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With prices at all-time lows at the beginning of 1994, South Africa's sole primary aluminum producer--Alusaf--is considering building the world's largest greenfield smelter. Using cost estimates in this case, students can evaluate the relative cost position of this plant in the context of the cost data on other smelters provided in the spreadsheet accompanying "The Aluminum Industry in 1994." By building on the supply and demand analysis supported by that case, students can evaluate the profitability of this massive capital investment.

Taiwan's United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC), one of the world's leading semiconductor foundries, has grown dramatically in 16 years. UMC pursued a strategy of vertical disintegration as part of the chairman's vision of turning UMC into a "pure-play" foundry. This case discusses the major technological and competitive forces affecting the industry and looks at UMC's restructuring through the eyes of the chairman. Provides enough detail to engage the class in a discussion of the merits of UMC's vertical disintegration strategy and the possible pitfalls of this approach going forward.

In August 1998, Kerry King, president and CEO of Ultratech Corp., looked with great interest at the changes that were occurring in the technology industry. Ultratech Corp. had an opportunity to enter into a strategic merger transaction that would make the combined company the undisputed leader in its market segment. The transaction, a multi-billion dollar deal, made a lot of sense to Kerry, his board of directors, and Ultratech's outside financial advisors, with one caveat. As a result of a technical accounting issue, pooling accounting was not available for the merger. Under purchase accounting, Kerry was advised that significant amounts of goodwill would be created and amortized over future fiscal years, effectively "destroying" the combined company's reported earnings. The challenge confronting Kerry was whether to consummate the merger and risk the earnings "damage" or to let an otherwise perfect opportunity pass. Kerry's decision could profoundly impact the future of his company and the fiber optic telecommunications industry as a whole.

Today, knowledge is considered the most strategically important resource and learning the most strategically important capability for business organizations. However, many initiatives being undertaken to develop and exploit organizational knowledge are not explicitly linked to or framed by the organization's business strategy. In fact, most knowledge management initiatives are viewed primarily as information systems projects. While many managers intuitively believe that strategic advantage can come from knowing more than competitors, they are unable to explicitly articulate the link between knowledge and strategy. This article provides a framework for making that link and for assessing an organization's competitive position regarding its intellectual resources and capabilities. It recommends that organizations perform a knowledge-based SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis, comparing their knowledge to that of their competitors and to the knowledge required to execute their own strategy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Choosing a distinctive strategic position involves making tough choices about whom to target as customers, what products to offer, and how to undertake related activities efficiently. The most common source of strategic failure is the inability to make clear, explicit choices in these areas. Unfortunately, not only do aggressive competitors imitate attractive positions but, perhaps more importantly, new strategic positions emerge continually. Successful incursions into established markets by strategic innovators such as Canon and the brokerage firm Edward Jones are based on strategic innovation--proactively establishing distinctive strategic positions that are critical to shifting market share or creating new markets. To prepare for the inevitable strategic innovation that will disrupt its market, an organization should: identify turning points before a crisis occurs by regularly monitoring indicators of strategic rather than financial health in the market, prevent cultural and structural inertia by creating a culture that welcomes change, develop processes that allow experimenting with new ideas, develop the required competencies and skills, and manage a transition to the new strategic position. Designing a successful strategy is a never-ending, dynamic process of identifying and colonizing a distinctive strategic position; excelling in this position while concurrently searching for, finding, and cultivating another viable strategic position; simultaneously managing both positions; slowly making a transition to the new position as the old one matures and declines; and starting the cycle again.

Summarizes the core ideas about the microeconomics of markets that are most relevant to business strategy. Sections I and II develop two basic building blocks of any market, demand and supply. Section II discusses how demand and supply interact to determine the quantity of goods traded in a market and the price paid for those goods, with special attention to the way that external events influence the quantity traded and the price paid. Section IV presents the important benchmark of "perfect competition," in which equally matched firms compete so vigorously and market entry is so easy that no firm earns more than its cost of capital. Section V explores the ways that real markets depart form perfect competition. These departures lie at the heart of long-run profitability.

In 1980, Apple was the leader of the PC industry, but by 1999, it had suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Wintel camp. This case examines Apple's efforts to create sustainable competitive advantage as the PC industry evolves. After discussing Apple's history and past strategic moves (1977-1999), the case poses the question: Can Steve Jobs make Apple "insanely great" again?

In 1998, Newell Co., a manufacturer of low-tech, high-volume consumer goods, acquired Calphalon Corp., a high-end cookware company, and Rubbermaid, a $2 billion manufacturer of consumer and commercial plastic products. The case focuses on Newell's strategy and its elaboration throughout the organization, as well as the importance of selecting appropriate acquisitions to grow the company. Do Calphalon and Rubbermaid fit with the company's long-term strategy of growth through acquisition and superior service to volume customers? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 799-139.

Pandesic is a joint venture of SAP and Intel designed to develop turnkey information architectures for marketspace companies. The case explores the problems of developing the joint venture from the perspective of its general management. Describes the development of its strategy and organization. At the end of the case, performance is poor and Harold Hughes (Intel) steps in from his position as part-time chairman to run Pandesic.

Through their competitive battle, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have created a stable and highly profitable duopoly in the U.S. soft drink industry. As the domestic industry matured and the cola wars moved to international markets, Coke and Pepsi tried to redesign their competitive strategies as well as the vertical structure of their corporations. A rewritten version of an earlier case by Michael E. Porter and David B. Yoffie.

Supplements the (A) case.

No matter how monolithic they may seem, most companies are really engaged in three kinds of businesses. One business attracts customers. Another develops products. The third oversees operations. Although organizationally intertwined, these businesses have conflicting characteristics. It takes a big investment to find and develop a relationship with a customer, so profitability hinges on achieving economies of scope. But speed, not scope, drives the economics of product innovation. And the high fixed costs of capital-intensive infrastructure businesses require economies of scale. Scope, speed, and scale can't be optimized simultaneously, so trade-offs have to be made when the three businesses are bundled into one corporation. Historically, they have been bundled because the interaction costs--the friction--incurred by separating them were too high. But we are on the verge of a worldwide reduction in interaction costs, the authors contend, as electronic networks drive down the costs of communicating and of exchanging data. Activities that companies have always believed were central to their businesses will suddenly be offered by new, specialized competitors that won't have to make trade-offs. Ultimately, the authors predict, traditional businesses will unbundle and then rebundle into large infrastructure and customer-relationship businesses and small, nimble product innovation companies. And executives in many industries will be forced to ask the most basic question about their companies: What business are we really in? Their answer will determine their fate in an increasingly frictionless economy.

With Multi-currency HORIZON, a real-time multi-currency accounting system that replaced the traditional batch-oriented single-currency accounting system, successfully launched, State Street Corp. (State Street) began to focus on growing the scope of its business through new information-based value-added services. At an analyst meeting in May 1997, Marshall N. Carter, chairman and chief executive office of State Street, had announced that State Street's goal was to offer its customers a fully integrated range of products and services, from news and market data to trade settlement.

The goal of strategy is clear--to increase shareholder value. But in volatile markets, it's difficult to predict how a particular investment will affect a company's value. In this article, Martha Amram, a partner with the consultancy Onward Inc., and Nalin Kulatilaka, a professor at Boston University's School of Management, explain how managers can draw on the frameworks and information of the financial markets to make better, more sure-footed strategic investments. The financial markets are adept at calculating the value of an investment under uncertain conditions--exactly the challenge faced by business strategists. By applying the discipline of the markets, executives can avoid basing important decisions on subjective judgments about the future. The application of market discipline to strategy involves three components. First, the decision is framed in terms of the real options it creates. Second, in evaluating an investment, all the relevant information on value and risk available in the financial markets is taken into account. Third, actual financial transactions are used, when appropriate, to acquire options or otherwise mitigate risk. In a series of cases, the authors show how applying market discipline can help illuminate a range of common business decisions--whether to add production capacity, or to invest in a new venture, or to upgrade an information system, for example. By providing disciplined insight into the uncertainty present in all markets, the real-options approach lets executives think more clearly and realistically about complex and risky strategic decisions.

Most companies focus on matching and beating their rivals. As a result, their strategies tend to take on similar dimensions. What ensues is head-to-head competition based largely on incremental improvements in cost, quality, or both. The authors, Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne from INSEAD, have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space--that is, by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors. This path to value innovation requires a different competitive mind-set and a systematic way of looking for opportunities. Instead of looking within the conventional boundaries that define how an industry competes, managers can look methodically across them. By so doing, they can find unoccupied territory that represents real value innovation. Rather than looking at competitors within their own industry, for example, managers can ask why customers make the trade-off between substitute products or services. Home Depot, for example, looked across the substitutes serving home improvement needs. Intuit looked across the substitutes available to individuals managing their personal finances. In both cases, powerful insights were derived from looking at familiar data from a new perspective. Similar insights can be gleaned by looking across strategic groups within an industry; across buyer groups; across complementary product and service offerings; across the functional-emotional orientation of an industry; and even across time. To help readers explore new market space systematically, the authors developed a tool, the value curve, that can be used to represent visually a range of value propositions.

Competition on the Internet is creating fierce battles between industry giants and small-scale start-ups. Smart start-ups can avoid those conflicts by moving quickly to uncontested ground and, when that's no longer possible, turning dominant players' strengths against them. Authors David Yoffie from HBS and Michael Cusumano from MIT call this competitive approach judo strategy. They use the Netscape-Microsoft battles to illustrate the three main principles of judo strategy: rapid movement, flexibility, and leverage. In the early part of the browser wars, for instance, Netscape applied the principle of rapid movement by being the first company to offer a free stand-alone browser. This allowed Netscape to build market share fast and to set the market standard. Flexibility became a critical factor later in the browser wars. In December 1995, when Microsoft announced that it would "embrace and extend" competitors' Internet successes, Netscape failed to give way in the face of superior strength. Instead it squared off against Microsoft and even turned down numerous opportunities to craft deep partnerships with other companies. The result was that Netscape lost deal after deal when competing with Microsoft for common distribution channels. Netscape applied the principle of leverage by using Microsoft's strengths against it. Taking advantage of Microsoft's determination to convert the world to Windows or Windows NT, Netscape made its software compatible with existing UNIX systems. While it is true that these principles can't replace basic execution, say the authors, without speed, flexibility, and leverage, very few companies can compete successfully on Internet time.

This case illustrates an industry that is experiencing intensifying competition and regulation. The Chinese fireworks industry thrived after China adopted the "open door policy" in the late 1970s and grew to make up 90% of the world's fireworks export sales. However, starting from the mid-1990s, safety concerns led governments both in China and abroad to set up stricter regulations. At the same time, there was rapid growth in the number of small, family-run fireworks workshops, whose relentless price cutting drove down profit margins.

Monsanto, a biotechnology giant highly committed to sustainable development efforts, needs to assess the attractiveness of the drinking water treatment industry before deciding its entry to it. Four dimensions of the global water treatment industry are described: types of products and services, applications, end users, and geographical markets. The drinking water treatment segment, which is classified into municipal drinking water treatment and residential drinking water treatment, is examined in depth. Players in these two categories produce the chemicals and equipment necessary to purify tap water supplied to consumers and residential water purification devices. The bottled water industry is considered a substitute of the drinking water treatment segment. Teaching purpose: To answer the question "Is the industry attractive?" and to introduce students to industry analysis and industry segmentation.

After restructuring Scott Paper with a 34% reduction in head count and successfully selling the company to Kimberly Clark, Al Dunlap is hired as CEO by Sunbeam. This case describes the management principles of this corporate turnaround expert and his actions at Sunbeam.