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How 27 cities worldwide stack up on measures of international appeal--including number of hotel rooms, number of international tourists, airport activity, and international association meetings--and on livability: cultural vibrancy, quality of life, ease of driving and efficiency of public transportation. Overall, Paris and London rank first and second respectively, with New York in fifth place.

This Note summarizes the potential of the Jobs Act of 2012 to change the way in which emerging growth companies, or EMGs, access capital markets. Described as among the most significant change to US securities laws in over 20 years, the Jobs Act may reduce the burdens associated with going public while at the same time making it easier for EMGs to remain private. In addition to the so-called "IPO On-Ramp" and "crowdfunding," the Note briefly discusses the changes to general solicitation and general advertising rules, the private holder cap and mini-public offerings.

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In 2006 the French bank Crédit Agricole bought the Greek Emporiki bank, for €2.8 billion, at the peak of a bull market for bank takeovers. Six years, a major financial crisis, and 5.2 billion of losses later, in a context of great uncertainty in the European banking sector, what decision should Crédit Agricole take regarding Emporiki? Through the example of this European cross-border acquisition the case looks at the Greek banking system before and during the unprecedented Greek sovereign debt crisis; the efforts of Greece and the main actors of the European financial system to prevent the battled country from having to exit the euro zone; and the potential scenarios for Greek banks in mid-2012.

The case assembles texts giving perspectives on the Great Depression by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz and Ben Bernanke. This should allow for a discussion of the role of fiscal and monetary policies in reaching and escaping outcomes in which the interest rate is close to zero for a long time.

In 2012, the World Bank faced important questions in terms of its future strategy and mission. Should the Bank continue to focus on micro-level development initiatives, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), or return to traditional macro-level financial support? Was the Bank's role as a source of funds for developing countries still relevant? Should emerging market nations be given a greater role in the governance structure? Most importantly, was Jim Yong Kim, a US national, the right choice to lead the Bank, in preference to highly qualified candidates from developing nations?

In late 2006, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg created the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO). Born out of recommendations made by the Bloomberg appointed public-private Commission for Economic Opportunity, CEO was designed to be an innovations lab that would test anti-poverty programs by applying a results-based approach. With a budget of $100 million, CEO would closely monitor new programs and hold them accountable for producing measurable results. Uniquely, CEO would cut funding for programs that did not "make the grade." Bloomberg named Veronica White the Executive Director of CEO. White had decades of experience working in executive positions in several New York City agencies but with CEO she had daunting tasks ahead. She would have to redefine how poverty was measured in the city, facilitate cross agency partnerships, and most important, develop an effective and achievable evaluation system for all programs. This case traces the CEO team's challenges in placing program evaluation at the core of their mission. CEO programs are geared toward three target populations-working poor adults, young adults between the ages of 16 and 24, and families with children ages five and below. In the first year of operation, White and her team launched a slate of anti-poverty programs that varied widely in scale and scope and ranged from New York's first ever conditional cash transfer program to a program that would accelerate graduation rates in community colleges. But from the beginning, CEO's evidence-based programming was put to the test. White faced constant pressure to "produce results quickly." With the 2008 recession, however, CEO endured significant cuts in its evaluation budget. White and her team had to make the most of limited resources while still sustaining a comprehensive evaluation policy. Case Number 1971.0

In response to the potential collapse of large financial institutions in 2007, the U.S. government committed trillions of dollars to loans, asset purchases, guarantees, direct spending to provide fiscal stimulus, expansionary monetary policy, and bailouts of various private financial institutions. The bailouts were especially controversial because public money was used to protect private financial institutions and their wealthy executives while ordinary citizens received no such protection. One outcome of the government's response was the proposal to enact into law the Volcker rule, which prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary trading, or trading for their own-not their clients'-benefit. Proprietary trading was believed to generate up to 10 percent of total trading revenues, which would have exceeded $5.9 billion in 2010 for the six largest American banks alone. If the Volcker rule were to become law, government agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, would write the detailed regulations that would implement the law. These agencies employed civil servants but were run by political appointees with technical backgrounds. After issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking the agencies would solicit comments from the public, which would help shape the regulations. Executives of large banks needed to decide how to respond to this potential change in their business environment.

This case is about Colbun, Chile's second largest electricity generator, which is facing significant uncertainty regarding the cost and availability of alternative energy sources. Problems with the contracted supply of natural gas and the volatility of oil prices, coupled with pressure from collective activists, force Colbun to revise its business strategy and its sourcing mix. The case also deals with the pros and cons of various energy sources in view of their perceived environmental impact. The company's CEO, Bernardo Larrain Matte, has to take all these different considerations into account when planning Colbun's future, especially in the light of new opportunities and challenges posed by global climate change. The case analyzes the operations of Colbun to illustrate the complexities associated with conducting business under the influence of global energy markets, political uncertainty, and environmental activism.

This case explores the challenge of investing in basic research as a public good. CSIRO was Australia's leading science and research agency, and it was chartered to enhance national prosperity through R&D. Its Flagships program was designed to align research interests with national priorities, with a strong focus on the adoption of research outputs. The Light Metals Flagship (LMF) was one of six flagships established in 2003, and its goal was to help the nation capture more of the added value of its resources by developing and commercializing downstream technologies in the processing and fabrication of products made from aluminum, magnesium, and titanium. While the LMF met with technical successes, Australian industry was reticent to co-invest. This lack of industry enthusiasm was in many ways unsurprising, as governments often found it important to fund long-term basic research that was outside of the horizon of firms. But what kind of a signal would stopping the program send? Was CSIRO prepared to let short-term thinking in light metals firms drive its agenda? The case examines the technical decision-making process.

Iceland has two unique features. First it has one of the most unique landscapes in the world. A country twice the size of Switzerland, it has only 300,000 inhabitants and thus most of its regions are sparsely inhabited. Second, it also has access to significant amounts of "green energy" in the form of geothermal and hydroelectric power and in the future, possibly wind. Further in Iceland green energy is comparatively inexpensive. These two attributes have set in motion a major debate - should Iceland accelerate the development of its green energy resources by attracting more power intensive industries to locate in the country and perhaps export some of its power to Europe or should it slow the rate of power development and focus on preserving its unique natural resources and build up its tourism industry? This case addresses these two alternatives. It is built around two specific decisions - whether the government should build the generating facilities that would provide the electricity for a fourth aluminum smelter and whether to accept a new plan written by the national electric company to aggressively embrace additional development of its energy resources. Case Number 1968

Whether the government or markets, or a mixture of both, can provide efficient and effective incentives for encouraging entrepreneurial activity and new venture financing is an age old question. Public promotion efforts are controversial and in most cases they tend to fail. In the United States, debate about the role of government in these areas can be traced back to at least the Great Depression and the period immediately after World War II when the issue became a particular concern. Policy makers considered that existing financial institutions could neither provide the necessary due diligence nor the pool of risk capital that was necessary to spur entrepreneurial ventures. Furthermore, there were calls for additional inducements in the form of tax related incentives. The mechanisms that were used raise questions about benefits, costs and unintended consequences. Can, and should, the government influence entrepreneurial activity and venture financing? What are the limits to government intervention?

In 2012, the energy sector in the United States was demanding major reform. Prices of oil and gas had continued to cripple the middle and lower class as the U.S. economy slowly recovered. At the same time, the U.S. lagged behind developed economies in production of renewable energy. The acceptance of climate change remained a partisan issue. The development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) promised an abundance of accessible, cheap, domestically produced natural gas, but the cost to the environment remained a point of debate. As incumbent Democratic President Barack Obama faced Republican opponent Mitt Romney in the 2012 election, their (and their parties) stances on energy policy and the environment differed in several major areas. The results of the election would shape the country's energy policy for at least the next four years, and potentially create enough momentum to set energy policy of the United States for many years to come.

On January 18, 2012, President Obama rejected TransCanada's application for a "national interest" determination to approve construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline. Keystone XL was a 1,700 mile long, 36-inch diameter pipeline to transport 1.1 million barrels a day of Canadian heavy oil from Alberta (and shale oil from Montana) to the American Gulf Coast. But the American environmental community had focused all its resources on stopping Keystone XL-to them, a symbol of the nation's refusal to deal with climate change. Now the head of Keystone had to figure out what had gone wrong, and decide what to do next in order to get the project approved.

In spite of its abundant energy resources, Nigeria in 2012 had one of the lowest levels of energy use in the world. Self-generation of power from costly generators was double that of grid-supplied electricity. The history of its power sector was one of inefficient monopolies, missteps, and corruption. But a wholesale change to the market, designed under reformist President Obasanjo and pushed forward by President Jonathan, promised greater efficiencies and investment guided by private-sector principles including widespread privatization, pricing reforms, and reliance on firms to produce and distribute the electricity. Power producer firms on the sideline needed to decide whether they wanted to be a part of this new market.

Supplement for case 713042

The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is a 1.25-square-mile industrial park six miles north of the Demilitarized Zone in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The complex includes both North and South Korean workers, and is subsidized by Seoul. The result of an agreement between North and South Korea in 2000, Kaesong stood as the sole beacon of hope for economic cooperation between the divided states, and remained open for business despite a number of hostilities over the ensuing decade. This case reviews the political and economic risks and opportunities of entering Kaesong through the lens of Bright Ray Apparel, a hypothetical South Korean textile manufacturing firm. Jihoon Lee, Bright Ray's CEO, is encouraged by his CFO and a trusted senior economist to enter Kaesong. But risks abound. North Korea's nuclear threats and leadership transition have brought a new wave of uncertainty to the Korean Peninsula. Facing its own upcoming presidential election, much remains to be determined in Seoul regarding future economic policy and outreach toward Pyongyang. As Jihoon Lee's meeting with his financial adviser nears, Bright Ray's leadership must consider a variety of influences and factors involved in entering Kaesong, from political instability to economic opportunity, and the potential to improve the working condition of North Korean employees.

Over the past decade, Brazil's future as a leading world economic power appeared certain. An expanding middle class and commodity boom had fueled economic growth, with GDP growth hitting a peak of 7.5% in 2010. However, the high cost of conducting business in Brazil, known as "Custo Brasil," was hurting domestic manufacturing, while incoming foreign investments threatened to overwhelm Brazilian markets. Under President Dilma Rousseff, economic growth stagnated, and the Rousseff administration struggled to find the best balance between reducing inflation, maintaining a flexible exchange rate, and improving the competitiveness of Brazilian exports.