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Market lore recounts a host of fabled asset price bubbles: the Dutch tulip bubble of the 1630s, the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles of 1720, the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, and the global real estate bubble of the mid-2000s. One survey reported the occurrence of some 60 bubbles since the 17th century. Despite their apparent prevalence, asset price bubbles are a challenging theoretical and empirical concept. The aims of this note are to: explore the concept of an asset price bubble; consider some tell-tale signs of a bubble from the standpoints of economic theory, empirical research, and market lore; survey evidence about the existence of bubbles; summarize theories about the causes of bubbles-especially the apparent irrationality of bubbles and the behavior of rational sophisticated investors in buying into them; and finally, highlight some of the regulatory dilemmas that bubbles present. Although the existence of the occasional asset price bubble may seem obvious to the casual observer, this note explains why bubbles are hard to identify and challenging to trade upon.

Debates on issues about the economy, growth, inequality, fiscal responsibility, and financial crises frequently reduce to debates about money. Moreover, debates about money often reduce to the soundness of money, meaning the ability of a unit of currency to retain its value. Eventually, discussions about soundness touch on the classic era of the gold standard. The aims of this note are to (1) describe the mechanism of the international monetary system known as the gold standard during the time that it had the greatest influence on the global economy; (2) place the gold standard in context with other systems that preceded and followed it; and (3) dispel some enduring misconceptions.

Spreadsheet for product 8B19N004.

Spreadsheet to accompany product 9B19N004.

Indus Valley Telecom Ltd. (IVTL) wanted to set up an optical fibre cable plant at its subsidiary, Cosmic Equipment Company Ltd. The general manager of IVTL had hired an outside consulting agency that determined that the project was technically viable. Next, in January 2016, the general manager needed to conduct a comprehensive economic viability study of the project before presenting the proposal to IVTL management for approval. The decision of whether to proceed now depended on the outcome of the economic assessment.

Impax Laboratories was a technology-based pharmaceutical company that used a "dual platform" strategy to sell both generic and branded treatments. While Impax had grown organically for most of its history, it was beginning to use major acquisitions for growth. In the early morning of June 21, 2016, the firm issued a press release announcing it was buying a portfolio of generic drugs from Teva for $586 million in cash. The leadership team (CEO, CFO, and Head of Investor Relations) was now preparing for a conference call with analysts and investors to describe the deal's acquisition price, strategic rationale, and financial impact. Like its first major acquisition-the acquisition of Tower Holdings in 2014 for $700 million-the Teva acquisition was expected to be immediately accretive (i.e., the firm's expected earnings per share in 2016 would increase). Was the leadership team ready to answer the full range of questions investors might ask and to explain the deal's strategic rationale and financial implications in compelling ways? And would investors react as favorably to the Teva announcement as they had when Impax announced the Tower Holdings acquisition-Impax closed up 12% that day?

IExplores events after Impax announced the acquisition of a portfolio of generic pharmaceutical products from Teva in June 2016.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 220030.

As the cofounder and CEO of Whole Foods, John Mackey had spent the better portion of his life rapidly growing the company from a niche natural grocery store in Austin, Texas, into the premier natural-foods grocer in the United States. Highly regarded as industry leader, Whole Foods contributed to the explosion in health-conscious eating sweeping the country. But not all good things lasted forever. Whole Foods had been treading increasingly choppy waters since early 2014. Increased competition in the natural-grocery space and broader macroeconomic factors wore on earnings and contributed to lackluster stock returns. Investors were becoming increasingly frustrated with company's leadership team. By the end of April 2017, Whole Foods had received a number of inquiries from both strategic and financial buyers. A full-blown sale process was launched, and though tech giant Amazon entered the bidding war late, its offer was fast and decisive, not giving Whole Foods much time to contemplate or find a competing bid. Now Mackey faces a decision that will not only shape the fate of his company, but the broader direction of the grocery industry for years or even decades to come.

The case discusses the strategy of Pantheon, a UK-based fund of funds investing in private equity. Client demands and preferences had changed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and Pantheon had to adapt its business model to accommodate requests for new asset classes and customized portfolios. The challenge was to keep an eye on the fee structure, as clients also put pressure on the costs. Pantheon had extended its offer into infrastructure, real assets, and private debt, and had found a way to offer customized portfolio solutions at an acceptable cost level, but the very long-term nature of private asset classes was making it difficult to assess the success of this strategic turnaround.

This note examines the corporate venture capital (CVC) industry, which has played an increasingly large role in the global innovation ecosystem, especially in Silicon Valley, over the last decade. The contents of the note include: a history of CVC beginning in the early 1960s; a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the industry in the late 2010s; a summary of the primary reasons why large corporations establish CVC arms; a framework for balancing strategic and financial value; profiles of three prominent CVC arms; a discussion of the challenges to realizing strategic value; and a process model to improve strategic collaboration.

In 2007, California-based Pannacotta Development had built iPort 12 near two active New Jersey shipping ports for $122 million. Now in 2011, with only one tenant, the property was losing $2.7 million at the operating level, and the project's $76.5 million construction loan was in default. The lender, Bank of America (BofA), had taken control of the property and decided to sell the buildings. The transaction market was at a standstill and BofA knew iPort 12 would certainly sell for less than the loan balance. KTR, one of only a few buyer prospects, was under contract to purchase the project for $53 million-less than half of Pannacotta $122 million cost. It was a heady time for KTR. The fully integrated real estate private equity fund manager specializing in industrial property was sitting on $375 million of uninvested capital from KTR's $700 million second fund, a 2008-vintage vehicle whose investment period was due to expire at the end of 2011. On the heels of the financial crisis, KTR's 2009 and 2010 investments were priced to deliver relatively safe 13 percent IRRs, with potential upside if the market recovered. But the investment market had begun to shift in late 2010. Prices for well-located, leased properties had firmed as the capital markets recovered. In sharp contrast, the market for properties with substantial vacancy was an entirely different story as leasing activity remained depressed. As debt service shortfalls mounted, lenders became impatient, seized control and began selling the distressed collateral for defaulted loans. Buying these properties meant considerably greater risk than KTR's 2009 and 2010 acquisitions. But, with more risk came the prospect of 20 percent or higher IRRs.

China Merchants Bank, the sixth-largest lender in China, intends to boost its family office business as a result of an increase in the population of ultra-high net worth individuals. Already ranked China's number-one private bank with AUM exceeding US$300 billion, the Bank is exploring different ways to cater to the demand from newly minted billionaires and their families, and to maintain its competitiveness in retaining these customers amid fierce competition with domestic and foreign banks. Management also needs to brace for an emerging trend in which super-affluent families opt to reduce their reliance on traditional bankers by setting up independent family offices. The case raises issues in segmentation of private banking, change in organization design, and devising strategies for target customers and value creation.

This case follows Nikos Stathopoulos, Managing Partner of BC Partners, as he and his team evaluate the potential sale of one of BC Partners' portfolio companies, Acuris. Acuris was a global financial intelligence, news, and data company that had been acquired by BC Partners only three years prior. During that time, Stathopoulos and his team had been able to implement a variety of operational improvements and acquisitions which resulted in BC Partners receiving numerous offers for both full and partial sales of the company, at attractive multiples. But the BC Partners team felt there was still more gain to be realized from their value-add initiatives, and there were also several initiatives they had identified but not yet implemented. Stathopoulos had to decide: should they pursue a full sale, partial sale, or no sale at all?

The Indian banking sector had undergone significant changes since 1991 when it was transformed from a highly regulated, predominantly state-owned industry to a more competitive industry with a sizeable presence of private sector banks. However, by 2017, despite reforms implemented by the government, the sector was facing many challenges. The most worrisome problem was an increasing number of non-performing assets (NPAs), particularly among the state-owned banks. Although the Indian economy was one of the fastest growing among larger countries with a stable government, its future growth was compromised by the immediate challenges in the banking sector. What had caused NPAs in the Indian banking sector and how could the problem be addressed?

The Indian banking sector had undergone significant changes since 1991 when it was transformed from a highly regulated, predominantly state-owned industry to a more competitive industry with a sizeable presence of private sector banks. However, by 2017, despite reforms implemented by the government, the sector was facing many challenges. The most worrisome problem was an increasing number of non-performing assets (NPAs), particularly among the state-owned banks. Although the Indian economy was one of the fastest growing among larger countries with a stable government, its future growth was compromised by the immediate challenges in the banking sector. What had caused NPAs in the Indian banking sector and how could the problem be addressed?

In February 1933, President Herbert Hoover reviewed the past four years of his administration. He had met a stock market crash and a recession that worsened into the Depression with actions out of the playbook of Republican "orthodoxy": balanced budgets, tax reduction, protectionism, and community relief based on volunteerism. Yet as the Depression deepened, Hoover pivoted toward policies that pushed the limits of his own philosophy: debt financing of fiscal deficits, government investment in private enterprises, social relief, debt moratoriums, and public works spending to promote employment. None of these actions had halted the worsening economic news. In November 1932, New York governor Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Hoover in the presidential election. Now, in the interregnum before the transfer of office on March 4, 1933, economic conditions turned suddenly worse. Consumers and business leaders deferred spending until the new administration outlined its policies. Hoover sought Roosevelt's support for policies and actions to address the crisis. What should Hoover do or say to elicit that support? The answers lay in careful diagnosis of the problems and prioritization of remedies. Opinion was divided on the question of whether demand shocks or supply shocks had caused the Great Depression-each would dictate different policy actions. What was the appropriate diagnosis? What should be the remedies? The A case presents the dominant narrative; a suggested B case provides correspondence between Hoover and Roosevelt.

Student spreadsheet to case UV7887

Supplement to case UV7888 Following an A case that presents the dominant narrative around the causes and remedies for the Great Depression, this B case provides correspondence between outgoing president Herbert Hoover and president-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1933, economic conditions turned suddenly worse, and opinion was divided on the question of whether demand shocks or supply shocks had caused the Great Depression-each would dictate different policy actions. What was the appropriate diagnosis? What should be the remedies?