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This four-page update to the case, "The Walt Disney Company and Pixar Inc.: To Acquire or Not to Acquire?" details the Walt Disney Company's acquisition of Pixar, including deal terms, executive appointments, and operating guidelines for the two studios.

Soon after Robert Iger took over as CEO of the Walt Disney Company in late 2005, he turned his attention toward Pixar, the animation studio with which Disney had worked since 1991 and was responsible for producing hits such as Toy Story and Finding Nemo. Disney's own animated film business had been in decline since Jeffrey Katzenberg left to establish rival studio Dreamworks and the business relied on revenue from its partnership with Pixar to maintain performance. With the Co- Production Agreement between the two studios coming to a close in 2006, Pixar was looking to negotiate better terms with another distribution partner. Could Disney risk losing them?

Yelp was a popular on-line destination for reviews of local establishments, written by volunteer Internet users and read by 20 million people per month. However, the company made meager profits. The CEO needs to decide between two options to increase the revenue. First, the company can maintain its existing monetization model and quickly build a massive sales force to enroll many local business owners as advertisers and sponsors. The second option was to change the monetization model completely and charge readers for access to Yelp reviews.

This case is set in 2008 and examines the challenges facing Amit Mehra, Managing Director of Reuters Market Light (RML), a newly formed unit within Thomson Reuters, as he tries to grow the business amid organisational and market upheaval. RML represented a creative venture by Thomson Reuters to leverage its competences and make money at the bottom of the pyramid. Specifically, RML was set up in 2007 to offer customised, localised and personalised weather forecasts, crop prices and local agricultural news via short message service text messages on mobile telephones to rural Indian farmers. To do so, it had to develop an appropriate business model that allowed it to make money in rural India. The case is therefore a perfect vehicle to discuss three interrelated themes: (1) corporate entrepreneurship - how big established companies can grow new ventures next to the established core; (2) playing two games at the same time - how established companies can compete with dual business models; and (3) scaling up a new business - how to grow a new business while protecting it from rival attacks and internal politics.

In tough economic times, some companies have outmaneuvered rivals to become market leaders through value-for-money strategies. That is, they have enabled recession-hit consumers to economize (do less and spend less), become more efficient (do the same for less), or become more effective (do more but spend no more). To implement such a strategy, argue this British professor and Chinese academic, companies must go beyond refining cost-cutting capabilities to develop expertise in cost innovation. That may not be good news for many U.S., European, and Japanese corporations, because multinationals from emerging markets, which have long experience with value-conscious customers, have already built cost-innovation capabilities that are unlocking mass markets in both developing - and developed - countries. Some, like battery maker BYD, have learned to sell high-tech products profitably at mass-market prices through a combination of lower labor costs and manufacturing innovations. Others, like drinks purveyor United Spirits, have dominated industries by blanketing sizable niches in their home markets with a full range of products or customized options. And still others, like appliance manufacturer Haier, have used low-price offerings to turn small, unguarded niches into mass markets in developed countries. In response, the authors argue, Western companies should turn to developing countries for vital lessons in lowering the cost of building brands and developing and manufacturing products. They should enter into alliances with emerging giants to gain cost-innovation capabilities. And they should use their superior financial strength to beat emerging giants at their own game of growing mass markets in developing countries. Multinationals that fail to learn from emerging rivals are unlikely to weather the recession well - or stay competitive for very long.

All companies making big-budget investment decisions face the same basic dilemma: On the one hand, they must make timely, strategic investments to prevent rivals from gaining ground. On the other, they must avoid tying up too much cash in risky projects, especially during times of market uncertainty. The traditional valuation methods - namely, discounted cash flow and real options - fall short in resolving this dilemma. Neither one, on its own, properly incorporates the impact of demand and price volatility in an industry while also taking into account additional investments that the firm and its competitors may make. In this article, Nelson Ferreira, an associate principal at McKinsey & Company in Sao Paulo; Jayanti Kar, an associate at McKinsey & Company in Toronto; and Lenos Trigeorgis, a professor of finance at the University of Cyprus and the president of the Real Options Group, present a valuation tool that overcomes the shortfalls of those analytic approaches. The tool, called option games, combines real options (which predict the evolution of prices and demand) and game theory (which captures competitors' moves) to quantify the value of both flexibility and commitment, allowing managers to make rational choices between alternative investment strategies. Option games will be of particular value to companies facing high-stakes decisions, such as those involving millions of dollars in capital investment, in a volatile environment in which their moves and those of their competitors clearly affect each other.

Below $10,000 per capita, a country's income can grow even in the absence of good institutions. But at higher income levels, as China will soon discover, institutional quality starts to matter quite a lot.

In November 2007, Amazon introduced the Kindle, the first electronic reader with wireless functionality. The case describes the launch of the Kindle and provides information on representative players in the industry (or broader ecosystem) who are likely to be affected, and react: including Penguin (the leading educational publisher), Barnes & Noble (the largest bricks-&-mortar retailer), Apple and Sony (as manufacturers of competing devices), Google (as a major provider of free e-content) and Adobe (as a competitor in creating an e-book standard).

This case sequel is a shorter, more focused, "decision-forcing" version of The Turnaround Artist: Craig Coy Tackles Political Influence at Massport (Case Program, 1896.0). Like its more comprehensive counterpart, it addresses a set of decisions facing Craig Coy, a business executive, retired Coast Guard officer, and former White House security adviser, when he was named executive director of the Massachusetts Port Authority, or "Massport," on April 11, 2002. The appointment came at a time of significant turmoil at Massport, the state authority responsible for managing Boston's Logan International Airport and several other regional transportation resources. The two airline jets hijacked in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 had departed from Logan. Massport had not been responsible for the security practices that had allowed the terrorists to board the jetliners with weapons, but the authority had, in recent years, repeatedly come under fire for political excesses and patronage. These long-tolerated vagaries-when vaulted into the national spotlight-suddenly appeared tawdry and intolerable to state officials and lawmakers. Coy's mandate, when hired a few months later, was to stop to the excesses of the past, to improve safety and security, to run the Authority in businesslike fashion-in sum, to effect a "cultural turnaround." This case describes a string of choices Coy had to make early in his tenure that pertained to the people-management side of his challenge. For example, Coy had to decide the extent to which he wanted to fire top managers at the authority and bring in his own team. He had to find a way to signal the shift to new priorities. And he had to decide what to do when elected officials-whose support was crucial to Massport in a number of respects-called up and asked the authority to hire their constituents. HKS Case Number 1901.1

In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, China's US$5.714 billion outdoor advertising market, like the city itself, underwent a major overhaul. With the advancement of communication technologies, China's outdoor media scene saw the arrival of more and more digital-driven media formats geared toward capturing a population that was increasingly on the move. The government initiative to overhaul the city landscape had facilitated significant consolidation of China's previously decentralized outdoor media market and redefined the competitive landscape, giving rise to a handful of major players. Tulip Mega Media was founded by retired Chinese Olympic swimming champion Zhuang Yong and partner Wang Min in 1998. By July 2008, Tulip Mega Media's footprint not only covered Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, but stretched to a total of some 12 major cities in China. Its head-on competitor, Advision, another Shanghai-based outdoor digital media company, was racing against Tulip Mega Media in acquiring prime media sites and in attracting funding from the capital market. Could Tulip Mega Media rise to the challenge and replicate the success of some of its predecessors, such as Focus Media and AirMedia?

In April 2008, Nintendo was ranked seventh in the annual BusinessWeek-Boston Consulting Group ranking of the world's most innovative companies. The award recognized the company as an innovative design powerhouse that had challenged the prevailing business model of the video game industry with its new video game console, the Wii. The video game console industry traditionally went into a new cycle every five to six years. In 2006, when the newest generation of video game consoles was introduced, Microsoft and Sony had continued with their previous strategies of increasing the computing power of their latest products, the Xbox 360 and the PlayStation 3. This time, however, Nintendo had planned something different. The company believed that the video game industry had been focusing far too much on existing gamers and completely neglecting non-gamers who could well be the source for future growth. Armed with this insight, Nintendo had developed a radically different strategy by producing the Wii, whose processing power was dwarfed by that of the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that Nintendo's Wii was a runaway success. How has Nintendo achieved this success? Has the company really disrupted the video game industry? What course of action is available to Nintendo's competitors?

On one side, a loose network of protesters made arrangements for dramatizing their opposition to the WTO and international trade practices. At the same time, public safety officials from local, state, and federal agencies developed security plans for the public areas near the locus of the ministerial meetings. Their aim was to ensure that the talks proceeded smoothly while preserving the activists' rights to peaceful protest. Throughout the planning process, local leaders operated on the assumption that the tolerant ethos of the Pacific Northwest would prevail. This assumption proved terribly wrong, however, when, on the opening day of the talks, law enforcement officials lost control of the crowds gathered outside the meeting venue. Readers are asked to consider what lessons can be drawn from this ultimately inadequate security planning process. How might security planners have thought differently about how to prepare for the conference? What should they have anticipated in advance? How could they have developed a better awareness of protesters' activities and plans? HKS Case Number 1897.1

On one side, a loose network of protesters made arrangements for dramatizing their opposition to the WTO and international trade practices. At the same time, public safety officials from local, state, and federal agencies developed security plans for the public areas near the locus of the ministerial meetings. Their aim was to ensure that the talks proceeded smoothly while preserving the activists' rights to peaceful protest. Throughout the planning process, local leaders operated on the assumption that the tolerant ethos of the Pacific Northwest would prevail. This assumption proved terribly wrong, however, when, on the opening day of the talks, law enforcement officials lost control of the crowds gathered outside the meeting venue. Readers are asked to consider what lessons can be drawn from this ultimately inadequate security planning process. How might security planners have thought differently about how to prepare for the conference? What should they have anticipated in advance? How could they have developed a better awareness of protesters' activities and plans? HKS Case Number 1897.0

The Cleveland Clinic's health care services are internationally renowned for quality. In 2008, The Clinic began to restructure the organization into teams defined around patient needs, rather than traditional medical specialties."Patients First! takes shape as the teams measure and report outcomes, coordinate care, and develop to support improving value for patients. In addition to restructuring care delivery in the hospitals and throughout northeastern Ohio, The Clinic has investments, facilities, and staff in several other states in the U.S. as well as in Canada and Abu Dhabi. Now in 2015, as the Clinic's domestic and international footprint continues to expand, its leadership is also focused in maintaining the Cleveland Clinic brand and providing optimal clinical care. Students can explore strategy transformation, geographic expansion, the process of introducing new measurement approaches, alignment of activities with strategic goals, and issues in leading change both within a company and across an economic sector.

Managers regularly implement new ideas without evidence to back them up. They act on hunches and often learn very little along the way. That doesn't have to be the case. With the help of broadly available software and some basic investments in building capabilities, managers don't need a PhD in statistics to base consequential decisions on scientifically sound experiments. Some companies with rich consumer-transaction data - Toronto-Dominion, CKE Restaurants, eBay, and others - are routinely testing innovations well outside the realm of product R&D. As randomized testing becomes standard procedure in certain settings (website analysis, for instance), firms learn to apply it in other areas as well. Entire organizations that adopt a "test and learn" culture stand to realize the greatest benefits. That said, firms need to determine when formal testing makes sense. Generally, it's much more applicable to tactical decisions (such as choosing a new store format) than to strategic ones (such as figuring out whether to acquire a business). Tests are useful only if managers define and measure desired outcomes and formulate logical hypotheses about how proposed interventions will play out. To begin incorporating more scientific management into your business, acquaint managers at all levels with your organization's testing process. A shared understanding of what constitutes a valid test - and how it jibes with other processes - helps executives to set expectations and innovators to deliver on them. The process always begins with creating a testable hypothesis. Then the details of the test are designed, which means identifying sites or units to be tested, selecting control groups, and defining test and control situations. After the test is carried out for a specified period, managers analyze the data to determine results and appropriate actions. Results ideally go into a "learning library," so others can benefit from them.

Competing in volatile markets feels a lot like boxing: Punches come from all directions; strategies change constantly; and one powerful blow could knock out your company at any moment. As firms fight their way through tumultuous times, they can learn much from boxing champions. London Business School professor Donald Sull outlines two fundamental approaches to mastering uncertainty - agility and absorption - using the classic "Rumble in the Jungle" between Muhammad Ali and George Foreman to illustrate them. Both capabilities can help companies survive turmoil. Agility, exemplified by Ali, is the ability to quickly spot and exploit opportunities. It comes in one of three forms: operational agility, the capacity to seize opportunities to improve operations and processes within a focused business model; portfolio agility, the ability to shift resources out of less-promising units and into attractive ones; and strategic agility, the ability to jump on game-changing opportunities. Each kind of agility is enhanced by a distinct set of assets and leadership priorities. Absorption, exemplified by Foreman, is the strength to withstand punishment and weather sudden shifts. Sull describes 10 ways that companies can build absorption, including capitalizing on size, diversifying assets, and stockpiling a war chest of cash. Balancing agility and absorption is critical. Apple's iPod is an excellent example of agility, but it was absorption - in the form of a small core of fanatical customers - that kept the company going during the 1990s, when its market share shrank dramatically. Those customers kept Apple alive until changes in context created its golden opportunity. Ali won the Rumble by maintaining his agility while enhancing his absorption. Companies that follow his lead and cultivate both capabilities increase their chances of emerging from turbulence as new market leaders.

To understand the recent trend toward privatization of infrastructure assets (e.g., airports), this article proposes a valuation methodology based on real options and game theory analysis that enables assessing when investors might overpay for infrastructure assets over standard discounted cash flow methods and when a premium is justified for their operating flexibility or strategic growth option value. While some infrastructure asset acquisitions may involve financial transactions whose value derives primarily from their expected cash flows, many of these infrastructure investments provide a platform and create the strategic context within which the firm can grow.