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Urban Plus Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. was a real estate brokerage company started in 2009 in Gurgaon, India, by a young MBA professional. In February 2010, he was considering the various issues he was faced with in day-to-day business activities. The company provided both resale and new bookings services, with a focus on the residential sector. The resale business was needed for immediate and substantial cash inflows to sustain the company's growth. The new bookings business was also crucial to capture more market share and achieve aggressive growth. However, confronted with multiple hurdles, the company had slow business growth in its initial year. It appeared that handling both types of businesses was becoming a challenge. A recent incident involving one employee's unethical behaviour in a resale transaction had forced the company to carefully consider its strategic plan. What strategy would the company need to compete in its sector and achieve its long term goals?

When Etsy proceeded with an initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange in April 2015, it was the second U.S. company to go public as a certified B Corporation. Etsy's status as a B Corporation meant that social responsibility was ingrained in its mission. However, as an online marketplace for artisanal goods, Etsy faced a number of challenges. Principal among them was the launch of the new online store "Handmade" at Amazon, a direct attack on Etsy. Etsy had a core base of merchants and buyers, but Amazon had significantly more as well as a higher level of financial security than Etsy. Etsy's fast growth had also put pressure on its merchants' ability to offer larger quantities of handmade goods. Many merchants were pressing the company to allow sales from large-scale manufacturing, a path the company had eschewed since its start. Could Etsy find a way to successfully confront these challenges while maintaining its B Corporation ethos?

An entrepreneur contemplated the future of her business that had evolved from a one-woman show to a team of more than 20 highly skilled and specialized coaches from around the world, including some former Cirque du Soleil performers. As chief executive officer and owner, she had taken a community-based gymnastics program and grown it into Flip Factory Inc., a company offering alternative gymnastics activities such as circus-arts and parkour. Its market was customers who wanted experiences outside of traditional competitive gymnastics. She had achieved success in building her company and, despite steep costs and meagre profits, sought further growth. Her coaches were restless to offer a broader range of programs to match their skills. Her facility was at capacity,but, with two years remaining on her lease, she was torn between renting a second location and/or building her own. Could she franchise out her programs to grow the company?

In early 2011, José Manuel Villanueva and Lucas Carné, founders of Privalia, an online fashion discount store, were about to submit to the Board of Directors a strategic plan that could mark the beginning of a new phase in the company's growth. Since its inception in 2006, Privalia had grown at a fast pace: three years later, it was already profitable in Spain and expanded into Italy, Brazil and Mexico. By 2010, it had secured market leadership in every country where it operated. However, the competition grew just as fast, and the experience acquired over recent years indicated that speed and market size proved key in online fashion sales. Privalia already operated in Spain and Italy, but, if it really wanted to become a relevant player in Europe, the company needed to move into the topmost markets like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Villanueva and Carné decided to strengthen Privalia's international expansion by venturing into the German market. Thus far, Privalia's international growth had unfolded organically, via the creation of affiliates in the countries where it had moved into (Italy, Brazil and Mexico). Now, in order to enter the German market, should Privalia set up a subsidiary or should it acquire Dress-for-Less that was up and running in a leading local market position? Villanueva and Carné did not have much time. A board meeting had been scheduled to make a final decision. They needed to design a clear growth strategy, evaluate their options and prepare an entry proposal for Germany.

In early 2011, José Manuel Villanueva and Lucas Carné, founders of Privalia, an online fashion discount store, were about to submit to the Board of Directors a strategic plan that could mark the beginning of a new phase in the company's growth. Since its inception in 2006, Privalia had grown at a fast pace: three years later, it was already profitable in Spain and expanded into Italy, Brazil and Mexico. By 2010, it had secured market leadership in every country where it operated. However, the competition grew just as fast, and the experience acquired over recent years indicated that speed and market size proved key in online fashion sales. Privalia already operated in Spain and Italy, but, if it really wanted to become a relevant player in Europe, the company needed to move into the topmost markets like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Villanueva and Carné decided to strengthen Privalia's international expansion by venturing into the German market. Thus far, Privalia's international growth had unfolded organically, via the creation of affiliates in the countries where it had moved into (Italy, Brazil and Mexico). Now, in order to enter the German market, should Privalia set up a subsidiary or should it acquire Dress-for-Less that was up and running in a leading local market position? Villanueva and Carné did not have much time. A board meeting had been scheduled to make a final decision. They needed to design a clear growth strategy, evaluate their options and prepare an entry proposal for Germany.

In early 2011, José Manuel Villanueva and Lucas Carné, founders of Privalia, an online fashion discount store, were about to submit to the Board of Directors a strategic plan that could mark the beginning of a new phase in the company's growth. Since its inception in 2006, Privalia had grown at a fast pace: three years later, it was already profitable in Spain and expanded into Italy, Brazil and Mexico. By 2010, it had secured market leadership in every country where it operated. However, the competition grew just as fast, and the experience acquired over recent years indicated that speed and market size proved key in online fashion sales. Privalia already operated in Spain and Italy, but, if it really wanted to become a relevant player in Europe, the company needed to move into the topmost markets like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Villanueva and Carné decided to strengthen Privalia's international expansion by venturing into the German market. Thus far, Privalia's international growth had unfolded organically, via the creation of affiliates in the countries where it had moved into (Italy, Brazil and Mexico). Now, in order to enter the German market, should Privalia set up a subsidiary or should it acquire Dress-for-Less that was up and running in a leading local market position? Villanueva and Carné did not have much time. A board meeting had been scheduled to make a final decision. They needed to design a clear growth strategy, evaluate their options and prepare an entry proposal for Germany.

Birgit Skarsgard, head of sustainability and public affairs at Volvo Group, has successfully taken part in the ElectriCity cooperative experiment to integrate electric buses into Sweden's market using KPMG's True Value methodology. This methodology is employed by firms to understand future earnings at risk due to internalization of externalities. As part of the pilot program, Volvo's hometown of Gothenburg, Sweden has accepted electric buses with delight. The question is: Can the company scale the program to the Chinese market where the real opportunity lies? Students are asked how Volvo can leverage the True Value methodology to enter this market.

As this case opens in 2012, a cross-sector alliance to bring new rail transport to the Motor City seems about to collapse, and civic leaders have one last chance to save it. The case covers the rise of Detroit, the city's devastating fall, and the ongoing potential revival of the city. It allows a discussion of what causes cities to thrive and to fail, with a special emphasis on the roles of cross-sector collaboration and transportation infrastructure.

By August 2015, Berlin-based advertising technology venture Roq.ad had grown from a chance encounter between its two co-founders to become a revenue generating operation with 18 full-time employees in Germany and Poland -- in just 10 months. Their goal was to develop new cross-device, user-recognition technology that would enable advertisers to accurately target consumers across a range of devices such as personal computers and peripheral devices. Roq.ad's co-founders had decided from the beginning not to seek out venture capital and instead to retain tight control of their business. Given the lead time needed to develop technology, they had also decided to use an industry-standard agency model for generating revenues that would be used to fund the development of technology and the eventual launch of the program. As Roq.ad approached the end of its first year in business, the co-founders faced an important strategic challenge: How could they successfully transform the company from its initial mobile-advertising agency model to become Europe's number one provider of cross-device, user-recognition technology?

In June 2012, the Kingston, Frontenac, Lennox, and Addington chapter of the United Way had the opportunity to present its views at an upcoming public forum on a proposal to build a casino in Kingston, Ontario. The possibility of a casino in Kingston was a controversial and emotional topic; it was supported by influential business and government leaders but also had many detractors. Pro-casino advocates said a casino would create jobs, spur local business, and contribute millions of tax dollars to municipal coffers. Opponents contended that the social costs of a casino would outweigh the touted economic benefits and that a casino would lead to an increase in problem gambling. City councillors were evenly divided on the issue. For the United Way, many of the proponents and opponents alike were active and financially supportive of the organization. The United Way was asked to take a stand, and yet was hesitant to enter into a political debate. Was it possible for the United Way to uphold its values without alienating pro-business donors and local government officials?

In 2002, a joint venture, Hess LNG, proposed a liquid natural gas import terminal in the city of Fall River, Massachusetts. The community led by the city's mayor, who built a coalition comprising concerned citizens, non-governmental organizations, and politicians at multiple levels opposed the project. From early 2002 to June 2004, multiple issues emerged, and the opponents used various tactics to challenge their adversaries. Hess LNG's chief executive officer needed to deal with the community opposition, which was further complicated by the need for regulatory approval from the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

By 2014, iFLYTEK was a proven leader in the Chinese speech technology industry with over 70 per cent of the domestic market; however, the company's growth had become stagnant. As competitive pressures were rising, iFLYTEK's chief executive officer needed to determine whether the company should continue to pursue its current business-to-business strategy or instead adopt new opportunities in the business-to-consumer market.

Author Joshua S. Gans concedes that disruption is a possibility, but he contends that the link between disruption and failure may not be as strong as many managers believe. In particular, Gans argues that disruption can be averted. "Many businesses find ways of managing through it, and this can weaken any relationship between a disruptive event and the actual disruption,"he writes. The question, Gans says, is whether companies facing disruption are able to counter its effects. He describes three approaches to dealing with market entrants: beating them; joining them; and waiting them out. Beating Them: The first approach involves investing aggressively in new innovations after entrants bring them to market. Although Gans says managers may not know right away whether an entrant's innovation will become a threat, when the situation becomes clear, they must act to protect their market position. He uses the example of Microsoft Corp., which introduced its Internet Explorer in the mid-1990s to compete against Netscape Navigator, which at the time was the dominant product in the browser market. Microsoft created a new division dedicated to defusing the Netscape threat. Joining Them: The idea here is for established businesses to "wait and see"whether a market entrant's innovation improves and becomes a competitive threat. Then, instead of waging war, the existing player can acquire the entrant's business and its products, thereby averting disruption. When disruption is upon them, Gans explains, incumbents realize they will face stiffer competition in the future, so they have an incentive to neutralize the threat. But there are also advantages to disrupters in avoiding a long period of intense competition with an established incumbent. Waiting Them Out: Gans suggests that established players should assess what they have that entrants lack -- entrants rarely have every element of a value chain.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Too often, great products fail because customers do not recognize the value that they create. Although we now have ample insight into how customers evaluate new products, many companies focus primarily on creating value -- without enough regard to how customers recognize innovations and evaluate new products. There are only two ways consumers can collect information, the author notes: They can search, or they can infer. Knowing when consumers will search or infer will help you determine which of your innovations customers will recognize. The Internet has had a profound impact on the way customers evaluate many products. First, it has lowered the cost of search by making information more accessible. Second, the Internet has broadened what is searchable by including customer reviews as well as product features on standard spec sheets. To ensure that customers will recognize the value your products offer, the author recommends focusing on three questions: Are customers motivated to search? Are they able to search effectively? What cues will customers use to infer value?

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Not long ago, companies had to rely in large part on surveys and focus groups to understand what customers liked and didn't like about their products. In recent years, social media and online ratings have given businesses new ways to learn about customers'opinions about their products. Today, however, some of the products themselves -- at least those devices that are part of the connected world of the Internet of Things -- are starting to provide unprecedented levels of information that can be used to improve both the products and the customer experience. In particular, information from connected devices offers companies three tremendously important core pieces of contextual information that were previously unavailable: where the products are being used, how they are being used, and which customers are using them at any given time. Going forward, the authors expect that companies that manufacture smart, connected products will have an advantage in the market. For instance, a company does not have to wait until a customer calls with a complaint to know that a product connected to the Internet of Things is not working correctly; the product has already communicated the information. With this advance knowledge, the company can report an issue to a customer and seek to address it before it becomes a bigger problem. This service call could also turn into a sales call if the company adds a new feature that gives the product additional capabilities.

Groupe Park Avenue (GPA) owns a large group of automotive dealers in Montreal, Canada. The business's origins go back to Norm D. Hébert, who purchased an underperforming Chevrolet dealer on Park Avenue in downtown Montreal in 1959. His son Norman Jr. joined GPA in 1980, when it was still a single dealership. Now, thirty-five years later, GPA owns 20 car dealerships and must adapt to an ever-evolving landscape. Historically "mom and pop" shops, dealerships are increasingly acquired by regional dealer groups such as GPA and by public companies. Indeed, AutoCanada, a Canadian public company, has just purchased a BMW and a MINI dealer in the Montreal market, the first time a consolidator has stepped onto GPA's home turf. Meanwhile, GPA is also changing, with Norman Jr.'s son having recently joined the business. This case, which centres on the interaction between enterprise growth and family ownership, examines the strategic challenges and ownership transition issues facing GPA.

For decades, the five-forces model of competition has dominated the thinking about strategy. But it describes competition among traditional "pipeline" businesses, which succeed by optimizing the activities in their value chains--most of which they own or control. "Platform" businesses that bring together consumers and producers, as Uber, Alibaba, and Airbnb do, require a different approach to strategy. The critical asset of a platform is external--the community of members. The focus shifts from controlling resources to orchestrating them, and firms win by facilitating more external interactions and creating "network effects" that increase the value provided to all participants. In this new world, competition can emerge from seemingly unrelated industries and even from within the platform itself. The authors, three platform strategists, walk executives through the choices they must make when building platforms, outlining the different metrics needed to manage them. Businesses that fail to learn the new rules will struggle, they argue. When a platform enters the marketplace of a pure pipeline business, the platform nearly always wins. That's exactly what happened when the iPhone came on the scene in 2007. By 2015, it accounted for 92% of global profits in mobile phones, while most of the giants that once ruled the industry made no profit at all.

Following the path of companies such as Apple and Amazon, more and more firms are trying to become not just product purveyors but also platform providers, facilitating direct connections between customers and other groups. Although launching a platform can generate new revenue, success is not automatic. After studying more than 20 companies that have tried to move from products to platforms, the authors point to four practices that can separate winners from losers: (1) Start with a defensible product and a critical mass of users. A strong product and a loyal customer base will attract third parties to your platform. (2) Apply a hybrid business model. Instead of operating with a "product mindset" or a "platform mindset" alone, combine the two in order to discover new opportunities for creating value. (3) Drive rapid conversion to the platform. Existing customers are likely to flock to a platform if it provides enough new value, if the additional products and services offered are consistent with your brand, and if users have opportunities to improve both the products and the platform. (4) Deter competitive imitation. Make it tough for rivals to copy your product-to-platform strategy: Consider creating proprietary standards, using exclusivity contracts, and erecting other barriers to competition.

Platform businesses such as Airbnb and Uber have risen to success partly by sidestepping laws and regulations that encumber their traditional competitors. Such rule flouting is what the authors call "spontaneous private deregulation," and it's happening in a growing number of industries. The authors explain that businesses are most vulnerable to spontaneous deregulation when certain conditions hold. One, for example, is when regulations are excessive or outdated, protecting consumers against unlikely risks--and when platform providers offer other means of shielding consumers from harm. Incumbents facing threats from private deregulation can respond by taking legal action to press for enforcement of existing laws. Alternatively, they can embrace aspects of a new entrant's approach--taxi operators, for example, have developed Uber-style apps for ordering rides. Incumbents can also leverage their own strengths to set themselves apart from upstart competitors--that's the tactic that CitizenM, the Pod Hotel, and Yotel are using to woo guests who might otherwise book with Airbnb. If all else fails, incumbents may have to cease operation. But they stand a good chance of avoiding that fate if they address their vulnerabilities early.

Set in April 2014, this case explores some of the important questions confronting Dileep Ranjekar and Anurag Behar, CEOs of the Azim Premji Foundation, which had entered the second decade of its existence with fresh plans and renewed vigor. Ranjekar and Behar had evolved an organizational strategy, after carefully reflecting on the Foundation's past work, that was characterized by the idea of working in an "institutional" mode and not merely in a "programmatic" mode. This meant establishing a long-term presence in the places where the Foundation worked (i.e., disadvantaged districts in the country), and engaging on a continuous and long-term basis with the public education system to facilitate change. Given the trajectory that the management team had set for the Foundation, it was constantly faced with issues related to finding the right people with the required skill sets and mindset, finding field staff to overcome the challenges of working in difficult, far-flung places, and scaling up at the right speed to achieve the desired reach and outcomes. Documenting the evolution and growth of the Foundation, the case brings to light some of the key challenges it faced in scaling up. The case highlights some of the challenges of building a large, professionally managed not-for-profit and the strategic decisions that have to be made to grow it into a sustainable organization.