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Peloton Interactive, a well-known venture-capital-backed unicorn in the connected fitness space, recently had gone public with a market capitalization of over $8.0 billion. However, in the weeks following its public debut, Peloton's stock price had fallen by over 25%. Taylor Knox, an enthusiastic Peloton subscriber, believed that connected fitness products were the future of exercise and he had been excited about the prospect of investing in Peloton. However, given the market's reaction to the company's IPO, Knox understood the need to determine the fundamental value of Peloton's shares, as well as to identify and to evaluate the key risks associated with its innovative business model. Reflecting on the situation, Knox wondered if this was an opportunity to invest in his favorite activity at a discount. Or, did market investors understand something he didn't?

Spreadsheet supplement to case 220060. Peloton Interactive, a well-known unicorn in the connected fitness space, had gone public with a market capitalization of over $8.0 billion. In the weeks following its public debut, Peloton's stock price fell by over 25%. Taylor Knox, a stock analyst and enthusiastic Peloton subscriber, must determine the fundamental value of Peloton's shares, as well as identify and evaluate the key risks associated with its innovative business model.

Supplement for #ST17.

On April 8, 2019, Occidental's CEO Vicki Hollub made a private offer to buy Anadarko Petroleum Corporation for $72 in cash and stock. Anadarko's CEO Al Walker said he would consider the offer, yet three days later, on April 11, he signed a merger agreement with Chevron in a deal worth $65 per share in cash and stock. This agreement included a $1 billion "break-up" (termination) fee payable to Chevron if Anadarko accepted another offer. To avoid losing the deal, Hollub then made an initial public offer to buy Anadarko for $76 per share in cash and stock on April 24. When Anadarko failed to respond, Hollub, revised her offer on May 5. Although the revised offer had the same stated value of $76 per share, it included substantially more cash ($59 per share instead of the original $38 per share). With competing offers on the table, Walker now had to decide whether to accept Chevron's $65 offer or pay the break-up fee and accept Occidental's $76 offer? Of course, once he had made up his mind, he would have to convince his board that it was the right offer to accept and the right price.

On November 14, 2017, Aurora Cannabis Inc. (Aurora) made a proposal to CanniMed Therapeutics Inc. (CanniMed) to acquire all of CanniMed’s issued and outstanding common shares in a share exchange that valued CanniMed’s common shares at a premium of almost 30 per cent over the previous day’s share price. In its proposal, Aurora requested a response from CanniMed’s board of directors by November 17, 2018, in the absence of which it intended to launch a formal, hostile takeover bid. Instead of responding to Aurora’s offer, CanniMed’s board of directors issued a news release advising shareholders to take no action regarding Aurora’s bid and announcing that CanniMed had entered into an agreement to wholly acquire Newstrike Resources Inc. (Newstrike). As a result, Aurora took its bid directly to CanniMed shareholders, with a condition that CanniMed terminate the proposed Newstrike acquisition. Now CanniMed investors had to carefully consider their alternatives: should they tender their shares to Aurora’s bid, or should they hold on to their shares according to the CanniMed board’s recommendation and then decide whether to vote in favour of the Newstrike transaction?

On November 14, 2017, Aurora Cannabis Inc. (Aurora) made a proposal to CanniMed Therapeutics Inc. (CanniMed) to acquire all of CanniMed's issued and outstanding common shares in a share exchange that valued CanniMed's common shares at a premium of almost 30 per cent over the previous day's share price. In its proposal, Aurora requested a response from CanniMed's board of directors by November 17, 2018, in the absence of which it intended to launch a formal, hostile takeover bid. Instead of responding to Aurora's offer, CanniMed's board of directors issued a news release advising shareholders to take no action regarding Aurora's bid and announcing that CanniMed had entered into an agreement to wholly acquire Newstrike Resources Inc. (Newstrike). As a result, Aurora took its bid directly to CanniMed shareholders, with a condition that CanniMed terminate the proposed Newstrike acquisition. Now CanniMed investors had to carefully consider their alternatives: should they tender their shares to Aurora's bid, or should they hold on to their shares according to the CanniMed board's recommendation and then decide whether to vote in favour of the Newstrike transaction?

ArtGo Holdings Limited (HKSE:03313) was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's main board. The company mined marble in mainland China. In July, after MSCI, the index company, announced it would include the stock in the MSCI China All Shares Index, the share price shot up from around HKD2.0 to a high of HKD14.96 in November. Inclusion was expected to result in significant demand for this stock by passive investors. When MSCI announced it would not include ArtGo in its index after all, the share price dropped to HKD0.305 before share trading was halted on the morning of 21 November. Almost HKD46bn, equivalent to 98% of the shareholders' wealth, had been wiped out Stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, one of the world's largest, are famous for their volatility. Without substantial changes in its business or economic outlook, stock prices have been known to go up multiple times. At the same time, it is not unheard of for a stock to lose most of its value within a single day. This case addresses a few interesting and important questions about stock valuation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Stock financing agreements between substantial shareholders and lenders can have a significant effect on the value of listed companies in Hong Kong. The same goes for market news and rumours. How can (minority) shareholders can avoid this kind of tail risk, and what are the problematic risk indicators in such cases? Does the regulator do enough to protect the interest of minority shareholders?

In August 2019, WeWork filed for an initial public offering; investors in its 14 venture capital rounds were anxious for an exit. Softbank had invested US$6 billion in WeWork, including US$2 billion in the Series H round that valued the firm at US$47 billion; consequently, it hoped for a positive reception from Wall Street. While WeWork had 100 per cent recent sales growth, its net income was US$1.9 billion, and it was on pace to spend over US$5 billion in 2019; it needed capital. WeWork's chief executive officer met with SoftBank in Tokyo to discuss a "dramatic reduction in its valuation." Should they proceed with the IPO, even if it required a reduction in its valuation, or should they cancel the IPO and pursue an additional round of private capital?

Student spreadsheet to case W20367

Why do large corporations sell off business units to PE firms that make a fortune by selling them a few years later? The author, a former Rotman School dean, argues that the answer is rooted in the way many corporations value their businesses and projects. Their basic mistake is to compare estimates of future cash flow with the amount of cash put into a business as a capital investment. Although this sounds perfectly reasonable (and largely follows conventional practices for measuring economic value added, or EVA, and its equivalents), it can anchor performance measurement in a historical number that very quickly loses its relevance. As Martin explains, once an investment has been made in an asset, the company's expectations about the value that investment will create are, in effect, publicized. Thus a company assessing the performance of its investment should base its measures not on the cash put in but on the current value of the asset or capability in question, which--and this is the critical point--includes the value that the market already believes the company will create or destroy with that asset or capability. Martin describes an approach that is grounded in market expectations about future value.

In June 2018, Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, Ltd., one of the largest infrastructure and financial services companies in India, shocked the investment community by defaulting on several debt repayments. Its previously highly-rated debt instruments were downgraded, triggering fears of a market liquidity crisis. In an attempt to defuse the crisis, the Government of India appointed an interim board of directors comprised of industry professionals. The new board faced the difficult task of getting the company back on track, but it first needed to answer several questions: What governance and intermediation failures led to this crisis? What was the company's current financial position? What options were available to remedy the situation?

In June 2018, Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, Ltd., one of the largest infrastructure and financial services companies in India, shocked the investment community by defaulting on several debt repayments. Its previously highly-rated debt instruments were downgraded, triggering fears of a market liquidity crisis. In an attempt to defuse the crisis, the Government of India appointed an interim board of directors comprised of industry professionals. The new board faced the difficult task of getting the company back on track, but it first needed to answer several questions: What governance and intermediation failures led to this crisis? What was the company’s current financial position? What options were available to remedy the situation?

This case highlights the rise of China in the global economy and capital markets. Many wealthy individuals and institutional investors in China are seeking better asset management services. As foreign asset managers make strategic plans for China, China's opening of its financial markets provides foreign asset managers opportunities as well as challenges. Specifically, the case deals with how the world largest hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates, LP (Bridgewater), founded by Ray Dalio, develops its China business under its wholly foreign-owned enterprise Bridgewater (China) Investment Management (BCIM). Students are expected to gain understanding of China's capital markets and wealth management industry from the perspective of Yan Wang, the general manager of BCIM, who is deciding how to embark on the next stage in China by reviewing its strategy and product offerings together with all major challenges ahead. Students can determine if the culture, products, and success factors of foreign asset managers work in China and discuss the potential strategies a foreign asset manager may undertake to develop its business in China. In addition, the case can be used for the discussion of the application of diversification, asset allocation, and all-weather strategy in practice and the merits and challenges of investing in the A-share market and RMB assets.

This case examines the key issues facing MetLife, a major company in life and annuity (L&A) and-to a lesser extent-property and casualty (P&C) insurance. The case provides an opportunity to analyze the business models of insurance companies, the main risks they face, and the broad investment strategies they pursue. The case also discusses how technology (including insurtech), regulation, and risk affect MetLife and insurance companies in general, and describes MetLife's history and recent developments. Finally, the case presents an opportunity for a simple valuation of an insurance company using multiples.

Set in January 2020, this case presents Ant Financial's success in promoting financial inclusion in China through its Quick Response (QR) Merchant Growth Plan. Established in 2014, Ant Financial grew out of Alipay, a mobile payment provider that served Alibaba's e-commerce customers. Inheriting Alipay's huge customer base, Ant Financial grew rapidly and in 2019, it dominated 54.2% of China's US$7 trillion mobile payment market. The QR Merchant Growth Plan was launched in May 2018, encouraging merchants to accept QR codes in payments. Also known as QR Merchants, these micro-entrepreneurs typically resided in China's lower tier cities. The Plan progressed from offering 'plain vanilla' business loans to a multi-product suite, and has since served more than 12 million micro businesses. To scale further, Ant Financial has set a bold target of reaching out to 100 million small and micro businesses by 2021. However, China's central bank had announced a new regulation requiring all merchants to use a universal QR code for transactions by 2021. How will it challenge Ant Financial's dominance of the mobile payment market? In the face of impending regulatory pressure, how viable will the QR Merchant Growth Plan be in the mid to long term? Concurrently, Ant Financial's foray into the digitisation of commercial banks presents new business opportunities. Through the provision of 'technology as a service' to banks, Ant Financial's pivot from a competitor to a partner is timely as traditional banks realise the need for digital transformation. But will the new business model work in favour of Ant Financial to bring the next wave of growth?

This case considers a $10 million investment in an outpatient surgery center by a not-for-profit community hospital in rural South Carolina. A member of the purchasing department, R. D. Scott, is invited to complete a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis of the investment opportunity to help quantify the financial costs and benefits of the project in this not-for profit context. The analysis maintains substantial uncertainty regarding a number of key parameters.

Spreadsheet supplement for case UV8031.

Spreadsheet supplement for case UV8031.

In late July 2018, a buy-side analyst at Dimensional Wealth Group (DWG), a privately owned investment management firm, needed to decide whether DWG should increase, decrease, or not change its position in Harley-Davidson Inc. (Harley-Davidson) stock. DWG had been bullish on its Harley-Davidson stock, leading DWG to increase its position in Harley-Davidson substantially over time. However, Harley-Davidson was currently facing several challenges, which suggested that the timing was appropriate for DWG to reconsider its bullish position. How should the analyst determine a suitable recommendation regarding the Harley-Davidson stock?

In late July 2018, a buy-side analyst at Dimensional Wealth Group (DWG), a privately owned investment management firm, needed to decide whether DWG should increase, decrease, or not change its position in Harley-Davidson Inc. (Harley-Davidson) stock. DWG had been bullish on its Harley-Davidson stock, leading DWG to increase its position in Harley-Davidson substantially over time. However, Harley-Davidson was currently facing several challenges, which suggested that the timing was appropriate for DWG to reconsider its bullish position. How should the analyst determine a suitable recommendation regarding the Harley-Davidson stock?