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Silicon Valley venture capitalists used to routinely oust start-up founders--who were viewed as green and unskilled--as part of the process leading to an IPO. The author, an adjunct professor at Stanford and a well-known entrepreneurship thinker, describes how VCs gradually came to see founders not as a problem that needed to be solved but as a valuable asset that needed to be retained. In July 2009, when Mark Andreessen cofounded the VC firm Andreessen Horowitz with Ben Horowitz, it was with a key philosophical difference from rival firms: a "founder friendly" focus. Blank argues that this trend has gone too far, and the situation at Uber is just the most obvious example of that. He offers prescriptions for how to begin correcting this power imbalance.

As firms scramble for competitive advantage, boards--once the cautious voices urging management to mitigate risk--are now calling for breakthrough innovation. Indeed, avoiding risk is now seen as the riskiest proposition of all. In speaking with CEOs and board members from a range of industries, the authors identified four common obstacles most boards face in governing innovation: an outdated risk agenda, insufficient time, lack of expertise, and a relationship with management that needs retuning. Embracing innovation and its inherent risks requires that boards and senior management develop new ways of working together. To bolster out-of-the-box thinking at their companies, boards should promote diversity among members. They should foster "creative abrasion" to keep ideas flowing and rethink traditional methods of governing. And they must learn to embrace and encourage risk.

Relative to established organizations, start-ups can be hard to figure out. What are the jobs to be done? The best entry points? How can you tell whether a company has potential for success and is the right fit for you? The author advises that you first assess whether you're suited for a young, entrepreneurial organization. Start-up joiners need to do three things well: manage uncertainty, push the limits, and think like an owner. He then outlines four steps for choosing the right company: Pick a domain (find a field you're passionate about); pick a city (preferably in an entrepreneurial hub); pick a stage ("jungle," "dirt road," or "highway"); and pick a winner (do due diligence on the founding team, the market, and the business model). Once you've made those choices, you'll need to sell yourself, and Bussgang suggests how: Identify key players at the companies you're interested in and find ways to connect with them. When you meet, articulate how you can contribute, engage your interviewers about their work, and offer expertise, advice, or contacts with no expectation of reciprocity. Suddenly you'll be perceived as someone who is already adding value.

As crowdsourcing evolves, new research finds a pitfall companies should be alert to: Consumer voting on the ideas submitted on open innovation platforms is often skewed by social bias, or people's tendency to like and vote for ideas whose progenitors have liked and voted for their own. A study of 87 crowdsourced projects suggests that when evaluating the ideas that are generated through open innovation, companies should rely less on consumer preference and more on their own evaluative criteria. And the right answer may come from tapping a small number of the right people--ones whose specialized expertise makes their views more relevant--rather than from polling a crowd of random idea generators.

By 2016, the BMB Group (BMB) had become the biggest producer of gourmet chocolates and Middle Eastern confectionery in the United Arab Emirates. Making private-label, highly customized confectionery for other brands had proven to be a winning strategy for the company; however, BMB's leaders felt it was time to transition to a business-to-consumer model. Establishing BMB brands was essential to continued growth because management believed the private-label space would soon fill up with competitors. Which market should BMB enter? There were three possible options: (1) go where Middle Eastern sweets were already popular but compete with many producers; (2) target Middle Eastern expatriate populations that might embrace the products and partner with local distributors; or (3) focus on markets where the population showed a preference for sweets but had relatively limited exposure to, or preference for, Middle Eastern sweets, and use BMB brands to set the standard. Would BMB's own brands aid the company's ambitious plans for expansion, or was the firm biting off "more than it could chew?"

In 2017, the German company mymuesli GmbH (mymuesli) was operating in six European countries. Having begun to successfully distribute its customizable organic breakfast cereals online, mymuesli built on its growing popularity by opening stores in various cities across Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where the most popular versions of the product were sold. The relatively young company differentiated itself with its customizable, premium organic products, and relied on its strengths to adapt to lifestyle and health trends. After a conversation in early 2017 with fellow hotel guests hailing from different European countries, the three founders of mymuesli were convinced that entering new countries might be a promising option for the company’s future growth. They began to analyze the maturing industry and its impacts on the company's growth plans.

By 2016, the BMB Group (BMB) had become the biggest producer of gourmet chocolates and Middle Eastern confectionery in the United Arab Emirates. Making private-label, highly customized confectionery for other brands had proven to be a winning strategy for the company; however, BMB’s leaders felt it was time to transition to a business-to-consumer model. Establishing BMB brands was essential to continued growth because management believed the private-label space would soon fill up with competitors. Which market should BMB enter? There were three possible options: (1) go where Middle Eastern sweets were already popular but compete with many producers; (2) target Middle Eastern expatriate populations that might embrace the products and partner with local distributors; or (3) focus on markets where the population showed a preference for sweets but had relatively limited exposure to, or preference for, Middle Eastern sweets, and use BMB brands to set the standard. Would BMB’s own brands aid the company’s ambitious plans for expansion, or was the firm biting off “more than it could chew?”

In 2017, management at Shift, an online marketplace that uses a "high touch," concierge approach to buy and sell used cars, was formulating plans for the San Francisco-based startup's next phase of expansion. One option was to preserve Shift's current business model and grow through geographic expansion. Another option was to decentralize more tasks to sellers and/or buyers, for example, management of inspections and repairs. While decentralizing tasks would reduce Shift's labor per transaction and thereby improve the venture's unit economics and its scalability, Shift might risk undermining users' trust by handing off responsibility for critical tasks.

Founded in 2009 by Tyler Gage and Dan MacCombie, Runa was the result of their experience living with local communities. After six years of operation, Runa had built new markets for teas and energy drinks based on guayusa. Their marketing efforts in the United States had put their products in over 5,800 stores and had doubled their revenues between 2014 and 2015. Tyler and Dan decided to shape their start-up on the principles of fair trade and sustainable business models, with the aim of improving the livelihoods of the Kichwa and contributing to the development and sustainability of the guayusa value chain. Their business had a commercial for-profit branch led by Runa LLC in the United States and Runatarpuna Exportadora S.A. in Ecuador. Fundación Runa in Ecuador and the Runa Foundation in the United States constituted Runa's nonprofit branch. The RG supported the development of local economic capacity by offering producers a 15% premium on all purchased guayusa. This premium was placed in a Fair Trade Social Premium Fund to be administered by the farmer associations. RG increased the incomes and favored the inclusion of small indigenous producers in the guayusa value chain. The foundations focused on research, improvement in the farmers' productive activities and community development, and on the promotion of fair public policies, while the for-profit companies focused on the production, marketing, and sales of the final products for the United States market. From the perspective of RG founders, 2017 would be critical to demonstrate that their business model could be sustainable, and that they could keep on growing as a business while benefiting the farmers and protecting the environment. This teaching case focuses on the challenges and dilemmas of modeling a sustainable business that is founded not only on the pursuit of the entrepreneurial venture's economic consolidation and growth, but also on a multiple stakeholders' view of value creation.

In 2017, the German company mymuesli GmbH (mymuesli) was operating in six European countries. Having begun to successfully distribute its customizable organic breakfast cereals online, mymuesli built on its growing popularity by opening stores in various cities across Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where the most popular versions of the product were sold. The relatively young company differentiated itself with its customizable, premium organic products, and relied on its strengths to adapt to lifestyle and health trends. After a conversation in early 2017 with fellow hotel guests hailing from different European countries, the three founders of mymuesli were convinced that entering new countries might be a promising option for the company's future growth. They began to analyze the maturing industry and its impacts on the company's growth plans.

Joe Morrisroe, executive director for NYC311, had some gut instincts but no definitive answer to the question he was just asked by one of the Mayor's deputies: "Are some communities being underserved by 311? How do we know we are hearing from the right people?" Founded in 2003 as a phone number for residents to dial (311) from a landline for information on city services and to log complaints, the city launched a 311 website and mobile app in 2009, and social media support in 2011. In 2016, NYC311 received over 35 million requests for services and information. Technological progress had made it considerably easier to hear from NYC residents. Were those gains from innovation being shared equally? More recently, the city began using the data to create predictive models that might help direct inspectors and other workers. Morrisroe and his team had considered the potential downsides of agencies relying too heavily on NYC311 data or on its predictive power. In the sheer volume of the data and its potential to enable a new approach to city services, were biases around income, education, race, gender, neighborhood, home ownership, and other factors, hiding too? Morrisroe considered the question posed to him and its implications. He asked for the data and a team to assess it: Are we hearing from everyone?

In January 2012, Alberta-based energy infrastructure business, AltaGas Ltd. (AltaGas),was considering the purchase of U.S.-based green energy power producer Decker Energy International, Inc. The move into renewable energy and into the United States would be a departure for AltaGas, which was primarily focused on traditional energy and infrastructure businesses in Canada. The financial lead on the acquisition project was looking at the assumptions provided. His task was to value the U.S. power producer’s assets and provide feedback on issues that could affect the deal.

In April 2016, the owner of Apoorva Mess (Apoorva) in Manipal, India, wanted to open a full-service economical restaurant to reach out to customers, beat the competition, improve his sales, and fulfil his dream of serving quality food at affordable rates to the lower middle class. He was facing a dilemma over selecting the best location for establishing his new restaurant, knowing that the wrong choice would spell disaster for his business in the long run. A number of conflicting constraints were making it difficult for him to come to a decision. He wanted to follow a systematic approach to pinpoint the final location.

Student spreadsheet for case W17326.

Student spreadsheet for case W17662.

Eastern Bank is a 200-year-old New England mutual bank with a community focus. Eastern specializes in small business lending, having made strategic investments to become the top SBA lender in New England in the midst of the Great Recession, when other banks were pulling back. But with technology threatening to disrupt Eastern's relationship banking model, CEO Bob Rivers is getting worried. Looking to spur innovation at the bank, he set up meetings at MIT to talk with "fintech" entrepreneurs. In a deliberate quest for innovation talent, Rivers finds his way to Dan O'Malley, co-founder of the payments division at Capital One and, most recently, CEO of a failed online bank. O'Malley agrees to join the bank as Chief Digital Officer, leading product development, customer support, and "Eastern Labs"-a new office enclosed by glass walls and located in the middle of Eastern's main lobby. Rivers provides Labs with $4 million annually-1% of gross revenues-to develop new banking technologies, and promises to help O'Malley spin out his own company if he develops product that can be monetized. O'Malley conducts tests in insurance cross-selling and small business lending, eventually launching a completely automated small business lending product. Rivers keeps the promise by helping O'Malley spin out a bank technology company called Numerated, and secures a 25% equity share for Eastern. But by the time of the spin out, Rivers is reassessing the success of the effort. Did Rivers have the right intrapreneurship model? Did he change the culture at Eastern? Did he make a mistake spinning off Numerated into a separate company? What lessons can he learn for "Labs 2.0"?

On June 1, 2016 a student was preparing for a summer job with Agarwal Automobiles, a vehicle fuel station owned by his father. The student had taken courses that covered supply chain management, including inventory management and forecasting. His father had suggested that, as a summer project, the student examine the fuel station’s retail inventory management practices with the intention of replacing the current simple rules with a more rational and complex planning model. The student needed some ideas to use as a guide toward a better ordering policy. The available data for the previous six months suggested that the company held an average ending inventory of ?2.1 million worth of fuel products to maintain average daily sales of ?0.52 million. The challenge was to reduce the inventory levels, while maintaining a high customer service level in fuel sales.

A senior manager at Ergonomica Consulting was under pressure to demonstrate to her client Solltram Hotels that the hotel's investment in LED lighting would provide a payback. Winning the client's buy-in would lead to an extension of the contract with the client, development of a new specialist practice area within Ergonomica Consulting, improvement of the manager’s chances of promotion, and the cementing of her reputation. However, at a critical moment, the manager discovered that a previously hidden error in her main spreadsheet, which contained over two million data points, had resulted in her overestimating the cost savings for the client. Should she conceal the mistake and win the important contract, improving her chances of promotion? Or should she own up to the mistake and risk losing the account, her promotion, and her reputation?

In late 2015, the chairman of Sofame Technologies Inc. (Sofame), a Montreal-based manufacturer and marketer of energy-recapture systems, faced a dilemma. The firm, which transformed the waste heat generated by hot water and exhaust gases into usable energy, had struggled for more than a decade as it coped with low gas prices and a failed carbon credits management subsidiary. Sofame had just been delisted from the stock market and was precariously close to bankruptcy. However, the chairman continued to see value in Sofame and was considering a restructuring plan that involved the acquisition of a New York–based boilermaker that could save the firm. In addition to the financial viability of the acquisition and the difficulty of raising funds, he also needed to consider other issues, including the fact that, as the chairman of a Canadian Crown corporation, he could not preside over a firm undergoing the bankruptcy process.