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In building the International Space Station (ISS), NASA opened the door to the development of a robust in-space economy in low-Earth Orbit, and yet the decision to build the station, and continue to extend its lifetime, placed a huge burden on NASA's Human Spaceflight budget. Should NASA continue to invest in the ISS? Or is it possible for the agency to facilitate the commercialization of the Station and move beyond low-Earth Orbit?

Colombia, once the fastest growing country in Latin America, continues to struggle with productivity. Both labor productivity and total factor productivity have been low for the past decade, despite economic growth of 4.7% annually. Many factors contribute, which President Duque, and President Santos before him, have tried to address. But now, however, President Duque has even larger institutional problems to solve-implementation of the peace treaty, dealing with Venezuelan refugees and COVID-amidst a macroeconomic and political crisis induced by the pandemic.

Renewable energy (RE) is "green gold" for corporate energy buyers, and big companies have been using their influence and scale to advocate for state policies that will make it easier to buy RE. For most companies, however, getting to 100% RE is still a long slog through the current policy landscape. With that in mind, this article highlights policy implications at the state level that can advance or impede corporate RE energy buying. The article also provides case studies based on four states whose varying policies create different opportunities for companies to buy RE. The goal is to demonstrate the potency of state energy policy and to recommend shifts in the policy landscape so companies can meet their RE targets.

The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 (FSMA) was the first significant reform in 70 years of the food production regulations governing the safety of human and animal foods produced for consumption in the United States. FSMA intended to provide policies that proactively prevent foodborne illnesses, establish science-based food safety standards, and include supply chain partners to ensure systematic prevention of foodborne illnesses. Yet these intentions may also drive small farms out of business, create food supply shortages, stifle food innovation, and harm the environment and consumer health. We propose that policy makers and managers consider reducing unnecessary documentation requirements, incentivizing innovative food technologies that improve food safety, improving the capacity and efficiency of testing labs, and increasing consumer awareness of food safety.

Using data on more than 4,000 product recalls, we recently found that firms whose boards of directors include more women are significantly faster to recall dangerously defective medical products. More specifically, adding just one female director to a board with no women did not speed recalls, but increasing from one female director to two, from two to three, and so on led to increasingly faster recalls. This provides initial evidence that consumer safety can be improved through including more women on companies' boards. Assuming data from other settings support our findings, it is tempting to conclude that governments should mandate a certain level of female board representation, especially for firms in consumer product sectors such as medical devices, food, toys, and automobiles. We suggest, however, that policy makers need to carefully think through the possible intended and unintended consequences of dictating board composition in terms of gender. Meanwhile, wise companies will recognize the benefits of greater female board representation and will pursue it without government intervention.

The birth of "Modern Economic Growth" constituted a watershed in human history, allowing societies to escape the Malthusian impasse and permanently raise living standards. While the new growth regime had lifted billions of people out of extreme poverty over the last two centuries, the total distribution of economic gains-both between and within countries-had been far from equitable. Why had Europe diverged from the baseline of human history, and how did this success relate to the deeper history of Western imperialism, exploitation, and the mass commodification of human beings? Would modern economic growth have occurred absent the transatlantic slave trade? And could the horrors of slavery-and its continuing, long-term consequences-be remedied? Growing numbers of people around the world called for reparations for historical wrongs in 2020, and nowhere more intensely than in the United States. A reckoning with the past was at hand, and much depended on the response of newly elected President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris.

In May 2019, amidst of an ever-worsening trade war between the U.S. and China, President Donald Trump added Chinese telecom giant Huawei to the Department of Commerce's "entity list," essentially forbidding American firms from doing business with the company. Huawei, along with another Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, seemed poised to lead the globe in 5G technology, a step-wise shift in mobile communications that would be rolled out everywhere from Beijing to Beirut to Boise over the early 2020s. In the last year of Trump's presidency, a group at the State Department led by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Energy, and the Environment, former Silicon Valley business leader Keith Krach, embarked on a global campaign to challenge the market dominance of Chinese firms. The Clean Network initiative, which recruited countries and companies into commitments to abide by a set of shared principles in technology adoption and practices, began with 5G but Krach and others had ambitions well beyond. The controversial program to some heralded a new era of multilateral, democratic governance of the internet and to others augured a "splinternet" where market participants and countries had to choose between the U.S. and China. Whatever the view, the competitive landscape for 5G was different at the end of 2020, and participants had to understand how and why.

In 2018, the Seattle City Council unanimously voted 9-0 for a tax that would require companies whose annual revenue surpassed $20 million to pay the city $275 per employee per year. The tax money would then be used to combat homelessness in Seattle. In response, Starbucks Senior Vice President John Kelly released a statement: "There's no reason why one of the wealthiest cities in the world should have children sleeping in cars. But the solution is not to funnel more money through a city council that has thus far failed to show it can spend it effectively." Ultimately, Starbucks, Amazon, and other large Seattle-based companies mounted a campaign to put a tax-repeal referendum on the ballot. The controversy grew, and less than a month after unanimously approving the tax, the City Council voted 7-2 to repeal it. Starbucks has been very public in its commitment to being socially responsible and a good citizen of the communities in which it operates, so how would customers react to the company not wanting to pay local taxes to support social initiatives?

In 2020, Ndidi Nwuneli, founder and CEO of Sahel Consulting in Nigeria, faced a thorny set of problems. Her firm partnered with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in a large project to develop the local dairy industry as a way to facilitate equitable growth and conserve foreign exchange. The Nigerian dairy market was dominated by imported, powdered milk, but the country had a large population of cows owned by pastoralists. Nwuneli had to devise a plan to get local dairy processors, multinational firms, local pastoralists, and the Nigerian government to work together to make local cows more efficient, connect smallholder farmers with processors, and compete with imported milk powder. The stakes were high: the project, if successful, could play a large part in reducing Nigeria's deadly farmer-herder conflict and reducing the country's macroeconomic imbalances. The case explores the variety of interests involved and asks students to debate whether Nwuneli and others should push for protectionist policies as a way to catalyze local production.

With a fine division of labor across different countries, the global value chains use global sourcing and combines developed countries' know-how with developing countries' low-cost labor to produce lower-priced and higher-quality products, bringing benefits to all parties joining the global value chains. This case, which is based on Foxconn, a major supplier to Apple and other global technology giants, enables students to understand that several forces are challenging and reshaping these global value chains. Foxconn, officially known as Hon Hai Precision Industry, plays an important role as an electronics manufacturer in the global supply chains. The company manufactures different parts in multiple locations to lower costs and offers good quality and competitive prices. Foxconn's main manufacturing plants are all located in China, but Foxconn is under pressure from major US customers such as Apple to move production facilities to other countries. Many factors that are reshaping the global value chains, such as the US-China trade war and COVID-19 pandemic, all have affected Foxconn's operations and forced Foxconn to adjust its strategies. This case sheds light on the risks of global value chains. It provides an opportunity for students to discuss how a company can be affected by global value chain restructuring, especially the US-China trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic, and what strategies a company might adopt to cope with global value chain restructuring.

Trichloroethylene, or TCE, was a chemical used by tens of thousands of businesses in the United States. It was an affordable tool for many. Yet, TCE had been associated with important health risks, including cancer and autoimmune disease. TCE potentially posed other risks as well: some researchers argued that low doses of TCE caused deformities in fetal hearts, while others argued that there was not enough science to back up this claim. Over twenty years, a vigorous debate encompassing academic, government and industry voices played out around just how toxic TCE was. The American chemical industry and TCE end-users used lobbying to advocate for their positions. A loose coalition of activists, academics and journalists promoted their own, different, perspectives on TCE. Developments in the TCE story were often communicated to the public through investigative reporting, a field of journalism facing economic crisis. The U.S. government and its Environmental Protection Agency were responsible for assessing TCE's toxicity, leading to secondary policy decisions around how the chemical should be regulated. Yet, by the end of 2020, controversy remained around whether successive governments had been untowardly influenced by special interests in their TCE decision-making. Which stance should the Biden administration take in regards to TCE? More broadly, which broader lessons could be drawn from the TCE case? In particular, should the influence of lobbying on regulations and policies be constrained in any way?

In 2019, the People's Republic of China (PRC) turned seventy-years-old and became the longest active authoritarian regime in recent history. By then, China was the world's second largest economy by GDP (after the United States), and a high-technology industrial powerhouse, with ambitions to bring connectivity infrastructure to developing nations. By the time China's fifth generation leader Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party had presided over decades of unprecedented economic growth while maintaining a monopoly on political power. By 2021, Xi showed no signs of choosing a successor or stepping down after the customary two five-year terms. Despite promising more and deeper market reforms, the PRC at 70 appeared to oversee an increasingly complex economy and society with a party-state expanding its presence into nearly every aspect of civilian life. The world sought to make sense of China's changes and especially the apparent resurgence of the party-state. What would China's conservative turn mean for its future and its role in the world?

The case opens in November 2020 as Eyad Alkassar and Mahmoud Fouz, co-founders of Iran's first and leading ride-hailing platform, Snapp, eagerly await the results of the U.S. presidential elections. The case takes us through the challenging times between November 2019 and November 2020, as the confounders navigated Snapp through an increasingly challenging environment of sanctions, stricter restrictions of big tech companies, and since February 2020, through the operational difficulties exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic that shook Iran to its core. The case highlights the challenges of operating under sanctions and the different ways the co-founders try to find to keep Snapp alive and asks how the U.S. election results could change the environment in which Snapp operates, as the two presidential candidates have vastly different approaches to their policy to Iran.

Supplement to case 720030

PUB, Singapore's National Water Agency, is one of the heaviest users of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model in the public sector. As of 2020, it had awarded seven PPP contracts for a total of five desalination and three NEWater plants. Among the key features of PUB's PPP projects were the adoption of the Design, Build, Own and Operate (DBOO) project structure; a 25-year concession period; and small-sized project teams. The main benefits which arose from these PPP projects were value for money, the introduction of new technologies and knowledge transfers, the expansion of Singapore's private water industry, and the blossoming of Singapore into a hydro hub. However, despite letting the private sector have a hand in running the water plants, PUB was of the view that its own officers had to obtain these companies' expertise, so that it could evaluate whether they were technically competent, and, in the event of a default, step in to manage the plants. To further mitigate against risks to Singapore's water supply, PUB also carried out regular operations audits, and engaged the plants' senior management regularly.

Emerging markets often are portrayed as dysfunctional and are characterized by weak institutions. Such environments can expose foreign direct investment to myriad challenges, including the demand for bribes, regulatory obstacles, government and business partner hold-up problems, macroeconomic meltdowns, and even civil war. This case underscores how non-market risk factors can have powerful implications on the success or failure of a business and must be monitored continuously and addressed with deliberate strategies. The case features SOCO International, a British oil and gas exploration and production company fighting in February 2015 to maintain its license to operate in Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) amid a worldwide backlash against its practices. Students will step into the shoes of SOCO, the DRC government, the local community, and the international community as they develop a 360-degree view of the situation. Discussions should highlight how to diagnose and address challenges on multiple fronts.

This case is one of a series of cases that examines corporate governance in Hong Kong using the financial crises of 2008 that engulfed CITIC Pacific (now CITIC Limited) as the study. The first case dealt with the mechanics of the foreign exchange hedging which caused considerable losses at the company. The present case examines the governance structures at the start of the crisis, and how such structures have changed up to the present. There has been considerable change of the leadership at CITIC and new financial governance committee structures have been formed in order to manage risk. The case poses the question of whether such changes will prevent future challenges when operational and financial risks arise from cross-border activities. Finally, the case considers the role of the regulatory bodies that formulate the rules by which such companies have to operate. The case considers whether the standards that govern the activities of companies in an industry are adhered to or are viewed merely as guidelines since all the competitors are pursuing the same activity.

July 2017 was supposed to be a triumphant month for HNA Group. The latest Fortune Global 500 list showed the company had again skyrocketed in its ranking to no. 170, an improvement of over 200 positions from the year prior. Yet earlier that same July, the mysterious death of Co-Chairman Wang Jian portended a darker outlook. Over the next three years, HNA would fall as fast as it has risen. A liquidity crunch forced HNA to sell many of the assets it had purchased. The Chinese government, once a core supporter, also lost patience with HNA, fearing that the sprawling and deeply indebted conglomerate could threaten China's financial system. Chairman Chen Feng forged ahead with attempts to deleverage, but the COVID-19 crisis, which decimated HNA's core travel business, proved to be the last straw. A task force of officials, reported in the media as a "takeover" by China's Hainan provincial government, entered HNA to assess the situation. By 2021, it was clear that HNA Group would not just be humbled, it would also be broken up. Hundreds of HNA affiliates were to enter bankruptcy, the umbrella group would be restructured, and Chen Feng was legally barred from the luxuries leading HNA had afforded him. How could HNA, with its flight routes and reputation for good service, recover as an airline? Or were its founders' sky-high ambitions to see an Icarus-like end?