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Our case focuses on Da Jiang Innovations (DJI), the Shenzhen-based company that contributed significantly to the growing popularity of civilian drones not only in China, but also globally. It chronicles the genesis and development of the company and its recent efforts to address current challenges and anticipating future competition. DJI within a few years of producing its first drone, cornered more than 70% of the global civilian drone market and emerged as a "decacorn", which are "unicorns" that valued at least US$10 billion. However, with intensifying competition and rapid shifts in technology, DJI's leadership position could erode quickly. Additionally, as concerns about safety, privacy, and security continued to mount, what should DJI do? Our case offers students an opportunity to analyse the challenges and opportunities that confront a new market leader in an emerging industry, in the face of mounting competition and rapid technological shifts from 2017. It also showcases the rise of globally-minded Chinese firms, with DJI as an exemplar. These "born global" firms, also known as micro-multinationals, went global from the start and did not try to build a base in China's domestic markets as their first steps.

In 2017, Ivey Publishing, a publisher and distributor of cases for the academic market, struggled with widespread copyright infringement, which affected its revenue stream. The digital revolution, which had an impact on so many other creative industries, including music, film, and computer software, had also affected the publisher. Ivey Publishing's sales team leader made a call to a business professor to elicit his support in encouraging his students to purchase cases from Ivey Publishing (rather than copying them from other students). Having failed to persuade this professor and others, the sales team leader reflected on what else she could do to strengthen Ivey Publishing's financial performance.

For alliances to sustain themselves, the synergies that are generated between partners must be greater than the conflicts that drive them apart. A good starting point to get to the root cause of conflicts in an alliance is to know your partner's levels of fear and greed. In this article, I first offer a systematic way of evaluating fear and greed and then explain how to classify partners into four types (i.e., easy partner, fearful partner, greedy partner, and risky partner) and position them on a map. This map, the alliance map, highlights key areas of concern for managers dealing with each type of partner. This article offers an integrative perspective on alliance management, incorporating both relationally based and contractually based concerns that help to stabilize, develop, and strengthen the partnership in alliances.

Supplement to case E572. Between 2013 and 2017 PayPal had grown from $8 billion to almost $11 billion in revenues and had a market cap of over $70 billion. In addition, the product and cultural transformations of the organization made the firm feel like an entirely new company from the one that existed several years prior. Outside of the company, major trends continued to impact PayPal: e-commerce conducted on mobile devices in the United States accounted for just under 12 percent of all e-commerce transactions in 2014 and were forecast to rise to almost 45 percent by 2020, thus further changing how customers conducted business and paid for goods and services. The case explores how PayPal leadership has continued to evolve the organization and product lineup in order to compete in an extremely competitive landscape.

Tencent had undergone many transformations since it was founded in 1998 as a simple messaging service. In 2017, it was the largest online games provider in China with a wide range of game types, China's largest social networking service provider with several of the largest social networking applications in the world, and China's favorite Internet portal. It was challenging Alibaba's Alipay as the leader in online payments systems, and it had established strategic relationships with many service providers to help exploit new opportunities in online-to-offline (O2O) services and leverage its huge user base in e-commerce and search. However, there was no room for complacency. Competition from the other big local Internet companies such as Baidu and Alibaba was fierce, and there were always thousands of start-ups looking to enter the sector. Founder and CEO Ma Huateng ("Pony" Ma) remarked, "In America, when you bring an idea to market you usually have several months before competition pops up, allowing you to capture significant market share. In China, you can have hundreds of competitors within the first hours of going live. Ideas are not important in China-execution is."

CyberArk was the recognized leader in the Privileged Account Management (PAM) space, a cybersecurity subsegment it had essentially created to secure organizations' IT systems and sensitive data. Over 17 years, the Israeli company had grown to a market capitalization of over $1.6 billion, with sales exceeding $217 million and 900 global employees with a strong corporate culture. In May 2017, Udi Mokady, founder, chairman, and CEO, debated how best to drive growth. He mulled over whether he should stay the course and remain focused on providing best-of-breed PAM for enterprises, both on-premise and in the cloud, or expand into new markets. Cyber threats were on the rise, which afforded numerous growth opportunities such as entering the broader identity management space, creating new products to protect critical infrastructure, and securing the burgeoning world of the Internet of Things (IoT). This case explores the company's competitive position, the challenges of sustaining its advantages in a highly competitive and consolidating industry, and whether it should pursue organic or inorganic growth, while maintaining company culture.

CEO Hubert Joly has successfully tackled BBY's two main problems - declining comps and margins - and engineered a financial turnaround within his first five years on the job. Now Joly must develop and implement a strategic plan to create a sustainable competitive advantage for Best Buy in the highly competitive, electronic retail industry. With less than 20 percent of revenues coming from online sales, Best Buy is still predominantly a bricks-and-mortar store with an online presence and has not yet transformed into a "bona fide, multi-channel retailer." The case provides an overview of Best Buy's main competitors: Circuit City (now defunct), Walmart, Target, Apple, and Amazon.com. It further highlights the threat emanating from the continuous shift to online retailing.

This case follows John Fernandez, CEO of Massachusetts Eye and Ear, as he evaluates whether or not his organization should join Partners HealthCare, the state's largest healthcare provider. Starting in the mid-2000s, there was a growing trend towards provider consolidation in health care. Many physician practices joined larger groups or hospitals, while independent hospitals integrated into larger health systems. The case explores the causes and consequences of health care consolidation, including the impact of policy reform. It then identifies key costs and benefits for an independent hospital considering an acquisition offer from a major health system. In doing so, it highlights the challenges and opportunities that managers of small providers face in a changing regulatory environment.

Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) was a medical technology firm headquartered in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey, with 43,000 employees and 2016 revenues of $12.5 billion. For several years, the company had pursued development of products that created shared value, defined as those that both generated profits and created positive social impact. One of the primary ways the company advanced such products was through establishing and maintaining public-private partnerships (PPPs) with governmental or non-governmental organizations. In June 2017, Gary Cohen, an Executive Vice President of BD, and Renuka Gadde, Vice President of BD's Global Health function, were deeply engaged in a six-year PPP to bring a new low-cost labor and delivery tool called the Odon Device to market. This device had the potential to avert hundreds of thousands of maternal and newborn deaths, primarily in low-resource settings. Although they had faced many challenges in bringing together multiple organizations to develop and launch the device, Cohen and Gadde were convinced that BD's ability to collaborate with governments and international agencies to address urgent global health needs was a source of competitive advantage for the company. Through these collaborations, BD had strengthened important external relationships and developed a distinctive corporate strategy for its expansion in emerging markets. Cohen, Gadde, and the BD Global Health team were also working to construct a framework for measuring both the social and financial impact of the company's shared value initiatives, starting with the BD Odon Device. Cohen believed that creating shared value was "fundamentally a better way to do business," but he wanted hard data to demonstrate the full economic and social benefit of BD's shared value initiatives. The competition for internal capital and the challenges of taking on new types of products meant that any shared value initiative required a rigorous business case and clear indicators

This case explores the long-term relationship between Tempur Sealy (TPX, a mattress manufacturer) and Mattress Firm (MFRM, a bedding retailer and TPX's largest customer). For almost 20 years, the firms enjoyed a mutually beneficial and commercially prosperous relationship. Yet in August 2016, Steinhoff (a large, South African retailer) made an offer to acquire MFRM. Whether this acquisition will affect the symbiotic relationship that had existed between TPX and MFRM was the subject of intense speculation. While some industry observers believed it would increase MFRM's bargaining power vis-à-vis TPX, others argued it would not alter the balance of power, and that the incentives to collaborate would remain intact.

Analyzes the commercial relationship between Tempur Sealy and Mattress Firm following the events discussed in the (A) case.

Analyzes the commercial relationship between Tempur Sealy and Mattress Firm following the events discussed in the B case.

For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis, Lenovo, the world's largest PC maker, not only fails to increase its revenues and profits, but it has a net loss. Lenovo's market share is still growing, but the PC market itself is shrinking about 5% annually. Lenovo had hoped that the US$2.91 billion acquisition of the Motorola Mobility handset business in 2014 would prove as fruitful as the company's acquisition of IBM's Personal Computing Division a decade earlier. Such hopes proved to be too optimistic, however, as Lenovo faces strong competition in local and international markets. Its position in the Chinese smartphone market dropped from 2nd to 11th between 2014 and 2016, while its worldwide market share shrank from 13% to 4.6%. In 2016, its smartphones group showed an operational loss of US$469 million. At the same time, the global smartphone market quickly lost steam. In response, Lenovo devised a two-pronged strategy of consolidating its core PC business while broadening its product portfolio. The PC group, which focused on desktops, laptops and tablets, aims for improved profitability through market consolidation and product innovation. The smartphones group focuses on positioning the brand, improving margins, streamlining distribution channels and expanding geographical reach. It is not clear, however, how the company could thrive with PCs in decline. Nor is it obvious how it could compete in a tough smartphone market dominated by the international juggernauts Apple and Samsung, and strong local players such as Huawei, Oppo, Vivo and Xiaomi. How could Lenovo best deploy its vast resources?

The "LEGO IN THE AGE OF DIGITIZATION" case is in two parts. Part A provides an opportunity to follow the developments of the LEGO Group in the digital gaming arena. It focuses on the "failure" of LEGO Universe, the LEGO Group's first Massive Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG), versus the success of Minecraft, launched by the start-up Mojang. The LEGO Group followed the traditional waterfall process of sequential phases: design, development, testing and commercialization. The company experienced the issues of partnering with a development studio located in Colorado, far away from the Lego Group's HQ. That caused problems in aligning on the image, branding and safety of the game versus the LEGO Group's values and selling proposition. After years of development, LEGO Universe was finally launched in 2010, but failed to meet the Group's ambition for it to become a second core business. By the end of 2011, a decision had to be made on whether to continue LEGO Universe or to close it. In contrast, Minecraft followed a very different development pattern that could be described as agile, where early users did testing and provided ideas for further development. In addition, the start-up followed a more usual digital pricing scheme of initial low price and add-on purchases. The success of Minecraft is even more in contrast to LEGO Universe because both development projects started around the same time, building on a very similar gaming concept and user experience, but with very different means and development approaches. Part B is an epilogue to Part A. It describes the LEGO Group's decision to close the LEGO Universe game, its learnings on how to embark on digital together with partners, the need to internally develop a unit to manage these partnerships and the conclusion to adopt a "hybrid" approach between waterfall and agile development.

Supplement to case IMD976 The "LEGO IN THE AGE OF DIGITIZATION" case is in two parts. Part A provides an opportunity to follow the developments of the LEGO Group in the digital gaming arena. It focuses on the "failure" of LEGO Universe, the LEGO Group's first Massive Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG), versus the success of Minecraft, launched by the start-up Mojang. The LEGO Group followed the traditional waterfall process of sequential phases: design, development, testing and commercialization. The company experienced the issues of partnering with a development studio located in Colorado, far away from the Lego Group's HQ. That caused problems in aligning on the image, branding and safety of the game versus the LEGO Group's values and selling proposition. After years of development, LEGO Universe was finally launched in 2010, but failed to meet the Group's ambition for it to become a second core business. By the end of 2011, a decision had to be made on whether to continue LEGO Universe or to close it. In contrast, Minecraft followed a very different development pattern that could be described as agile, where early users did testing and provided ideas for further development. In addition, the start-up followed a more usual digital pricing scheme of initial low price and add-on purchases. The success of Minecraft is even more in contrast to LEGO Universe because both development projects started around the same time, building on a very similar gaming concept and user experience, but with very different means and development approaches. Part B is an epilogue to Part A. It describes the LEGO Group's decision to close the LEGO Universe game, its learnings on how to embark on digital together with partners, the need to internally develop a unit to manage these partnerships and the conclusion to adopt a "hybrid" approach between waterfall and agile development.

John Christ is an entrepreneur in his early 20's and the owner of Wil's Grill, a small street food business in Flagstaff, AZ, serving customers throughout Northern Arizona. The critical decision he must make is whether to expand in the street food business, add catering to his existing business, or do something else entirely different to make a livelihood. Wil's Grill was founded in January 2014. $129,000 in revenue had been recognized from January 2014 through December 2016. Wil's Grill was highly portable, and targeted two main markets: 1) college students who were tired of chain-based fast food and wanted good, reasonably priced, late night food, and 2) community events, where organizers and customers wanted reasonably priced, "clean", high quality street food. "Clean" food was characterized by locally produced, organic foods and sustainable practices. In January 2017, John had to decide how he was going to grow revenue if Wil's Grill was to provide him with a livelihood. He was determined to make a strategic decision to either expand his focus on the street food business upon which Wil's Grill was founded, add a catering business, or do something else. The Instructor's Manual offers suggestions for leading a class discussion of these alternatives using both a VRIO (Valuable, Rare, Costly to Imitate and Organized to Capture Value) framework and a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) Analysis framework to evaluate the current resources, capabilities, core competencies, and distinct competitive advantages for this small business. A Venn diagram is used to illustrate the differences between and transferability of resources and capabilities between the street food and catering segments. The Instructor's Manual provides Net Present Value and Breakeven analyses to quantify future revenue growth opportunities. This case provides an opportunity for identifying and defending the "best" strategic decision for this small business.

On April 1, 2016, fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) announced the departure of its creative director who had been responsible for successfully reviving the struggling YSL brand since 2012. Three days after this surprising departure, the company announced that its next creative director would be a relatively inexperienced, 36-year-old designer. After decades of leadership turmoil and financial instability at YSL, the incoming creative director was facing increasing pressure from stakeholders to build off the success that his predecessor had achieved. The global luxury fashion industry had become increasingly competitive, with multiple brands competing for the industry's estimated value of €265 billion in 2017. Had YSL made the right decision in selecting this young director? To help YSL remain one of the top brands in the fashion industry, should the new director implement a strategy that builds upon the successful foundation created by his predecessor, or should he develop new strategies?

The case is based on Ocean Park Corporation (OPC), which manages Ocean Park Hong Kong (OP), the 12th most popular theme park in the world in 2013. Known as "Hong Kong people's park", OPC successfully completed a HKD5.5bn Master Redevelopment Plan in 2012. By mid-2014, it had achieved impressive results: growing attendance by over 10% annually and reaching a surplus of nearly HKD130mn. Its customer profile has become more international, with visitors from Mainland China, in particular, representing an increasing share. The focus on growth led OPC to decide that OP should become an international resort destination, aligned with global industry trends, by developing additional attractions such as an all-year water park, and three hotels. To become a resort destination, the key question was how the management team could ensure that its brand identity was aligned with its entertainment, education, and conservation missions.

In July 2017 Cumulus Media, owner of a nationwide network of 447 radio stations and a syndicated content provider to another 8,200 radio stations, was carrying over $2 billion of debt due to recent acquisitions and shifts in the radio broadcasting industry. Operating cash flow had shrunk by about a third for the 12 months ending March 31, 2017 versus the same period in 2016, following an additional two years of significant declines. Led by Mary Berner, an experienced media executive, Cumulus had established programs to improve employee satisfaction, attempted to refinance Cumulus's term loan, and revamped the company's sales strategy. But at the end of June 2017, it was not clear whether Berner's efforts would be enough to turn Cumulus around.