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Before the breakup of the Bell System, U.S. telephone companies were permitted by law to ask for security deposits from a small percentage of subscribers. The companies used statistical models to decide which customers were most likely to pay their bills late and, thus, should be charged a deposit, but no one knew whether the models were right. So the Bell companies made a deliberate mistake. They asked for no deposit from nearly 100,000 new customers randomly selected from among those who were considered high risks. Surprisingly, quite a few paid their bills on time. As a result, the companies instituted a smarter screening strategy, which added millions to the Bell System's bottom line. Usually, individuals and organizations go to great lengths to avoid errors. Companies are designed for optimum performance rather than for learning, and mistakes are seen as defects. But as the Bell System example shows, making mistakes--correctly--is a powerful way to accelerate learning and increase competitiveness. If one of a company's fundamental assumptions is wrong, the firm can achieve success more quickly by deliberately making errors than by considering only data that support the assumption. Moreover, executives who apply a conventional, systematic approach to solving a pattern recognition problem are often slower to find a solution than those who test their assumptions by knowingly making mistakes. How do you distinguish between smart mistakes and dumb ones? The authors' consulting firm has developed, and currently uses, a five-step process for identifying constructive mistakes. In one test, the firm assumed that a mistake it was planning to make would cost a significant amount of money, but the opposite happened. By turning assumptions on their heads, the firm created more than $1 million in new business.

Of all the meetings top executives attend in a year, none is more important than the strategy off-site, where the most essential conversations for the future of the business occur. Yet, it is the rare management team that can say its strategy off-site truly changed the way the business is run. At best, participants do some vague direction setting and work on team-building skills; at worst, they write off the retreat as a waste of time and resources. It needn't be like that. From their two decades of experience designing and facilitating strategy off-sites in companies large and small around the world, the authors have distilled a set of best practices that businesses can use to make the most of this annual opportunity. Essentially, the problem with most strategy off-sites is that they're insufficiently structured. People think that if you schedule a meeting, invite top leaders (and, perhaps, an outside expert), and block off units of time to discuss big subjects, the rest will take care of itself. In reality, formlessness leads to aimlessness. Oddly enough, only rigorously designed meetings give rise to truly candid strategy discussions. That rigor starts before the meeting, when the scope of the matters discussed must be limited, the participant list drawn up accordingly, the relevant materials (and only those) sent out and absorbed, and a detailed agenda established. During the meeting, the pace and quality of the conversation can be managed through attention to politics and by using carefully tailored frameworks, decision points, and group exercises. After the meeting, an action plan ensures clear accountability and follow-through. If you and your executive team spend four days a year rafting down rivers together, you'll eventually get good at rafting down rivers. Spend four days a year having well-designed strategy conversations together, and you will transform your annual off-site from a meaningless junket into a genuine turning point for your business.

Every year, at the annual summit of Ralston Crane's marketing group, Chief Marketing Officer Ruth McViney homes in on an important organizational objective. Last year, the architecture and design firm was focused on green building initiatives. This year, Ruth says, is the year of customer loyalty. Toward the end of her keynote remarks, she introduces two kickoff projects. The goals of one, Project Holding Pattern, sound familiar to Ralston's Guy Christiano; if the project team structures its loyalty program to look like the one he'd been associated with in his previous job, it could be a boon for the company. "Why didn't they put me on that project?" he wonders. "Then again," Guy figures, "I've got plenty to do already." Several weeks after the conference, Guy is contacted by a member of the project team. Guy's ready to share the key success factors for the loyalty program he'd been involved with before: a marketing initiative that looks like a service offering. But what the team is proposing sounds more like a run-of-the-mill seminar series. Against his mentor's advice, Guy calls team leader Charyl Urquhart to make the case for a different approach, going so far as to e-mail her his suggested outline for the program. Miffed, Charyl cuts the call short and never follows up. Guy considers going over her head, to McViney. But another friend in the firm warns him off: "If it's as screwed up as you say it is...you don't want to be associated with it." Should a colleague with strong opinions butt in or butt out? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0606A and R0606Z are four expert commentators--consultant and author Marcus Buckingham, Harley-Davidson's Joanne Bischmann, former Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, and Umea University School of Business professor Tomas Blomquist.

Every year, at the annual summit of Ralston Crane's marketing group, Chief Marketing Officer Ruth McViney homes in on an important organizational objective. Last year, the architecture and design firm was focused on green building initiatives. This year, Ruth says, is the year of customer loyalty. Toward the end of her keynote remarks, she introduces two kickoff projects. The goals of one, Project Holding Pattern, sound familiar to Ralston's Guy Christiano; if the project team structures its loyalty program to look like the one he'd been associated with in his previous job, it could be a boon for the company. "Why didn't they put me on that project?" he wonders. "Then again," Guy figures, "I've got plenty to do already." Several weeks after the conference, Guy is contacted by a member of the project team. Guy's ready to share the key success factors for the loyalty program he'd been involved with before: a marketing initiative that looks like a service offering. But what the team is proposing sounds more like a run-of-the-mill seminar series. Against his mentor's advice, Guy calls team leader Charyl Urquhart to make the case for a different approach, going so far as to e-mail her his suggested outline for the program. Miffed, Charyl cuts the call short and never follows up. Guy considers going over her head, to McViney. But another friend in the firm warns him off: "If it's as screwed up as you say it is...you don't want to be associated with it." Should a colleague with strong opinions butt in or butt out? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0606A and R0606Z are four expert commentators--consultant and author Marcus Buckingham, Harley-Davidson's Joanne Bischmann, former Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, and Umea University School of Business professor Tomas Blomquist.

Board directors suffer from conflicts of interest just as managers do and, so, can't be trusted to act in shareholders' interests. The solution is to make directorship a high-profile public service.

A recent study shows that even criminals benefit from being mentored. So why are so few rank-and-file employees paired with their more seasoned colleagues?

Top management teams whose members don't trust one another perform worse when they're handed unilateral decisions than when they slug it out to reach a consensus.

Because executive pay policies show very little sensitivity to company value, underperformers often are overpaid, whereas top performers are underpaid.

In 2002, when Wal-Mart became the largest U.S. company in sales, it began to attract considerable attention. Its expansion into the grocery business seemed to ignite a firestorm of contention and bad press. Wal-Mart was criticized for providing low wages and inadequate health care benefits, driving small merchants out of business, damaging the culture in small towns, harming the environment, and violating workers rights. The company realized that its practice of focusing solely on customers and employees was no longer sufficient--it needed a nonmarket strategy to address the criticism and repair its deteriorating reputation. This case explores the opposition that organized around Wal-Mart's practices and the issues raised. It sets the stage for developing and analyzing a successful nonmarket strategy for Wal-Mart.

General Electric thrived in every decade of the 20th century. Since its founding in 1892, GE has placed a high value on picking and training the best people. Staff members worked with other scientists in the company's research lab to design and manufacture new and better products to satisfy the growing American consumer demand for lighting, appliances, and consumer electronics in the 1910s to 1920s as well as in the 1950s and 1960s. GE's top executives have shown a clear understanding of the leadership and managerial styles that were appropriate for the years in which they worked. In the first decade of the 20th century, Charles Coffin demonstrated that he was an adept negotiator who amassed great wealth for GE in building generators and power equipment for local utilities in which GE also had a financial stake through bond issues. In the final decades of the 20th century, Jack Welch emphasized that GE should support only the most profitable businesses in the company's portfolio, a logic that led Welch and GE to phase out GE's consumer electronics division while bolstering the financial position of GE capital. Profiles all of GE's top executives.

Willa Seldon, an African-American woman with 16 years of for-profit experience, was hired as executive director of Tides Center, a nonprofit in San Francisco, CA. Tides Center was a fiscal sponsor dedicated to supporting individuals and groups working toward social change. In her first few months as executive director, Seldon quickly and deliberately rolled out initiatives to ensure that Tides Center became a customer-centric organization capable of delivering exceptional fiscal sponsorship services and steady organizational growth. One aspect of this involved conducting a comprehensive performance management review. Examines the transition from the for-profit to the nonprofit sector and deals with change management.

In 2004 and 2005, Wal-Mart began to implement a nonmarket strategy to respond to detractors and improve its image. This case details the many steps that Wal-Mart took, from becoming politically involved to creating community relations offices to working with special interest groups. Wal-Mart ran ads in various newspapers, launched a major environmental initiative, extended health care benefits, set up a diversity task force, and announced support for local businesses in communities in which it planned to open new stores. Study questions set up a discussion of Wal-Mart's actions.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. In R0605A and R0605Z, four experts discuss this fictional case study: Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors' findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can contribute significantly to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.

If you want to know why so many organizations sink into chaos, look no further than their leaders' mouths. Over and over, leaders present grand, overarching--yet fuzzy--notions of where they think the company is going. They assume everyone shares their definitions of "vision," "accountability," and "results." The result is often sloppy behavior and misalignment that can cost a company dearly. Effective communication is a leader's most critical tool for doing the essential job of leadership: inspiring the organization to take responsibility for creating a better future. Five topics wield extraordinary influence within a company: organizational structure and hierarchy, financial results, the leader's sense of his or her job, time management, and corporate culture. Properly defined, disseminated, and controlled, these topics give the leader opportunities for increased accountability and substantially better performance. For example, one CEO always keeps communications about hierarchy admirably brief and to the point. When he realized he needed to realign internal resources, he told the staff: "I'm changing the structure of resources so that we can execute more effectively." After unveiling a new organization chart, he said, "It's 10:45. You have until noon to be annoyed, should that be your reaction. At noon, pizza will be served. At one o'clock, we go to work in our new positions." The most effective leaders ask themselves, "What needs to happen today to get where we want to go? What vague belief or notion can I clarify or debunk?" A CEO who communicates precisely to 10 direct reports, each of whom communicates with equal precision to 40 other employees, aligns the organization's commitment and energy with a well-understood vision of the firm's real goals and opportunities.

Since the days of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, the American public's regard for the competence of public agencies and the value of the services they perform has steadily declined. During that time, innovations in management practice and thinking have mostly originated and been tested in the private sector. But recent events, such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the engulfment of New Orleans, have demonstrated how essential it is for public agencies to be well run, too. Unfortunately, few public administrators have a background in change management, and a variety of factors--such as civil service rules, political considerations, and the limited tenures of agency heads--have combined to make true reform a rare event. These facts of public life may never go away. But some agency leaders have figured out how to court important stakeholders, rededicate staffers to an agency's true mission, undertake reform so comprehensively that resistant elements are unable to subvert it, and lay the groundwork for next steps clearly and systematically. Consultant Frank Ostroff has studied turnarounds at the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Government Accountability Office, and Special Operations Forces--the fast-response, clandestine arm of the military. From these examples and others, he has distilled five principles that underlie successful change efforts: Improve performance against agency mission; win over external and internal stakeholders; establish a road map; recognize the connections among all the organizational elements; and be a leader, not a bureaucrat. Change programs that follow these principles are more likely to survive when leadership changes hands.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. Commenting on this fictional case study in R0605A and R0605Z are Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. Commenting on this fictional case study in R0605A and R0605Z are Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Coming up with fresh ideas for new or existing products, services and processes is widely recognized as the key to enduring economic advantage, and as a result, employee creativity has taken center stage in discussions of innovation. But how can creativity be actively fostered and sustained in the workplace? Paying attention to employee emotions is critical, say the authors. Organizations are emotion-laden environments, and while research has begun to validate affective (i.e. emotional) influences on a number of work outcomes (including task quality, productivity and efficiency), little is known about how naturally-occurring affective experiences in the flow of our daily work lives relate to creative thinking on the job. The authors show that the emotion-creativity system is a cycle, whereby influences at any point can begin a dynamic pattern of increasing or decreasing positive affect and creativity.

Adrian Ivinson is the director of Harvard Center for Neurodegeneration and Repair (HCNR), a not-for-profit research center at the Harvard Medical School (HMS). The center was started in late 2000 with a gift of $37.5 million from an anonymous donor. Its mandate was to conduct research that could lead to actual treatments for neurodegenerative disease (i.e., ALS, Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, MS, and Huntington's) and do so by encouraging collaboration among researchers in the HMS community. When Ivinson takes the helm in 2001, he finds a dysfunctional center with little organization or structure. In addition, he has little formal authority to make changes and he must navigate the complex culture of the HMS neurological research community as well as the HMS academic culture. Demonstrates Ivinson's efforts to develop HCNR as a catalyst for aligning scientific researchers in the HMS community by creating incentives for innovation and collaboration. Also, profiles the issues he faces as general manager at various stages of the organization's development--and how his style, priorities, and approach must change as the needs of the organization change. Provides an opportunity for action planning to address the major issues facing the HCNR at the end of 2005. Focuses on organizational culture, alignment, leadership style/fit, and change management.