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BYJU'S The Learning App (BYJU's) is India's largest K-12 education app with about 300,000 annual paid subscribers. The mobile app uses a mix of video lessons and interactive tools to personalize learning for every student. Although there is room to grow exponentially in India, BYJU's decides to enter the U.S. and other English speaking international markets. It believes that United States has a large demand for "better learning", a strong digital payment infrastructure and a willingness to pay subscription fees. At the same time, winning in U.S.'s education market where most students attend public schools and many ed-tech companies are proliferating is challenging. Is it wise to expand to the U.S., even though India presents such a vast untapped opportunity with so many students in need?

Malaysian publicly-listed Hartalega has grown to become one of the world's largest nitrile glove manufacturers. Still predominantly managed by the founder's family, it is renowned for its innovation and quality. Its growth and operational achievements have translated into a stellar financial performance, boosting its stock price 20-fold since 2008 (while the Malaysian stock market has been flat). Among other factors, its success is the result of a commitment to innovation and technology, as well as a competitive strategy that builds upon Hartalega's strengths. Having grown into a billion-dollar company (by market capitalization) and one of the largest glove manufacturers in the world, Hartalega still has ambitious plans to almost triple its production capacity in the next four years. However, the planned expansion comes at a challenging time. First, Hartalega's competitors are enjoying substantial economies of scale and are investing in technology and product quality to rival that of Hartalega. Second, if the expected increase in supply outstrips that of demand, there is a possibility of overcapacity in the glove market, which could shrink margins and harm profitability. In this regard, Hartalega's margins have already fallen by approximately seven percent since 2011. Finally, as Hartalega embarks on its ambitious plan, given its size and complexity, it must transform itself from a traditional family business into a business with a professionalized management and a more formalized structure and governance. Thus, despite its great success, Hartalega is faced with substantial challenges.

The case sets China's Huawei Technologies in the context of the evolving global smartphone industry, notably its positioning and the links between its competitive strategy and its corporate (global) strategy. It describes the origin, growth and structure of the smartphone industry, evolving industry trends and dynamics, and profiles the major players including Apple and Samsung (originally hardware manufacturers), Google and Microsoft (originally software developers), and new entrants such as HTC and Xiaomi. It focuses on the factors behind Huawei's stunning success-from a traditional telecom equipment provider to the third largest smartphone maker in the world (after Samsung and Apple), while pointing to the challenges that lie ahead. The unique characteristics of smartphones- multi-functionality, high degree of technology integration, and fast-moving ecosystems-make them an ideal choice for analysis of industry change. The tale of Huawei-a Chinese telecom giant-entering and succeeding in the highly competitive global smartphone industry allows for discussion of the competitive strategy and organizational transformation of an emerging economy multinational enterprise.

The case discusses the digitalization strategy of Siemens AG, a German-based company operating in manufacturing and electronics. The increasing impact of digital technologies on all of its business units had prompted the CEO Joe Kaeser and his team to put digitalization at the core of the new corporate strategy, alongside electrification and automation. The challenge was to balance this corporate initiative with the many business units within Siemens, which were used to being independent and had very specific offerings for their clients. For its new analytics platform, Siemens had opted for a push and pull approach to involve business units in its creation, rather than conceptualizing the platform centrally and imposing it on the business units afterwards. The jury was still out whether this approach would drive digitalization within Siemens fast enough, given the exponential developments in data generation and analytics.

This "mini-case" summarizes the beloved Chicago Cubs' many years of futility and remarkable turnaround in the early teens of the twenty-first century. Central to the case is the concept that despite being an incredibly popular, billion-dollar franchise holding a special place in the hearts of Chicagoans for more than a century, the organization's sale from the Tribune Company in 2009 to the Ricketts family effectively required a full reboot of the company's infrastructure, akin to a startup or to a "carve-out" situation popular in the private equity world. The case resonates because the brand is easily recognizable in an industry with the unique dynamics of professional sports, and yet the company's situation features similarities to any lower-profile organization trying to build or rebuild its SG&A infrastructure from scratch.

Today, 14% of the world's population (US, Japan and Europe) accounts for over 80% of the medical devices market. Lower income countries (aka the Global South) do not have access to essential medical imaging devices such as X-Ray machines. The main reasons are initial costs, reliability and maintenance. An EPFL-led team of 40 academics and specialists developed a proof-of-concept for a digital radiography machine. It was designed specifically to address the harsh environment and unreliable electrical supply found in the Global South at a tenth of the cost of competitors. Bertrand and Klaus, the two project leaders, have been struggling to find investors to enable their EssentialMed foundation to complete the development and commercialization of the product in Africa. But investors didn't seem to get it. What were they missing? EssentialMed was nearly out of funds, with its one full-time equivalent employee position at risk. EssentialMed desperately needed to raise additional funds but did it have the right strategy, business model and approach to investors? Learning objective: The case can be used to achieve the following learning objectives: 1) How to create and capture value for end users and investors. 2) How to provide access to high capital intensive equipment to low income countries (service instead of product). 3) How to compare and choose financially between different projects (e.g. IRR, NPV, breakeven). 4) How to involve stakeholders in product development (co-creation).

This note gives students a systematic and comprehensive framework for analyzing and managing competitive advantage. It pays explicit attention to both creating and sustaining advantage and considers both alignment and assets (or resources) as sources of advantage.

In September 2014, Tom Montgomery (SVP of strategic initiatives at the De Beers Group) and his team launched a pilot program in the United States to explore the $1 billion diamond market for pre-owned (recycled) diamonds. According to Montgomery, the motivation for the pilot program was to improve the consumer reselling experience and to enhance "diamond equity". Somewhat paradoxically, consumers typically received very low prices when they tried to sell diamonds (5-20% of the original retail price) leaving them reluctant to purchase diamonds in the future and making them into ambassadors of ill will. At a meeting scheduled for November 2015, the De Beers Executive Committee would have to decide whether to end the pilot program, extend it for another year to gather more information, or convert it into a new standalone business unit. Because De Beers had historically focused on producing rough diamonds (the "upstream" business), yet the new business unit offered an opportunity to enter and enhance the market for polished diamonds (the "downstream" business), the decision was particularly noteworthy.

In September 2014, Tom Montgomery (SVP of strategic initiatives at the De Beers Group) and his team launched a pilot program in the United States to explore the $1 billion diamond market for pre-owned (recycled) diamonds. According to Montgomery, the motivation for the pilot program was to improve the consumer reselling experience and to enhance "diamond equity". Somewhat paradoxically, consumers typically received very low prices when they tried to sell diamonds (5-20% of the original retail price) leaving them reluctant to purchase diamonds in the future and making them into ambassadors of ill will. At a meeting scheduled for November 2015, the De Beers Executive Committee would have to decide whether to end the pilot program, extend it for another year to gather more information, or convert it into a new standalone business unit. Because De Beers had historically focused on producing rough diamonds (the "upstream" business), yet the new business unit offered an opportunity to enter and enhance the market for polished diamonds (the "downstream" business), the decision was particularly noteworthy.

At the end of 2003, Clear Channel Communications, Inc., a diversified media group with revenues of $8.9 billion, could claim leadership positions in all three of its main businesses. Clear Channel Broadcasting was the largest radio-station operator in the world, with sales of $3.7 billion and EBITDA of $1.6 billion. Clear Channel Outdoor was the largest outdoor advertiser in the world, with revenues of $2.2 billion generating EBITDA of $581 million. Clear Channel Entertainment was the world's largest live-entertainment promoter with revenues of $2.6 billion and EBITDA of $191 million. Media entrepreneur L. Lowry Mays (MBA 1962) had built Clear Channel through a concerted campaign of acquisitions over 30 years by consolidating fragmented media businesses, delighting shareholders in the process. But maintaining the pace of acquisitions was proving challenging, and the synergies he had hoped for between his businesses had proven elusive. Shareholders were upset. How might Mays return Clear Channel to its former glory?

In 2016, JCDecaux was number one in the world in outdoor advertising. This was a far cry from the situation in 2003; at that time, JCDecaux had been unseated by Clear Channel from the number-one spot that it had held for decades, and it was fighting for second place with OUTFRONT (then owned by Viacom). Over the 12 intervening years, JCDecaux had doubled in size, building leadership positions in China, Japan, Latin America, Africa, and Russia, and in 2010, it had passed Clear Channel to lead the industry once more. Now, co-CEOs Jean-François Decaux and Jean-Charles Decaux were looking for new ways and new places to grow. After the company overtook Clear Channel in 2010, Jean-François had indicated that he believed that another doubling in size was feasible, but it would probably take a major acquisition to do so. And JCDecaux faced more pressing short-term issues. The contract for London bus shelters that the company had won with much fanfare in August 2015 was behind schedule. To make matters worse, the United Kingdom's June 2016 "Brexit" vote to leave the European Union cast a shadow over the project, and the markets reacted negatively. By the start of November, JCDecaux's share price had fallen 21% since the beginning of the year. Just what the economic uncertainty of Brexit would mean for global outdoor advertising in general, and U.K. outdoor advertising in particular, was not clear. Doubling in size in such an environment appeared a daunting task.

IN less than two decades, Netflix has grown from a DVD-by-mail service into a $55-billion-dollar global company. Along the way, it disrupted established industry players and changed how television is watched. Netflix's success has attracted the attention of aggressive competitors like Amazon, HBO, and Hulu. Netflix CEO Reed Hastings must find ways to work with internet service providers (ISPs) to ensure that subscribers can access its content. As Netflix expands internationally (to 190 countries), it also needs to ensure that it invests in the content that will be relevant to its customers. How can Netflix keep subscribers loyal and acquire new ones?

Following the March 2016 launch of DB11, Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd.'s first new sports car platform in over a decade, the case discusses the future strategy of the famed British luxury auto manufacturer. Since its founding in 1902, Aston Martin's has been characterized by leading automotive design of bespoke luxury vehicles. In 2016, CEO Andy Palmer faced decisions about the company's future direction in an automotive industry in the midst of a digital tornado with the arrival of autonomous, internetworked, clean energy-propelled vehicles. Palmer's Second Century Plan called for Aston Martin to diversify into new vehicle categories and increase overall production volume in an effort to boost earnings without compromising Aston Martin's reputation for exclusivity, style, and engineering. As one of the few luxury car companies not backed by a larger automaker, Palmer and Aston Martin faced the challenge of funding development of new vehicles and maintaining a position of leadership in automotive design. "The big question is whether the Second Century Plan has us departing from our traditional role as a sports car and luxury manufacturer and moving into new segments, new businesses," said Palmer in late 2016. "Is that a wise choice? How does a high-end premium provider in any business grow without losing its exclusive reputation? That is the eternal business question."

Beginning in 2013, Humana Inc., headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky, pursued a major organizational transformation, from being an insurance company focused on paying claims to becoming a health and well-being company focused on improving the health of its beneficiaries. The company set a "Bold Goal" of improving the health of the communities it served by 20% by 2020. To achieve this new goal, Humana undertook a multiyear redesign and investment of people, processes, and products in order to gain the trust of consumers and providers, and to partner with communities to improve health. The case focuses on community initiatives, where Humana was developing its new role as "convener of conversations," providing leadership infrastructure and partial funding to spark community planning with a wide range of stakeholders and to design and monitor interventions that were tailored to local health improvement. At the same time, Humana remained a publicly-held corporation accountable to its shareholders for revenue growth and financial return. The case protagonist, Andrew Renda, MD, MPH, Director, Bold Goal Measurement, must design and implement a business plan, including leading and lagging performance metrics, that would measure Humana's progress toward its Bold Goal in ways that supported continued investment in community health improvement in Humana's local markets, while satisfying its traditional business constituents. This case can be used in courses on strategy, community health improvement, the corporate role in public health, and other courses exploring the intersection of business and society. It also offers a rich opportunity to explore the research design and measurement challenges associated with evaluating the impact of public health interventions on local communities.

In 2008, Aarti Joshi, founder and CEO of Modak Analytics, returned to India after working in the data analytics space in the US for seven years. At that time, India's SMEs were unaware of the benefits of using their POS data to differentiate themselves from competition. Hence, Modak Analytics was incorporated to serve these SMEs. However, soon the CEO realized the diminished potential of this target market, which was plagued by wafer thin profit margins, lack of long term strategy for their companies, and lack of awareness towards the benefits of big data analytics. Modak Analytics then started targeting the more attractive BFSI segment. The company soon developed advanced analytics products for this sector. Major ones included Enterprise Data Warehouse, RapidETL product, Master Data Management and Campaign Management System. Modak Analytics' MDM software could help banks to achieve desired differentiation in the marketplace. This was possible due to the unique customer and household profiles that MDM helped create for the bank. The next step in the company's growth ladder came when Modak Analytics was asked by a bank to create profiles of not only its current customers, but also its potential customers. The exercise that started as data collection within the city of Hyderabad in India soon converted into a mammoth exercise when a pan-India political party approached Modak Analytics to do the voter profile analysis for the whole country. This was a herculean task as it involved deciphering the PDFs collected from electoral commission, which were in various languages and very heterogeneous from one state to another. At the time of the case, Modak Analytics was at a crossroads with respect to its future business strategy. Modak Analytics can either specialize in data integration and target the big markets of Europe and the US or it can aim to become a leading data aggregating company in India, given its huge repository of Indian voter profiles.

After decades of continuity, Luse Holdings faced a new challenge in 2015. The company needed to pivot in a changing industry context-specifically, Luse had lost a bid to a non-union competitor for the first time-and CEO and fourth-generation member Steve Luse was considering three primary options: (1) continue as is, while also adding non-union services; (2) sell part of the business to reduce family risk; or (3) sell the entire business to fund other family interests. A fourth possible option was a maximization-of-growth alternative. This decision involved more than business considerations alone. The family's legacy as an industry champion and community philanthropist also required considering all relevant stakeholders, including immediate and extended family, employees, and community. Complicating the situation was the lack of an immediately identifiable successor in the next generation of the Luse family, though several fifth-generation members had completed internships with the business-including Steve's daughter Ashley, a recent MBA graduate. Students will step into Steve's shoes as he considers what recommendations to make to the advisory board six months from now. Students can also take the perspective of Ashley, a rising next-generation member: should she join the family business?

This case analyses Tata Motors' strategic move to create and launch the Tata Nano, exploring the factors behind the project's earlier success and the reasons for its execution failure. It illustrates the importance of having a strong and aligned set of value, profit and people propositions in order to create and capture a blue ocean. The teaching note reviews how Tata Nano created its exceptional value proposition and attained a viable profit proposition by following the right strategic sequence, and then examines different components of Tata Nano's people proposition to identify the major causes of failure in executing its blue ocean strategy. The case comes with a teaching note, lecture slides and a three-part movie based on first-hand research and face-to-face interviews describing Tata Nano's strategic move from conception to execution. The slides and videos can be downloaded for teaching purposes from www.blueoceanstrategy.com The case material is also available in Chinese.

In 2014, Medtronic was about to execute a $50 billion acquisition of Ireland-based Covidien. Medtronic CEO Omar Ishrak was committed to building the largest medical technology company in the world while broadening its ability to fulfill its mission of "alleviating pain, restoring health, and extending life" for millions more patients every year. The acquisition plan might change when, in September 2014, U.S. Secretary Jacob Lew issued new rules for American companies seeking to change their legal domicile through mergers with foreign companies - so-called tax inversion.Should Medtronic proceed with the acquisition? What would be the challenges of integration for both organizations?

Royal DSM CEO Feike Sijbesma was pondering the challenges of shifting DSM's global organization from the constant transformations of the past 100 years to creating organic growth. When Sijbesma took the helm as CEO in 2007, he further pushed and completed the company's final moves away from commodity chemicals and toward more sustainable businesses whereby DSM could create value with differentiated offerings. Sijbesma emphasized innovation and moving into "sunrise" businesses that would fuel future growth by playing a positive role in the broader society. Sijbesma asked himself, did DSM's current portfolio in life sciences and materials sciences provide sufficient growth opportunities to sustain consistent and superior performance? Would DSM's 21,000 employees worldwide embrace the DSM Strategy 2018: "Driving profitable growth through science-based sustainable solutions," anchored via the Lead & Grow support and development program for key managers of the company? Should DSM continue making moves in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to complement organic growth, or could its growth goals be achieved by focusing on organic growth for now, followed later by M&A activities again? What new markets should it look to in order to ensure sustainable growth? Sijbesma felt that after a decade of transformations (divestments and acquisitions), it would be healthy for the company to focus fully on organic growth for several years. During that period the company had already indicated it would divest three of its major holdings in joint venture (JV) companies, which would generate the financial capacity for M&A activities again in later years. In the meantime, Sijbesma wanted the company to prove it could grow organically as well.