sold Fairdeal appliances might also become Technica dealers. Had Fairdeal’s selective distribution strategy run its course? Should Fairdeal open up the market and pursue an intensive distribution strategy? The entire market was waiting for a response from Fairdeal.

In 2017, Uber, a ride-hailing application that was recognized as the world's most valuable start-up, was considering launching the world's first “urban air transport” service—Uber Elevate. Uber's chief product officer needed to convince the new chief executive officer and the board that electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing vehicles were the future of Uber, and to articulate a strategy to launch the service. But was it the right time to proceed with this bold initiative? Uber had recently seen its value plummet following a string of scandals that had forced its founder and chief executive officer to step down. How could the chief product officer ensure that Uber Elevate would be the success that he believed it would be? What steps were needed to ensure success?

In early 2017, Voot was one of India's popular video-on-demand (VOD) service providers of movies and television series. By that time, more than 50 million users had installed the application on the Android mobile platform alone. Voot's parent company, Viacom18 Media Pvt. Ltd. (Viacom 18), was popular for its television channels Rishtey, Colors, MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon, and Comedy Central India. Due to a rise in VOD service providers and a growing number of Internet users in India, VOD consumption had been increasing rapidly; therefore, launching Voot was important for Viacom18 to secure a place in the surging digital market. Even though Viacom18 was already a popular television network service provider at the time of Voot's launch, it was not the first service to enter the VOD market, and its competitors were doing well. Voot had to determine what monetization model to implement and it had to choose a content strategy that would allow it to be competitive in the market, considering its diversified consumer base in terms of language, culture, and economic conditions.

As its Series A extension round approaches, the founders of Hubble, a subscription-based, social-media fueled, direct-to-consumer (DTC) brand of contact lenses, are reflecting on the marketing strategies that have taken them to a valuation of $200 million and debating changes to them that will allow them to grow their business. Ensuring that their marketing dollars were being spent efficiently was critical to the data-driven management team and proving to be complicated as the company moved spending from digital marketing to offline media, which made attribution modeling more difficult. Decisions pertaining to product extensions, channel expansion beyond DTC e-commerce, and geographic expansion were also on the table to prove that Hubble's customer value proposition and operations could profitably scale.

GoPro, Inc. was an American action camera and software manufacturer founded in 2002 by a young entrepreneur. The company introduced innovative action cameras and became a successful brand with the help of content marketing. It continued its innovative spree for more than a decade and was the market leader in the industry. However, in March 2017, the company faced challenges due to product failures and increased competition, and the introduction of new products in the market. GoPro’s stock price dropped as a result of a loss of confidence by both consumers and investors. What strategies could the company adopt to regain its competitive strength and revive confidence in its brand? What could it do to be more innovative and successful, and in doing so, fend off the low-cost competition?

In November 2017, Coca-Cola India Private Limited (Coca-Cola India) laid out a plan for the next summer—the introduction of a whipped frozen fruit dessert. Minute Maid Perfect Fruit, which Coca-Cola India planned to launch in India's top 10 cities in 2018, was to be an extension of the company’s Minute Maid brand. Coca-Cola India also intended to expand Maaza, its fruit drink brand, with two new variants. These extensions were to be part of the company’s strategy to launch a line of Beverage Plus products. Although globally, the parent company first began testing Perfect Fruit in Australia, the frozen dessert market in India would be the first to witness its full-scale launch. The company planned to launch the products at high foot-traffic retail outlets and popular locations for young people. If Coca-Cola India chose to make a foray into the frozen desserts segment, what strategic capabilities could it leverage? What possible obstacles to success could arise in the new product categories? What branding strategies could the company use to promote its products in this segment? Which market segments should the company target? What were the pros and cons of entering this segment? Most importantly, was it the right time to enter this market segment?

In November 2017, Coca-Cola India Private Limited (Coca-Cola India) laid out a plan for the next summer-the introduction of a whipped frozen fruit dessert. Minute Maid Perfect Fruit, which Coca-Cola India planned to launch in India's top 10 cities in 2018, was to be an extension of the company's Minute Maid brand. Coca-Cola India also intended to expand Maaza, its fruit drink brand, with two new variants. These extensions were to be part of the company's strategy to launch a line of Beverage Plus products. Although globally, the parent company first began testing Perfect Fruit in Australia, the frozen dessert market in India would be the first to witness its full-scale launch. The company planned to launch the products at high foot-traffic retail outlets and popular locations for young people. If Coca-Cola India chose to make a foray into the frozen desserts segment, what strategic capabilities could it leverage? What possible obstacles to success could arise in the new product categories? What branding strategies could the company use to promote its products in this segment? Which market segments should the company target? What were the pros and cons of entering this segment? Most importantly, was it the right time to enter this market segment?

GoPro, Inc. was an American action camera and software manufacturer founded in 2002 by a young entrepreneur. The company introduced innovative action cameras and became a successful brand with the help of content marketing. It continued its innovative spree for more than a decade and was the market leader in the industry. However, in March 2017, the company faced challenges due to product failures and increased competition, and the introduction of new products in the market. GoPro's stock price dropped as a result of a loss of confidence by both consumers and investors. What strategies could the company adopt to regain its competitive strength and revive confidence in its brand? What could it do to be more innovative and successful, and in doing so, fend off the low-cost competition?

By early 2018, Seattle-based Amazon.com Inc. (Amazon), one of the world’s most valuable companies and the largest online retailer in the world, had grown dramatically since its beginnings in 1994. The company that had started as an online bookseller now sold merchandise and digital content in more than 30 categories, including electronics, clothing, books, furniture, and streaming music and video. It sold its own products and listed products for sale by over two million third-party sellers. It provided on-demand cloud-computing services and offered fulfillment and shipping services to businesses, and it had recently entered grocery retailing through its purchase of Whole Foods Market. With 2017 shipping costs that exceeded $21 billion, the company was working to establish greater control over its supply chain network and capabilities. Amazon was selling a huge variety of products in many formats, and the chief executive officer needed to determine how to structure the company’s supply chain in order to support its strategy and growth objectives. What supply chain capabilities would Amazon need as its business model continued to evolve?

In 2015, Cerana Beverages Pvt. Ltd. launched Bira 91 (Bira), India’s first handcrafted beer. It was introduced to fill a gap in the market between Indian brands and expensive imported beers. The handcrafted beer was priced lower than several premium beers but was more expensive than the market leaders. This allowed Bira to develop price leadership in the premium beer segment. By setting a new price range, Bira executed “high quality, low price” appeal and became capable of influencing customer product evaluations. With its intention to replicate this pricing strategy in its global expansion, now Bira would have to successfully design a proactive strategy to meet the associated challenges.

In 2015, Cerana Beverages Pvt. Ltd. launched Bira 91 (Bira), India's first handcrafted beer. It was introduced to fill a gap in the market between Indian brands and expensive imported beers. The handcrafted beer was priced lower than several premium beers but was more expensive than the market leaders. This allowed Bira to develop price leadership in the premium beer segment. By setting a new price range, Bira executed "high quality, low price" appeal and became capable of influencing customer product evaluations. With its intention to replicate this pricing strategy in its global expansion, now Bira would have to successfully design a proactive strategy to meet the associated challenges.

TCNS Clothing Company Limited (TCNS), the owner of women's fusion-wear brands W, Weve, Aurelia, and Wishful, had built up a strong retail brand presence in India since its founding in 2002. By 2017, its product innovation, proactive customer need fulfillment, and extensive retail reach had enabled it to grow into a ₹11.5 billion company. The W brand had been building its online presence, but this was still contributing only single-digit shares to sales. Faced with issues of declining loyalty and increasing expectations of digitally influenced consumers, retailers in India were moving toward omni-channel strategies. In early 2018, this seemed to have become an imperative for W as well. Was it now time for W to pursue an omni-channel retail strategy to offer its customers an unbeatable experience? An infusion of funds from two major investors had given the company significant financial muscle to pursue aggressive marketing. Yet, the challenges of going omni-channel were considerable. How should W proceed?

TCNS Clothing Company Limited (TCNS), the owner of women’s fusion-wear brands W, Weve, Aurelia, and Wishful, had built up a strong retail brand presence in India since its founding in 2002. By 2017, its product innovation, proactive customer need fulfillment, and extensive retail reach had enabled it to grow into a ₹11.5 billion company. The W brand had been building its online presence, but this was still contributing only single-digit shares to sales. Faced with issues of declining loyalty and increasing expectations of digitally influenced consumers, retailers in India were moving toward omni-channel strategies. In early 2018, this seemed to have become an imperative for W as well. Was it now time for W to pursue an omni-channel retail strategy to offer its customers an unbeatable experience? An infusion of funds from two major investors had given the company significant financial muscle to pursue aggressive marketing. Yet, the challenges of going omni-channel were considerable. How should W proceed?