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Decision Support, Analytics, and Business Intelligence is an eight-chapter book written by Daniel J. Power, Professor of Management Information Systems at the College of Business Administration at the University of Northern Iowa, and published by Business Expert Press in 2013. This revised and expanded edition targets MBA students and management professionals who need to quickly grasp the basics of analytics, business intelligence, and computerized decision support. Major topics include: modern decision support systems (DSS), business intelligence and data driven support systems, predictive analytics and model-driven support, as well as identifying opportunities for decision support. The author addresses 61 of the most fundamentally relevant concepts needed to build a solid understanding of the rapidly changing realm of computerized decision support. Chapter 5 focuses on predictive analytics and model-driven DSS. Analytic applications - broad sets of model-driven information systems - are discussed, as is analytical processing, or quantitatively transforming and summarizing relevant data. The tools and applications used for spreadsheet-based DSS, such as Microsoft Excel, are clarified. Sensitivity and "What If?" analyses are compared. Last, the role played by computer-driven simulations, which imitate the behavior of a human or physical system, is addressed

Decision Support, Analytics, and Business Intelligence is an eight-chapter book written by Daniel J. Power, Professor of Management Information Systems at the College of Business Administration at the University of Northern Iowa, and published by Business Expert Press in 2013. This revised and expanded edition targets MBA students and management professionals who need to quickly grasp the basics of analytics, business intelligence, and computerized decision support. Major topics include: modern decision support systems (DSS), business intelligence and data driven support systems, predictive analytics and model-driven support, as well as identifying opportunities for decision support. The author addresses 61 of the most fundamentally relevant concepts needed to build a solid understanding of the rapidly changing realm of computerized decision support. In Chapter 6, the author reviews the benefits and disadvantages of computerized decision support. Nine potential benefits and advantages of DSS are explored, as are claims that some systems provide a competitive advantage. Substitutions for computerized decision support and their applications are then reviewed. The final section examines the potential disadvantages of building and using DSS.

Decision Support, Analytics, and Business Intelligence is an eight-chapter book written by Daniel J. Power, Professor of Management Information Systems at the College of Business Administration at the University of Northern Iowa, and published by Business Expert Press in 2013. This revised and expanded edition targets MBA students and management professionals who need to quickly grasp the basics of analytics, business intelligence, and computerized decision support. Major topics include: modern decision support systems (DSS), business intelligence and data driven support systems, predictive analytics and model-driven support, as well as identifying opportunities for decision support. The author addresses 61 of the most fundamentally relevant concepts needed to build a solid understanding of the rapidly changing realm of computerized decision support. Chapter 7 discusses the search, planning, and implementation processes associated with DSS. The auditing decision process is clarified and the content of a feasibility study examined. Concerns surrounding the reengineering of internal systems are explored. The factors influencing DSS implementation risks, and the trade-offs of outsourcing enterprise-wide DSS, are also discussed.

Why is it so difficult for established companies to pull off the new growth that business model innovation can bring? Here's why: They don't understand their current business model well enough to know if it would suit a new opportunity or hinder it, and they don't know how to build a new model when they need it. Drawing on their vast knowledge of disruptive innovation and experience in helping established companies capture game-changing opportunities, consultant Johnson, Harvard Business School professor Christensen, and SAP co-CEO Kagermann set out the tools that executives need to do both. Successful companies already operate according to a business model that can be broken down into four elements: a customer value proposition that fulfills an important job for the customer in a better way than competitors' offerings do; a profit formula that lays out how the company makes money delivering the value proposition; and the key resources and key processes needed to deliver that proposition. Game-changing opportunities deliver radically new customer value propositions: They fulfill a job to be done in a dramatically better way (as P&G did with its Swiffer mops), solve a problem that's never been solved before (as Apple did with its iPod and iTunes electronic entertainment delivery system), or serve an entirely unaddressed customer base (as Tata Motors is doing with its Nano-the $2,500 car aimed at Indian families who use scooters to get around). Capitalizing on such opportunities doesn't always require a new business model: P&G, for instance, didn't need a new one to leverage its product innovation strengths to develop the Swiffer. A new model is often needed, however, to leverage a new technology (as in Apple's case); is generally required when the opportunity addresses an entirely new group of customers (as with the Nano); and is surely in order when an established company needs to fend off a successful disruptor (as the Nano's competitors may now need to do).

China Telecom was a major provider of telecommunication services in China. It was organized into three layers―Corporate HQ, Provincial companies, and city branches. Zhejiang Corporation, one of China Telecom's 31 provincial companies, adopted enterprise software to combat rising competition from wireless providers to its fixed line phone services. This case explores how Zhejiang Corp. centralized its database and key transactions to analyze data, create semi-customized promotions, and reach out into non-telephone services. Then, in May 2008, the Chinese government restructured the telecommunications industry, turning China Telecom into a national carrier and removing previous restrictions on its ability to provide mobile phone services. Now that China Telecom could offer full-blown mobile service, it had to develop a new strategy to market its portfolio of products.

We discuss the challenges of implementing an Internet-based platform for creating collaborative supply chains using a case study in the retail sector. The case presents how an Internet-based collaboration platform was implemented to address the strategic issue of increasing shelf availability and customer service in grocery retailing, an issue that has emerged as one of the major confrontations for the whole sector over the past years. The case presented shows the challenges of executing such strategic collaborative supply-chain initiatives which, although arguably beneficial, can be hindered by IT adoption failures. A longitudinal view of the case is presented, from an initial pilot back in 2001 to the final success in 2005. We discuss the particular challenges of the execution of Internet-enabled collaborative supply-chain initiatives as well as possible managerial actions through a simple framework we develop based on the lessons from the case.

In the continuing quest for business growth, many CEOs are turning to their CIOs and IT organizations because technology is absolutely essential to two compelling sources of growth: innovation and enterprise integration. The speed of innovation often depends on the ability to coordinate across organizational boundaries. Innovations cannot reach a sufficient level of scale and impact unless they are integrated into the larger operations of the corporation. And yet, say recently retired Harvard Business School dean Cash, Oxford dean Earl, and nGenera director of research Morison, the two endeavors remain "unnatural acts": Far too many large businesses are better at stifling innovation than at capitalizing on it, better at optimizing local operations than at integrating them for the good of the enterprise and its customers. To make both pursuits seem more natural, the authors recommend creating two dedicated, IT-powered teams: a distributed innovation group (DIG) and an enterprise integration group (EIG). The DIG serves as the center of expertise for innovation techniques, considers new uses for technology already being developed inside the company, looks for new developments outside the company, and provides experts for internal innovation initiatives. The EIG selects the most promising from among competing integration projects, provides resources to give them a strong start, and then folds them into the operating model of the enterprise. Without such agencies, the authors maintain, innovation and integration won't spread far enough or fast enough throughout a large organization to keep pace with the smaller, younger, more technology-based competitors to which innovation and integration come much more naturally.

The case opens with XGen Technologies, a software-led IT solutions provider, being placed in a situation of having to grapple with the issues of linear growth, similar to most of the contemporary ITES companies. XGen's traditional ''linear'' business model now had Partha Sen, the CEO, seeking out new profit opportunities. The company's headcount had touched a whopping 40,000 and managing such a large setup was becoming a severe challenge. Besides, in the emerging war for talent, sourcing and retaining quality talent was another problem. An export-driven software services company, XGen earned substantial revenues in dollars, and the appreciation of the rupee by close to 15% coupled with rising salaries had impacted its profit margins in the current fiscal. All these factors, and the fact that XGen was a listed company, put immense pressure on Partha to adopt an innovative business model to ward off pressure on bottom lines, ensure sustainability of the business in the long run. Most Indian ITES companies had been clocking impressive growth, yet there were concerns about the future, particularly with regard to the burden and difficulties that were expected in manpower intensive business models that inextricably had to struggle with ever-escalating costs as well as increasing complexity in managing its humongous operations. The focus of the case then shifts to the various strategies that software companies have been adopting in order to achieve greater non-linearity in their business. In particular, the case concentrates on Zyme Solutions, Inc., a fully outsourced hosted data service provider to the high-tech vertical market, which has built a non-linear business from the ground up, without the legacy of the linear business models to contend with. The second half of the case describes in detail how Zyme Solutions has gone about constructing an innovative non-linear business model for its business.

Investments in certain technologies do confer a competitive edge-one that has to be constantly renewed, as rivals don't merely match your moves but use technology to develop more potent ones and leapfrog over you. That's the conclusion of a comprehensive analysis that Harvard Business School professor McAfee and MIT professor Brynjolfsson conducted of all publicly traded U.S. companies in all industries over the past few decades. They found a clear correlation between levels of IT spending and a new competitive dynamic: Since the mid-1990s, when the rate of spending on IT began to rise sharply, the spread between the leaders and laggards in an industry has widened. There are more winner-take-all markets. But the increased concentration has ramped up, rather than dampened, churn among the remaining players. And these dynamics are greatest in those industries that are more IT intensive. This pattern is already familiar to the makers of digital products, but it has now spread to traditional industries, the authors contend, not because more products are becoming digital but because more processes are. Enterprise software like ERP and CRM systems, coupled with cheap networks, is allowing companies to replicate their unique business processes quickly, widely, and faithfully, in the same way that a digital photo can be endlessly reproduced. In this new environment, top managers must pay careful attention to which processes to make consistent and which to vary locally. And while standardizing some ways of working, they must also encourage employees to come up with creative process improvements to outdo competitors' innovations. Competing at such high speeds isn't easy, and not everyone will be able to keep up-but the companies that do may realize vastly improved business processes as well as higher market share and increased market value.

On 6 November 2007, Alibaba.com debuted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising US$1.5 billion to become the world's biggest internet offering since Google's initial public offering in 2004. A frenzied purchase of the stock pushed prices up by 193% on the first trading day, making it the fourth-largest first-day gain in Hong Kong's stock exchange in three years. The closing price of US$5.09 per share valued Alibaba.com at about US$25.6 billion and made it the fifth-largest among global internet companies and the largest in Asia outside Japan. It also made the company one of the most expensive stocks in Hong Kong, trading at 306 times the company's projected 2007 earnings. In contrast, globally recognized brand names such as Yahoo and Japan's Softbank, both major stockholders of Alibaba.com, were trading at only 60 times their projected earnings. Shareholders were therefore displaying extreme optimism towards Alibaba.com's earning prospect by paying a significant premium to own the company's shares. As observers and venture capitalists have remarked, China is becoming a center of technology and a major pole for innovation. Many successful dot com strategies in the West have been copied and refined by Chinese technological gurus who have honed their technical and entrepreneurial skills in the West. These "sea turtles" are beating international giants likes Google and eBay in the burgeoning Chinese market and have their sights set on global domination. Armed with proceeds from a record-breaking IPO, Alibaba.com is poised to stay ahead in the increasingly-competitive online B2B market in China. What strategies can the company pursue and what pitfalls must it avoid?

Spreadsheet supplement for case KEL174.

At the end of 2005, Atlanta-based Oxford Industries was closing on its third major acquisition in as many years. Two-and-a-half years earlier, Oxford had acquired the Tommy Bahama brand in Seattle, and one year later, it had purchased London-based Ben Sherman. As Oxford's CIO, John Baumgartner has managed over the last three years to provide systems support to establish visibility into the day-to-day financial activities of the legacy company and the newly acquired operating companies, while at the same time minimizing any negative impacts on the profitability of the newly acquired companies through business process and system changes. As additional acquisitions are planned, however, balancing these two objectives is becoming more and more difficult. The degree to which the acquired organizations should function independently or be brought under one corporate information system is becoming an increasingly pressing issue.

Amp Up, a wildly popular electronic-music game, is the brainchild of KMS's cherished programmers, who now spend their time trying to keep customers dazzled with upgrades. But a couple of start-ups have ripped off the idea using their own code - which is open source. Now they're demanding that KMS float with the rising tide and join the open-source community. How could the company make money without its IP? And why should it try? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0804A and R0804Z. Jonathan Schwartz, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, says that if KMS is confident it knows what its customers will want next - and if it's content with a small corner of the market - it should stay proprietary. But it will pay a reputational price. Eric Levin, the executive vice president of Techno Source, suggests that KMS take a middle path: license its software to third-party companies and add features to promote community building. This approach could fund itself through royalties or fees and would allow KMS to approve or veto third-party products. Gary P. Pisano, of Harvard Business School, points out that an open-source strategy could increase Amp Up's rate of improvement, enhance users' satisfaction with the game, and reduce KMS's development costs. But if the company stops competing on the basis of its code, it had better be sure of the strength of its downstream capabilities. Michael J. Bevilacqua, of the law firm WilmerHale, warns that KMS risks greater liability for intellectual-property infringement if it joins the open-source community, where code carries no guarantee that it doesn't infringe on someone's IP rights and providers offer no indemnification.

Amp Up, a wildly popular electronic-music game, is the brainchild of KMS's cherished programmers, who now spend their time trying to keep customers dazzled with upgrades. But a couple of start-ups have ripped off the idea using their own code - which is open source. Now they're demanding that KMS float with the rising tide and join the open-source community. How could the company make money without its IP? And why should it try? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0804A and R0804Z. Jonathan Schwartz, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, says that if KMS is confident it knows what its customers will want next - and if it's content with a small corner of the market - it should stay proprietary. But it will pay a reputational price. Eric Levin, the executive vice president of Techno Source, suggests that KMS take a middle path: license its software to third-party companies and add features to promote community building. This approach could fund itself through royalties or fees and would allow KMS to approve or veto third-party products. Gary P. Pisano, of Harvard Business School, points out that an open-source strategy could increase Amp Up's rate of improvement, enhance users' satisfaction with the game, and reduce KMS's development costs. But if the company stops competing on the basis of its code, it had better be sure of the strength of its downstream capabilities. Michael J. Bevilacqua, of the law firm WilmerHale, warns that KMS risks greater liability for intellectual-property infringement if it joins the open-source community, where code carries no guarantee that it doesn't infringe on someone's IP rights and providers offer no indemnification.

Amp Up, a wildly popular electronic-music game, is the brainchild of KMS's cherished programmers, who now spend their time trying to keep customers dazzled with upgrades. But a couple of start-ups have ripped off the idea using their own code - which is open source. Now they're demanding that KMS float with the rising tide and join the open-source community. How could the company make money without its IP? And why should it try? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0804A and R0804Z. Jonathan Schwartz, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, says that if KMS is confident it knows what its customers will want next - and if it's content with a small corner of the market - it should stay proprietary. But it will pay a reputational price. Eric Levin, the executive vice president of Techno Source, suggests that KMS take a middle path: license its software to third-party companies and add features to promote community building. This approach could fund itself through royalties or fees and would allow KMS to approve or veto third-party products. Gary P. Pisano, of Harvard Business School, points out that an open-source strategy could increase Amp Up's rate of improvement, enhance users' satisfaction with the game, and reduce KMS's development costs. But if the company stops competing on the basis of its code, it had better be sure of the strength of its downstream capabilities. Michael J. Bevilacqua, of the law firm WilmerHale, warns that KMS risks greater liability for intellectual-property infringement if it joins the open-source community, where code carries no guarantee that it doesn't infringe on someone's IP rights and providers offer no indemnification.

Many managers think that developing and rolling out a major IT system is like putting up a warehouse: You build it and you're done. But that does not work for IT anymore. Taking that approach results in rigid, costly systems that are outdated from the day they are turned on. What's needed for today's businesses is IT that serves not only as a platform for existing operations but also as a launchpad for new functions and businesses. In this article, the authors present a path-based approach that addresses the primary challenges of IT: the difficulty and expense of mapping out all requirements before a project starts because people often cannot specify everything that they need beforehand; the other unanticipated needs that almost always arise once a system is in operation; and the tricky task of persuading people to use and "own" it. Japan's Shinsei Bank emerged during the authors' research as a standout among the companies applying the path-based method. The firm designed, built, and rolled out its system by forging together, not just aligning, business and IT strategies; employing the simplest possible technology; making the system truly modular; letting it sell itself to users; and ensuring that users influence future improvements. Some of the principles are variations on old themes, while others turn the conventional wisdom on its head.

Campbell Soup, like most food manufacturers, faced grocery chain and wholesale demand for its goods driven by Campbell's own promotional pricing structure rather than retail consumer demand. Former policies to encourage overstock created huge swings in production and inventory levels. Campbell's introduced continuous product replenishment (CPR) under which they would manage inventory for their customers, enabled by electronic data interchange to link supply to actual demand. Implementing this channel shift required a restructuring of relationships with its customers and a radical restructuring of its promotional policies.

Three-quarters of Specialisterne's expert software testing staff are diagnosed with some form of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Usually a handicap, ASD conveys talents especially suited to software testing and other highly repetitive tasks that require very high accuracy. This case describes a growing company struggling with unique challenges as it implements a "social enterprise" business model; it describes the difficulties faced by social entrepreneurs implementing for-profit business models in domains usually populated by non-profits. The case is also useful as an introduction to the business of software testing.

Social networks have evolved into influential, compelling and persuasive systems, the portals of Web 2.0 and one of the most powerful media phenomena in 2008. This note provides a brief background and description of various social network sites including MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube. We also discuss recent trends and strategies stemming from the social network phenomena including widgets and online advertising.

There is a dearth of research on the capabilities of innovative small-to-medium software enterprises (SMSEs). Understanding how SMSEs build and apply business and information systems (IS) capabilities is important, as such firms account for over 90% of software enterprises operating in Europe and the US. This paper elaborates and applies dynamic capability theory to explore and help understand the web of conditions and factors that shaped and influenced business and IS capability development and application in one European SMSE. Drawing on the overarching theory of dynamic capabilities, a theoretical model is presented that posits relationships among (1) a firm's past activities; (2) its integration, learning and reconfiguration, and transformation capabilities; (3) its financial, complementary, locational, and technological asset positions; and (4) the products and services that result, and which are of value to an SMSE's customers. The paper refines and elaborates the model by describing and enumerating the business and IS capabilities, assets, and products and services of the SMSE under study. To properly assess whether this firm's products and services were of value to its customers, research was also conducted at two customer sites in Ireland and the US, in addition to the investigation at the primary research site in Dublin. The study therefore informs both practitioners' and researchers' understandings of this complex and under-researched phenomenon: for practitioners, it highlights the characteristics required to build innovative software solutions; for researchers, it illustrates the patterns and regularities associated with the development and application of business and IS capabilities.