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Explores how IBM incorporated diversity into its business strategy, making the case that workforce diversity is critical to marketing its products and services to its customers. In the early 1990s, Ted Childs, vice-president of Workforce Diversity, proposed to CEO Lou Gerstner the creation of eight diversity task forces. Delves into the organizational and cultural impediments to starting a diversity task force initiative and how IBM overcame these obstacles to implement an effective diversity strategy. After the task forces were established, they underwent tremendous growth and became global in scope. Childs also faces the challenge of taking a U.S.-based diversity strategy and applying it to IBM's global organization. Teaching Purpose: To demonstrate how a company can implement an effective diversity strategy and integrate it into its overall business strategy.

In June 2001, the men's wrestling program at Marquette University was terminated, despite the fact that the program had been operating for several years with privately raised funding. Bucknell University discontinued its wresting program the same year. An important factor in the termination of these programs was Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which required that "no person...on the basis of sex...be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Title IX was primarily intended to help women overcome discrimination in academic programs, but it also applied to athletics. Marquette and Bucknell sued the U.S. Department of Education to eliminate what they viewed as the unintended consequences of Title IX implementation in reducing opportunities for men. Describes Title IX, its implementation, and controversial issues faced by institutions attempting to meet the objectives of the law.

In 1993 there was a major realignment of college football conferences, as three schools left the Big East Conference to join the Atlantic Coast Conference, leading to a wave of changes as the Big East moved to replace the departing schools. The University of Notre Dame was the nation's premier independent intercollegiate football program, unaffiliated with any conference. Notre Dame periodically had considered joining a conference, and had done so for its non-football sports, but had remained independent for football. Independence brought considerable financial benefits, primarily in the form of a lucrative television contract, but also caused difficulties. With the conference landscape changing, the school reconsidered its future, and the possible benefits of joining a conference. Describes the intercollegiate conference system and the related economic issues.

Provides a general description and overview of U.S. law on insider trading, including the basic theories of liability, the responsibilities of securities firm managers to prevent and detect insider trading, and the potential penalties for insider trading. A rewritten version of an earlier note.

Can managers really tame corporate knowledge? Seeks answers by exploring the internal practices of a large consulting firm and identifying those that help and those that hinder knowledge management. Examines both canonical and noncanonical practices in the firm, along with a look at some of the ironies that arose when the two types differed. The model developed here outlines appropriate strategic considerations, depending on the strategic focus and knowledge characteristics within the environment of the firm.

Focuses on a crisis in the board at Vivendi. Highlights the difficulties that arise when dramatic pressure from outside the boardroom affects boardroom dynamics. In this case, there are two events. The first is an unexpectedly large financial loss and a pending cash flow crisis that forces Vivendi's directors to deal with the issue of dismissing their CEO. Whatever they decide, their actions will be scrutinized by the press and investors and will likely be revisited in a legal environment. The second is the board diagnosing its role in the financial crisis by approving a series of costly acquisitions in recent years that led to the crisis.

In 2003, Steve Hash, research director at Lehman Brothers, prepared to initiate the firm's "Ten Uncommon Values" stock-picking process for the year. An investment committee had to pick the 10 best stocks from about 100 stock ideas presented by the firm's analysts. The performance of the stocks selected for the Ten Uncommon Values had historically been strong--an investment strategy to acquire the recommended stocks and hold them for one year would have outperformed the S&P 500 for 39 of the last 54 years. However, during the latest three years--2000 to 2002--the recommendations had performed poorly, generating an average return of -22.5% vs. -11.7% for the S&P 500. Hash pondered several questions: What was the importance of the Ten Uncommon Values for Lehman Brothers and its clients? How much time and effort should the firm put into the process of selecting stocks for the report? How many members should be on the Investment Policy Committee, and who should be selected? What should the process for selection be? Should analysts whose stocks were selected be compensated for their picks? Finally, should they continue the process? Teaching Purpose: Using both qualitative and quantitative data, to allow students to discuss a range of issues: the optimal process of selecting stocks, the optimal size of the committee, how much time to spend with each analyst, private or public voting on stocks by the committee members, the right decision-making process, and whether incentives play a role in the process.

While reading the Wall Street Journal, Edward Rogers notices an advertisement for a knowledge management architect at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Rogers is an academic whose scholarship centers on developing models of how and why people cooperate intellectually. After submitting his resume and completing the interview process, Rogers is offered the position for a term appointment of three years. After one month on the job, Rogers wonders how he should proceed in helping the Goddard Space Flight Center become a learning organization. It is, in fact, the kind of opportunity Rogers has looked forward to for many years, but what will his plan of attack look like? How can he help this collection of rocket scientists work better together? In the B case, Rogers's action plan is presented, together with input from NASA engineers, scientists and other key players. See also the A case (UV3262).

The literature on CEO succession planning is nearly unanimous in its advice: Begin early, look first inside your company for exceptional talent, see that candidates gain experience in all aspects of the business, and help candidates develop the skills they will need in the top job. It all makes sense and sounds pretty straightforward. Nevertheless, the list of CEOs who last no more than a few years on the job continues to grow. Implicit in many, if not all, of these unceremonious departures is the absence of an effective CEO succession plan. The problem is, most boards simply don't want to talk about CEO succession: Why rock the boat when things are going well? Why risk offending the current CEO? Meanwhile, most CEOs can't imagine that anyone could adequately replace them. In this article, Kenneth W. Freeman, the retired CEO of Quest Diagnostics, discusses his own recent handoff experience (Surya N. Mohapatra became chief executive in May 2004) and offers his approach to succession planning. He says it falls squarely on the incumbent CEO to put ego aside and initiate and actively manage the process of selecting and grooming a successor. Aggressive succession planning is one of the best ways for CEOs to ensure the long-term health of the company, he says. Plus, thinking early and often about a successor will likely improve the chief executive's performance during his tenure. Freeman advocates the textbook rules for succession planning but adds to that list a few more that apply specifically to the incumbent CEO: Insist that the board become engaged in succession planning, look for a successor who is different from you, and make the successor's success your own. After all, Freeman argues, the CEO's true legacy is determined by what happens after he leaves the corner office.

Annual spending on executive coaching in the United States is estimated at $1 billion. Yet, information about coaching's effectiveness is scarce and unreliable. No one has yet demonstrated conclusively what qualifies an executive coach or what makes one approach to executive coaching better than another. Barriers to entry are nonexistent--many executive coaches know little about business, and some know little about coaching. The coaching certifications offered by various self-appointed bodies are difficult to assess, and methods of measuring return on investment are questionable. But strategic coaching can provide critical help both to individuals and to organizations. In this article, Stratford Sherman, a senior vice-president of Executive Coaching Network, and Alyssa Freas, the founder and CEO, explore the popularity of executive coaching and investigate ways to make the most of the experience. They argue that coaching is inevitably a triangular relationship between the client, the "coachee," and the coach. Its purpose is to produce behavioral change and growth in the coachee for the economic benefit of the client. The best way to maximize the likelihood of good results is to qualify all the people involved. Even so, many triangular relationships continue to generate conflict among all three parties. At the most basic level, coaches serve as suppliers of candor, providing leaders with the objective feedback they need to nourish their growth. Coaching gets executives to slow down, gain awareness, and notice the effects of their words and actions. On a larger scale, the best coaching fosters cultural change for the benefit of the entire organization. It provides a disciplined way for businesses to deepen relationships with their most valued employees while also increasing their effectiveness.

We can't observe how leaders make decisions, so we judge--and often misjudge--those decisions by appearances, explains business professor Michael Useem.

Management professor Henry Mintzberg argues that a little leadership goes a long way.

Discusses issues involved in the job interview process. Teaching Purpose: To assist in career planning.

Discusses the process of generating implications from life themes, a necessary step for completing the Self-Assessment and Career Development final paper.

Provides insights and observations into the process of analyzing and choosing a job offer. Teaching Purpose: To assist in career planning.

While reading the Wall Street Journal, Edward Rogers notices an advertisement for a Knowledge Management Architect at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Rogers is an academic whose scholarship centers on developing models of how and why people cooperate intellectually. After submitting his resume and completing the interview process, Rogers is offered the position for a term appointment of three years. After one month on the job, Rogers wonders how he should proceed in helping the Goddard Space Flight Center become a learning organization. It is, in fact, the kind of opportunity Rogers has looked forward to for many years, but what will his plan of attack look like? How can he help this collection of rocket scientists work better together? The A case presents an undisguised picture of a NASA center that is fostering a learning approach to developing the organization. See also the B case (UV3264).

On June 8, 1998, California-based Wells Fargo and Minneapolis banking company Norwest announced a "merger of equals" in a stock deal valued at $34 billion and one that created the Western Hemisphere's most extensive and diversified financial services network. The Wells-Norwest combined company would have $191 billion in assets, more than 90,000 employees, approximately 20 million customers, and 5,777 financial services "stores" (mortgage, consumer finance, or banking stores) in 50 states, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and internationally. The new combined company, Wells Fargo & Co., would be the sixth largest bank in the United States and have the largest supermarket branch network and the largest Internet bank of any U.S. bank. With the merger, Paul Hazen, chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo at the time, became chairman of the new organization. Richard Kovacevich, chairman and CEO of Norwest, became president and CEO of the new organization. Despite Kovacevich's and Hazen's enthusiasm for the merger, they had a series of potential barriers to overcome: First, Wells Fargo and Norwest had contrasting cultures--Norwest was known for customer service and a superior sales culture, whereas Wells Fargo was a leader in online banking and technology, with a focus on efficiency. Second, in 1998, Wells Fargo was still in the process of overcoming a merger with First Interstate that was widely considered a failure. Finally, many industry analysts viewed the Wells-Norwest merger with much caution. Given such barriers, Kovacevich and his team wondered how they could overcome such issues through an optimal integration strategy and effective execution toward that plan.

On June 8, 1998, California-based Wells Fargo and Minneapolis banking company Norwest announced a "merger of equals" in a stock deal valued at $34 billion and one that created the Western Hemisphere's most extensive and diversified financial services network. The Wells-Norwest combined company would have $191 billion in assets, more than 90,000 employees, approximately 20 million customers, and 5,777 financial services "stores" (mortgage, consumer finance, or banking stores) in 50 states, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and internationally. The new combined company, Wells Fargo & Co., would be the sixth largest bank in the United States and have the largest supermarket branch network and the largest Internet bank of any U.S. bank. With the merger, Paul Hazen, chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo at the time, became chairman of the new organization. Richard Kovacevich, chairman and CEO of Norwest, became president and CEO of the new organization. Despite Kovacevich and Hazen's enthusiasm for the merger, they had a series of potential barriers to overcome: First, Wells Fargo and Norwest had contrasting cultures--Norwest was known for customer service and a superior sales culture whereas Wells Fargo was a leader in online banking and technology, with a focus on efficiency. Second, in 1998, Wells Fargo was still in the process of overcoming a merger with First Interstate that was widely considered a failure. Finally, many industry analysts viewed the Wells-Norwest merger with much caution. Given such barriers, Kovacevich and his team wondered how they could overcome such issues through an optimal integration strategy and effective execution toward that plan.

The Denver office of Clarion Co., a $30 million, full-service marketing firm, has always been a politics-free zone. Nonwork conversations revolve around families, romances, and the state of the powder at Aspen. If the office sometimes seems detached from the wider world, no one cares. But that all changes with the arrival of Marcus Lippman. A senior project manager hired away from a rival firm in Chicago, Marcus is both charming and aggressive about meeting his new colleagues. During morning encounters in the mail room or kitchenette, he often alludes to the day's headlines. In particular, Marcus follows the presidential campaign with an avidity his colleagues reserve for the fate of contestants on American Idol. Those informed enough to respond, generally do so. Over time, others join in. Politics soon enters the office bloodstream. Employees sense a new energy, a feeling of engagement that intensifies as the campaign season progresses. Many employees make contacts in the business community as they pursue extracurricular political activities. But there are downsides as well. Out-of-control e-mail debates sap productivity. Feelings get hurt. And general manager Joan Mungo discovers that political views play an important part in determining who rises to power in the company. As tensions mount, Joan wonders: Should she do something to stanch political debate and, if so, what? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0410A and R0410Z are Brian Flynn, the CEO of Schlossberg:Flynn, a business development consulting firm; Frank Furedi, a professor of sociology at the University of Kent in England; Paula Brantner, the program director at Workplace Fairness, a nonprofit organization; and James E. Rogers, the CEO of Cinergy, a diversified energy company.

The Denver office of Clarion Co., a $30 million, full-service marketing firm, has always been a politics-free zone. Nonwork conversations revolve around families, romances, and the state of the powder at Aspen. If the office sometimes seems detached from the wider world, no one cares. But that all changes with the arrival of Marcus Lippman. A senior project manager hired away from a rival firm in Chicago, Marcus is both charming and aggressive about meeting his new colleagues. During morning encounters in the mail room or kitchenette, he often alludes to the day's headlines. In particular, Marcus follows the presidential campaign with an avidity his colleagues reserve for the fate of contestants on American Idol. Those informed enough to respond, generally do so. Over time, others join in. Politics soon enters the office bloodstream. Employees sense a new energy, a feeling of engagement that intensifies as the campaign season progresses. Many employees make contacts in the business community as they pursue extracurricular political activities. But there are downsides as well. Out-of-control e-mail debates sap productivity. Feelings get hurt. And general manager Joan Mungo discovers that political views play an important part in determining who rises to power in the company. As tensions mount, Joan wonders: Should she do something to stanch political debate and, if so, what? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0410A and R0410Z are Brian Flynn, the CEO of Schlossberg:Flynn, a business development consulting firm; Frank Furedi, a professor of sociology at the University of Kent in England; Paula Brantner, the program director at Workplace Fairness, a nonprofit organization; and James E. Rogers, the CEO of Cinergy, a diversified energy company.