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The joint venture between General Motors (GM) and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (SAIC) in 1997 was regarded as the largest single foreign investment ever made in China. The joint venture was considered by many as a high-risk investment for GM at that time. Eight years after signing the joint venture, GM proved to the world that its investment in China was justified, with its growing market shares and successful partnership with SAIC. Attempts to understand the strategic alliance between GM and SAIC and how the relationship contributes to the success and rapid growth of GM in China. Also analyzes the strategies adopted by GM and the potential threats and challenges imposed on foreign automobile companies in China. Sheds light on devising viable strategies for foreign companies to enter emerging markets.

The management at Monster.com, the leading U.S. provider of online recruitment services, must decide how to proceed with Monster Networking (MN), a new business launched in late 2003. MN helps users identify other individuals who can offer career advice. Monster.com management views MN as: a vehicle for reducing the cost of attracting job seekers to its core matching services and a potential source of subscription revenue. As of early 2005, MN's performance has been mixed. Networkers were deeply engaged, but subscription revenue growth was disappointing. In the face of this performance, Monster.com management must decide whether to proceed with its original plan, eliminate subscription fees to boost traffic, augment MN's scale by acquiring an online social networking start-up, or simply terminate MN.

In 2001, Seiji Frank Sanda is facing his worst crisis since founding Japan Communications Inc. (JCI) in 1996. His planned IPO was stopped, leaving JCI with a large organization and strong revenues, but losses and a dwindling balance sheet. He is seriously considering severe personnel cuts, however, layoffs in Japan may cause severe damage to his reputation and make it difficult to hire people in the future. Furthermore, JCI is facing decisions regarding implementation of its business strategy, wondering if now is the time to diversify its service offerings.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Describes Yahoo!'s management of the launch of version 6.0 of its Instant Messenger (IM) product, which incorporates features from 12 other Yahoo! properties, including Search, Music, Games, Photos, Personals, News, and Shopping. The integration of features from so many properties--all of which face urgent competitive priorities beyond their support of IM--presents a complex set of product and strategy development problems. Yahoo! has a distinctive approach for managing such "network integration," which it sees as its key competitive advantage vs. Google and Microsoft's MSN.

Managers of DoCoMo, Japan's largest mobile phone company, are formulating a strategy for mobile FeliCa: contactless integrated circuits that will be built into DoCoMo phones, allowing them to be used for quick and convenient retail or commuter fare payments, building entry, airline boarding passes, and other applications. DoCoMo's managers must determine how best to profit from mobile FeliCa. The options, which are not mutually exclusive, include: increasing mobile phone subscriber acquisition and retention rates by offering "sticky" differentiated new services; extracting monopoly rents from a joint venture (with Sony, FeliCa's inventor) that will license FeliCa technology to other mobile phone companies and application providers; and profiting from eMoney (retail payments) either through partnerships with incumbent financial services firms or by offering payment services directly.

The newly hired head of Strategic Resources Planning and Management at Royal Bank of Canada Investments (RBCI) must develop a "dashboard" mechanism for strategically assessing and managing RBCI's non-interest expenses, excluding brokerage fees associated with providing value-added service to clients. After a week of analysis, two things became apparent: first, the four major business units within RBCI were operating independently, neither collaborating on projects nor sharing information; second, most of the non-interest expenses were related to information technology projects. Considering that RBCI was spending nearly $700,000 per day on service delivery, the senior management team was extremely eager to see what the head of Strategic Resources Planning and Management would propose. Presents information technology portfolio management challenges facing large organizations, and challenges students to develop performance metrics that will be useful at the most senior levels of the organization.

In 1998, the CEO of Whirlpool Corp. decides to change the company's strategy significantly to escape an increasingly unattractive "stalemate" in the appliance industry. The change he proposes involves a fundamental shift in the company's focus--from manufacturing to branding--and requires the development of altogether new organizational capabilities. Examines the full range of adjustments that the CEO must lead his management team to make throughout all the functions of Whirlpool. Distinguishes itself from other cases on strategic change by examining the challenge of change in a company that is not in crisis (yet).

Conglomerates lie at the heart of debates in corporate strategy. They include, perhaps, the best known companies in history--Beatrice Corp., General Electric, ITT, Siemens, and ABB--and at various times over the last few decades have been both admired and vilified as a form of corporate organization. Regardless of the time at which these debates have occurred, they invariably focus on a few common questions, which this note addresses: Why do conglomerates exist? Do they add value to their component businesses? If so, how?

Which businesses should a firm expand into? This question of corporate scope is central to corporate strategy. Flawed scope decisions can have severe consequences, and the trauma experienced by many companies as a result of mistaken decisions to expand scope is often large. What leads to such mistakes? Where do managers go wrong? And, what might be a sensible logic by which to approach the question of scope expansion? Examines these questions and the logic of the scope decision in those instances where the target business is ostensibly related in some way to a company's existing ones.

Describes the objectives of the Corporate Strategy course; the conceptual framework used in the course; some central principles of corporate strategy that emerge from this framework; and the modular structure of the course, together with the topics each module covers.

To launch its Latin American operations, the Indian IT giant Tata Consultancy Services recruits a seasoned executive who becomes the only non-Indian member of senior management. Reviews the start-up operations, from the site selection to staffing and training, the challenges of operating in a Latin American context, the integration of two very different cultures, and the strategic rationale for an emerging market company to invest in another Third World region at a time in which it is launching an initial public offering. Identifies a series of challenges that must be addressed two years on and poses the question whether Tata Consultancy Services should pause or accelerate its presence in Latin America.

Companies face much uncertainty about the competitive effects of the recently adopted Kyoto Protocol on global climate change and the current and future regulations that may emerge from it. Companies have considerable discretion to explore different market strategies to address global warming and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Examines these strategic options by reviewing the market-oriented actions that 136 large companies that are part of the Global 500 are currently taking. Companies use six different market strategies to address climate change, consisting of different combinations of the market components available to managers. Managers can choose between a greater emphasis on improvements in their business activities through innovation or employing compensatory approaches such as emissions trading. They can either act by themselves or work with other companies, NGOs, or (local) governments.

To date, the United States has declined to ratify the Kyoto Treaty to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, many companies are taking advantage of the lack of a mandatory U.S. GHG emission reduction program to set targets at their own pace and in ways that complement their own strategic objectives. Currently, as many as 60 corporations, with net revenues of roughly $1.5 trillion, have set voluntary reduction targets. Many of these companies are agnostic about the science of climate change or the social responsibility of protecting the global climate. The reasons are decidedly strategic. So why are they doing this? They are searching for ways to be prepared for the long term should GHG emission reductions become mandatory, while at the same time attempting to reap near-term economic and strategic benefits should new regulations not emerge.

The market universe is composed of two types of oceans: red oceans and blue oceans. Red oceans are all the industries in existence today; they are increasingly characterized by intense competition. Blue oceans are all the industries not in existence today; they are untouched and uncontested. To prosper in the future, companies need to go beyond competing; they need to create blue oceans. The issue is how to do so. Presents a set of analytical tools and frameworks that can enable firms to develop blue ocean strategies.

On October 2, 2003, on the eve of a special election to choose a new Governor of California, the Los Angeles Times published a lengthy investigative article about allegations of sexual misconduct on the part of the leading candidate: movie star turned Republican gubernatorial hopeful Arnold Schwarzenegger. The result was surprising. As much as it made Schwarzenegger the subject of discussion, so too did it do the same for the Times itself. In part because it appeared within days of the election and, in part because of a history of criticism of the newspaper for what its critics alleged was a liberal political bias, the Times found itself having to defend publicly its decision to do what it understood to be a key responsibility of a major daily newspaper-scrutinizing the record of a politician. HKS Case Number 1790.0

It's hard to find a better exemplar for competition than chess. Even people who have scant knowledge of the game instinctively recognize that chess is unusual in terms of its intellectual complexity and the strategic demands it places on players. Can strategists learn anything from chess players about what it takes to win? To find out, HBR senior editor Diane L. Coutu talked with Garry Kasparov, the world's No.1 player since 1984. Kasparov believes that success in both chess and business is very much a question of psychological advantage; the complexity of the game demands that players rely heavily on their instincts and on gamesmanship. In this wide-ranging interview, Kasparov explores the power of chess as a model for business competition; the balance that chess players strike between intuition and analysis; the significance of his loss to IBM's chess-playing computer, Deep Blue; and how his legendary rivalry with Anatoly Karpov, Kasparov's predecessor as World Chess Champion, affected his own success. Kasparov also shares his solution to what he calls the champion's dilemma, a question for all world masters, whether they are in business, sports, or chess: Where does a virtuoso go after he has accomplished everything he's ever wanted to, even beyond his wildest imagination?

Leaders tend to be so immersed in the specifics of strategy that they rarely stop to think how much of their reasoning is done by analogy. As a result, they miss useful insights that psychologists and other scientists have generated about analogies' pitfalls. Managers who pay attention to their own analogical thinking will make better strategic decisions and fewer mistakes. Charles Lazarus was inspired by the supermarket when he founded Toys R Us; Intel promoted its low-end chips to avoid becoming like U.S. Steel; and Circuit City created CarMax because it saw the used-car market as analogous to the consumer electronics market. Each example displays the core elements of analogical reasoning: a novel problem or a new opportunity, a specific prior context that managers deem to be similar in its essentials, and a solution that managers can transfer from its original setting to the new one. Analogical reasoning is a powerful tool for sparking breakthrough ideas. But dangers arise when analogies are built on surface similarities. Psychologists have discovered that it's all too easy to overlook the superficiality of analogies. The situation is further complicated by people's tendency to hang on to beliefs even after contrary evidence comes along and to seek only the data that confirm their beliefs. Four straightforward steps can improve a management team's odds of using an analogy well: Recognize the analogy and identify its purpose; thoroughly understand its source; determine whether the resemblance is more than superficial; and decide whether the original strategy, properly translated, will work in the target industry.

Corporate treasurers and chief financial officers have become adept at quantifying and managing a wide variety of risks: financial, hazard, and operational. To defend themselves, they use tried-and-true tools such as hedging, insurance, and backup systems. Some companies have even adopted the concept of enterprise risk management, integrating available risk management techniques in a comprehensive, organizationwide approach. But most managers have not addressed in a systematic way the greatest threat of all: strategic risks--the array of external events and trends that can devastate a company's growth trajectory and shareholder value. For example, a new technology may overtake your product. Gradual shifts in the market may slowly erode one of your brands beyond the point of viability. The key to surviving these strategic risks, the authors say, is knowing how to assess and respond to them. In this article, they lay out a method for identifying and responding to strategic threats. They categorize the risks into seven major classes and describe a particularly dangerous example within each category. The authors also offer countermeasures to take against these risks and describe how individual companies have deployed them to neutralize a threat and, in many cases, capitalize on it. Besides limiting the downside of risk, strategic risk management forces executives to think more systematically about the future, thus helping them identify opportunities for growth.