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Supplements the (A) case.

Presents a follow-up to the (A) and (B) cases.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 700-115.

Explores issues related to (1) the vertical boundaries of the firm in an emerging-economy context, especially the effects of lack of intellectual property rights and lack of contract enforcement on both industry structure and boundaries of the firm; and (2) the extent to which strategy and organizational structure must be localized to the country context, as illustrated by considering competition between multinationals and domestic firms and the sustainability of their respective positions.

This case is designed to facilitate a discussion and analysis of Ford Motor Company's e-commerce strategy in 1999-2000. It presents an independent analysis of costs and savings along the automobile-industry supply chain as well as recent information regarding auto dealers' reactions to Ford's e-commerce initiatives.

Syndication has long been a fundamental organizing principle in the entertainment world, but it's been rare elsewhere in business. The fixed physical assets and slow-moving information that characterized the industrial economy made it difficult, if not impossible, to create the kind of fluid networks that are essential for syndication. But with the rise of the information economy, flexible business networks are not only becoming possible, they're becoming essential. As a result, syndication is moving from business's periphery to its center. Within a syndication network there are three roles that businesses can play. Originators create original content, which encompasses everything from entertainment programming to products to business processes. Syndicators package that content, often integrating it with content from other originators. Distributors deliver the content to consumers. A company can play a single role, or it can play two or three roles simultaneously. Syndication requires businesses to rethink their strategies and relationships in radical ways. Because a company's success hinges on its connections to other companies, it can no longer view its core capabilities as secrets to protect. Instead, it needs to see them as products to sell. FedEx, for example, is succeeding by distributing its sophisticated package-tracking capability to other companies on the Internet. Syndication promises to change the nature of business. As this new way of doing business takes hold, companies may look the same as before to their customers, but behind the scenes they will be in constant flux, melding with one another in ever-changing, self-organizing networks.

The bright line that once distinguished the dot-com from the incumbent is rapidly fading. Success in the new economy will go to those who can execute clicks-and-mortar strategies that bridge the physical and virtual worlds. But how executives forge such strategies is under considerable debate. Despite the obvious benefits that integration offers--cross-promotion, shared information, purchasing leverage, distribution economies, and the like--many executives now assume that Internet businesses have to be separate to thrive. They believe that the very nature of traditional business--its protectiveness of current customers, its fear of cannibalization, its general myopia--will smother any Internet initiative. Authors Ranjay Gulati and Jason Garino contend that executives don't have to make an either-or choice when it comes to their clicks-and-mortar strategies. The question isn't, "Should we develop our Internet channel in-house or launch a spin-off?" but rather, "What degree of integration makes sense for our company?" To determine the best level of integration for their companies, executives should examine four business dimensions: brand, management, operations, and equity. Drawing on the experiences of three established retailers--Office Depot, KB Toys, and Rite Aid--the authors show the spectrum of strategies available and discuss the trade-offs involved in each choice. By thinking carefully about which aspects of a business to integrate and which to keep distinct, companies can tailor their clicks-and-mortar strategy to their own particular market and competitive situation, dramatically increasing their odds of e-business success.

Retailers have long assumed that bigger is better: megastores mean broader product selection and lower operating costs. But by networking smaller stores, retailers can replicate big-store advantages and offer shoppers greater convenience.

When Biogen received approval for a breakthrough drug for treating multiple sclerosis, it had to quickly get the product to market. So it circumvented the traditional supply chain and joined with partners to become a virtual manufacturer.

Designed to explore the structure, implementation, and sustainability of an information-based strategy (IBS) undertaken by Capital One during the 1990s. Particular issues of interest are the impact of mass customization on industry structure, the ability to transfer IBS skills to new sectors, and the impact of the Internet on industry structure and competitor strategies.

Examines the role of transaction costs in impeding the functioning of markets and shows how the concept of transaction costs sheds light on a broad range of issues in strategy.

This case is designed for an MBA course in management planning and control systems, an MBA course on mergers and acquisitions, an MBA course on strategy implementation, or any class on executive compensation systems. It gives students exposure to executive compensation plans, the design of performance measurement and incentive compensation systems to facilitate the implementation of strategy, and issues that arise in post-merger integration. Significant differences in executive compensation for British Petroleum and Amoco Corporation prior to the merger between the two companies pose interesting challenges to successfully integrating the two executive teams after the merger. Students are asked to evaluate the post-merger executive compensation plan for BP Amoco in light of company's post-merger strategy, differences in the pre-merger executive compensation plans, and issues surrounding post-merger integration in their preparation and class discussion.

This article examines the current and medium-term future impact of Internet-based sales on the physical retail store format. The web-based retail sector currently has a minimal financial effect on physical-based retail. The evolution of e-retail sales will likely mimic that of the catalogue industry in terms of ultimate market share potential. Certain categories of goods (travel, computers, electronic services, books, toys, and sporting goods) lend themselves more readily to shopping by computer and, therefore, are more susceptible to e-based competition. However, with Internet commerce firm profit forecasts still in the distant future, cutthroat price competition, and distribution and tactility constraints, e-retail will continue to present a relatively minor risk to experience-oriented and non-commodity physical retailers.

To develop and sustain competitive advantage, companies must begin thinking about strategy in a more integrated way. First, strategies must be comprehensive: they need to have clear direction and a coherent product-market focus, and they must be supported by incisive operating capabilities and resources and robust organization cultures. Second, strategies must align these dimensions and their subcomponents and ensure that each is well adapted to the competitive environment. Third, all of the elements of strategy need to be orchestrated around a powerful core theme. This article shows how managers can develop each of these aspects of strategic integration.

This case is accompanied by a Video Short that can be shown in class or included in a digital coursepack. Instructors should consider the timing of making the video available to students, as it may reveal key case details.

When Starbucks made coffee hip, its success set off a chain reaction of innovation that boosted the whole category's profits. New research shows the same phenomenon at work in other markets, but the effect can work in reverse as well.

Dave Pottruck, president and co-CEO of Charles Schwab Corp. (CSC), is contemplating a piece of news in the June 1, 1999 edition of the Wall Street Journal that was about to send shock waves through the brokerage community: Merrill Lynch's decision to launch online trading on December 1, 1999. Customers at Merrill Lynch would be able to trade online for $29.95/trade or, for a minimum annual fee of $1,500, make as many trades as they wanted. Now that Merrill Lynch had joined the online trading revolution, Pottruck wondered, how would this affect Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (Schwab), and what should the company do in response? Pottruck observes that Merrill Lynch, E*Trade, WingspanBank, and Schwab, although competing for similar customers, appeared to be doing so from very different starting points. Pottruck considers the competitive dynamics of the brokerage industry and wonders: How can Schwab maintain its growth trajectory in the face of so many, varied competitors? What other firms might enter the space? How could Schwab protect and grow its existing customer base? Was Schwab getting "squeezed in the middle" or could it create a "category of one"?

Focuses on Ericsson in the Chinese mobile phone market--the company's largest single market, and one that is still growing at rates in excess of 50%. Permits comparison of two distinct ways of entering the Chinese market: by forming joint ventures with local competitors or with a WFOE (wholly foreign-owned enterprise) structure. But the bulk of the case is devoted to changes in the Chinese market and in mobile phone technology, and the threats that they pose to the sustainability of existing competitive advantages as well as the new opportunities that they open up.

This powerful first-person memoir-style case tells the story of a Western journalism teacher in post-war Cambodia where, amidst near-ubiquitous hardship and tragedy, she finds herself drawn to one individual tragedy-that of a woman she encounters in a hospital corridor. HKS Case Number 1561.0

By the fall of 1999, StarMedia had sprinted to a sizable lead in the race to acquire Latin American Internet users. Its pan-regional, horizontal portal was the first to target Spanish- and Portuguese-language speakers on the Internet, registering 1.2 billion page views in the third quarter of 1999. Thirty-three-year-old StarMedia co-founder Fernando Espuelas was the toast of "Silicon Alley" and a recognized hero throughout Latin America. A picture of him on the cover of Internet World magazine--ripping his shirt open to show the StarMedia logo, like Superman, summed up the spirit of the company. But each day brought an announcement of a new initiative by a heavyweight nemesis. To maintain its lead, StarMedia raised and spent money at a frenetic pace, promoting its brand, acquiring companies, and launching new Web initiatives. Losses for 1999 were projected to be $90 million on revenues of $19 million, a burn rate made sustainable by private and public financing rounds that had netted the company half a billion dollars since its 1996 inception. By December 1999, StarMedia had evolved from a pure Web company to an integrated media company that stretched into the ISP, mobile phone, and broadband production businesses with more than 700 employees in 12 countries. As the new millennium dawned, the major question facing StarMedia's executive team was how to best leverage the company's infrastructure to maintain and extend its traffic leadership--and to monetize its audience--in an environment that was becoming both more competitive and more sophisticated. Includes color exhibits.