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Explores the phenomenon of software becoming a service. Salesforce.com has catapulted into the lead for offering a customer relationship management (CRM) solution as a Web-based service. Siebel, the leader in CRM packaged software sales, has to devise a strategy to compete with salesforce.com

The managing director of MD Foods of Denmark and the president of Arla of Sweden, both cooperatives, were contemplating whether their companies should merge to create Europe's largest dairy company. Both companies wanted to continue the success of their joint ventures with a much closer relationship, but wondered whether their owners (the milk-producing farmers in each country) would approve the merger. The two companies were different in size, organizational structure, organizational culture, monetary currency, and language. A cross-border merger of two cooperatives was unprecedented.

In August 2002, the FDA had notified the executive steering committee for Abbott Laboratories' new rheumatoid arthritis drug to expect approval significantly ahead of schedule. If everything went smoothly, the compound D2E7 (brand name HUMIRA) would be approved for sale in the United States before the end of the year. This gave Abbott and its HUMIRA brand team no more than four months to complete preparations for the product's launch. Abbott acquired D2E7, a biologic disease-modifying antirheumatic drug, when the company purchased Knoll Pharmaceuticals in March 2001. With a significant head start and combined 2002 sales anticipated to exceed $2 billion, Enbrel (from Immunex, later acquired by Amgen) and Remicade (from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Centocor) would provide HUMIRA with tough competition. Yet, with the rheumatoid arthritis market expected to grow to over $7.5 billion by 2008, there was still a significant opportunity for Abbott. The executive steering committee knew that the HUMIRA team would have to orchestrate every aspect of the product's global launch carefully to quickly and effectively establish HUMIRA in this challenging market.

Examines the impact of market liberalization on the Mainland insurance industry following China's World Trade Organization accession. With a handful of Chinese insurance companies continuing to dominate the market, what are the potential challenges and opportunities facing domestic firms in the face of foreign competition? Despite rapid growth in premium income, restrictions on business scope and geographical region of operation impede efforts by foreign insurers to tap into the country's burgeoning insurance business. Examines the experience of American International Group, the first foreign insurance firm to open a wholly owned subsidiary in China since 1979, and the difficulties it has encountered in developing its Mainland businesses.

Can a short-sleeved, sandal-wearing, college dropout create a company manifesting love, joy, and happiness? Chainsaw John Mackey did. This CEO took a five-month sabbatical to hike the Appalachian Trail. More credentials: Sales-per-square foot of $690 and rising. Hiring by means of teams and a vote requiring a two-thirds majority. A single store in Austin, Texas in 1980; 144 stores in 2004. A seven-year streak near the top of Fortune's list of best companies to work for in America. Team-based hiring with a two-thirds majority required. Incentives based on the bottom line. Morale surveys. No salary higher than eight times the average salary. So how did John Mackey come to be christened Chainsaw John Mackey?

TCL considers the underlying logic behind the globalization of one of China's most prominent companies. TCL, and similarly prominent companies in China, are in the forefront of China's emergence as one of the world's preeminent economic powers. Allows a discussion of how TCL's approach to globalization compares with those of other Chinese companies and those of companies from other developing countries. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

An energy company's integration of a $2 billion firm it had acquired was smooth because much of the back end was outsourced, says consultant Jane C. Linder.

A 2004 McKinsey survey of more than 30 companies reveals that at least 70% of them have major alliances that are underperforming and in need of restructuring. Moreover, JVs that broaden or otherwise adjust their scope have a 79% success rate, vs. 33% for ventures that remain essentially unchanged. Yet, most firms don't routinely evaluate the need to overhaul their alliances or intervene to correct performance problems. That means corporations are missing huge opportunities: By revamping just one large alliance, a company can generate $100 million to $300 million in extra income a year. Here's how to unlock more value from alliances: (1) Launch the process. Don't wait until your venture is in the middle of a crisis; regularly scan your major alliances to determine which need restructuring. Once you've targeted one, designate a restructuring team and find a senior sponsor to push the process along. Then delineate the scope of the team's work. (2) Diagnose performance. Evaluate the venture on the following performance dimensions: ownership and financials, strategy, operations, governance, and organization and talent. Identify the root causes of the venture's problems, not just the symptoms, and estimate how much each problem is costing the company. (3) Generate restructuring options. Based on the diagnosis, decide whether to fix, grow, or exit the alliance. Assuming the answer is fix or grow, determine whether fundamental or incremental changes are needed, using the five performance dimensions above as a framework. Then assemble three or four packages of restructuring options, test them with shareholders, and gain parents' approval. (4) Execute the changes. Embark on a widespread and consistent communication effort, building support among executives in the JV and the parent companies. So the process stays on track, assign accountability to certain groups or individuals.

It has become fashionable to discuss business models, but there is much confusion about what business models are and how they can be used. In fact, business models can serve a positive and powerful role in corporate management. Although authors have offered definitions of "business model," none appears to be generally accepted. This lack of consensus may, in part, be attributed to interest in the concept from a wide range of disciplines, all of which have found a connection to the term. To help managers better understand business models, this paper reviews the extant literature and identifies and classifies the components of business models cited therein. Components were classified into four primary categories: strategic choices, the value network, creating value, and capturing value. Offers a definition of "business model" that integrates and synthesizes earlier work. Based on the proposed definition, the case contrasts business models with strategy. Also, discusses four problems associated with business models.

It has been 20 years since R. Edward Freeman (1984) first proposed his stakeholder approach to strategic management, which stated that corporations must consider the needs and demands not only of their shareholders but also those of a wide range of other external constituencies, or "stakeholders." Examples of stakeholders include customers, employees, suppliers, and communities. Freeman's theory has generated an extensive body of research, including not only the efforts of the management researchers who have tested, revised, and refined the theory, but also the views of corporate executives who have used the stakeholder approach in their strategic planning. This article, based on a review of that literature, identifies five important lessons from the stakeholder model for today's business leaders. These lessons are particularly timely, given the inappropriate behavior that has occurred in the business world during recent years.

Chen Feng and three others started Hainan Airlines in China during a historic transformation and privatization of the civil aviation industry. From a small loan from the local province in 1992, Chairman Chen built the company into a conglomerate that, by 2003, owned airlines, hotels, airports, travel agencies, an insurance company, and a department store. Despite its many successes, including being the first airline in China to attract foreign capital, the company faces many challenges at both the business and corporate levels. Was the company's increasing breadth a distraction to the airline business or a route to competitive advantage? Going forward, what should be Chen's priorities?

Supplements the (A) case. A rewritten version of an earlier supplement.

In September 2004, four months after Hungary joined the European Union, the strategy group of Matav, Hungary's largest communications company, is working on its mid-term strategic plan. Since being privatized from the state in 1993, the company has seen several changes in its strategy, structure, and culture. Nearly 15 years later, the company is a fully integrated telecommunications company involved in a broad range of services, including fixed line telephony, mobile communications, Internet services, data transmission, and outsourcing. The company's latest acquisition of a state-run telecommunications company is considered a success, and management believes that international expansion is necessary to realize dynamic growth as its domestic fixed line business is declining. In addition, Hungary's mobile market is highly competitive and saturated with 80% of the country having mobile phones. The management team feels that Matav is at a crossroads with three main options: expansion in Hungary, regional expansion, or organic growth in existing product lines. The team has to consider all of the lines of business in forming a strategy and whether Matav's resources and organization are suitable for a healthy future.

KTM is a successful European off-road motorcycle manufacturer with sales in 72 countries. KTM has been experiencing impressive growth in both its top and bottom lines over the past several years, but it is facing significant growth pressure from its venture capitalist investor. The chief financial officer must determine how the company could achieve its growth objectives. Options include geographic expansion (increase U.S. emphasis or expansion to new European Union countries) or product expansion. Implementation options include a merger, acquisition, or internal growth. Several opportunities for geographic expansion and product diversification exist, and implementation options include make, buy, or ally decisions.

Examines how firms find pathways to high performance while simultaneously focusing on their top and bottom lines by aggressively developing and managing their relationships with key stakeholders. Top-performing firms are shrinking their core while expanding their periphery. At the same time that they are contracting their organizational centers and outsourcing increasing portions of their activities, these firms are extending their organizational borders by trying to provide customers with greater sets of products and services. As companies refocus, they have become increasingly dependent on reinforcing mutually beneficial ties to four sets of critical stakeholders: customers, suppliers, alliance partners, and intraorganizational business units. In each of these relationships, successful firms work their way up a ladder in which they intensify their collaborative efforts with that particular constituent. This phenomenon, which is evident across an array of industries, is one of the hallmarks of a new operating model: the relationship-centered organization.

Emerging markets are increasingly becoming economies of expertise, says IBM's Steven Sams.

Risk aversion is undermining U.S. innovation, warns Deborah Wince-Smith, president of the Council on Competitiveness.

If you were the CEO of Pitney Bowes, the postage meter maker, how would you envision the future of the business? The company has an undeniable core competence in the solutions it provides to high-volume postal service users. But with snail mail on the decline, some would say that core has about as much future as the buggy whip. In this article, Pitney Bowes Chairman and CEO Michael Critelli gives us a glimpse of how he leads his company's strategy development--and how that development has supported a counterintuitive return to the company's core after decades of diversification. He and others in the company begin the process by tapping into deeply knowledgeable people and organizations to understand key trends in the business and the rate at which change is occurring. Then, it's a question of the firm reshaping the environment in which it does business, whether through R&D investments or work with regulators and policy makers who influence market forces; this is especially important in emerging markets. Focusing on a core business area enables a company to find adjacent high-margin opportunities and to offer comprehensive solutions to customers. What stands out most sharply in this account, however, is the importance of having a strategist's mind-set. Whether Critelli is reading the day's news, visiting a key account, or spending an hour with his own people working in the context of a customer mail room, he is constantly extrapolating possible long-term competitive implications from the immediate facts. Often inspired by strategic thinkers, Critelli believes that the greatest thing he can do for his organization is to shift the terms of the debate. "Rarely am I credited with sterling words or bold, symbolic actions," he writes. "Instead, I help people to see the business we are in differently and to reach a shared vision as to where we want to end up. And, little by little, things move in the right direction."

Many companies assume that once they've launched a major innovation, growth will soon follow. It's not that simple. High-potential new businesses within established companies face stiff headwinds well after their inception. That's why a company's emphasis must shift: from ideas to execution and from leadership excellence to organizational excellence. The authors spent five years chronicling new businesses at the New York Times Co., Analog Devices, Corning, Hasbro, and other organizations. They found that a breakthrough new business (referred to as NewCo) rarely coexists gracefully with the established business in the company (called CoreCo). The unnatural combination creates three specific challenges--forgetting, borrowing, and learning--that NewCo must meet to survive and grow. NewCo must first forget some of what made CoreCo successful. NewCo must also borrow some of CoreCo's assets--usually in one or two key areas that will give NewCo a crucial competitive advantage. Incremental cost reductions, for example, are never a sufficient justification for borrowing. Finally, NewCo must be prepared to learn some things from scratch. Because strategic experiments are highly uncertain endeavors, NewCo will face several critical unknowns. The more rapidly it can resolve those unknowns--that is, the faster it can learn--the sooner it will zero in on a winning business model or exit a hopeless situation. Managers can accelerate this learning by planning more simply and more often and by comparing predicted and actual trends.

Examines L'Oreal's acquisition of leading U.S. cosmetics brands, including Maybelline, Redken, and Kiehl's, and their subsequent renewal and globalization. Reviews the history of L'Oreal, now the world's largest cosmetics company, from its origins in France in 1907. The company entered the United States in 1953, and from 1990, expanded rapidly with the acquisition of U.S. brands, which were renewed and then taken international. Focuses on Kiehl's--since 1851, a quirky New York luxury brand--which L'Oreal acquired in 2000 and is now expanding globally. Shows how L'Oreal developed a portfolio of U.S. and European brands that are now sold globally. Explores the corporate strategy and marketing challenges facing consumer products firms as they globalize and how acquisitions can facilitate globalization.