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More and more firms are engaging in greenwashing, misleading consumers about their environmental performance or the environmental benefits of a product or service. The skyrocketing incidence of greenwashing can have profound negative effects on consumer and investor confidence in green products. Mitigating greenwashing is particularly challenging in a context of limited and uncertain regulation. This article examines the external (both institutional and market), organizational, and individual drivers of greenwashing and offers recommendations for managers, policy makers, and NGOs to decrease its prevalence.

Regulatory uncertainty has been inherent in climate change policy due to the absence of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Many companies have called for more certainty and a stable policy framework. However, besides having clear disadvantages, regulatory uncertainty may also benefit some companies if they recognize the opportunities of flux and move early. This article explores business opportunities that have emerged for different types of companies, including utilities, banks, project development & carbon offset companies, brokers, exchanges, consultants, auditors, and legal services providers with respect to clean development projects and the related carbon market.

Coping with uncertainty is a fundamental challenge for firms. One way they can respond is by building up strategic flexibility. By looking at airlines' flexibility responses to regulatory uncertainty associated with their inclusion in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, this article shows that firms can respond to regulatory uncertainty by developing such flexibility in two ways: they can either anticipate the potential consequences of changing regulatory conditions and try to prepare for them; or they can adapt quickly and efficiently to them once the regulatory situation has become clear. By examining evidence from nine case studies, the article identifies the organizational capabilities required to pursue an anticipatory or adaptive strategy and demonstrates that each type of response requires a specific bundle of capabilities.

Automotive assemblers and suppliers have employed a number of different strategies to deal with external uncertainty. These strategies have evolved relatively rapidly of late in part because of changes in the locus of innovation from OEMs to suppliers, changing market conditions, and the future regulations of greenhouse gases. This presents a unique challenge for the industry. Some auto firms have been more effective in dealing with market and regulatory uncertainty due to technology resource integration across platforms and integration between functions on the value added chain from suppliers to retailers.

This article offers two integrated strategies managers can use in the face of environmental regulatory uncertainty. As integrated strategies, they both recognize non-market forces while taking into account market realities. Advocating for pragmatic, progressive policies enables firms to shape future policy around existing environmental strengths; this strategy raises competitors' costs when competitors have yet to develop identical competencies. Systematically embracing advancing regulation enables firms to satisfy activists who are pressuring policymakers to force firms to conform to higher environmental standards in other jurisdictions; this strategy allows managers to adapt to coming regulation at their own pace while leveraging market competencies. This article presents four case studies that highlight how some firms have implemented these strategies, and why some have been successful at mitigating regulatory uncertainty and some have not.

In recent years criminal organizations have begun to mimic the tactics of legitimate businesses-becoming so sophisticated that they are now creating new best practices in adaptive strategy, supply chain management, the use of incentives, and other disciplines. Companies should study their techniques as a defensive measure, and also because they might well profit from some of the global gangsters' insights.

Facial symmetry, long seen as a sign of beauty, is also thought to lead to success. But new research shows that subtle asymmetries can actually better position people for certain leadership roles, and offers some reasons why.

Whereas brand names can "prime" consumers to react positively to a product or business, slogans often backfire, because people recognize them as attempts to persuade. Marketers should be aware of this backlash and avoid messages that can be seen, even subconsciously, as manipulative.

New research is upending the long-held belief that the desire for profit is what inspires innovation. Recent studies show that innovations by consumers who give their ideas away are outpacing innovations by companies that hope to sell them. And that throws the need for intellectual property protection into a whole new light.

Employers and employees alike benefit from choices that promote good health. But too often, companies refresh the cafeteria menu, offer discounted gym memberships, and leave it up to the individual to go from there. Research shows, however, that management's decisions contribute to morbidity and mortality at least as much as employees' own actions. Layoffs, long hours, failure to provide health insurance, lack of autonomy on the job, and general financial insecurity all promote ill health as a result of stress and its correlates. Furthermore, businesses don't always see the direct economic consequences of their actions. Companies must scrutinize their decisions carefully to encourage a healthier workforce.

The Old Boys' Club simply will not be dismantled. So, to rise up in the ranks, high-potential women must secure sponsors in the C-suite, where most executives are men. Smart companies are already facilitating this path to sponsorship so that their future leadership ranks reflect the full range of available talent.

Data from the executive search firm Spencer Stuart reveals trends in the makeup of boards of directors, comparing the years 1987 and 2011. Most directors are still white men, but they're older and more independent. As the role of boards has professionalized over the years, they have evolved from larger groups to leaner decision-making bodies composed of directors with specific skill sets.

When Kevin Peters became president of Office Depot's North American operations, in 2010, its customer service scores (as graded by a third-party mystery-shopping firm) were soaring-but sales were falling. To understand why, he went undercover, quietly visiting 70 stores in more than 15 states. He talked to customers and observed their behavior. What struck him most was how often they walked out of the store empty-handed. It turned out that Office Depot's customer service scores depended on factors that shoppers didn't really care about-such as the cleanliness of floors and bathrooms. And its employees were being incentivized to focus on the wrong things. (In fact, the company learned that some of its associates preferred interacting with stock over interacting with people.) Peters's conversations with customers gave him three insights: The chain needed to offer smaller stores, to dramatically improve the in-store experience, and to add value with services such as shipping and copying. Office Depot has since rolled out 30 pilot stores, retrained associates, and begun to see the first signs of improvement.

Providing earnings guidance-publicly releasing managerial forecasts of a company's profits-has become a highly controversial practice, with critics ranging from Warren Buffett to a McKinsey team to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Yet more than a thousand U.S. corporations issue such forecasts each year. Are they making a mistake? On the contrary, argues Lev, an accounting professor at NYU Stern: Investors want more information, and they will reward companies that make it available. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, Lev maintains that investors care a lot about what drives a company's long-term growth; however, they often need help understanding what the drivers are. Guidance, non-GAAP pro forma earnings statements, and executive conference calls with investors and analysts after the release of earnings statements are potent tools. Done right, they can bring higher stock prices, lower volatility, and reduced cost of capital, and they may also temper shareholder litigation and its consequences. Some guidance for guiders is in order: Offer guidance only if your predictions are consistently better than analysts' consensus forecasts. Don't stand out as a "guidance refusenik" in a sector where guidance is prevalent. Maintain credibility and don't duck the truth-manipulating expectations so that reported earnings will comfortably exceed them breeds mistrust. Resist legal advice to be cryptic or bland, and don't overlook the value of "soft" information; executives' narrative and tone color many investors' decisions and account for most stock price changes in the wake of financial reports. These are not easy times to be an executive dealing with financial markets. But running away from disillusioned investors only makes things worse. Far better is to figure out what they value and to shape your financial reporting and communications strategies accordingly.

Corporate leaders have long subscribed to the belief that the sole purpose of business is to make money. That narrow view, deeply embedded in the American capitalist system, molds the actions of most corporations, constraining them to focus on maximizing short-term profits and returns to shareholders at the expense of worker safety and health, the environment, and society in general. In this article, HBS professor Kanter argues that a very different logic informs the practices of most high-performing and sustainable companies: an institutional logic. These companies believe that they are more than money making machines; they are also a vehicle for advancing societal goals. They deliver more than just financial returns; they also build enduring institutions. At great companies, institutional logic takes its place alongside economic logic in research, analysis, and managerial decision making. Six facets of institutional logic-a common purpose, a long-term focus, emotional engagement, partnering with the public, innovation, and self-organization-radically alter leadership and corporate behavior and form the building blocks of a more sustainable competitive advantage.

He may not appear to be one, but Murthy is quite the contrarian. At a time when few Indians felt they could become entrepreneurs, he founded Infosys with just $1,000. When no one believed that India could compete in the high tech arena, he dared to develop software services for export. In an era when hardly anyone in India conducted business ethically, he set out to create a values-based corporation. Over his 30-year tenure, Murthy has largely succeeded. He helped create a $6 billion technology firm with over 134,000 employees, pioneered an innovative way of delivering software services globally, and strove to make Infosys the epitome of a "good" company. That's a reputation that is hard won and easily lost, especially in India today, where companies are notorious for their lack of transparency. In fact, public outrage against corruption reached a flashpoint in August 2011, with millions taking to the streets in protest. As businesses gird for change in India, Infosys faces its own turning point. In August, Murthy stepped down as chairman, according to plan. In this interview, Murthy explains that building a values-based firm is a never-ending process. Leaders must demonstrate that values matter every day, at every turn.

Excellence in community engagement, labor relations, environmental protection, corporate governance, and supply chain accountability isn't easy to achieve. But in the long run, top performance in those areas strengthens an organization, as the five companies profiled in this article demonstrate. They prove that doing the right thing isn't at odds at all with building the bottom line, and in fact it can be integral to a firm's economic logic. Dutch chemical maker Royal DSM, for instance, not only specializes in nutritional and environmental products but gives them away to people in need. That unconventional move is helping DSM win the talent war and crack critical markets. Southwest has become America's largest domestic airline by committing to employee happiness. China's Broad Group has won industrial customers worldwide with its energy-efficient air conditioning and filtration systems and is now moving into sustainable building construction. PotashCorp, a Canadian fertilizer company, has raised the bar on transparency in governance-and is reaping the reputational rewards. And Unilever has proved that it is possible to make your supply chain more sustainable, even if you sell 170 billion products across 180 countries a year and run 250 factories.

A growing number of socially motivated entrepreneurs have been creating new kinds of organizations that combine a social mission with a business engine. Unlike typical for-profits, these "for-benefit" enterprises have social or environmental outcomes as their ultimate bottom line; and unlike typical nonprofits, they derive their income mostly from the sale of goods and services rather than from grants and donations. They defy classification as pure business or non-profit and are very much a blend of the two. Many more such enterprises would exist, except that most entrepreneurs haven't been able to choose "for-benefit" as a legally recognized organizational structure. Most countries' legal and economic systems allow only for-profit or nonprofit activity, so entrepreneurs often end up shoehorning their vision into one or the other structure and accepting burdensome trade-offs in the process. All this seems destined to change. For-benefit enterprises will become more commonplace as entrepreneurs learn to better navigate existing constraints, and as an ecosystem of specialized support-including public policy, financial markets, accounting standards, and professional services-develops around them. The even bigger news is what will happen then, writes the author. With formalization of the for-benefit structure, we will see the emergence of a fourth sector of the economy, interacting with but separate from government, nonprofits, and for-profit businesses. The rise of that sector is likely to reshape the future of capitalism.

The sharper a company's differentiation, the greater its competitive advantage. In studying companies that sustained a high level of performance over many years, the authors, both partners at Bain, have found that more than 80% of them had a well-defined and easily understood differentiation at the center of strategy. But differentiation can wear with age: The growth it generates creates complexity, and complex companies tend to forget what they're good at. Often they respond by trying to reimagine their entire business models quickly and dramatically. That's rarely the answer, the authors write. Really successful companies relentlessly build on their fundamental differentiation, going from strength to strength. They learn to deliver it to the front line, creating an organization that lives and breathes its strategic advantages day in and day out. They learn to sustain it through constant adaptation to changes in the market. And they learn to resist the siren song of today's hot market better than their less-focused competitors do. The result is a simple, repeatable business model that a company can apply to new products and markets over and over again to generate sustained growth.

Although most companies have collected lots of friends and followers on social platforms such as Facebook, few have succeeded in generating profits there. That's because they merely port their digital strategies into social environments by broadcasting their commercial messages or seeking customer feedback. To succeed on social platforms, says Harvard Business School's Piskorski, businesses need to devise social strategies that are consistent with users' expectations and behavior in these venues-namely, people want to connect with other people, not with companies. The author defines successful social strategies as those that reduce costs or increase customers' willingness to pay by helping people establish or strengthen relationships through doing free work on a company's behalf. Citing successes at Zynga, eBay, American Express, and Yelp, Piskorski shows that social strategies can generate profits by helping people connect in exchange for tasks that benefit the company such as customer acquisition, marketing, and content creation. He lays out a systematic way to build a social strategy and shows how a major credit card company he advised used the method to roll out its own strategy.