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The founders of Lynx Solutions have survived tensions within the founding team, the firing of Lynx's founder-CEO, and a crisis sparked by media allegations that it had been spying on its users. Now the founders are considering a proposal from one of their directors to make a dramatic shift in the venture's strategy and have to decide how to react.

Even rude or irrelevant feedback can be useful, but only a rare few can put ego aside and extract the hidden value.

The Q&A should be more than just an afterthought, says communications consultant Michael Sheehan. It may be the only part of your speech people actually listen to.

Outside directors are at lower risk of liability than they might think, but they can protect themselves even further.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Even the most seasoned executives may have strongly opposing views about the wisest course of action for an organization, particularly given their diverse personal backgrounds or previous immersion in other corporate cultures. But such differences in approach don't necessarily lead to conflicts that are unproductive and damaging to an organization. To investigate such issues, the authors conducted a study of the organizational values (objectives that an individual or group believes are important in running a business, such as industry leadership, employee welfare, and profit maximization) of the top management teams in 31 companies. The authors investigated two specific types of team conflict: task and relationship. Task conflict is characterized by substantive, issue-related differences in opinion. This type of disagreement can be beneficial when it ensures that a greater number of possible solutions are explored. In contrast, relationship conflict--characterized by disagreements over personalized, individually oriented matters--is generally detrimental. It corrodes trust, hinders communication, slows the acceptance of ideas, and leads to isolation and politicization among group members. The study results showed that behavior is driven by perception rather than reality. Specifically, the greater the perceived difference in organizational values among members of a top management team and their CEO the greater the conflict. Interestingly, any actual dissimilarity was not a factor. Thus, the bottom line is that many top management teams are unnecessarily encountering difficulties because of members' faulty assumptions. To lessen this tendency, the authors advise companies to consider the following: establish an appropriate atmosphere for the team; because perceptions become reality, understand and manage them; investigate the gaps between perceptions and reality; and act decisively to correct gross misperceptions.

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0704A and R0704Z are Stephen R. Hardis, the nonexecutive chairman of Marsh & McLennan; Hal Shear, the managing director of Board Assets; Mary Rowe, an ombudsperson for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Jackson W. Robinson, the founder and president of Winslow Management.

The success of an executive team depends heavily on the relationships the boss has with his or her direct reports. Yet the leadership literature has had little to say about what is expected in those relationships--on either side. Larry Bossidy, formerly the chairman and CEO of Honeywell, and before that of AlliedSignal, shares what he calls "the CEO compact," detailing the behaviors a leader should look for in subordinates and what they should be able to expect in return. A CEO's best people, he says, know when a situation calls for them to get involved. They generate ideas--remembering that some of the best ones may sound crazy at first. They are willing to collaborate, putting the long-term good of the company above short-term goals of their divisions. They step up to lead initiatives, even if the outcome is uncertain. They develop leaders among their people, especially through direct involvement in performance appraisals. They stay current on world events and anticipate how those events may affect the company and its competition. They drive their own growth by exposing themselves to new people and ideas and by accepting demanding assignments. And they sustain these behaviors in bad times as well as good. On the other side of the compact, the boss should provide clarity of direction; set goals and objectives; give frequent, specific, and immediate feedback; be decisive and timely; demonstrate honesty and candor; and offer an equitable compensation plan. Executives who aren't lucky enough to have such a boss can create a compact with their own subordinates, Bossidy says, and demonstrate by example. The result will be to improve team and company performance and accelerate individual growth.

Critical initiatives stall for a variety of reasons--employee disengagement, a lack of coordination between functions, complex organizational structures that obscure accountability, and so on. To overcome such obstacles, managers must fundamentally rethink how work gets done. Most of the challenges stem from broken or poorly crafted commitments. That's because every company is, at its heart, a dynamic network of promises made between employees and colleagues, customers, outsourcing partners, or other stakeholders. Executives can overcome many problems in the short term and foster productive, reliable workforces for the long term by practicing what the authors call "promise-based management," which involves cultivating and coordinating commitments in a systematic way. Good promises share five qualities: They are public, active, voluntary, explicit, and mission based. To develop and execute an effective promise, the "provider" and the "customer" in the deal should go through three phases of conversation. The first, achieving a meeting of minds, entails exploring the fundamental questions of coordinated effort: What do you mean? Do you understand what I mean? What should I do? What will you do? Who else should we talk to? In the next phase, making it happen, the provider executes on the promise. In the final phase, closing the loop, the customer publicly declares that the provider has either delivered the goods or failed to do so. Leaders must weave and manage their webs of promises with great care--encouraging iterative conversation and making sure commitments are fulfilled reliably. If they do, they can enhance coordination and cooperation among colleagues, build the organizational agility required to seize new business opportunities, and tap employees' entrepreneurial energies.

Senior leadership teams whose members play complementary roles have been chronicled as far back as Homer's account of the Trojan War: Although King Agamemnon commanded the Greek army, Achilles, Odysseus, and Nestor each played a distinct role in defeating Troy. Today, complementary leadership structures are common and, in some cases, even institutionalized. Think of a CEO concerned mainly with external issues and a COO who focuses internally. The authors describe four kinds of complementarity: task, expertise, cognitive, and role. The two top executives at the software company Adobe Systems, for example, represent the second kind. As CEO, Bruce Chizen draws on his sales and marketing knowledge, while COO Shantanu Narayen adds his engineering and product development expertise. Roberto Goizueta, formerly the CEO of Coca-Cola, and Douglas Ivester, his COO (who later became CEO), were famous examples of the fourth type: Goizueta, the diplomat, maintained good relations with external stakeholders; Ivester, the warrior, drove the company to defeat the competition. Bringing together two or more people with complementary strengths can compensate for the natural limitations of each. But with the benefits comes the risk of confusion, disagreement about priorities, and turf battles. Leadership succession also presents substantial challenges, especially when a COO or president who has worked in a complementary fashion with the CEO moves into the top role. An organization's board of directors and CEO can manage the risks by fostering a shared vision, common incentives, communication, and trust. They can also ensure smooth succession processes in various ways, such as brokering a gradual transfer of responsibilities or allowing the CEO and the COO to share duties as long as they maintain the logic of complementarity.

How does a large multinational keep thousands of employees, operating in hundreds of countries, honest in a high-pressure business environment? As the chief legal officer at General Electric for nearly 20 years, Ben Heineman was part of the senior management group that sought to do just that--to make sure its executives and employees are moved to do the right thing as strongly as they are motivated to make their numbers. Heineman describes a set of systems that combine the communication of clear expectations with oversight, deterrence, and incentives. Nowhere are the expectations higher--and the sanctions more powerful--than for top executives. Heineman recounts example after example of senior leaders terminated for ethical lapses even when the business consequences of doing so were painful--and even when they had no direct knowledge of the violations occurring on their watch. To make expectations clear throughout the company, GE has systematically sought to set uniform standards that stay well ahead of current legal developments and stakeholders' changing attitudes about corporate accountability. Responsibility for implementing those standards, which are embedded in GE's operating practices, rests with the business leaders in the field. Oversight is both methodical and multifaceted. A host of auditing and assessment systems enables GE to compare the performance of its various business units against one another and against industry benchmarks. Perhaps the most powerful is the company's ombudsman system, which doesn't just allow but requires employees to lodge concerns. Failures to report into the system or up the line, or retaliation in any form, are firing offenses. The current intense focus on board-level governance has missed the point, Heineman argues. It is time to shift the debate from board oversight of the CEO to how top company leaders can most effectively infuse integrity at all levels of the corporation.

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play?

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0704A and R0704Z are Stephen R. Hardis, the nonexecutive chairman of Marsh & McLennan; Hal Shear, the managing director of Board Assets; Mary Rowe, an ombudsperson for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Jackson W. Robinson, the founder and president of Winslow Management.

An abstract is not available for this product.

Computer science departments were new to universities in the 1960s, and the one created at the University of Utah by David Evans and Ivan Sutherland had a research mission to invent the field of computer graphics. Details the research process that led to many of the critical breakthrough concepts and algorithms for the field and the training of PhDs, who then created companies that brought the new technology to the marketplace.

In 2002, the Orsa Group consisted of several business units in the pulp, paper, and packaging sector, having grossed nearly US$ 250 million that year. The Group's enterprises were: Orsa Celulose; Papel e Embalagens [Orsa Pulp, Paper and Packaging], featuring industrial plants in the states of Sao Paulo and Goias and in the Amazon; and Jari Celulose and Orsa Florestal, both located in the Jari region in the heart of the Amazon rainforest. In addition, its philosophical principle of social and environmental responsibility led the Group to create a non-profit organization, the Orsa Foundation, supported by 1% of the Group's consolidated gross sales. More than a mere social welfare action branch, the Orsa Foundation became a priority within company operations as a result of two major factors: a) Orsa was a family-owned business run by main shareholder and president Sergio Amoroso, an entrepreneur with a penchant for social issues; and b) the strategic alignment, especially at the Jari Celulose unit, between business objectives and local, sustainable development. In the light of the specific challenges faced by pulp companies and international markets in general, Amoroso, along with Orsa Group's advisors and top managers, needed to assess the impact of the Orsa Foundation's social strategy on Jari operations.

The chief financial officer (CFO) of Workbrain Corporation (Workbrain) must prepare a memo for the upcoming board of directors meeting. Workbrain, a venture-backed company, has grown substantially since its founding in November 1999. Now the CFO must communicate to the board whether it is time to consider an initial public offering (IPO) and, if so, in which exchange market the stock should be offered. The company must also consider what financing alternatives are available (including maintaining the current venture financing arrangement) and whether the company needs to raise money at all. The CFO is thinking about the memo, knowing that his words will have considerable impact on the company.

Explores how families in business can apply five principles of negotiation that are used effectively by non-family members. The distinctive characteristics of family relationships and of family business systems--which affect the use of these principles--are described.

Business leadership has become synonymous in the public eye with unethical behavior. Widespread scandals, massive layoffs, and inflated executive pay packages have led many to believe that corporate wrongdoing is the status quo. That's why it's more important than ever that those at the top mend relationships with customers, employees, and other stakeholders. Professor Gardner has spent many years studying the relationship between psychology and ethics at Harvard's Graduate School of Education. In this interview with HBR senior editor Bronwyn Fryer, Gardner talks about what he calls the ethical mind, which helps individuals aspire to do good work that matters to their colleagues, companies, and society in general. In an era when workers are overwhelmed by too much information and feel pressured to win at all costs, Gardner believes, it's easy to lose one's way. What's more, employees look to leaders for cues as to what's appropriate and what's not. So if you're a leader, what's the best way to stand up to ethical pressures and set a good example? First and foremost, says Gardner, you must believe that retaining an ethical compass is essential to the health of your organization. Then you must state your ethical beliefs and stick to them. You should also test yourself rigorously to make sure you're adhering to your values, take time to reflect on your beliefs, find multiple mentors who aren't afraid to speak truth to your power, and confront others' egregious behavior as soon as it arises. In the end, Gardner believes, the world hangs in the balance between right and wrong, good and bad, success and disaster. "You need to decide which side you're on," he concludes, "and do the right thing."

In an economy driven by ideas and intellectual know-how, top executives recognize the importance of employing smart, highly creative people. But if clever people have one defining characteristic, it's that they do not want to be led. So what is a leader to do? The authors conducted more than 100 interviews with leaders and their clever people at major organizations such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, Cisco Systems, Novartis, the BBC, and Roche. What they learned is that the psychological relationships effective leaders have with their clever people are very different from the ones they have with traditional followers. Those relationships can be shaped by seven characteristics that clever people share: They know their worth--and they know you have to employ them if you want their tacit skills. They are organizationally savvy and will seek the company context in which their interests are most generously funded. They ignore corporate hierarchy; although intellectual status is important to them, you can't lure them with promotions. They expect instant access to top management, and if they don't get it, they may think the organization doesn't take their work seriously. They are plugged into highly developed knowledge networks, which both increases their value and makes them more of a flight risk. They have a low boredom threshold, so you have to keep them challenged and committed. They won't thank you--even when you're leading them well. The trick is to act like a benevolent guardian: to grant them the respect and recognition they demand, protect them from organizational rules and politics, and give them room to pursue private efforts and even to fail. The payoff will be a flourishing crop of creative minds that will enrich your whole organization.

An unrecognized affliction is striking certain gifted performers at the top of their game. Its cause, paradoxically, is success itself. These stars, who thrive on conquering new challenges, can lose their bearings and question their purpose once a job has been mastered. A vague dissatisfaction gives way to confusion and then to inner turmoil. Left unattended, this summit syndrome can derail promising careers. The syndrome has three phases. In the approach phase, when most of the challenges of a current job have been met, sufferers tend to push harder in a vain attempt to recapture the adrenaline rush of the climb. Then, in the plateauing phase, when virtually all the challenges have been conquered, these individuals, who are incapable of coasting, bear down to try to produce ever more stellar results, but to less effect and greater dissatisfaction. This leads to the terminal descending phase, when performance slips noticeably. As their superstar status fades, they jump ship, accept demotions, or take lateral transfers. It's a terrible waste, for if the syndrome is recognized, steps can be taken before performance slips to dispel the confusion and set the stage for productive growth to the next assignment. There are four parts to this process: First, understand your "winning formula"--the characteristic way you approach a situation--and the vital part it plays in feeling stale or losing your edge. Second, reconnect with your core purpose in life. Third, recast your current, or future, job to better align your inner aspirations with the external requirements of your work. And fourth, create a developmental path by honing a handful of core leadership competencies. None of this is easy, but for talented individuals--and the organizations that rely on them--the vaccine of preventive awareness is far better than gambling on an after-the-fact cure once the crisis is full-blown.