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A summary of the major themes discussed in the eleventh class of The Moral Leader (EC curriculum).

A summary of the major themes discussed in the twelfth class of The Moral Leader (EC curriculum).

A summary of the major themes discussed in the thirteenth class of The Moral Leader (EC curriculum).

In October 2004, SpaceShipOne rocketed into space, winning the $10 million Ansari X PRIZE. This competition for the first privately funded, manned spaceflight was organized by the X PRIZE Foundation, and attracted 26 competitors, who had spent more than $100 million in pursuit of the prize. The success of SpaceShipOne generated intense media and public interest. Many of the competitors for the Ansari X PRIZE also planned to continue their efforts to develop commercial spaceflight businesses. After this success, Peter Diamandis, founder and CEO of the X PRIZE Foundation considered the future of the foundation. He saw three options: shutting down, continuing with a focus on space, or creating a "world-class prize institute that uses the prize-incentive model to solve today's grand challenges." He chose the third alternative, with the vision of developing 10-15 prize competitions. The foundation chose to work on fields including space, medicine and genomics, energy and transportation, education, and other social challenges. Describes lessons learned about prize competitions through the Ansari X PRIZE program. Discusses issues in creating and operating a successful competition, as well as the advantages of using incentive prizes, including bringing new thinking to bear on difficult problems and paying out only when an important goal is accomplished (paying for results, not effort). Poses several problems facing the Foundation as it begins to focus on fields outside of space: could prize competitions work in fields that were not technology-centric (such as poverty); could the organization scale up to support as many as 10-15 competitions; and what areas should the foundation focus on. Finally, could the prize model revolutionize philanthropy by using financial incentives to stimulate investment in important fields and leverage philanthropic dollars by paying only for results?

At the close of 2004, CANTV was Venezuela's largest privately owned company. It operated in the telecom market, the only economic sector other than oil that enjoyed sustained growth in the 1990s. At the start of 2000, it faced growing competition, regulated tariffs, and deteriorating consumer purchasing power. The company focused efforts on cost containment and the introduction of new services. Although in 2004 the telecom sector rebounded, political instability, currency devaluation, and tariff regulation affected investment plans. Poses the challenge of designing a social responsibility strategy for a large, publicly traded Latin American company operating in a context of political instability, financial volatility, and growing poverty. President Gustavo Roosen felt CANTV should project a "grand and friendly" image to its stakeholders (customers, government, and suppliers, among others). The aim was to align the social portfolio with the image of a company that generated social (friendly) and economic value (grand). The company's social responsibility was implemented through a variety of programs. CANTV had placed emphasis on philanthropy by means of the Social Fund and other sponsorships, run from the Institutional Relations Department. In 2004 CANTV launched Super@ulas, a program aligned with the telecom business and managed from the Executive Vice President's office. Some of the company's top managers expressed concern in 2004 over the results generated by social contributions, and looked for synergistic opportunities--among them improved relations with the regulating agency and alignment with business objectives. The idea was to continue providing support to social agencies, many of which were at risk as a result of the shrinking number of grant sources and a government policy that sought total control over social programs.

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This is a minicase, one of 10 in a set of short cases written to illustrate the business benefits companies realize through adopting sustainable business strategies. This minicase discusses the formation and implementation of Nike's sustainability strategy in the 1990s through 2006 including changes to product designs and supply chain policies.

Senior management at PSI, arguably the world's largest and most successful social marketer with impressive achievements in the field of family planning, HIV/AIDS, and malaria prevention must determine what to do about their slow-to-take-off clean water initiative. PSI's point-of-use products offered effective protection against water-borne diseases, especially diarrhea, yet the organization found it hard to attract donor funds to sustain the initiative. Its managers must determine how to alter their strategy going forward.

More than ever, corporations are expected to practice "citizenship" by engaging in various community or social philanthropy programs. These corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs have broad appeal among business scholars, business executives, and the public. After first setting some theoretical boundaries for CSR as it relates to the legal and strategic management fields, the authors examine how CSR (both its implementation and expectations) can lead to unintended results, compromising the distinct roles business and government play in market-driven, democratic systems.

The spread of bird flu outside of Asia, particularly in Africa and Europe, topped headlines in 2006. The migration of wild birds brought the virus to Europe, where for the first time it spread to productive livestock, bringing it closer to the Western world. Due to today's globalized and highly interconnected world, the consequences of a potential bird flu pandemic are expected to be much more severe than those of the Spanish flu, which killed 50-100 million people between 1918 and 1921. A vaccine for the bird virus is currently not available. As of July 2006, 232 cases of human infection had been documented, mostly through direct contact with poultry. Of those, 134 people died. The best medication available to treat bird flu was Roche's antiviral drug Tamiflu®. However, Tamiflu was not widely available; current orders of government bodies would not be fulfilled until the end of 2008. Well aware that today's avian flu might become a global pandemic comparable to the Spanish flu, Roche CEO Franz Humer had to decide how Roche should respond. While the pharmaceutical industry continued its research efforts on vaccines and medications, Tamiflu could play an important role by protecting healthcare workers and helping to contain the virus-or at least slow down its spread. Due to patent protection and a complicated production process with scarce raw ingredients, Roche had been the only producer of the drug. Partly in response to U.S. political pressure, in November 2005 Roche allowed Gilead to produce Tamiflu as well. Even so, it would take at least until late 2007 for Roche and Gilead to meet the orders of governments worldwide. The issue was a difficult one for Roche: What were the risks; what were the opportunities? If a pandemic occurred before sufficient stockpiles of Tamiflu had been built up, would Roche be held responsible? What steps, if any, should Roche take with respect to patent protection and production licensing in the shadow of a potential pandemic?

Because U.S. legislators are often most attentive to the issues raised by people who create jobs in their states, Bob Epstein, a local business owner, has been asked by activists to help lobby for a bill that would mandate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in California. Before deciding whether he should work to establish the business community's backing for this bill, Epstein must weigh the pros and cons of supporting measures that might put his business (and standing in the community) at risk.

The spring of 2005 marked a tricky juncture for the leaders of a program designed to improve health care access for thousands of residents living in impoverished, isolated settlements just north of the Mexican border in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and also for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which had provided the program with a four-year startup grant, due to expire in a few months time. The project leaders wanted to keep the Integrated Health Outreach System (IHOS) alive, but were not sure how to fund it. In addition, frustrated by aspects of the project's design, they wanted to reorganize and refocus the program. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, meanwhile, had gone through an internal organizational change that had significantly changed RWJF's approach to charitable giving. In general, the Foundation was no longer funding "safety net" programs like IHOS, but had moved toward broader, systemic, collaborative efforts to address the root causes of poor health in vulnerable populations. But the RWJF administrators recognized that the plight of the IHOS clients was extreme. In addition, they knew that resources on the border were scarce. In practical terms, that meant the Foundation was reluctant to cut off the IHOS funding at least not until IHOS could stand on its own feet. HKS Case Number 1852.0

The spring of 2005 marked a tricky juncture for the leaders of a program designed to improve health care access for thousands of residents living in impoverished, isolated settlements just north of the Mexican border in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and also for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which had provided the program with a four-year startup grant, due to expire in a few months time. The project leaders wanted to keep the Integrated Health Outreach System (IHOS) alive, but were not sure how to fund it. In addition, frustrated by aspects of the project's design, they wanted to reorganize and refocus the program. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, meanwhile, had gone through an internal organizational change that had significantly changed RWJF's approach to charitable giving. In general, the Foundation was no longer funding "safety net" programs like IHOS, but had moved toward broader, systemic, collaborative efforts to address the root causes of poor health in vulnerable populations. But the RWJF administrators recognized that the plight of the IHOS clients was extreme. In addition, they knew that resources on the border were scarce. In practical terms, that meant the Foundation was reluctant to cut off the IHOS funding at least not until IHOS could stand on its own feet. HKS Case Number 1852.0

Presents the background of the Spanish courier and urgent parcel service company MRW and its financial situation in the first quarter of 2004. At that time, the urgent delivery service sector was immersed in a process of growth. There was strong competition within the sector and MRW occupied one of the leading positions. Places special emphasis on the social initiatives of MRW and its franchising system, which was used as an expansion strategy. But this system entailed important coordination issues, which led to the creation of a Committee of Ethics and Arbitration. Begins when MRW's central office interviewed a prospective candidate interested in buying a franchise which was left free due to early retirement. The candidate appeared to be a very competent manager who would get results for the franchise in an industrial zone, benefiting the entire network. Nevertheless, he expressed his doubts about the usefulness of MRW's social plans. Javier Marza (assistant general manager of MRW) and Paco Sosa (director of external relations) considered whether they should be concerned about convincing a franchise holder in particular as to the social enterprise of the company. This raised the question of the place social enterprise had in MRW's strategy and of the need to re-evaluate its impact in detail, especially during a phase of growth and renovation in the franchise network, and in the mid-term, with a view to the eventual retirement and replacement of the company's founder, who had always shown clear leadership. All of this could present difficulties for the continuity of the company's culture.

Wan Chai, one of the oldest districts in Hong Kong, was appointed as one of the urban redevelopment areas in Hong Kong in 1998. The government had laid out various redevelopment plans in select sections within the district. Ever since the announcement, many community leaders, residents, and town planners have expressed the fear that Wan Chai would become an "air-conditioned glass box" if the historical buildings were torn down to make ways for high-rises. The government, on the other hand, made justifications to proceed with renewal and claimed that they have adopted a "people-oriented" approach to solve the social and cultural issues. Illustrates a classic case of disputes between policy and people in urban renewal projects and the dilemma of urban renewal and preservation of culture and community networks.

Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF, Doctors without Borders) is an organization that responds to humanitarian crises throughout the world with medical staff and supplies. The organization also acts as an advocate for those it serves, providing "testimony" (temoignage) about the plight of those caught up in humanitarian crises. In the late 1990s MSF began caring for people with HIV/AIDS and in 2000 began the first efforts to provide anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs to HIV-infected people in developing countries. The case describes these efforts, and, in particular, an initiative in Ethiopia by MSF Holland. The discussion of the situation in Holland focuses on the reasons why MSF began an ARV program in Ethiopia and what its future was likely to be. The case highlights the problems facing a highly decentralized organization oriented towards emergency response, which is, nevertheless, engaged in a long-term intervention. As such, it raises questions about the alignment between the organization's mission, structure, and the requirements of a particular program. It also highlights questions about organizational decision making both in terms of entry into a new initiative and exit from it. Finally, it provides an example of organizational effectiveness as advocacy - how proving the impossible is possible moves policy makers to act. The case is appropriate for classes on strategic management and operations management. HKS Case Number 1851.0

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When disaster strikes, many corporations respond generously. After the 2004 tsunami, for instance, U.S. firms alone contributed more than half of a billion dollars in cash and in-kind donations. But a host of reactive efforts don't produce the best results--and may even get in the way. To make the most of their humanitarian efforts, companies need to address two fundamental questions: What kind of aid do we want to contribute--philanthropic (money and in-kind donations) or integrative (backroom, operational assistance)? And how do we want to contribute it--by working one-on-one with a single agency or by joining a consortium? The permutations of those two decisions lead to four different approaches, each with its own strengths and challenges. Single-company philanthropic partnerships work well when there's a good match between what a company wants to contribute and what an agency needs, as with Coca-Cola's donations of water to the Red Cross. More diffuse, but also potentially more effective, are the benefits of joining a multicompany philanthropic partnership, which enables the resources of many firms to be matched to the missions of many agencies. More difficult to establish but more fundamental in its impact is a single-company integrative partnership, in which a corporation works to improve the way an aid agency operates, as the logistics giant TNT has done to help the distribution efforts of the World Food Programme. And most difficult to implement--but potentially most effective--is a multicompany integrative partnership, which brings to bear the collective best practices of many companies to improve the response capabilities of multiple agencies. It's easy to see why the image of a relief worker carrying a sack of grain delivers an emotional wallop, but the behind-the-scenes work of process enhancement is just as crucial to humanitarian efforts. The sooner executives realize this, the better positioned the world will be to respond to global disasters.

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In the early 1980s, Missouri's director of early childhood education launched a novel parent education pilot project designed to increase children's kindergarten readiness and support family wellbeing by sending specially trained educators on monthly home visits to help parents foster their babies' early development. By 1985, when an evaluation touted strong results for the pilot, the Missouri legislature already had made the program-dubbed Parents as Teachers-a mandatory offering of school districts statewide. Soon after, the St. Louis-based Parents as Teachers National Center, formed to oversee the state program and respond to outside inquiries, became an independent nonprofit. From the start, the National Center staff built quality controls into program design and the training of parent educators while simultaneously embracing rapid growth; by 1999 Parents as Teachers programs served more than 500,000 children in the US and six foreign countries. But despite such quality control efforts, the flexibility and adaptability that aided fast replication left the National Center with no effective way to manage or monitor the more than 2,000 sites worldwide. As a result, the National Center was forced to take a hard look at its replication model, its oversight role, and at how the center could better monitor and improve program quality. HKS Case Number 1849.0