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The alliances highlight the fact that companies may not need to own all of the resources, skills, and knowledge necessary to undertake key strategic growth initiatives. When conditions are uncertain and the stakes are high, partnerships can be an attractive alternative to going it alone or to mergers and acquisitions. Accordingly, many companies now maintain alliance portfolios. As a result, executives must manage multiple alliances with diverse partners across the globe simultaneously. However, the skills required to develop and manage alliances are still not well understood. In this article, the authors attempt to address these shortcomings by offering an integrative and holistic framework of alliance management along with practical guidance. Although strategic alliances are often viewed as a critical tool for pursuing growth opportunities, recent survey data suggest that roughly half of alliance portfolios underperform. Although the assessments of performance are subjective, it is fair to say that many alliances fail to live up to expectations. Why? As the authors found in their research, companies move at different rates down the learning curve related to managing alliances. Smaller companies may have advantages in this relative to larger partners because they are usually less complex internally and have stronger incentives to learn. Moreover, the benefits of alliance experience depend on the extent to which the organization can actively capture and leverage its experience (for instance, one partner may be able to draw additional benefits from an alliance, while the other may continue to make the same old mistakes). Hence, the authors argue, companies need to take a holistic and strategic approach. Tesla, for instance, doesn't view its alliances as individual deals but as part of an overall strategy to establish a new standard in automotive technology and, along the way, to gain a competitive advantage.

The case study on Rosneft was written to focus on two central themes, (1) the impact of state ownership on the governance and functioning of large corporations in emerging markets, and (2) the growth of State Owned Multinational Corporations (SOMNCs) in the oil and gas industry. The study offers rich insights into the chaotic founding of Rosneft reflecting events that have a lot of parallels in other emerging markets that have been through transformative economic reforms. It chronicles the actions of two powerful leaders who have shaped the destiny of the company from a grab bag of odds and ends to a modern corporation that has become a global powerhouse in the oil and gas industry. In doing so, the case offers several important lessons both in leadership and strategy especially as it applies to mixed ownership companies in settings where the government plays an instrumental role in directing the destiny of corporations.

China's three National Oil Companies (NOCs) collectively represent a potent force in the world of oil and gas. While they have been mostly focused on domestic priorities since their founding, they started a methodical program of globalization at the behest of the Chinese government in the mid 1990's. By 2016, they had completed a string of overseas acquisitions and seemed poised to gain enough strength to become contenders in the competitive battles against the more established International oil Companies (IOCs). The government had announced its intent to reform the NOCs in order to make them more efficient such that they would be able to compete against the best globally. The idea was to create a Chinese ExxonMobil out of the three NOCs. However, the road ahead appeared rocky. There were three main issues that posed formidable obstacles. First, the governance structure and state control had bred a culture that did not seem ready for transformative change. Political interference and lack of a clear strategic direction were just two of the outcomes associated with the resistive culture. These shortcomings manifested themselves in the second major obstacle namely the instinct to protect resources although the NOCs themselves did not seem to have the technology to monetize the reserves. The slow development of shale was a case in point. Despite controlling the world's largest reserves of shale, China had not been able to come anywhere close to replicating the runaway success that the US had demonstrated. The government had not articulated a clear shale development strategy, and had been dragging its feet with respect to trying imported technology and allowing foreign companies to operate leases. Lastly, there were clouds on the horizon with respect to global expansion as well. The decline in energy prices and a slowing down of domestic economic growth in China had stifled the global march of the NOCs.

This case describes how IKEA's distinctive strategy was formed over a period of about 30 years (late 1940s to late 1970s). It describes how the various elements of its strategy were created gradually, with the help of many people other than the founder Kamprad, and how these elements were ultimately integrated with each other thanks to the creation of IKEA's organizational culture that came much later.

The case illustrates a wide range of strategic and implementation issues that companies face in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), particularly in an emerging market such as China. The three-part case is about Sunac, a real estate company listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), and its various attempts to expand by acquiring other real estate businesses in China. Case (A) describes the overall industry environment, value chain, and analyses of Sunac (the acquirer) and Greentown (the target). It explains the macroeconomic background and the details of proposed transaction in May 2014. Case (B) reveals what happened after Sunac had paid HKD6.3 billion for Greentown. Case (C) describes two further acquisition attempts by Sunac in 2015 - of Kaisa and Yurun.

Supplement to case IN1274. The case illustrates a wide range of strategic and implementation issues that companies face in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), particularly in an emerging market such as China. The three-part case is about Sunac, a real estate company listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), and its various attempts to expand by acquiring other real estate businesses in China. Case (A) describes the overall industry environment, value chain, and analyses of Sunac (the acquirer) and Greentown (the target). It explains the macroeconomic background and the details of proposed transaction in May 2014. Case (B) reveals what happened after Sunac had paid HKD6.3 billion for Greentown. Case (C) describes two further acquisition attempts by Sunac in 2015 - of Kaisa and Yurun.

Supplement to case IN1274. The case illustrates a wide range of strategic and implementation issues that companies face in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), particularly in an emerging market such as China. The three-part case is about Sunac, a real estate company listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), and its various attempts to expand by acquiring other real estate businesses in China. Case (A) describes the overall industry environment, value chain, and analyses of Sunac (the acquirer) and Greentown (the target). It explains the macroeconomic background and the details of proposed transaction in May 2014. Case (B) reveals what happened after Sunac had paid HKD6.3 billion for Greentown. Case (C) describes two further acquisition attempts by Sunac in 2015 - of Kaisa and Yurun.

The Joffrey Ballet is a landmark Chicago nonprofit performing arts organization that helped shape the landscape of American ballet. In 2016, the Joffrey was at a point of transformation after a period of financial crisis and artistic decline. It had successfully raised $4 million for the widely anticipated new production of the Nutcracker. With annual revenues at around $20 million, this production represented a significant investment, and the organization needed to continue its artistic momentum while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The leadership team decided to launch an $80 to $120 all-funds campaign to ensure the artistic and financial health of the organization. Known for its diversity, the Joffrey Ballet had a history of balancing highly athletic performances of canonical works with boundary-blurring new ballets. Founded in New York City in 1954, it carved a niche as the distinctly American company in the ballet ecosystem known for its classical European influences. After its relocation to Chicago in 1995, the ballet relied upon its New York reputation in the face of financial and artistic woes. By 2016, however, the Joffrey Ballet was poised to reemerge as a major player in the national and international dance landscape. It had just celebrated its 60th anniversary and its 20th year in Chicago, and the leadership team debated the essential areas for investment going forward. The endowment, currently at about $1.4 million as of June 30, 2016, needed to be grown. The profitable Academy needed more space and funds to grow, while Community Engagement programs offered the potential for impact in the community. Programming large-scale works from the most important choreographers was essential but costly. In order to attract donors and secure the Joffrey's future, the organization needed to craft a compelling fundraising case supported by a sound business plan.

In 2016, the €75 billion French multinational energy conglomerate ENGIE was massively transforming its strategic and operational imperatives toward renewable energy. The 200-year old company owned Europe's biggest natural gas pipeline and was a major global producer and supplier of natural gas and other energy sources. ENGIE had announced the transformation in 2014-following a sharp drop in global fossil fuel prices-viewing it as the beginning of a new era in energy. ENGIE set goals to double renewable power capacity for Europe over the next decade, rapidly expand its renewable footprint in high growth regions such as India and China, slash its lines of businesses based on commodities, and reduce exploration of oil and gas. CEO Isabelle Kocher's vision followed her belief that "the name of the game was to take the lead in the new energy world." The case is set in mid-2015, when top management, convinced that ENGIE needed to build a strong global portfolio quickly, acquired nine-year old French energy company Solairedirect for €200 million. The acquisition made ENGIE the number one solar company in France and gave it an international presence and product pipeline. Solairedirect had a profitable business model-different from ENGIE's-that enabled it to rapidly build utility scale solar photovoltaic installations at competitive prices. ENGIE believed that buying the smaller company would bring an entrepreneurial spirit and new way of thinking to the company. However, ENGIE had just reorganized along mostly geographical business units, and Solairedirect did not fit into that organizational structure. Also, when ENGIE acquired Solairedirect, the solar company had just experienced an unsuccessful IPO attempt. The questions arose as to whether a company in that situation was a good acquisition target; whether ENGIE paid the right price for it; and how, and to what extent, Solairedirect could or should be integrated into the larger organization.

The chief executive of Barry-Wehmiller, a large maker of industrial equipment, has resolved to run the company via "truly human leadership" in which "success is measured by the way we touch the lives of people." With unusual people practices and a distinctive strategy, the company has generated enviable financial results. During the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the company went to great lengths to avoid layoffs. But as the case opens in 2013, one division of the company faces a sharp downturn, and the head of the division must decide whether to let employees go. In light of Barry-Wehmiller's people practices and strategy, what should he do?

In the summer of 2016, wearables 'wunderkind' and Pebble founder and CEO, Eric Migicovsky, was pleased with the young startup's success in the five years since its founding. The Silicon Valley-based company had recently shipped its two millionth smartwatch; held the record for three of the four highest Kickstarter campaigns ever (raising cumulatively over $40 million on the site); launched its first non-watch product dubbed a "wearables game changer;" and enjoyed a loyal customer base, particularly among technology early adopters and the community of software developers that created applications and watch faces for its products. Nonetheless, the young company faced a variety of challenges. The nascent smartwatch industry recently saw a dramatic uptick in competition. Apple had introduced its smartwatch the prior year; other established technology companies such as Samsung and Motorola offered smartwatches; U.S.-based fitness tracker Fitbit had recently launched its first smartwatch; and Chinese firm, Xiaomi, was soon to release a low-priced smartwatch. Migicovsky considers an array of strategic options as he looks ahead.

CF Industries' products-nitrogen fertilizers-are a crucial input to making agriculture productive enough to feed the world. However, its products are undifferentiated commodities. Throughout parts of its history, CF has struggled to be consistently profitable, yet over the last decade it has been very profitable. The case provides an opportunity to examine how CF manages to create value and capture it as profits despite being in a commodity business.

This module reading explores the implications of different business models on organization design. After discussing the distinction between units focused on work processes and those devoted to markets, the analysis provides insight as to when to organize businesses by function, geography, products, customers, or expert knowledge. The analysis highlights the difference between operating core units designed for efficiency and market-facing units designed for responsiveness. Span of control and span of accountability are introduced as key concepts to direct organizational attention and ensure the effective execution of strategy. While this module is designed to be used alone, it is part of the Strategy Execution series. Taken together, the series forms a complete course that teaches the latest techniques for using performance measurement and control systems to implement strategy. Modules 1 - 4 set out the foundations for strategy implementation. Modules 5 - 10 teach quantitative tools for performance measurement and control. Modules 11 - 15 illustrate the use of these techniques by managers to achieve profit goals and strategies. View the full Strategy Execution series at: hbsp.harvard.edu/strategy-execution.

This module reading explains how managers use information to control critical business processes and outcomes. The analysis begins by illustrating how managers use information to communicate goals and track performance. Then the focus turns to the choices that managers make in monitoring inputs, processes, and outputs. Factors that influence this choice include measurability, cost, cause and effect relationships, and desired levels of innovation. The module concludes by elaborating on the different purposes for which managers use information: decision-making, control, signaling, learning, and external communication. While this module is designed to be used alone, it is part of the Strategy Execution series. Taken together, the series forms a complete course that teaches the latest techniques for using performance measurement and control systems to implement strategy. Modules 1 - 4 set out the foundations for strategy implementation. Modules 5 - 10 teach quantitative tools for performance measurement and control. Modules 11 - 15 illustrate the use of these techniques by managers to achieve profit goals and strategies. View the full Strategy Execution series at: hbsp.harvard.edu/strategyexecution.

Attrition has always been expensive for companies, but in many industries the cost of losing good workers is rising. As a result, firms are intensifying efforts to predict which workers are at high risk of leaving so that managers can try to stop them. New research by CEB looks not just at why workers quit but also at when. Danger points include work anniversaries, big birthdays, and large social gatherings such as class reunions; these are natural occasions for people to measure their progress relative to their expectations and to others. Technology also provides hints about who might be eyeing the exit, and companies sometimes hire outside firms to monitor workers' social media activity for clues. When evidence suggests that an employee might be scouting around, companies shouldn't just wait for the inevitable and then make a counteroffer, the researchers say; a preemptive intervention, such as making the worker aware of attractive internal openings, is more likely to lead to long-term retention.

Set in 2016, this case describes ING Bank's implementation of a radical new way of working using agile principles. ING's agile way of working has been written up in Harvard Business Review, Sloan Management Review and McKinsey Quarterly. This case provides a detailed account of how the new structure was developed and implemented. The case describes the process of change in ING Bank, from the aftermath of the global financial crisis to 2016. It provides background information on two change initiatives (Tango and Less is More) that simplified and rationalised the bank's activities, then it provides a detailed account of the major transformation that became known as RIO ("Redesign into Omnichannel"). It focuses on the choices made by Bart Schlatmann, COO of the Netherlands business, and his team - to pursue an omnichannel strategy (i.e. where all channels to market are linked together and managed seamlessly) and to build an organisation to support this strategy that drew inspiration from digital companies such as Google, Facebook and Amazon. The subsequent restructuring into "agile" teams was a groundbreaking move for a company in the rather conservative banking industry. The case provides lots of detail on how this new model works in practice. After 12 months 3,000 staff had embraced the culture of agile methodology. At the end of the case, Schlatmann had to consider two main questions: (1) How to balance the autonomy of tribes with alignment to the company's strategic objective; and (2) How to roll out agile to other parts of the ING.

What consumers truly value can be difficult to pin down and psychologically complicated. But universal building blocks of value do exist, creating opportunities for companies to improve their performance in existing markets or break into new markets. In the right combinations, the authors' analysis shows, those elements will pay off in stronger customer loyalty, greater consumer willingness to try a particular brand, and sustained revenue growth. Three decades of experience doing consumer research and observation for corporate clients led the authors-all with Bain & Company-to identify 30 "elements of value." Their model traces its conceptual roots to Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of needs" and extends his insights by focusing on people as consumers: describing their behavior around products and services. They arrange the elements in a pyramid according to four kinds of needs, with "functional" at the bottom, followed by "emotional," "life changing," and then "social impact" at the peak. The authors provide real-world examples to demonstrate how companies have used the elements to grow revenue, refine product design to better meet customers' needs, identify where customers perceive strengths and weaknesses, and cross-sell services.

Firms have never known more about their customers, but their innovation processes remain hit-or-miss. Why? According to Christensen and his coauthors, product developers focus too much on building customer profiles and looking for correlations in data. To create offerings that people truly want to buy, firms instead need to home in on the job the customer is trying to get done. Some jobs are little (pass the time); some are big (find a more fulfilling career). When we buy a product, we essentially "hire" it to help us do a job. If it does the job well, we hire it again. If it does a crummy job, we "fire" it and look for something else to solve the problem. Jobs are multifaceted. They're never simply about function; they have powerful social and emotional dimensions. And the circumstances in which customers try to do them are more critical than any buyer characteristics. Consider the experiences of condo developers targeting retirees who wanted to downsize their homes. Sales were weak until the developers realized their business was not construction but transitioning lives. Instead of adding more features to the condos, they created services assisting buyers with the move and with their decisions about what to keep and to discard. Sales took off. The key to successful innovation is identifying jobs that are poorly performed in customers' lives and then designing products, experiences, and processes around those jobs.

High-end professional services firms, unlike product companies, traditionally experience only linear revenue growth. That's because selling more services means adding more professionals, which limits profit margins. However, savvy providers of consulting, legal, accounting, and other services are using technology to their benefit. They are automating certain routine aspects of their work to essentially "productize" those tasks. By combining those products with human attention to matters requiring more knowledge or judgment, they can give clients better service at a lower cost. This article provides a guide to product development for professional services firms. The author describes the three key stages of the process: (1) To "discover potential products," identify opportunities for automation by looking for patterns in your services and zeroing in on the tasks that are performed frequently and require little knowledge. (2) To "develop products," use algorithms and artificial intelligence to create "smart" tools to handle high-volume, low-sophistication tasks. (3) To "monetize your products," stop charging for time and materials, and shift first to transaction-based pricing and then to an outcome-based model. In conjunction with this process, it's important to create a cross-functional team that focuses on product development. And take the long view--you'll have to invest time and money before you reap the benefits of embedding products in services.

For most people, it is not easy to picture the buying and selling of cognitive capabilities that have traditionally been embedded in humans-things like judgment and decision-making. Yet, thanks to recent advances in machine learning, the author argues that precisely such a 'market for intelligence' is on the horizon. Given the potential of this market to transform the entire global economy, he argues, leaders and organizations must begin preparing for its emergence-now.