個案總覽

In June 1997, Thailand's currency became the object of intense speculation as the country's balance of payments was in tatters. Amidst the government's efforts to turn things around, finance minister Dr Amnuay Viravan resigned over policy disagreements and the Thai stock market plunged as investors feared a currency devaluation. As Amnuay's successor, Thanong, tried to pick up the pieces, he uncovered an awful secret: Thailand's central bank had virtually no liquid foreign exchange reserves left to defend its exchange rate. What action should he take? And, more importantly, what action could he take?

On April 8, 1787, James Madison wrote to Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia: "My Dear Friend, I am glad to find that you are turning your thoughts towards the business of May next." Madison was referring to the Federal Convention scheduled to begin the next month in Philadelphia to revise the Articles of Confederation. Madison's project was for an entirely new form of government-although the upcoming gathering had made clear its aim of merely improving the existing government under the Articles of Confederation. This case explores the extraordinary leadership of James Madison who had few stereotypical qualities of a leader.

In 1730, Japanese merchants petitioned shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune to officially authorize trade in rice futures at the Dojima Exchange, the world's first organized (but unsanctioned) futures market. For many years, the Japanese government had prohibited the trade of futures bills because it was widely regarded as a form of gambling that caused rice prices to rise. However, when the price of rice fell to record lows in the late 1720s, the samurai (whose income was tied to the value of rice) saw their economic position fall relative to the merchant class, whose growing economic power worried the nation's elites. The shogun responded by easing restrictions on futures trading, but without officially sanctioning a futures market at Dojima. The question now was whether he should heed the merchants' petition and take the next step.

This case describes the efforts of Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to improve liquidity in money markets during the subprime crisis. The case explains the four main new tools for monetary policy (or quantitative easing) the Federal Reserve has used between 2007 and 2009: the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).

As his inauguration approached, President-elect Obama faced a financial sector meltdown, a costly bailout, and massive government deficits. With the economy in recession, interest rates near zero, and joblessness on the rise, Obama needed to decide whether, and how much, to use fiscal stimulus to resuscitate the economy. To help students understand Obama's options, the case reviews both the recent tax cuts under President George W. Bush, including the supply-side and demand-management justification given for them, and the broad history of fiscal policy in the United States. Instructors may also obtain a Teaching Note, written by this case's author, that provides suggestions for using this case effectively in the classroom.

In 2005, the government of India enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in order to attract investment, generate export revenues, and create manufacturing jobs. However, several planned projects faced difficulties in acquiring land for setting up the SEZ. In December 2007, the government introduced a new piece of legislation, which proposed to extend the power of eminent domain to allow the government to acquire land for SEZs. Was this the right response to the land acquisition problems of private firms? Was the SEZ strategy the right one for India's economic growth?

Rising food prices threatened an unprecedented number of people around the world with malnutrition or starvation in 2008. The new Executive Director of the United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP)--the world's largest food relief agency-- must not only address this challenge but also must rethink the WFP's strategy in the rapidly-changing world of humanitarian assistance.

Craig Coy, a business executive, retired Coast Guard officer, and former White House security adviser, was named executive director of the Massachusetts Port Authority, or "Massport," on April 11, 2002. The appointment came at a time of significant turmoil at Massport, the state authority responsible for managing Boston's Logan International Airport and several other regional transportation resources. The two airline jets hijacked in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 had departed from Logan. Massport had not been responsible for the security practices that had allowed the terrorists to board the jetliners with weapons, but the authority had, in recent years, repeatedly come under fire for political excesses and patronage. These long-tolerated vagaries-when vaulted into the national spotlight-suddenly appeared tawdry and intolerable to state officials and lawmakers. Coy's mandate, when hired a few months later, was to stop to the excesses of the past, to improve safety and security, to run the Authority in businesslike fashion-in sum, to effect a "cultural turnaround." The case takes a comprehensive look at Coy's approach. He immediately focused the authority on a major, challenging initiative; instituted a number of classic business reforms; and drew a sharp line in the sand with respect to political favors. Coy also had to confront some of his own assumptions about what it meant to act in Massport's best interests. Was it always best to leave politics at the door? This was Coy's impulse. But in certain situations, he reluctantly came to accept that a more complex stance was required. HKS Case Number 1896.0

What caused the 1997-98 Asia Crisis: Asian nations' poor economic management, international financial contagion, close "crony" relations between local politicians and capitalists? This case examines how the crisis erupted in Thailand and spread in a chain of events that no one-neither Asian financial authorities nor Western economists-had foreseen. The crisis raises questions about how competently financial institutions such as mutual funds managed their global capital investments. It raises questions about how effective the International Monetary Fund's package of reforms was-and to what extent the IMF acted in the interest of Wall Street rather than developing nations. And the crisis raises questions about the development policies of Asian nations: Did too-close "crony" relations between politicians and owners of major banks or firms pave the way for crisis?

Tesco PLC, the largest retailer in the United Kingdom, was pondering India. India's booming economy and absence of major retail chains provided opportunity to both domestic and foreign firms. Entry of foreign retailers, however, was limited by restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in retailing. India had gradually been removing its restriction on FDI in other sectors but had not done so in retailing because of concerns about the fate of small retailers. Removal of FDI retailing restrictions was inevitable, prompting many large Indian industrial groups to hastily enter the retailing sector before global retailers could. In 2006 Reliance Industries, the largest business group in India, explained that its strategy was to establish "a pan-India footprint of multi-format retail outlets" with large rural hubs to purchase produce and dairy products directly from farmers as part of its "field-to-fork" control of the supply chain. This posed a substantial problem for the global retailers. They could enter the market now with constraints on their investments and hence on their organizational forms, or they could wait for further relaxations of the FDI regulations. India was Tesco's last remaining major market opportunity-Tesco had to decide whether to enter the market, how to enter it, and when to do it.

In 2005, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) received approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market Requip (Ropinirole) for Restless Leg Syndrome. Requip had already been approved for the treatment of Parkinson's disease. Prior the FDA's approval, GSK had already undertaken an intensive promotional campaign for Requip, issuing press releases, advertising to doctors in medical journals, and advertising direct-to-consumer. In 2003 it began developing consumer awareness of RLS with an advertising campaign stating that a "new survey reveals a common yet underrecognized disorder-restless legs syndrome-is keeping Americans awake at night." While GSK explained that its campaign was simply raising awareness about RLS, others disagreed. GSK was accused of 'disease mongering,' or trying to turn normal people with ordinary experiences into patients. This case explores GSK's tactics and the distinction between raising awareness and inappropriately promoting a drug.

Despite a tradition of high household savings, Japan has supported a dynamic and technically sophisticated consumer lending sector. The high profitability of the sector has periodically attracted interest from domestic banks as well as international investors. Most recently, in 1998 and 2000 respectively, GE Capital and Citi Financial both acquired Japanese consumer lending companies. In 2006, when the Japanese Supreme Court rules that one of the big Japanese consumer lenders must repay a borrower for "excess interest payments," the US firms must decide how to respond.

Critics have accused Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas producer, of eschewing market principles in favor of the foreign policy priorities of the Russian government, ever since the energy giant cut off the supply to Ukraine in January of 2006. The purported motive for the decision, however, seems to indicate the opposite: the company claimed that it had no other choice because the sides failed to conclude a contract on the terms of future trade. The case takes a look back in history for clues that may resolve this paradox. It highlights how politics shaped the economics of natural gas trade in the former Soviet Union and Europe since the late 1960s until the end of the 1990s; sketches the story of the creation of Gazprom by the first post-Soviet government of Russia; and describes how the erection of new sovereign borders in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, coupled with political and economic transition, created major problems in the gas trade between the former Soviet republics, emerging with the greatest intensity in the Russian-Ukrainian relations.

President Putin publicly stated that Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in the world, was a powerful political lever of the Russian state in the world and a keystone in the foundation of the country's energy security. Thus the top leadership of Russia has charted the course of the company's future away from the seemingly imminent dismemberment, privatization, and, by implication, de-monopolization toward a challenging combination of strengthened state control, professional, transparent management, and a major expansion. The case explores how in 2000-2008 Gazprom's management has pursued the strategy defined by the politicians. Gazprom's impressive expansion strategy envisioned diversification of markets, products, transportation routes, and modes of delivery. The challenges were equally formidable: massive investment needs, a possibility of a production shortfall, and a chronic problem with the transit state of Ukraine, to name a few. In fact, Gazprom's ambitiousness fully reflected the ambitiousness of Russia as a whole, characteristic of the Putin era.

The case describes the resolution to the January 2006 gas crisis, precipitated by the decision of Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in the world, to cut off gas supply to Ukraine because of disagreement on the terms of future trade. The case also narrates the events that have followed: the adoption by Gazprom of a comprehensive policy to renegotiate prices with the rest of the former Soviet states; the erratic relationship with Ukraine, dependent on the internal political configuration in the latter at any given time; and a persistence of Gazprom's negative image in the world.

This exercise is designed for students to analyze the economic benefits of free trade and political economy consequences arising from the distribution of benefits and costs among consumers and producers in each trading partner country.

In 2006 Merck received FDA approval for Gardasil, the first vaccine for human papilloma virus (HPV) which had been identified as the cause of cervical cancer. Merck priced the vaccine at $360 for the three injections and was working on programs for the use of Gardasil in developing countries at much lower prices. Projected sales of Gardasil were $1 billion a year and billions more if states mandated vaccination. Prior to FDA approval, Merck began to develop a market for Gardasil and launched an intensive campaign to get states to make HPV vaccination of girls entering middle school mandatory. As the public and organized private groups became aware of Merck's efforts, however, the campaign generated a backlash against mandatory vaccination. Merck subsequently suspended its campaign and reflected on the experience in deciding its next moves.

Though many multinationals see little business potential in serving the poorest people in developing countries, two innovative mobile phone companies are making profits and improving local economic conditions by doing exactly that.

What caused the 1997 Korea crisis? Did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) help or hinder recovery? Did democracy help or hinder recovery? Seen as an economic miracle, Korea succumbed to the wave of currency crises sweeping Asia in late 1997. Did the same state-led export growth strategy that had brought about such spectacular success cause this financial meltdown? Conversely, what role had foreign investors played in setting up the crisis by pouring short-term capital into Korea's partially and unevenly liberalized financial system? When it arrived on the scene, did the IMF do more to help Korea recover from its economic distress, or did it just bail out foreign investors and prepare the way for Wall Street to up buy Korean banks and firms? Had Korea's long move toward democracy helped or hindered government efforts to reform its economic strategy and to resolve the current crisis? This case explains the background to explore these questions.