個案總覽

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice-president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. Without funding, there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. Palmer was not against bold initiatives, but sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." She knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? In R0305A and R0305Z, four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice-president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice on this fictional case study.

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice-president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. Without funding, there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. Palmer was not against bold initiatives, but sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." She knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? In R0305A and R0305Z, four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice-president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice on this fictional case study.

The brutal, puzzle-based job interview has spread from the computer industry to the Fortune 500 and beyond. But grilling candidates in this way can backfire.

In the hours and days following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks which destroyed New York's World Trade Center towers, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani distinguished himself, in the view of many, for his style of leadership. A combination of resolve, reassurance, courage, and compassion appeared to rally the city and the United States. Although not long before he had been under fire for aspects of his mayoralty, the post 9/11 Giuliani won national and international acclaim as a leader. This case recounts the details of Giuliani's response such that students of effective public leadership can analyze both Giuliani's decisions and style as examples. The case combines a written account of Giuliani's career, his often-controversial pre-9/11 tenure in office, and a detailed description of his, and New York City government's response to the terrorist blows. The written case is complemented by a video exhibit that combine real-time footage of Giuliani during the immediate aftermath of the Trade Center attacks, as well as reflections by key New Yorkers on his leadership approach and its qualities. The case provides fodder for discussion of those personal and institutional characteristics which came into play during an extreme crisis management situation. These include Giuliani's personal and political behavior, his heroes and role models, as well as New York City's emergency management system and how it was deployed. There is a teaching note available for this case (1681.2). HKS Case Number 1681.0

Nobody likes performance reviews. Subordinates are terrified they'll hear nothing but criticism. Bosses, for their part, think their direct reports will respond to even the mildest criticism with stonewalling, anger, or tears. The result? Everyone keeps quiet and says as little as possible. That's unfortunate, because most people need help figuring out how they can improve their performance and advance their careers. This fear of feedback doesn't come into play just during annual reviews. At least half the executives with whom the authors have worked never ask for feedback. People avoid the truth and instead try to guess what their bosses are thinking. Fears and assumptions about feedback often manifest themselves in psychologically maladaptive behaviors such as procrastination, denial, brooding, jealousy, and self-sabotage. But there's hope, say the authors. Those who learn adaptive techniques can free themselves from these destructive responses. They'll be able to deal with feedback better if they acknowledge negative emotions, reframe fear and criticism constructively, develop realistic goals, create support systems, and reward themselves for achievements along the way. The authors take you through four manageable steps for doing just that: self-assessment, external assessment, absorbing the feedback, and taking action toward change.

Global Traffic Inc. (GTI) is a U.S.-based sign manufacturer. The vice-president of the company must recommend a human resources strategy for possible entry in the Russian market. This involves developing a plan for an expatriate assignment, selecting and compensating personnel as well as coming up with training needs and outlining the organizational culture.

Most organizations struggle with leadership development. They promote top performers into management roles, put them through a few workshops and seminars, then throw them to the wolves. Managers with the ability to survive and thrive are rewarded; those without it are disciplined or reassigned. The problem is, an alarming number of people fall into the second category. This happens not because managers lack skills but because companies fail to realize that there is no single kind of leader-in-training. In this article, Natalie Shope Griffin, a consultant in executive and organizational development at Nationwide Financial, describes four kinds of managers-in-training, each embodying unique challenges and opportunities: reluctant leaders, arrogant leaders, unknown leaders, and workaholics. The author outlines specific training approaches tailored to each type of prospective leader. By focusing on the unique circumstances of individual managers, investing in them early in their careers, offering effective coaching, and providing real-life management experiences, Nationwide's leadership-development program has produced hundreds of successful leaders.

Andreas Weber was selected as a high potential in a large German bank early in his career, and was posted on an international assignment to the USA. Over time, he progressed swiftly in the New York office. When he and his wife decided to return home after several years, headquarters was not able to find a position for him back in Germany that was requisite with his experience and skills. The case ends with Andreas wondering what he should do.

Andreas Weber was selected as a high potential in a large German bank early in his career, and was posted on an international assignment to the USA. Over time, he progressed swiftly in the New York office. When he and his wife decided to return home after several years, headquarters was not able to find a position for him back in Germany that was requisite with his experience and skills. The case ends with Andreas wondering what he should do.

A debate in a city council committee is described in which a 'rational' discussion of issues was overwhelmed not by political allegiances but by emotional issues of group identity and fairness. The case illustrates how such 'proxy debates' can arise, where the emotional issue is different from the theme that is officially discussed.

Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd been at Rainbarrel only a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work. Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. An employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? In R0301A and R0301Z commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for ChevronTexaco, offer their advice in this fictional case study.

What could be more fundamental to management, or more difficult, than motivating people? After all, a manager, by definition, is someone who gets work done through others. But how? A typical recipe for motivation calls for a mixture of persuasion, encouragement, and compulsion. Yet the best leaders, we suspect, need no recipe: They get people to produce great results by appealing to their deepest drives, needs, and desires. And so we discovered when we asked a dozen of the world's top leaders to describe how they each met a daunting challenge in motivating an individual, team, or organization. Some of the leaders appeal to people's need for the rational and the orderly: Mattel's Robert Eckert emphasizes the reassuring power of delivering a consistent message, and HP's Carly Fiorina focuses on facing hard truths and setting step-by-step goals. Some, like celebrated oceanographer Robert Ballard, Pfizer CEO Hank McKinnell, and BP America president Ross Pillari, see the powerful motivating effects of asking people to rise to difficult challenges. Others focus more on the human spirit, appealing to the desire to do something, as BMW's Chris Bangle puts it, "rare, marvelous, and lasting." And quite a few inspire through example, as Dial chairman Herb Baum did when he donated $1,000 from his bonus to each of the company's 155 lowest paid people.

Managers who motivate with incentives and the power of their vision and passion succeed only in energizing employees who want to be motivated. So how do you motivate intractable employees--the ones who never do what you want and also take up all your time? According to Nigel Nicholson, you can't: Individuals must motivate themselves. Instead of pushing solutions on problem employees, the manager should pull solutions out of them by creating circumstances in which the employees can channel their motivation toward achievable goals. That means addressing any obstacles--possibly even the manager's own demotivating style--that might be hindering the employees. Using detailed examples, Nicholson walks the reader through his method, pointing out potential pitfalls along the way. First, the manager creates a rich picture of the problem person. Second, the manager exercises flexibility and reframes goals so that the employee can meet them. Third, in a carefully staged, face-to-face conversation, the manager meets with the problem employee on neutral ground.

It's a manager's perennial question: "How do I get an employee to do what I want?" The psychology of motivation is very complex, but the surest way of getting someone to do something is to deliver a kick in the pants--put bluntly, the KITA. Companies usually resort to positive KITAs, ranging from fringe benefits to employee counseling. But although a KITA might produce some change in behavior, it doesn't motivate. Frederick Herzberg, whose work influenced a generation of scholars and managers, likens motivation to an internal generator. An employee with an internal generator, he argues, needs no KITA. Achievement, recognition for achievement, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or advancement motivate people. The author cites research showing that those intrinsic factors are distinct from extrinsic, or KITA, elements that lead to job dissatisfaction. Jobs can be changed and enriched. Managers should focus on positions where people's attitudes are poor. The investment needed in industrial engineering is cost effective, and motivation will make a difference in performance.

Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd been at Rainbarrel only a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work. Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. An employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? In R0301A and R0301Z, commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for ChevronTexaco, offer their advice on this fictional case study.

Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd been at Rainbarrel only a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work. Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. An employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? In R0301A and R0301Z, commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for ChevronTexaco, offer their advice on this fictional case study.

Examines the key elements and principles behind Haier's performance management system and the organizational behavioral context in which it was implemented. Haier's performance management system constituted a significant competitive advantage and was a key factor in the company's transformation from a small, backward, collectively owned local company to the number five player in the global white goods industry. The strength of the case lies in the universality of the key principles behind Haier's management performance systems.

Changes came hard at Stein, Bodello, & Associates, Inc., a consulting civil engineering firm employing 100 people in four branch offices. Following a move to a new location and an upgrade of the business and project management functions, some unhappiness developed in the ranks of middle management. Concerns leadership and change but from a bottoms-up perspective: through the eyes of subordinates. Focuses on the need to learn how to manage the boss.

Labor-management cooperation has been regarded for many years as a panacea for organizations' competitive woes. The academic and popular presses have lauded the joint efforts of companies and their unionized workforces to come together to solve companies' competitive problems while saving employees' jobs. Moreover, research on and examples of labor-management cooperation have found that through joint efforts, unions and firms can improve organizational performance and employee outcomes. Increasingly, however, it appears that cooperation is often but a short-lived phenomenon. This article examines a major initiative of labor-management cooperation that was undertaken to facilitate the fundamental restructuring of the health care delivery system in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota. For 10 years, management of more than a dozen hospitals and representatives of the Minnesota Nurses' Association came together to negotiate and manage the process of system integration, rationalization, and delivery improvement. The results were remarkable. Yet, just a few years later, despite the success, only remnants of labor-management cooperation remain in these hospitals. This article examines the reasons for this demise and provides lessons for those engaged in cooperative undertakings that may help extend the life of those initiatives.

Everyone knows a story about a talented businessperson who has lost his passion for work or a person who ditched a 20-year career to pursue something completely different and is the happier for it. "Am I doing what is right for me, or should I change direction?" is one of the most pressing questions for today's midcareer professional. A true change of direction is hard to swing. Many academics and career counselors contend that the problem lies in basic human behavior: We fear change and don't want to make sacrifices. But author Herminia Ibarra suggests another explanation. People most often fail, she says, because they take the wrong approach to finding new careers. Indeed, the conventional wisdom on how to change careers is a prescription for how to stay put. Most of us have heard that the key to a successful career change is figuring out what we want to do next, then acting on that knowledge. But change actually happens the other way around. Doing comes first, knowing second, because changing careers means redefining our working identity--our sense of self in our professional roles, what we convey about ourselves to others and, ultimately, how we live our working lives. Who we are and what we do are tightly connected, the result of years of action. And to change that connection, we must first resort to action.