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WaveRider Communications, Inc., a Toronto-based company, had a mission to become the leader in global wireless technology by developing, selling, and supporting products that enabled wireless Internet service providers. It recently launched its "Last Mile Solution," offering Internet service providers the opportunity to provide wireless Internet access at broadband speeds in the unlicensed 2.4 gigahertz spectrum. The wireless Internet access industry was relatively untapped, and WaveRider's vice president of marketing wondered whether the company, as it started its growth phase, should seek an alliance with a competing technology company. To determine the feasibility of this idea, he needed to classify the competition, review the customer barriers, and evaluate which technology was the best fit.

Provides a rigorous description of the economic dynamics that may produce inherent advantages for large and/or first-mover firms within an industry, as well as those factors that may result in disadvantages for such leading firms. The leader advantages discussed include both size advantages, such as economies of scale and scope, network effects, and learning effect, as well as timing advantages, such as preemption, reputation effects, buyer switching costs, and patents or institutional barriers. The leader disadvantages analyzed include pioneering costs, demand uncertainty, technological uncertainty, and incumbent inertia. Throughout the note, the experiences of Intel Corp., the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductors, are used to provide specific examples of the causes and consequences of leader advantages and disadvantages.

Eager to capitalize on the Internet's potential, many companies have allowed scores of on-line projects to bubble up throughout their organizations. The result? More harm than good, as companies find themselves confusing customers, irritating employees, and wasting bushels of money. In this article, consultant Anthony Tjan explains how companies can do better. By adapting classical portfolio strategy to the digital age, executives can coordinate their Internet initiatives to avoid the needless headaches and spending, he says. Much of the market and industry data that underpin traditional portfolio analysis is unavailable for the Internet space, so Tjan replaces the two criteria used in traditional portfolio analysis--market position and industry attractiveness--with business viability and business fit. Viability captures the available quantitative data about an investment's likely payoff. Fit is qualitative; it measures the degree to which an investment dovetails with a company's existing processes, capabilities, and culture. Using viability and fit to assess their on-line initiatives, companies can then plot these efforts onto a simple matrix, called an Internet portfolio map. Their location on the matrix will suggest whether each initiative should be invested in, redesigned, sold or spun out, or killed.

The music industry, described in breezy prose in John Alderman's Sonic Boom: MP3, Napster, and the New Pioneers of Music, is coming under intense pressure from Internet-based technologies that challenge traditional property rights. Industry executives are denouncing the upstarts, but Napster and companies like it are actually producing efficiency, not anarchy. To understand the full force of the Napster challenge, reviewer Clay Shirky says, one has to look beyond Sonic Boom's collage of people and events. Music has always been a business of high fixed costs and low marginal costs, and Internet technology is reducing marginal costs to practically zero. Before Napster, music industry executives assumed they would apply traditional per-unit pricing to sales over the Internet. Napster's success means the all-you-can-eat model has won. Newspaper and software publishers have already begun to adapt to this reality, and now it's the music industry's turn. This shift actually represents a big revenue opportunity for the industry, not a clear loss. Per-unit pricing imposes enormous psychological barriers to purchase, so shifting to an unlimited-access, subscription-based model will unleash pent-up demand for music. And the industry's abilities to develop and screen talent will be even more important to consumers in a Napster world.

In 2000, Accrue is one of three survivors of the initial consolidation of the Web traffic analysis software industry. However, entry from CRM software providers and consultants, as well as ASPs offering Web analysis services, has introduced new threats to Accrue. Newly tapped Interim CEO Greg Walker must develop a plan to help Accrue navigate through the transitions shaking this industry.

Describes the launch of Sega's 16-bit Genesis console in 1988 and its effect on competitor Nintendo. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

When Blindstogo.com, the online project of Blinds To Go (BTG), was first proposed in mid-1999 its board of directors was lukewarm to the idea. However, after six months of operation and seeing other retailers go online and the tremendous valuation being given to dot-coms, the board was encouraging BTG to devote more resources to the project. Plans were already in place to further expand their retail store network. Senior management at BTG had received sales, spending and survey results from their retail e-commerce venture. Data obtained from the web site indicated that the people who visited the site were the same people who visited the stores. The vice-chairman of BTG wanted to evaluate the results of this online venture by examining the fit of the e-commerce project within the overall business strategy, to determine where resources should be focused.

The purpose of this case is to present a series of strategic issues faced by a $1 billion company. The situation called for a major restructuring immediately followed by a hostile takeover bid. The company won a Delaware State Court decision in the case of the hostile offer.

Describes online brokers, companies that use the Internet to help clients identify prospective trading partners and sometimes help their clients complete transactions. First, summarizes the various ways that online brokers create value for their clients. Then analyzes the economic model for online brokers, focusing on their revenue and cost drivers. Building on that analysis, the next section examines the payoff to online brokers from pursuing aggressive growth strategies. Delineates the differences between and advantages of being a broker versus a retailer or a market maker, and explores some of the strategic challenges facing offline brokers as they move their businesses online, e.g., the risk of self-cannibalization and the threat of disintermediation by clients. Explores the value proposition offered by these companies and the economic imperatives they face. Finally, seeks to provide a framework to evaluate whether the adoption of aggressive growth strategies is prudent for online brokers.

This article interprets the early experience of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in terms of the market for technological mediation. A firm involved in technology mediation takes advantage of gaps between general technological opportunities and particular user needs in specific places at particular times. If the economic opportunities are renewed frequently, then the business can grow and adapt to take advantage of them. This concept provides a framework for explaining many facets of business behavior accompanying the diffusion of Internet access technology.

This case chronicles the 30-year evolution of Bank One's business strategy of growth through acquisition and the resulting branding issues encountered by the need to rebrand the acquired existing entities. Begins in 1968--at the start of the newly formed First Banc Group of Ohio, Inc.--a holding company created by the McCoy family to acquire other small banks in the state of Ohio. The banks were to be renamed "Bank One." It continues through the next 30 years of growth, marketing innovations, and expansion to many states beyond its Ohio base. This period of growth and change produced numerous challenges to the company's identity. The principal focus of the case is on the major branding obstacles associated with Bank One's merger with First Chicago NBD, a very large commercial bank. First Chicago NBD represented the first major commercial bank to become a member of the Bank One family of dominantly retail banks. Issues encompass whether the First Chicago NBD name should be changed to Bank One, as had been done for all previous retail bank acquisitions over the years or retain its name using only the endorsement, "A Bank One Company." Further complicating the situation is a major Bank One brand development initiative intended to implement the Bank One brand identity in new ways for all Bank One entities.

Most people think of Napster when they think of peer-to-peer systems. Nirav Tolia, CEO of Epinions, explains why the power of peer-to-peer goes far beyond the entertainment industry. He predicts it will shake up the entire retail industry.

While many management thinkers proclaim an era of radical uncertainty, authors Sawhney and Parikh assert that the seemingly endless upheavals of the digital age are more predictable than that: today's changes have a common root, and that root lies in the nature of intelligence in networks. Understanding the patterns of intelligence migration can help companies decipher and plan for the inevitable disruptions in today's business environment. Two patterns in network intelligence are reshaping industries and organizations. First, intelligence is decoupling--that is, modern high-speed networks are pushing back-end intelligence and front-end intelligence toward opposite ends of the network, making the ends the two major sources of potential profits. Second, intelligence is becoming more fluid and modular. Small units of intelligence now float freely like molecules in the ether, coalescing into temporary bundles whenever and wherever necessary to solve problems. The authors present four strategies that companies can use to profit from these patterns: arbitrage allows companies to move intelligence to new regions or countries; aggregation combines formerly isolated pieces of infrastructure intelligence; rewiring allows companies to connect islands of intelligence; and reassembly allows businesses to reorganize pieces of intelligence into coherent, personalized packages for customers. By being aware of patterns in network intelligence and by acting rather than reacting, companies can turn chaos into opportunity, say the authors.

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how-to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones.

Supplement to case IN1079. This case illustrates the challenges facing Intel as it attempts to manage the post-acquisition integration of DECs semiconductors businesses. Additional emphasis is placed on how Intel developed a post-acquisition integration capability and on the way it is currently structured to manage the acquisition process.

This series of 3 cases describes the creation of a dotcom start-up in Singapore and its penetration of the Chinese market. The company, MyWeb Inc.com started as a web designer, but moved quickly into set-top boxes for Internet access using TVs, as well as the design of a portal with localized content for China. At the end of the case, the inventors of the dotccom realize that their original business model is not viable and they evaluate the different options they have to create a profitable business model.

Supplement to case IN1082. This series of 3 cases describes the creation of a dotcom start-up in Singapore and its penetration of the Chinese market. The company, MyWeb Inc.com started as a web designer, but moved quickly into set-top boxes for Internet access using TVs, as well as the design of a portal with localized content for China. At the end of the case, the inventors of the dotccom realize that their original business model is not viable and they evaluate the different options they have to create a profitable business model.

Supplement to case IN1082. This series of 3 cases describes the creation of a dotcom start-up in Singapore and its penetration of the Chinese market. The company, MyWeb Inc.com started as a web designer, but moved quickly into set-top boxes for Internet access using TVs, as well as the design of a portal with localized content for China. At the end of the case, the inventors of the dotccom realize that their original business model is not viable and they evaluate the different options they have to create a profitable business model.

As the food industry becomes more sophisticated, and as genomics and other factors provide for quality control from the producers to the consumers in the food chain, the beef industry has been one of the last commodity systems to organize the vertical systems to satisfy consumers' needs for high-quality, consistently tender beef. The desire to also provide traceability has led Friona Industries to develop partnerships in the vertical chain to achieve these results with case-ready meat for supermarkets and consistent supplies for institutions such as McDonalds.