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Multicultural teams offer a number of advantages to international firms, including deep knowledge of different product markets, culturally sensitive customer service, and 24-hour work rotations. But those advantages may be outweighed by problems stemming from cultural differences, which can seriously impair the effectiveness of a team or even bring it to a stalemate. How can managers best cope with culture-based challenges? The authors conducted in-depth interviews with managers and members of multicultural teams from all over the world. Drawing on their extensive research on dispute resolution and teamwork and those interviews, they identify four problem categories that can create barriers to a team's success: direct versus indirect communication, trouble with accents and fluency, differing attitudes toward hierarchy and authority, and conflicting norms for decision making. If a manager--or a team member--can pinpoint the root cause of the problem, he or she is likelier to select an appropriate strategy for solving it. The most successful teams and managers, the authors found, dealt with multicultural challenges in one of four ways: adaptation (acknowledging cultural gaps openly and working around them), structural intervention (changing the shape or makeup of the team), managerial intervention (setting norms early or bringing in a higher-level manager), and exit (removing a team member when other options have failed). Which strategy is best depends on the particular circumstances--and each has potential complications. In general, though, managers who intervene early and set norms; teams and managers who try to engage everyone on the team; and teams that can see challenges as stemming from culture, not personality, succeed in solving culture-based problems with good humor and creativity. They are the likeliest to harvest the benefits inherent in multicultural teams.

In the aftermath of seismic debacles like those that toppled Enron and WorldCom, corporate boards have been shaken up and made over. More directors are independent these days, for instance, and corporations now disclose directors' salaries and committee members' names. Research shows that most of the changes are having a positive effect on companies' performance. They are primarily structural, though, and don't go to the heart of a board's work: making the choices that shape a firm's future. Which decisions boards own and how those calls are made are largely hidden from the public. As a result, boards are often unable to learn from the best governance practices of their counterparts at other companies. This article pulls back the curtain and provides an inside look. Drawing on interviews with board members and executives at 31 companies, along with a close examination of three boardroom decisions, the author identifies several formal processes that can help companies improve their decision making: creating calendars that specify when the board and the standing committees will consider key items; drafting charters that define the decisions committees are responsible for; and developing decision protocols that divvy up responsibilities between directors and executives. The author also identifies a number of informal decision-making principles: Items that are strategically significant and touch on the firm's core values should go to the board. Large decisions should be divided into small pieces, so the board can devote sufficient attention to each one. Directors must remain vigilant to ensure that their decisions are effectively implemented. The CEO and either the nonexecutive chair or the lead director should engage in ongoing dialogue regarding which decisions to take to the full board and when. And directors should challenge assumptions before making yes-or-no decisions on management proposals.

Headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota, Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) started as a small public station that 26-year-old William Kling established at St. John's Abbey and University in Collegeville, Minnesota in 1967. By 2004, Kling's venture had grown into a regional network of 38 stations, serving more than five million people. The organization had more than 83,000 members and boasted the highest percentage of listener membership of any community-supported public radio network in the nation. Much of MPR's growth and success had been built through what Kling referred to as "social purpose capitalism...the application of the traditional principles of capitalism...to a nonprofit organization [to] benefit the public sector." Kling's first foray into "social purpose capitalism" was in 1981 when Garrison Keillor, the popular host of "A Prairie Home Companion," wanted to reward loyal listeners with a free poster of "Powdermilk Biscuits," an allusion to a fictitious sponsor that was part of a Prairie Home gag. The giveaway drew over 50,000 responses, much more than originally anticipated, costing $60,000. To avert financial ruin, Kling printed an offer for other products that listeners could buy on the back of the poster. Netting $15,000 to $20,000 from that poster convinced Kling that there were opportunities to secure MPR's financial situation. Kling created a number of for-profit ventures to support and build the MPR empire. By 2004, however, MPR and Kling were the subject of unrelenting public criticism. Ostensibly, the issue was MPR's unwillingness to disclose Kling's compensation from the private for-profit enterprises spawned by MPR. After disclosing this information, Kling became the subject of condemnation amid accusations of conflicts of interest and nepotism. Knowledgeable observers, however, saw the real concern to be fear that a public benefit organization was being driven by profit-making priorities.

Steve Voigt, the CEO of King Arthur Flour, must determine how the company can continue to grow, whilst preserving its unique culture. In 1996, the company was sold to employees in as ESOP transaction. The following decade saw significant growth, despite declining sales for the industry as a whole. The success could be attributed both to the quality of the product and to the company culture, which treated employee-owners with respect and allowed them to meaningfully contribute to the future direction of the company. By 2006, King Arthur flour had grown from 60 employees to over 200 and Voigt was left questioning whether the unique culture, and ESOP structure, would continue to function as the company continued to expand.

Gianna Angelopoulous-Daskalaki led the bidding organization that secured the 2004 Olympics for Athens and then later the preparations for those Games. Tracks her leadership style and how she and her team won the bid. After substantial planning problems threatened to cost Greece the Olympics, Angelopoulos was asked to take over the preparations, with only 4 of the 7 years remaining. Ends with the question of what she needs to consider in making the decision to take over the Games' preparations, what role she should play, and where she should start.

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Habitat for Humanity--Egypt (HFHE), has grown in just seven years to become one of the most successful Habitat programs worldwide. The organization is at a crossroads as it attempts to reach the ambitious goal of serving 10% of the 20 million Egyptians living in poverty by 2023, while at the same time developing the local NGO capacity to serve the remaining 90%. Since its establishment in 1989, HFHE has worked in close partnership with CEOSS, a 50-year-old NGO, and through other local, community-based organizations. This network approach diverges from the traditional Habitat model of building houses through HFH's own affiliate organizations, but enables HFHE to begin building immediately rather than wait several years to become sufficiently established to operate as an independent entity. Yousry Makar, HFHE's national director, faces several key issues. How can he ensure that as HFHE's partnership network grows, his own office and staff can sustain the network? To what extent should he seek to address the needs of the "poorest of the poor," who cannot even repay loans and therefore do not qualify as Habitat beneficiaries? How can Makar continue to innovate to achieve the greatest mission impact while maintaining funding and support for HFHE?

In the mid-1980s, Prudential completely dominated the UK insurance market. Fifteen years later it was in grave danger of becoming irrelevant, and then things got worse with the post 9/11 collapse of stock markets and the ensuing downfall of its major product ("with profits" insurance). Led by a new CEO, Mark Wood, Prudential UK's management team embarked on a four-year rebuilding journey. The company was fragmented and had lost its direction. The product mix and distribution channels needed to be overhauled, as did the customer service systems and philosophies. The company had zero partnerships. And the corporate culture resembled that of a "country club". Yet, being in the insurance sector, the company had to continue projecting a reassuring image. This severely constrained the possibilities of making the case for change. Nevertheless, in the space of four years, Mark Wood and his team refocused the company, restored its pride and brought it back among the contenders. It emerged with solid assets - outstanding service, genuine innovation, funds for growth and improved relations with clients, IFAs and the regulator. It created options for itself. Learning objectives: The case focuses on the managerial and leadership aspects of a large-scale restructuring. It features some classic turnaround aspects, but also some unusual ones: 1) the rotating appointment of a "quartermaster" to drive performance in each quarter; 2) a leadership story that projects employees forward 1000 days; 3) regular periods of reflection time as a team; 4) the development of an internal business transformation capability, which involved up to 15 per cent of the workforce working off-line on change projects full-time. The case also raises issues around institutionalizing change.

Employers can choose from lots of tools when they want to encourage employees to work together toward a new corporate goal. One of the rarest managerial skills is the ability to understand which tools will work in a given situation and which will misfire. Cooperation tools fall into four major categories: power, management, leadership, and culture. Choosing the right tool, say the authors, requires assessing the organization along two critical dimensions: the extent to which people agree on what they want and the extent to which they agree on cause and effect, or how to get what they want. The authors plot on a matrix where various organizations fall along these two dimensions. Employees represented in the lower-left quadrant of the model, for example, disagree strongly both about what they want and on what actions will produce which results. Those in the upper-right quadrant agree on both dimensions. Different quadrants call for different tools. When employees share little consensus on either dimension, for instance, the only methods that will elicit cooperation are "power tools" such as fiat, force, and threats. Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito wielded such devices effectively. So did Jamie Dimon, current CEO of JPMorgan Chase, during the bank's integration with Bank One. For employees who agree on what they want but not on how to get it--think of Microsoft in 1995--leadership tools, such as vision statements, are more appropriate. Some leaders are blessed with an instinct for choosing the right tools--Continental Airlines' Gordon Bethune, General Electric's Jack Welch, and IBM's Lou Gerstner are all examples. Others can use this framework to help select the most appropriate tools for their circumstances.

Three years ago, consultants Laurence Prusak and Thomas H. Davenport asked prominent management thinkers to name their gurus and reported the results in HBR. James G. March appeared on more lists than any other person except Peter Drucker. A professor emeritus in management, sociology, political science, and education at Stanford University, March has taught courses in subjects as diverse as organizational psychology, behavioral economics, leadership, rules for killing people, friendship, computer simulation, and statistics. He is perhaps best known for his pioneering contributions to organization and management theory. March's accomplishments in that field, and in many others, have conferred on him an almost unprecedented reputation as a rigorous scholar and a deep source of wisdom. As University of Chicago professor John Padgett wrote in the journal Contemporary Sociology, "March's influence, unlike that of any of his peers, is not limited to any possible subset of the social science disciplines; it is pervasive." March approaches thought aesthetically; he cares that ideas have "some form of elegance or grace or surprise." His poetic sensibility can be felt in the metaphors he has created over the years--the "garbage can theory" of organizational choice, for instance, and the "hot-stove effect" in learning. In this edited interview with HBR senior editor Diane Coutu, March shares his thinking on aesthetics, leadership, the role of folly, and the irrelevance of relevance when it comes to the pursuit of ideas. He also comments on the fundamental differences between academic and experiential knowledge, underscoring the need for both.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Most large-scale change efforts fail to meet their expectations. A major problem is that even the most advanced change models will stumble when they face organizational designs and management practices that are inherently anti-change. The truth is that the effectiveness of change efforts is largely determined by organizational design, or how a company's structure, processes, reward systems, and other features are orchestrated over time to support one another as well as the company's strategic intent, identity, and capabilities. In a world that is perpetually changing, an organization's design must support the idea that the implementation and reimplementation of a strategy is a continuous process. However, a number of traditional organizational design features tend to discourage change. Thus, to transform themselves into organizations that are "built to change," companies need to rethink a number of these basic design assumptions with respect to managing talent (forget about job descriptions and redefine the relationship between company and worker), reward systems (implement a "person-based" pay system), structure (redesign the organization to maximize its "surface area"), information and decision processes (scrap the annual-budget process and move decision making closer to the front lines), and leaders (replace hierarchical command-and-control with shared leadership).

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Responding to competitive pressures, a growing number of corporate managers are dismantling organizations and cultures that were built on selling particular products and replacing them with new structures designed to be more responsive to customer needs. The push to restructure around customers is more than a new management fad. It is supported by success stories at companies including IBM, Cummins India, Fidelity Investments, and Imation. Companies transitioning from product-oriented to customer-centered organizations progress along a continuum. They begin with informal coordination to overcome the deficiencies of product or functional silos, adding integrating functions (such as key account managers and customer segment task forces) as needed. The market logic for becoming customer focused is often compelling. In surveying 347 companies, the author found that companies that embraced this approach saw accountability for customer relationships improve, and information about customers was more readily shared. These companies were also easier to do business with, according to customers. However, the author found that transforming product-centered cultures can be difficult and that the potential benefits do not necessarily translate into superior performance.

The editor of the "Annals of Improbable Research" observes that leeches have a thing or two to teach us about so-called best practices.

Boston Pops conductor Keith Lockhart discusses the challenges of filling big shoes and managing a team whose members all aspire to be number one.

Jim Quigley, CEO of Deloitte and Touche's consulting practice, asks senior partner Cathy Benko to lead Deloitte & Touche's much publicized Initiative for the Retention and Advancement of Women (WIN). Benko, already the Lead Client Service Partner on one of Deloitte's largest west coast engagements and the firm's High Technology Sector Leader, rejects the offer. This sets off a series of moves by players across the firm. The case follows Benko's early career, detailing the reasons why Quigley believes she is the right person to lead the initiative. Both Quigley and Benko make decisions and take steps that shape Benko's role as a leader in the firm.

Cathy Benko pulls together a group of Deloitte and Touche's top partners for a weekend discussion of the Initiative for the Retention and Advancement of Women (WIN). Benko, stimulated by the strong reaction by the attending partners, agrees to take on the leadership role. But only after negotiating the details of the role with CEO Quigley.

In early 2003, CEO Ben Verwaayen and Chief Broadband Officer Alison Ritchie of BT Plc. are trying to transform the former British Telecom from a stodgy telephone company into a 21st century broadband company. Their efforts to focus the firm on broadband issues within the UK are being thwarted by a reluctant management team. Discusses the problems Verwaayen and Ritchie face in forging a social revolution within BT and illustrates the challenges of cross line of business innovation.

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An abstract is not available for this product.

Looks at the multinational company, Philips Electronics, which is headquartered in the Netherlands, as an example of a company with a two-tiered board. The company is governed by both a supervisory board and a board of management. Examines the role, dynamic, and best practices of each of the two boards. Additionally, the case examines the relationship between the two boards and the key factors in determining that relationship.