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Popular lore tells us that genius is born, not made. Scientific research, on the other hand, reveals that true expertise is mainly the product of years of intense practice and dedicated coaching. Ordinary practice is not enough: To reach elite levels of performance, you need to constantly push yourself beyond your abilities and comfort level. Such discipline is the key to becoming an expert in all domains, including management and leadership. Those are the conclusions reached by Anders Ericsson, a professor of psychology at Florida State University; Michael Prietula, a professor at the Goizueta Business School; and Edward Cokely, a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, who together studied data on the behavior of experts gathered by more than 100 scientists. What consistently distinguished elite surgeons, chess players, writers, athletes, pianists, and other experts was the habit of engaging in "deliberate" practice--a sustained focus on tasks that they couldn't do before. Experts continually analyzed what they did wrong, adjusted their techniques, and worked arduously to correct their errors. Even such traits as charisma can be developed using this technique. Working with a drama school, the authors created a set of acting exercises for managers that remarkably enhanced executives' powers of charm and persuasion. Through deliberate practice, leaders can improve their ability to win over their employees, their peers, or their board of directors. The journey to elite performance is not for the impatient or the faint of heart. It takes at least a decade and requires the guidance of an expert teacher to provide tough, often painful feedback. It also demands would-be experts to develop their "inner coach" and eventually drive their own progress.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In studying teams at large companies in Europe and the United States, finds that diversity and complexity are becoming the rule. Diverse teams bring to bear a range of experiences and attitudes to tackle companies' hardest challenges. Paradoxically, however, the very nature of team diversity often creates conditions that reduce teams' innovative capacity. Illustrates many failures in collaboration and knowledge-sharing that resulted from faultlines--subgroups or coalitions that emerge naturally within teams, typically along demographic lines such as age, gender, and functional background, yet finds that some teams were able to collaborate and share knowledge despite the presence of faultlines. A defining factor was the behavior of the team leader and, in particular, the extent to which the leader was task-oriented or relationship-oriented. Where it is likely strong faultlines will emerge, many leaders tend to encourage team members to come together. However, simple socializing can make people's differences more apparent and cause faultlines to solidify. Recommends that leaders vary their leadership style according to how long a team has been together and outlines four steps for successful functioning of diverse teams: leaders should diagnose the likely extent of faultlines in a new team; focus on task orientation when a team is newly formed; consider when a switch in leadership style would be most appropriate; and finally, build a relationship-oriented style. Switching from task orientation to relationship orientation will be successful only when a team has developed a clear protocol for communication and coordination and an established operational structure.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For executives running global companies, the challenge of keeping abreast of events in markets around the world is mind-boggling. The problem is not a lack of information--it is having the time and energy to process the information. How should executives prioritize their time to ensure that it is focused on the countries and subsidiaries that need the attention? Which markets should they emphasize, and which ones can they allow to fall off their radar screen? Researches executive attention at global companies for five years, interviewing 50 executives at 30 corporations--including ABB, Dun & Bradstreet, Nestle, and Sara Lee--and finds that executives end up prioritizing a handful of markets at the expense of the others, but they don't always select the most promising ones. Because executive attention is so limited, executives tend to focus on the home market or on "hot" markets, always at the expense of other opportunities. Examines the nature of executive attention and identifies mechanisms by which subsidiary companies attract attention from the top executives. Although attention can be harmful as well as helpful, focuses on the positive aspects, three elements in particular: support, in terms of how headquarters executives interact with and help subsidiary managers achieve their goals; visibility, in terms of the public statements headquarters executives make about how the subsidiary is doing; and relative standing, in terms of the subsidiary's perceived status vis-a-vis other subsidiaries in the organization.

"I've had enough! I've decided that I need to resign," read the email from the founder of Webpoint to the company's board of directors. Les Trachtman, the CEO of Webpoint, has to figure out how to react to the founder's "it's Trachtman or me" ultimatum. Webpoint was Trachtman's fourth job as CEO, and in each case he had been hired as the first non-founding CEO, taking over from the founder-CEO of a tight-knit founding team. Trachtman had first taken over from a mother and son team, then from two brothers, then from a wife and husband team, and now from serial co-founders who were best friends. From these ventures, Trachtman had learned how to manage founders who had strong relationships, but those experiences had not prepared him for the current situation.

After its dramatic corporate turnaround, the Swedish telecom infrastructure company Ericsson hires a new CEO to bring the former Swedish flagship company back on track. Puts students in the shoes of Carl-Henric Svanberg, an industry outsider and CEO of locks group Assy Abloy, who does not hesitate a moment when he gets the call in early 2003. Looks back on the reasons for Ericsson's current situation and the recent restructuring programs that cut the company's staff and operating expenses in half. Presents Svanberg's vision for how to re-energize the ailing company and reach profitability once again, and gives students the opportunity to debate these issues.

Carl-Henric Svanberg, CEO of the Swedish telecom infrastructure company Ericsson, has to reorganize the recovering company in late 2003 after a major industry downturn. He is convinced that only a more market-orientated and customer-focused organization will be able to remain competitive in this maturing, high-technology focused industry. Presents his change project, in which the sales and marketing structure play a central role. Will his ideas allow the company to keep its customers and successfully go after new markets?

Reviews the work of the New York City School Chancellor Joel Klein and his attempt to create a Leadership Academy in order to better train principals to lead New York City public schools. Assesses what leadership skills and strategies are necessary for Klein to create a new cohort of effective site-based leaders for New York City Public Schools and further, what methodology Klein and the Leadership Academy establish to accomplish this task. The key question involves Klein's attempt to assess whether an institution dedicated to training better administrators can serve as the key component of a larger effort to improve the performance of the New York City public school system; on a more micro basis is the question of whether the Leadership Academy itself and its program to train principals has been effective in the context of the larger problems the school system faces. If so, will the principals trained be able to be successfully integrated and effectively utilized as organizational elements capable of leading site efforts necessary to improve New York City public school system performance?

The CEO and other company leaders are trying to do all the right things to motivate executives. One of those things is to develop the workforce through excellent executive education. On the last day of a week-long off-site program, the head honcho shows up to motivate program participants. With one short "pep talk," he swoops in, sucks all the energy out of the room, and leaves.

This is the first of a two-case series (IMD328 and IMD330). The idea for Dubailand first came up in early 2002 as part of the country's efforts to diversify the sources of its gross domestic product (GDP) by expanding the tourism market offering. The answer, developed by the Dubai Development and Investment Authority, was the founding principle behind Dubailand - the creation of a globally competitive entertainment and leisure hub. Between 2003 and 2005, a master plan for the project was drafted. International theme park experts and consultants were called on to provide input as to how the land should be divided and what should be included to make the destination globally competitive. In April 2006, Christian Perdrier, current CEO (Chief Executive Officer) of Dubailand, was approached by a headhunter based in London about the Dubailand project. They were looking for someone with international experience and industry expertise to lead the project, which was not taking off beyond the master-planning phase. He accepted the challenge and joined the company in February 2007. The case is set in 2007, in the first few months after a CEO is hired to make the vision happen. Between February 2007 and December 2010, the CEO will have to turn a plan into a reality, opening a leisure and entertainment complex of 27,000 hectares, hiring the first wave of the 250,000 people who will ultimately work in a hub that will include dozens of theme parks, hotels, retail and residential units.

Continuation of the 'Tale of the Lynx' case series.

Leslie Brinkman is the founder and CEO of a hedge fund, Versutia Capital. Leslie spent late 2002 and early 2003 assembling her team and launched the fund in early 2003. While the firm performed well during 2003 and 2004 (both in terms of returns and new assets), in 2005 the results began to suffer. Describes the process of designing the firm, the resulting team dynamics, the strains on the staff and the impact of Leslie's management style on the performance of her team. In the spring of 2005, Leslie must decide whether to re-design the firm and/or change her management style in order to address the performance issues that Versutia Capital is facing.

Marie Trellu-Kane is trying to decide how Unis-Cite should respond to French President Jacques Chirac's announcement in 2005 of a new national voluntary civil service program. Since 1994, Trellu-Kane and her co-founders had been creating and overseeing a civil service program called Unis-Cite, in which youth, particularly from the disadvantaged immigrant population, volunteered nine months of their time to work on community projects. Based in Paris, France, Unis-Cite had begun to expand to other areas. With the announcement that the government would provide funding to mobilize thousands of youth volunteers, Trellu-Kane needed to decide how Unis-Cite would proceed.

Describes the AFL-CIO: Office of Investments activities in their campaign to improve governance at Home Depot by calling attention to Home Depot CEO Robert Nardelli's compensation package and the company's poor performance. The AFL-CIO Office of Investments advocates for improved corporate governance at public companies, focusing on the problems of excessive chief executive compensation, improperly backdated stock options, insufficiently independent corporate board members, poor responsiveness to shareholders concerns, and a lack of transparency in the activities and decisions of boards. The AFL-CIO believes that such problems were indicators of underlying problems in corporate governance that could impact the long-term value of a public company. To advance its cause, the Office targeted Home Depot. In an effort to bring about change at the company, the AFL-CIO and AFSCME corresponded with Home Depot executives, staged public protests, appeared on talk shows, and maintained several Web sites. The trillion-dollar size of the union pension funds gave the Office a platform from which to work. The departure of Home Depot's CEO had been a significant step by Home Depot and the company had made other concessions as well. The AFL-CIO Office of Investment now needed to decide whether to continue to use its limited resources focusing on Home Depot or find a new target to forward their cause.

Always a thorny issue but it had to be asked. Who was next in line? Management succession is a significant issue in many firms. Executives put all their energy into the business. But how much time is spent on bench strength planning? And what happens if the CEO is not ready to hand the reigns over and begin a life outside the office? This case presents transition challenges that many companies currently face-the retirement age of baby boomers and the takeover of the C level suite by the next generation.

Describes Lazard's situation in 2001, and supplies context for the subsequent negotiation between its Chairman and his hand-picked successor. In 2001 Lazard, the last of the great investment houses to remain both private and in the control of its founding family, is in a state of decline. Infighting throughout the 1990s led to a defection of talent that left many wondering if Lazard could compete with the diversified financial behemoths of the 21st Century. It also left Chairman Michel David-Weill looking for a successor. David-Weill believes he has found one in M&A star Bruce Wasserstein: going into their negotiation, what should Wasserstein's strategy be?

Supplements the (A) case.

If Marketing and Finance can learn to get along, both can advance their agendas.

Portable media players are helping employees make productive use of their downtime, as businesses learn how to train people via pod cast.

Often, executives who are hired from outside a firm fail because they can't fit in with its culture. Here's how to help them avoid missteps.

Studies show that the more staffers' opinions of a company outshine customers', the greater that company's sales growth will be.