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Mukesh Ambani, the CEO of India's largest business house, Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL), was contemplating a major decision that could significantly affect the future of his company as well as the telecommunications landscape in India. By 2002, GSM (Global System for Mobile) cellular roaming services, based on TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) technology, had become the de facto standard in India. Seeking to find an alternative to GSM, Ambani's telecom team had developed an innovative solution for providing inexpensive roaming cellular services to customers on a nationwide basis using CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology. The required infrastructure for CDMA, which was significantly less costly than that of GSM, was already in place. As an early mover with a competitively priced CDMA offering, Ambani was confident he could capture a large percentage of the market. Reliance had permission from the Indian government to provide local CDMA coverage, yet there was nothing in the law that explicitly prohibited the company from rolling out these services on a more widespread basis to subscribers across the country.

When Robert Labatt took over ezBoard's helm in 2004, he faced a quandary: How to turn the company's essentially free information product into a paid product that would earn enough revenue to satisfy ezBoard's increasingly impatient investors. At the time, the largest hosted online discussion board company in the United States barely broke even. Among other things, Labatt had to develop a new revenue strategy for the company. Explores Labatt's options, focusing in particular on issues surrounding the introduction of an effective subscription model and pricing strategy. After providing the necessary background, asks readers to determine what they would do if they were in Labatt's shoes.

Describes a simplified economic model that serves as a vehicle for understanding the strategic and possibly anticompetitive aspects of product proliferation.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 706408.

Managers must reconsider their preconceptions about conglomerates, or multi-industry firms as they are now often called, because today's examples have much to teach us about successful corporate strategy. We examined the strategies of the largest conglomerates that have, for a sustained period, practiced the form. Four archetypes are available to managers for adding value to a broad portfolio of businesses. In top-performing firms, the bewildering diversity of end products can blind the casual observer to the intense focus of headquarters and the tight cohesion among the head office, the businesses, and the environment.

In October 2004, Mark S. Mastrov, CEO of 24 Hour Fitness, reflected on how far his company had come in just over 20 years. From humble beginnings in 1983 in San Leandro, California, 24 Hour Fitness had grown to become the largest privately-owned health-club chain in the world. The company operated 346 clubs in 15 U.S. states and 10 countries, and it employed 16,000, serving 3 million members. Revenues exceeded $1 billion. The challenge ahead for Mastrov was making choices in the face of so many opportunities. Should he focus the business on the domestic market and expand into the many states the company had not entered yet or devote more resources to international expansion? If he decided to expand into the Northeast, how should the company enter against entrenched competitors like Bally Total Fitness? Would a major acquisition make sense, or would it threaten the company's culture? And how should he fund such an acquisition? An IPO had many attractions, but it would expose the company to a whole new set of challenges.

Highlights the potential value of customer data and the choices and challenges the firm faces when attempting to capture this value. Carnival collects a significant amount of individual-level behavioral and demographic customer data. Senior management must now decide how to leverage such a wealth of data to improve firm performance through customer targeting and acquisition, customer retention, and customer profitability strategies.

In the early 1970s, when Canon took its first halting steps in reprographics, the idea of a fledgling Japanese company challenging Xerox seemed impossible. Fifteen years later, it matched the U.S. giant in global unit market share. The basis for Canon's success? A different approach to strategy, one that emphasized an organization's resourcefulness above the resources it controlled. In this McKinsey Award-winning article, first published in May 1989, Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad explain that Western companies have wasted too much time and energy replicating the cost and quality advantages their global competitors already experience. Familiar concepts like strategic fit and competitive advantage can foster a static approach to competition, while familiar techniques like portfolio planning and competitor analysis lead to strategies that rivals can easily decode. The sum total is a pathology of surrender that leads many managers to abandon businesses instead of build them. Canon and other world-class competitors have taken a different approach to strategy: one of strategic intent. They begin with a goal that exceeds the company's present grasp and existing resources: "Beat Xerox"; "encircle Caterpillar." Then they rally the organization to close the gap by setting challenges that focus employees' efforts in the near to medium term: "Build a personal copier to sell for $1,000"; "cut product development time by 75%." Year after year, they emphasize competitive innovation--building a portfolio of competitive advantages; searching markets for "loose bricks" that rivals have left underdefended; changing the terms of competitive engagement to avoid playing by the leader's rules. The result is a global leadership position and an approach to competition that has reduced larger, stronger Western rivals to playing an endless game of catch-up.

Executives know that a company's measurement systems strongly affect employee behaviors. But the traditional financial performance measures that worked for the industrial era are out of sync with the skills organizations are trying to master. Frustrated by these inadequacies, some man­agers have abandoned financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share. "Make operational improvements, and the numbers will follow," the argument goes. But managers want a balanced presentation of measures that will allow them to view the company from several perspectives at once. In this classic article from 1992, authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton propose an innovative solution. During a yearlong research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance management, the authors developed a "balanced scorecard," a new performance measurement system that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of their business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements those financial measures with three sets of operational measures related to customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's ability to learn and improve-the activities that drive future financial performance. The balanced scorecard helps managers look at their businesses from four essential perspectives and answer some important questions. First, How do customers see us? Second, What must we excel at? Third, Can we continue to improve and create value? And fourth, How do we appear to shareholders? By looking at all of these parameters, managers can determine whether improvements in one area have come at the expense of another. Armed with that knowledge, the authors say, executives can glean a complete picture of where the company stands-and where it's headed.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in reprints R0507A and R0507Z are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in reprints R0507A and R0507Z are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0507A and R0507Z, are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

What does it mean to be a high-performance company? The process of measuring relative performance across industries and eras, declaring top performers, and finding the common drivers of their success is such a difficult one that it might seem a fool's errand to attempt. In fact, no one did for the first thousand or so years of business history. The question didn't even occur to many scholars until Tom Peters and Bob Waterman released In Search of Excellence in 1982. Twenty-three years later, we've witnessed several more attempts--and, just maybe, we're getting closer to answers. In this reported piece, HBR senior editor Julia Kirby explores why it's so difficult to study high performance and how various research efforts--including those from John Kotter and Jim Heskett; Jim Collins and Jerry Porras; Bill Joyce, Nitin Nohria, and Bruce Roberson; and several others outlined in a summary chart--have attacked the problem. The challenge starts with deciding which companies to study closely. Are the stars the ones with the highest market caps, the ones with the greatest sales growth, or simply the ones that remain standing at the end of the game? (And when's the end of the game?) Each major study differs in how it defines success, which companies it therefore declares to be worthy of emulation, and the patterns of activity and attitude it finds in common among them. Yet, Kirby concludes, as each study's method incrementally solves problems others have faced, we are progressing toward a consensus theory of high performance.

Despite the enormous time and energy that goes into strategy development, many companies have little to show for their efforts. Indeed, research by the consultancy Marakon Associates suggests that companies on average deliver only 63% of the financial performance their strategies promise. In this article, Michael Mankins and Richard Steele of Marakon present the findings of this research. They draw on their experience with high-performing companies like Barclays, Cisco, Dow Chemical, 3M, and Roche to establish some basic rules for setting and delivering strategy: Keep it simple, make it concrete. Avoid long, drawn-out descriptions of lofty goals and instead stick to clear language describing what your company will and won't do. Debate assumptions, not forecasts. Create cross-functional teams drawn from strategy, marketing, and finance to ensure the assumptions underlying your long-term plans reflect both the real economics of your company's markets and its actual performance relative to competitors. Use a rigorous analytic framework. Ensure that the dialogue between the corporate center and the business units about market trends and assumptions is conducted within a rigorous framework, such as that of "profit pools." Discuss resource deployments early. Create more realistic forecasts and more executable plans by discussing up-front the level and timing of critical deployments. Clearly identify priorities. Prioritize tactics so that employees have a clear sense of where to direct their efforts. Continuously monitor performance. Track resource deployment and results against plan, using continuous feedback to reset assumptions and reallocate resources. Reward and develop execution capabilities. Motivate and develop staff. Following these rules strictly can help narrow the strategy-to-performance gap.

Tracks the development of the Kmart discount store chain from its inception in 1961 to its peak in 1990 and examines the contribution of each Kmart chief executive to the chain's success. In, parallel, compares the performance of Wal-Mart over the same period along a number of financial and strategic dimensions.

When is it possible to create a dual advantage of being both low cost and differentiated? In this case, students assess whether Samsung Electronics has been able to achieve such a dual advantage, and if so, how this was possible. Moreover, Samsung Electronics' long-held competitive advantage is under renewed attack. Students also can assess how Samsung should respond to large-scale Chinese entry into its industry.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 705-508.

Focuses on Microsoft's strategy for sustaining competitive advantage in the global software industry. Also, explores Microsoft's history and its current position, as it tries to diversify its product and service revenue streams.

An unprecedented bidding war for the Chinese fourth-largest beer maker, Haerbin Brewery, broke out between the world top two breweries--Anheuser-Busch and SABMiller. Presents the different strategies these companies adopted to enter Chinese market. Anheuser-Busch entered the Chinese market with its nearly fully owned subsidiary and promoted its own brand, Budweiser, whereas SABMiller knocked through the market with its joint venture with CRE. Its expansion in China came mostly through mergers--it did not introduce into the market its own world-famous brand. Anheuser-Busch, on the other hand, went down the acquisition road, first with Tsingtao and then with the Haerbin brewery.

Explores the challenges of commercializing a bleeding-edge technology. After seven years, E Ink has spent more than $100 million to commercialize electronic ink. With business momentum picking up, but resources running out, the case examines the key trade-offs in bringing a new technology to market.