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Launched in 2000, ASOS was one of the world's largest online fashion specialists in 2016. Focusing on young consumers aged 16-25 years, the company offered over 80,000 items on its websites, many times more than the largest fashion stores, and added several thousand new lines every week. Based in the United Kingdom, ASOS shipped products to 240 countries and territories, and international sales represented more than 50% of total revenues. But when new CEO Nick Beighton took over from founder Nick Robertson in September 2015, he faced some significant challenges. While ASOS was large by online standards, traditional fashion retailers were building their own online sales capabilities, and Amazon was expanding its apparel offering. Meanwhile, new online competitors were emerging at a rapid rate. After ASOS issued several profit warnings in 2014, its growth had slowed to 18% in 2015. Beighton was convinced that ASOS's strategy was right and that the company needed to improve its execution to recapture its historical success. Some analysts were not so sure, and the stock price still had not recovered from its 2014 fall. ASOS' goal was to be "the world's no.1 fashion destination for 20-somethings." Did this lofty ambition make sense? And did ASOS have the right strategy to achieve it?

Explores the phenomenon of software becoming a service. Salesforce.com has catapulted into the lead for offering a customer relationship management (CRM) solution as a Web-based service. Siebel, the leader in CRM packaged software sales, has to devise a strategy to compete with salesforce.com.

On March 1, 2017, Best Buy Company, Inc., North America's largest retailer of consumer electronics and appliances, announced a third year of comparable-store sales increases and a 20.8% increase in domestic comparable online sales. These results were in marked contrast to four years of declining comparable-store sales from 2010 through 2013. The stock price rose 17% in March, and on April 20, 2017, it surpassed $50 for the first time since January 2008. When CEO Hubert Joly took over in September 2012, Best Buy was losing share to Amazon.com, which was encouraging consumers to view products at Best Buy and other physical stores and then buy them for a lower price online, a practice known as "showrooming." Undaunted, Joly had encouraged the practice, convinced that it presented an opportunity to sell to customers as long as Best Buy's prices were competitive. Joly had committed the company to a multi-channel strategy in North America and exited struggling international operations. Operating margins had increased as a result, but growth was still proving elusive. In early 2017, Joly announced that his "Renew Blue" turnaround effort was complete and that he was now intent on creating the New Blue. Would the new strategy be enough to stop Amazon's advances?

Aravind Eye Care System (AECS) had a dream run on the growth path, providing affordable, quality eye care to its patients by building on economies of scale and developing a cross-subsidisation model for financial sustainability. The organisation's mission was 'to eliminate needless blindness' However, emerging demographics and disease profile question the sustainability of the approach taken by the organisation, especially as the organisational strategy, systems and processes were designed for cataract patients. With the increasing proportion of non-cataract patients, top management needs to assess the impact of the'changing patient' on various dimensions of the business model of AECS.

The three cases (Case A: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Opportunity; Case B: JSW Steel's Ispat Acqusition: The Setback & Case C: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Turnaround Strategy) describe the business situation leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW, the acquirer company's failure to realize synergies post-acquisition, and the subsequent turnaround initiatives to salvage the situation. In 2010, JSW Steel, a 14 mtpa Indian steel company acquired Ispat Steel with annual production capacity of 3 mtpa. The acquisition was part of JSW's multipronged strategy to realize its aspiration of being a 40 mtpa firm. At the time of acquisition, Ispat had huge debts, a long pipeline of unfinished projects, high production costs and unpredictable cash flows. Its main plant, Dolvi was shutdown for 45 days. However, the plant also had numerous advantages. It was located near the seashore and was technologically very advanced. Case A describes the events leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW. It captures the facts, opinions and inferences around the acquisition decision, which were used as inputs in the due diligence process to assess synergies between JSW and Ispat. The case describes the economic, competitive, and industry factors prevailing in 2010 when JSW was thinking of acquiring Ispat.

The three cases (Case A: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Opportunity; Case B: JSW Steel's Ispat Acqusition: The Setback & Case C: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Turnaround Strategy) describe the business situation leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW, the acquirer company's failure to realize synergies post-acquisition, and the subsequent turnaround initiatives to salvage the situation. In 2010, JSW Steel, a 14 mtpa Indian steel company acquired Ispat Steel with annual production capacity of 3 mtpa. The acquisition was part of JSW's multipronged strategy to realize its aspiration of being a 40 mtpa firm. At the time of acquisition, Ispat had huge debts, a long pipeline of unfinished projects, high production costs and unpredictable cash flows. Its main plant, Dolvi was shutdown for 45 days. However, the plant also had numerous advantages. It was located near the seashore and was technologically very advanced. Case A describes the events leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW. It captures the facts, opinions and inferences around the acquisition decision, which were used as inputs in the due diligence process to assess synergies between JSW and Ispat. The case describes the economic, competitive, and industry factors prevailing in 2010 when JSW was thinking of acquiring Ispat.

The three cases (Case A: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Opportunity; Case B: JSW Steel's Ispat Acqusition: The Setback & Case C: JSW Steel's Ispat Acquisition: The Turnaround Strategy) describe the business situation leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW, the acquirer company's failure to realize synergies post-acquisition, and the subsequent turnaround initiatives to salvage the situation. In 2010, JSW Steel, a 14 mtpa Indian steel company acquired Ispat Steel with annual production capacity of 3 mtpa. The acquisition was part of JSW's multipronged strategy to realize its aspiration of being a 40 mtpa firm. At the time of acquisition, Ispat had huge debts, a long pipeline of unfinished projects, high production costs and unpredictable cash flows. Its main plant, Dolvi was shutdown for 45 days. However, the plant also had numerous advantages. It was located near the seashore and was technologically very advanced. Case A describes the events leading to acquisition of Ispat by JSW. It captures the facts, opinions and inferences around the acquisition decision, which were used as inputs in the due diligence process to assess synergies between JSW and Ispat. The case describes the economic, competitive, and industry factors prevailing in 2010 when JSW was thinking of acquiring Ispat.

This case describes the knowledge management (KM) initiatives at the level of a unit of one of the largest chemical companies in India. The unit, Tata Chemicals Ltd, Mithapur, has a unique knowledge base accumulated over generations of experiments, trials, and errors. It is in the midst of implementing a rejuvenation plan that has created opportunities for external knowledge assimilation and new knowledge generation. With details on the initiatives for knowledge collection, sharing, measurement of performance and the systems for rewards and recognition, the case provides an opportunity to the participants of a programme on Knowledge Management to analyze the initiatives and make recommendations for the future to the head of Knowledge Management function at the company. The participants would be able to map the realm of knowledge management in an organization and discern - how KM initiatives contributed to the transformation of the organisation from manufacturing centred mind-set to customer focused one.

When Jamie Dimon took over as CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase) in 2005 he reaffirmed the commitment to pursue a "Universal Bank" strategy - providing a full range of products and services to both retail and wholesale clients. Yet the merits of the universal bank had long been disputed. After 2008, the Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession damaged many global and domestic financial services firms. While the Government bailed out universal banks and monoline financial institutions alike, both governments and public clamored for action against banks they deemed "too big to fail." Regulators around the world stepped in to increase capital requirements while the U.S. government passed the Dodd-Frank bill, which improved transparency and accountability, and, with the Volcker Rule, limited banks' ability to pursue proprietary trading. In response, many financial institutions reduced their scope and reshaped their portfolios. In this context, JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the U.S. by assets since 2011, which had successfully weathered the financial crisis in part due to the benefits of diversification, emerged with a ""fortress balance sheet" and an improved position in the banking league tables. Nevertheless, the bank faced pressure from many directions, including large civil fines to settle, analysts' arguments about its "conglomerate discount," and regulation that penalized size, interconnectedness and complexity. Despite the pressure, Jamie Dimon remained vocal in advocating for the value of a broad scope, large scale financial services firm. However, questions remained about the optimal scope of the bank, and how JPMorgan Chase could best allocate resources across its diverse lines of business in the face of new regulations designed to limit size and complexity.

On October 6, 2011, President Barack Obama publicly scolded Bank of America for developing a new revenue stream: a $5 monthly fee for all Bank of America debit card holders, which the bank had announced a month earlier. It was a strategy for replacing lost "swipe fee" revenue following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and accompanying Durbin Amendment, which capped swipe fees at 21 cents per transaction. This was the culmination of three tumultuous years for the world's largest financial services firm, but would not be the end of its public affairs challenges. The president's public critique of Bank of America came in response to-and helped exacerbate-consumer anger about the bank's monthly fee, changes across the banking sector, and general discontent with Wall Street. Bank of America's situation was complicated further by ongoing legal action following acquisitions of Merrill Lynch and Countrywide, which hurt the firm's shareholders and led to large-scale employee layoffs. In this case study, students will be challenged to analyze how Bank of America could have better managed the competing interests of different stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, regulators, customers, and the public.

The Marvel Way: Restoring a Blue Ocean explains one of the greatest turnarounds in modern business history. This case comes with a two-part video interview with then Marvel CEO Peter Cuneo who turned around the business and launched a blue ocean. Founded in 1939, Marvel Comics initially struggled in a red ocean producing primarily me-to knock-off comic books. In the early 1960's Marvel took a blue ocean turn by focusing on noncustomer college students. Marvel invented characters that were people first and superheroes second: Spider-Man, The Hulk, Iron Man, the X-Men. The business thrived. By the 1980's value extractors took over Marvel, badly misaligning value, profit, and people. In late 1996 Marvel filed for bankruptcy, a victim of red ocean management practices. New management purchased the business out of bankruptcy in 1998 but faced a daunting task: Marvel owed $30 million in annual interest payments on a $250 million loan, cash was so tight that they almost missed payroll, and movie rights for many of their best characters were licensed to others. First managers stabilized the business then Marvel created a new type of blue ocean that went on to produce the most profitable movie franchise in history. Just over a decade after exiting bankruptcy a debt-free Marvel sold itself to Disney for $4.2 billion. Exclusive two-part video interview with CEO Peter Cuneo and Lecture Slides can be obtained from https://www.blueoceanstrategy.com/teaching-materials/marvel/ Available in English, Chinese, Spanish and Korean.

IC Group owned several of Scandinavia's leading premium fashion brands. How should it respond to the decline of its primary wholesale distribution channels (independent fashion boutiques and department stores)? Should it open more physical stores or focus on e-commerce? Where should the Group focus its international expansion? How could it best leverage its operating platform to drive the profitability of its brands? Should it acquire existing brands or build new ones itself? In short, what should its "omni-channel retailing" strategy be?

Christina Gomez, energy and sustainability manager for the National Aquarium in Maryland, is looking back at the success the organization has had over the past two years in shrinking its environmental footprint. It is impressive. But bigger challenges lie ahead. The organization has a huge electricity bill, totaling $1.5 million in 2013 alone. She has three options she is considering to lower the bill and green the aquarium's operations further. Students are asked to weigh the pros and cons of each and choose the best solution.

Erica Ocampo, sustainability and advocacy manager at The Dow Chemical Company, is getting ready to present her report on the pilot Energy Bag program to her boss. The waste-to-energy program has been met with success in converting plastics to energy, but Ocampo is wondering how she can take the project a step further and truly make Dow a participant and leader in the circular economy. Students are asked to identify with Ocampo and develop a plan of action for the company.

This brief note explores the critical issues in modern anti-trust policy.

With the advent of big data, the Internet of Things, cognitive computing, and social media, it is becoming more difficult to argue that one could not have known or at least have considered more alternatives, particularly negative unintended consequences that happen in addition to the intended positive ones. Organizations too often make a decision that will produce a positive consequence and then focus on how to implement it, rarely stepping back to ask ''What else could happen?'' Any decision changes the system in which it exists. The longer the time required to implement a decision, the more systemic changes can alter the effects of the decision on the system. Decisions to implement Corporate Social Responsibility and sustainability initiatives usually involve many different stakeholders and may involve systems in which organizations have little expertise or experience. A major negative unintended consequence, even for a CSR initiative, can damage the stakeholders' trust in the organization. This article proposes a 5-step process to answer the question ''What else could happen?'' in order to identify possible unintended negative consequences, thereby helping organizations support their commitment to people, planet, and profit.

Many retail and restaurant companies adopt international expansion as a strategy to take advantage of business opportunities presented by target markets. Common objectives include increasing revenue, escaping a hypercompetitive or saturated home market, entering an emerging or lucrative market, and leveraging domestic capabilities in a bordering country. Success in international expansion is not guaranteed, however; the business world is littered with failures. In this article, we examine the international expansion failures of five service companies that opened physical facilities in a foreign country: Target, Tim Hortons, Best Buy, Tesco, and Walmart. While a variety of factors led to these failures, some common causes have been identified. These include a lack of understanding of the purchasing characteristics of consumers, underestimation of the local competition, supply chain issues, and poor strategic decisions regarding facility location and the rate of expansion. Not all international expansions are failures, though, and herein we also present the success stories of Aldo, Carrefour, and Nordstrom. These companies understood customer preferences and focused on location issues and their supply chains. Based on the aforementioned failures and successes, we offer guidance for companies looking to expand their business operations via a physical presence in a foreign country.

Ramé Hemstreet, vice president for operations and chief sustainable resource officer at Kaiser Permanente, is thinking about climate change and how he can improve the health of the community by fighting it. As a healthcare organization, Kaiser Permanente knows well that fighting climate change can decrease rates of asthma and other respiratory ailments, spread of infectious diseases, heat stress, and injuries from severe weather events. Hemstreet is looking to a power purchase agreement to green its operations, but he needs to persuade executives and the board of directors.

Mekong Capital, a private equity firm based in Vietnam, is considering exiting its stake in restaurant chain operator Golden Gate. Despite robust growth, Golden Gate's profitability is lagging. Students are asked to evaluate the best means of exit and whether operational improvements are required to attract buyers or create the foundation for a successful IPO. Please visit the dedicated case website http://cases.insead.edu/mekong-capital to access supplementary material.