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Euronext.liffe, a derivatives trading exchange, had just finished rolling out three new services targeted at the over-the-counter (OTC) market in 2004. The services offered automated confirmation and clearing for OTC equity derivatives. Yet, developments in the industry seemed to call for a re-evaluation of the exchange's OTC strategy. Describes the exchange and OTC markets for derivatives, Euronext.liffe's existing OTC services, and the other key market participants in 2004. Provides the information needed to evaluate the exchange's existing OTC services and consider other ways in which the exchange could create value for the industry.

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At the time of the millennium, diamond demand was threatened by an increasing awareness among jewelry customers that diamond production and trading in some countries was being linked to growing inequities and human rights violations. This, in turn, had an impact on De Beers' reputation and consumer confidence in the diamond as a product that represented integrity, love, and commitment. In 2000, De Beers' sustainability depends on the ability of its leaders to shift the paradigm of both the firm and its context and embrace a distinctly different strategy.

Colonel Moore reflects on his command of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and its preparation of the United States Army for 21st century adversaries. During his command, Colonel Moore had transformed the regiment from a unit focused on providing conventional force-on-force training as the world-class Opposing Force (OPFOR) to an organization that was preparing to deploy to Iraq to fight the insurgency. He also transformed the very nature of training at the Army's premier Nation Training Center from standard force-on-force conventional battles between two well-equipped adversaries to more complex training scenarios that better reflect the changing nature of warfare that the United States Army was experiencing on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Colonel Moore left his command, he could not help but wonder if the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would successfully meet the challenge of combat operations in Iraq. When the Army tapped the 11th Armored Cavalry regiment for combat duty in Iraq, Colonel Moore could not help but reflect on the changes he made to the OPFOR. Could the Blackhorse adapt successfully to fighting the insurgency in Iraq? Would the National Guard successfully replace the vaunted Blackhorse Regiment as the OPFOR? Was the OPFOR successfully preparing units for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Only time would tell.

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Set in 2004, as Massachusetts Medical Device Industry Council (MassMEDIC) President Tom Sommer contemplates the future direction of a successful medical device cluster association. Focuses on the formation of cluster organizations and their roles and effectiveness, highlighting the importance of these organizations in enabling cross-cluster collaboration between firms, universities, regulators and other government officials, and other institutions. Details the events that led to the formation of MassMEDIC and the initial challenges the organization faced. Discusses the evolution of MassMEDIC's activities, from its formation in 1996 through 2004, and the views of different MassMEDIC stakeholders on the future direction of the organization. Provides detailed data about MassMEDIC and the Massachusetts medical device cluster to enable an evaluation of results and inform future direction.

Companies that sell subscription model, "all-you-can-eat," digital content are boosting profits by carefully manipulating consumption.

Under Jack Welch's leadership, General Electric's managers applied their imaginations relentlessly to the task of making work more efficient. Jeffrey Immelt succeeded Welch as CEO on September 7, 2001, just in time to see the world change. Corporate scandals and terrorist attacks shook the global economy. In this fundamentally altered context, Immelt knew that GE could not simply cling to its status quo. Harvard Business Review offers the first deep look under the hood of Immelt's GE. In a conversation with editor Tom Stewart, Immelt was quick to point out that he is not leading a revolution; productivity is still important. But the new focus is on achieving organic revenue growth--and plenty of it. Immelt has set the audacious goal of increasing annual revenues from GE's existing businesses at two to three times the rate of global GDP growth. Hitting that target will depend on deep cultural change and, in Immelt's words, "making it personal" for every one of his managers. He's not afraid to pull the necessary levers. He has overseen changes to the company's famed talent management process (now, the highest potential executives are the ones who exhibit "growth leadership traits"); established new performance metrics; invested in new marketing capabilities and R&D resources; and created new mechanisms to flag promising ideas. Immelt expects positive results from each of these moves, but the real payoff comes from combining them in a process design he calls "Execute for Growth." It's vital, he believes, to cast growth as a process because that allows him to tap into a traditional strength of the organization--its process orientation--and put it in the service of the new goal. Meanwhile, investors are reassured to the extent that GE's recent stellar organic growth seems like the reliable and repeatable output of a well-designed process.

January 27, 2005, was an extraordinary day for Gillette's James Kilts, the show-stopping turnaround expert known as the "Razor Boss of Boston." Kilts, along with Procter & Gamble chairman Alan Lafley, had just orchestrated a $57 billion acquisition of Gillette by P&G. The creation of the world's largest consumer products company would end Kilts's four-year tenure as CEO of Gillette and bring to a close Gillette's 104-year history as an independent corporate titan in the Boston area. The deal also capped a series of courtships between Gillette and other companies that had waxed and waned at various points throughout Kilts's stewardship of Gillette. But almost immediately after the transaction was announced, P&G and Gillette drew criticism from the media and the state of Massachusetts concerning the terms of the sale. Would this merger actually benefit shareholders, or was it principally a wealth creation vehicle for Kilts?

In June of 2003, PeopleSoft management announced a merger with J.D. Edwards. Within hours of the announcement, Oracle had launched a hostile takeover attempt of PeopleSoft. Oracle's bid raised enormously difficult questions for the PeopleSoft board, questions about whether PeopleSoft products would continue to be supported and customers became reluctant to buy PeopleSoft software. Managers were therefore faced with a decision about how to respond to the bid and the uncertainty it created. To regain customer and analyst confidence, PeopleSoft's board considered adopting a Customer Assurance Program in which customers would receive a cash payment in the event of a takeover. This promise of a cash payment would not only encourage customers to invest in PeopleSoft products, but also created a liability that might be large enough to derail Oracle's takeover attempt altogether. The board therefore had to consider the implications of a Customer Assurance Program for the welfare of the firm, its customers, and its duties to shareholders faced with a tender offer.

Excellence in exploiting customer information and leveraging its affiliation to the GM group are among the strategic options that GMAC Insurance CEO Gary Kusumi is considering. GMAC Insurance, the wholly-owned auto insurance subsidiary of General Motors, formed through the merger of two smaller insurance firms, is at a strategic cross-roads. Progressive changed the competitive landscape with its superior pricing abilities, and now Kusumi must decide whether to compete on the ability to use customer information for pricing or whether even larger rewards could be found in leveraging the connection to the GM family. However, although jointly selling auto insurance and cars is common in many countries, the ability to do so at the GM Group is called into question by several significant organizational stumbling blocks.

In 2006, the DVD was the most popular storage medium in the entertainment and computer industries. The development of high-definition (HD) technology created a need for a format with greater storage capacity. Instead of agreeing on a single standard for a new HD disc, however, key players had formed two rival camps. The Blu-ray and HD-DVD formats each had distinct technical advantages and enjoyed the support of different groups in the consumer electronics, personal computer, and entertainment industries. Set at a time when companies were starting to release products for each format, this case includes a brief history of the format war along with information on the rival camps and their product offerings. Also, covers factors that might affect the future course of this battle, such as the role of copy protection features in HD devices, the bundling of each format with video game consoles, and competing modes of delivering video content.

Traces the development of De Beers and the diamond industry from its inception in the mid-1800s to the year 2000. Discusses De Beer's history and strategy as the industry leader and its role in industry development. Enables deep examination of the interdependence of companies and the locations and communities in which they operate and the role of a company in economic and social development. In 2000, De Beers faces critical choices about both its economic and social policies and how they interrelate.

Describes Infosys Technologies' approach to growing the company by expanding its service offerings; moving up the value chain to offer higher-end consulting services; improving its brand equity and recognition as a global company; increasing revenue through repeat business from the company's client base; and entering client relationships earlier in the lifecycle by defining problems and identifying solutions before implementation. Considers whether Infosys Technologies--through the creation of a wholly owned U.S.-based subsidiary, Infosys Consulting--has created disruptive change in the IT consulting industry by leveraging its competency in global delivery to create a new model that shortens the lifecycle from business consulting to implementation, reduces the costs of a typical client engagement, and delivers measurable benefits to clients. The case is set in early 2006. An overview of the Information Technology (IT) services landscape is provided for this period. The case profiles leading onshore (U.S.) and offshore (Indian) competitors and describes their different approaches to global delivery in the IT consulting industry.

An average of more than 500,000 businesses failed in the United States during each of the 10 recessions that have occurred since the end of World War II. Yet, scholarly and practitioner understanding of how to prepare for and respond to the challenges of an economic downturn remains extremely limited. This article analyzes and synthesizes the information from academic theory and business experience on managing through an economic recession. To assist firms in successfully navigating economic recessions, we suggest a program that involves positioning by holding positions in multiple markets and geographies, planning by developing a turnaround plan for facing sharply declining sales, promoting by maintaining marketing initiatives, and preparing by acting in anticipation of economic recovery.

Presents the performance of Sharp Corp. in 2004. Illustrates Sharp's continuing leadership in the high end LCD market.

In February 2005, the top management of Fuji Television Network, Inc., one of Japan's leading media conglomerates, was informed that a small IT-related company, Livedoor Co., had bought 35% of shares in Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (NBS) with the help of Lehman Brothers, a U.S.-based financial services firm. Fuji TV owned 12.39% of NBS shares and was in the process of acquiring it. What complicated the issue was that NBS' main asset was its 22.5% stake in Fuji TV. The news came as a shock because Livedoor had acquired NBS shares through off-floor trading at the Tokyo Stock Exchange--prohibited by the Securities Exchange Law, unless done for the purposes of a takeover bid. Fuji TV's top management had to take effective measures to counter Livedoor's move. Such measures involved the assistance of legal counselors and the planning department, who studied which legal and effective actions Fuji TV could take against Livedoor and calculated the corporate value of NBS using both American and Japanese methods.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 706-447.

Examines the industry structure and competitive strategy of Coca-Cola and Pepsi over 100 years of rivalry. New challenges in 2006 include boosting flagging carbonated soft drink (CSD) sales and finding new revenue streams. Both firms also began to modify their bottling, pricing, and brand strategies. They looked to emerging international markets to fuel growth and broaden their portfolios of alternate beverages like tea, juice, sports drinks, energy drinks, and bottled water. Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola had vied for the "throat share" of the world's beverage market. The most intense battles of the cola wars were fought over the $66 billion CSD industry in the United States, where the average American consumes 52 gallons of CSD per year. In a "carefully waged competitive struggle," from 1975 to 1995, both Coke and Pepsi had achieved average annual growth of around 10%, as both U.S. and worldwide CSD consumption consistently rose. This cozy situation was threatened in the late 1990s, however, when U.S. CSD consumption declined slightly before reaching what appeared to be a plateau. Considers whether Coke's and Pepsi's era of sustained growth and profitability was coming to a close or whether this apparent slowdown was just another blip in the course of a century of enviable performance.

A 123Systems was a young company that was founded on basic materials science research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A co-founder of the company, Yet-Ming Chiang, was a full professor at MIT and served as scientific adviser. Intellectual property based on the science, which offered a radical way to construct lithium-ion batteries that promised higher energy densities, was licensed from MIT. The concept for the company was based on laboratory demonstrations that the three components of battery cells could be selected and treated so that they would self-assemble (due to intrinsic molecular forces). This resulted in finer battery structures and better performance. Following 14 months of research and development, the company found that it required more time and resources than originally anticipated to take the self-assembled battery to market. However, additional IP for a new cathode material, which presented an intermediate market opportunity, had also been licensed from Chiang's lab at MIT. The new material had advantages over the incumbent electrode material: It met the criteria for self-assembly, and it could replace the electrode in the millions of lithium-ion batteries currently in production. The management team needed to decide whether to pursue the breakthrough self-assembly technology or move resources to commercialize the new electrode material and then return to the original breakthrough technology.