個案總覽

When retailers' sales slip, the biggest opportunity to boost profits comes from improving execution. To do that, research shows, managers may actually need to increase staff.

The vast majority of product safety recalls are due not to problems with Chinese manufacturing processes but to highly preventable design mistakes that Western companies keep making over and over again.

Jennifer Daley agreed to take on a dramatic overhaul of Tenet Healthcare's clinical quality under two conditions: She would work only on behalf of the patients, and she would consider every day to be her last.

Regional health information organizations-RHIOs--are springing up in the United States to meet a vital need: to connect the nation's disparate patient-health information systems. If RHIOs can find a viable business model, they stand to improve the quality and decrease the cost of U.S. health care dramatically.

The head of Infosys Technologies talks about the power of a well-placed word of encouragement and what it taught him about the CEO's toughest challenge--motivating people.

In recent years, the entire fabric of corporate governance, certainly in the United States, has dramatically changed. With the passage of what has colloquially become known as SOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), US-based corporations have operated under stricter governance guidelines than at any previous time, especially as regards the structure of boards of directors and financial oversight of the corporation. A now perennial governance "hot button" issue not addressed by SOX is concern over continually rising executive compensation. Until the 2006 adoption of new compensation disclosure guidelines by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it had been nearly 15 years since federal attention had been devoted to compensation guidelines or regulations. Beginning with 2007 filings, US corporations must now include a Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) section. The intent behind the CD&A is to provide investors access to clear explanations of executive compensation and the philosophy that underlies compensation. As often happens, this good intent is accompanied by several unintended risks that may mitigate the effectiveness of the CD&A.

This article presents a survey and an analysis of the academic literature on relationship lending to small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs). It is noted herein that relationship lending depends on soft (non-quantifiable) information, while other "lending technologies" depend on hard (quantifiable) information. Based on relative benefits and costs, relationship lending may be best suited for some types of SMEs, with alternate lending technologies better matched to others. Also discussed in this article are some interesting managerial and public policy issues. On the bank management dimension, relationship lending may create a special challenge for risk managers. On the public policy dimension, evidence suggests that relationship lending may be better delivered by smaller community banks; banking industry consolidation could, however, threaten the presence of such providers. Counter-intuitively, it is possible that banking industry competition may not be the best environment for relationship lending. Finally, this article highlights potentially interesting differences in the relative importance of relationship lending and the other lending technologies across countries with different financial architectures, and examines a potentially powerful link between relationship lending and monetary policy and other monetary shocks.

Today's corporate environment requires managers to be excellent decision makers. Their ability to make fast, widely-supported, and effective decisions will, in large part, shape the performance of their firms. In this article, we describe two cognitive systems that influence decision making. System 1 refers to a process that is fast, effortless, and intuitive. System 2 is a slow, controlled, and rule-governed decision-making process. Both are important to a wide variety of managerial decisions, and they interact with each other. There are, however, a number of forces at work that hinder the effectiveness of these processes. For example, we know from prospect theory that managers are unwilling to incur loss, so much so that they often make irrational decisions based on a small probability that they could avoid such loss. Another example, the escalation of commitment, explains why managers may continue to dedicate resources to failed projects. We describe these and other biases, with a view toward helping managers better understand the problems of decision making and improve the effectiveness of their decisions.

Just over a decade ago, the work of strategic management scholars helped to broaden the perspectives of executives caught in the throes of declining organizational performance. In addition to the traditional turnaround options that stabilized financial performance, managers were shown approaches that they could deploy to reduce the chances of a recurrence of the turnaround situation. This article updates the progress that has since been made in understanding the turnaround process. Further, we look at an ambitious approach to redirecting the strategies of a reemerging company toward a more promising competitive position, as the essential last step in the process of business turnaround. Called strategic transformation, this approach to reformulating strategy cultivates company growth in strong or emerging markets.

Leadership theories abound, but few have provided a means to integrate the depth and breadth of the vast literature available. Building on the research of Crossan, Vera, and Nanjad (who propose Transcendent Leadership as an integrative framework), we describe the key leadership challenges of leading across the levels of self, others, organization, and society. We argue that much of the leadership discourse has focused almost exclusively on leadership of others and occasionally on the leadership of the organization as a whole, yet little has focused specifically on the integral component of leadership of self. We provide evidence of the necessity of multiple levels of leadership, as well as some practical guidance, by drawing from in-depth interviews of six leaders in various contexts.

An organization with a strong learning culture faces the unpredictable deftly. However, a concrete method for understanding precisely how an institution learns and for identifying specific steps to help it learn better has remained elusive. A new survey instrument from professors Garvin and Edmondson of Harvard Business School and assistant professor Gino of Carnegie Mellon University allows you to ground your efforts in becoming a learning organization. The tool's conceptual foundation is what the authors call the three building blocks of a learning organization. The first, a supportive learning environment, comprises psychological safety, appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for reflection. The second, concrete learning processes and practices, includes experimentation, information collection and analysis, and education and training. These two complementary elements are fortified by the final building block: leadership that reinforces learning. The survey instrument enables a granular examination of all these particulars, scores each of them, and provides a framework for detailed, comparative analysis. You can make comparisons within and among your institution's functional areas, between your organization and others, and against benchmarks that the authors have derived from their surveys of hundreds of executives in many industries. After discussing how to use their tool, the authors share the insights they acquired as they developed it. Above all, they emphasize the importance of dialogue and diagnosis as you nurture your company and its processes with the aim of becoming a learning organization. The authors' goal--and the purpose of their tool--is to help you paint an honest picture of your firm's learning culture and of the leaders who set its tone.

Many managers think that developing and rolling out a major IT system is like putting up a warehouse: You build it and you're done. But that does not work for IT anymore. Taking that approach results in rigid, costly systems that are outdated from the day they are turned on. What's needed for today's businesses is IT that serves not only as a platform for existing operations but also as a launchpad for new functions and businesses. In this article, the authors present a path-based approach that addresses the primary challenges of IT: the difficulty and expense of mapping out all requirements before a project starts because people often cannot specify everything that they need beforehand; the other unanticipated needs that almost always arise once a system is in operation; and the tricky task of persuading people to use and "own" it. Japan's Shinsei Bank emerged during the authors' research as a standout among the companies applying the path-based method. The firm designed, built, and rolled out its system by forging together, not just aligning, business and IT strategies; employing the simplest possible technology; making the system truly modular; letting it sell itself to users; and ensuring that users influence future improvements. Some of the principles are variations on old themes, while others turn the conventional wisdom on its head.

The historian David McCullough, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner and well-known public television host, has spent his career thinking about the qualities that make a leader great. His books, including Truman, John Adams, and 1776, illustrate his conviction that even in America's darkest moments the old-fashioned virtues of optimism, hard work, and strength of character endure. In this edited conversation with HBR senior editor Bronwyn Fryer, McCullough analyzes the strengths of American leaders past and present. Of Harry Truman he says, "He wasn't afraid to have people around him who were more accomplished than he, and that's one reason why he had the best cabinet of any president since George Washington....He knew who he was." George Washington--"a natural born leader and a man of absolute integrity"--was unusually skilled at spotting talent. Washington Roebling, who built the Brooklyn Bridge, led by example: He never asked his people to do anything he wouldn't do himself, no matter how dangerous. Franklin Roosevelt had the power of persuasion in abundance. If McCullough were teaching a business school leadership course, he says, he would emphasize the importance of listening--of asking good questions but also noticing what people don't say; he would warn against "the insidious disease of greed"; he would encourage an ambition to excel; and he would urge young MBAs to have a sense that their work matters and to make their good conduct a standard for others.

An abrupt and lasting drop in revenue growth is a crisis that can strike even the most exemplary organization. The authors' comprehensive analysis of growth in Fortune 100-size companies over the past half century revealed, in fact, that 87% of them had stalled out at least once. The record shows that if management cannot turn a company around within a few years, the odds are that it will never again see healthy top-line growth. Fortunately, the authors (of the Corporate Executive Board) have uncovered and categorized the most common causes of growth stalls. The majority of these standstills are preventable because, according to the authors, they arise from management choices about strategy or organizational design; external factors (e.g., regulatory actions) account for only 13%. Four categories predominate: Premium-position captivity. When a firm's world-class offering has won the most demanding customers in the market, it often fails to respond effectively to new, low-cost competitive challenges or shifts in customer valuation of product features. Innovation management breakdown. Because most large corporations generate sequential product innovations, any systemic inefficiency or dysfunction in the innovation chain can cause extremely serious problems that last for years. Premature core abandonment. Managers may conclude too quickly that a core market is saturated. Or they may incorrectly interpret operational impediments in the core business as evidence that it's time to move into new competitive terrain. Talent bench shortfall. Insufficient capabilities will stop growth dead in its tracks. They also identified a common culprit in detailed case studies of 50 stalled companies--failure to adapt company strategy to changes in the external environment. Two tools can help managers avoid growth stalls: a self-test to diagnose impending stalls and a choice of practices to explicitly identify strategic assumptions and test them for ongoing relevance.

A decade ago, the Thomson Corporation, like most B2B companies, had a much better understanding of the people who purchased its newspapers, journals, and textbooks for their organizations than of the people who actually used them in their daily jobs. Facing an internet shakeup of its market, Thomson realized it needed to bridge that critical knowledge gap. The company began systematically scrutinizing its end users--in much the same way that Procter & Gamble tackles consumer research--as part of a new front-end customer strategy that would become the cornerstone of the firm's transformation. In this article, Harrington, Thomson's CEO, and Tjan, a consultant who advised him, describe how the company adopted a user-centric mind-set--initially in the Thomson Financial division and then throughout the organization. First came a redefinition of the division's market, which was mapped not by type of purchaser but by eight end-user segments. That gave Thomson a clear view of the division's real, addressable market and of corresponding opportunities. After conducting surveys and "day in the life" observations of users, Thomson charted their entire work flow, beginning with what they were doing three minutes before and after using a product, and saw where the organization could add value. Then, through cluster and conjoint analysis, the company determined how pain points and product preferences varied among the users. With that information, Thomson was able to identify three clusters of customers in one segment and develop three categories of offerings. Since beginning to implement this approach, Thomson has changed radically. Its revenue now comes mostly from digital, not print, products, and it generates twice the operating profit and four times the free cash flow it did 10 years ago. In a market that changes by the day, Thomson's revenue is unusually predictable and profitable.

Most firms have no formal programs for anticipating and fulfilling talent needs, relying on an increasingly expensive pool of outside candidates that has been shrinking since it was created from the white-collar layoffs of the 1980s. But the advice these companies are getting to solve the problem--institute large-scale internal development programs--is equally ineffective. Internal development was the norm back in the 1950s, and every management-development practice that seems novel today was routine in those years--from executive coaching to 360-degree feedback to job rotation to high-potential programs. However, the stable business environment and captive talent pipelines in which such practices were born no longer exist. It's time for a fundamentally new approach to talent management. Fortunately, companies already have such a model, one that has been well honed over decades to anticipate and meet demand in uncertain environments: supply chain management. Cappelli, a professor at the Wharton School, focuses on four practices in particular. First, companies should balance make-versus-buy decisions by using internal development programs to produce most--but not all--of the needed talent, filling in with outside hiring. Second, firms can reduce the risks in forecasting the demand for talent by sending smaller batches of candidates through more modularized training systems in much the same way manufacturers now employ components in just-in-time production lines. Third, companies can improve their returns on investment in development efforts by adopting novel cost-sharing programs. Fourth, they should seek to protect their investments by generating internal opportunities to encourage newly trained managers to stick with the firm. Taken together, these principles form the foundation for a new paradigm in talent management: a talent-on-demand system.

A substantial number of local companies in emerging markets have managed to hold their own--or better--in the face of competition from global Goliaths. Bhattacharya and Michael of the Boston Consulting Group show how these domestic Davids have achieved that impressive feat. The secret is to adopt most, if not all, elements of a six-part strategy. One, the homegrown winners customize products and services to meet local needs and initially go after economies of scope. Two, they develop business models to overcome market-specific obstacles and gain competitive advantage in the process. Three, they create or buy the latest technologies and use them effectively. Four, they find ways to benefit from low-cost labor and train workers in-house to overcome shortages of skilled employees. Five, they scale quickly by going national before regional rivals can challenge them. Six, they invest in top management talent in order to sustain rapid growth. No element on its own is groundbreaking, but in the aggregate the strategy is a potent one, as the authors illustrate with the story of Ctrip, China's largest online travel agent. Successful as homegrown champions have been--and this article identifies 50 of them--a few multinationals, such as Yum Brands, Nokia, and Hyundai, have managed to beat the locals at their own game by using the six-part strategy. Global companies would do well to study these models of achievement and, armed with acquired wisdom, rethink their own strategies before local rivals shut them out of lucrative emerging markets.

Companies often treat new-product development as a monolithic process, but it can be more rationally divided into two parts: an early stage that focuses on evaluating prospects and eliminating bad bets, and a late stage that maximizes the remaining candidates' market potential. Recognizing the value of this approach, Eli Lilly designed and piloted Chorus, an autonomous unit dedicated solely to the early stage. This article demonstrates how segmenting development in this way can speed it up and make it more cost-effective. Two classes of decision-making errors can impede NPD, the authors say. First, managers often ignore evidence challenging their assumptions that projects will succeed. As a result, many projects go forward despite multiple red flags; some even reach the market, only to fail dramatically after their introduction. Second, companies sometimes terminate projects prematurely because people fail to conduct the right experiments to reveal products' potential. Most companies promote both kinds of errors by focusing disproportionately on late-stage development; they lack the early, truth-seeking functions that would head such errors off. In segmented NPD, however, the early-stage organization maintains loyalty to the experiment rather than the product, whereas the late-stage organization pursues commercial success. Chorus has significantly improved NPD efficiency and productivity at Lilly. Although the unit absorbs just one-tenth of Lilly's investment in early-stage development, it delivers a substantially greater fraction of the molecules slated for late Phase II trials--at almost twice the speed and less than a third of the cost of the standard process, sometimes shaving as much as two years off the usual development time.

Our annual survey of ideas and trends that will make an impact on business: Stan Stalnaker heralds a peer-to-peer economy in which consumers become consumer-producers. Tamara J. Erickson dissects the expectations of Gen Y workers. Dr. Jerome Groopman writes a prescription for avoiding misdiagnoses in decision making. Michael Sheehan warns not to resort to the tools of competition when it's really opposition that threatens your company. John J. Medina conceives of a brain-friendly workplace that applies modern science to daily performance. Dan Ariely studies the minds of "honest" people when they cheat. Paul Root Wolpe and Daniel D. Langleben share truths about technologically sophisticated lie detection. Scott Berinato shines a light on the cybercrime service economy. Mark Kuznicki, Eli Singer, and Jay Goldman showcase Toronto, where a technology-driven event led to real social change. John Seely Brown and Douglas Thomas argue that online games are preparing the twenty-first-century workforce. Jane McGonigal calls alternate reality games the promising new operating systems for real-world business. Miklos Sarvary mines the history of broadcasting for wisdom about competing in the metaverses of the internet. Judith Donath asks how true to yourself you'll be in the virtual world. Jan Chipchase surveys the soon-to-be-charted territory of metadata trails. Lew McCreary points a finger at people who blame technology for their bad behavior. Jaime Lerner sees the city of the future in a turtle's shell. David Vogel catalogs the advantages of socially responsible lobbying. George Pohle lets the numbers prove the mass-market promise of China's second-tier cities. Aamir A. Rehman and S. Nazim Ali discuss the boom in sharia-compliant finance. Michael J. Mauboussin identifies the shrinking domain in which experts are the best problem solvers. Garrett Gruener reveals his list of sustainable and unsustainable trends.

Incoming CEOs and general managers don't have much time to show what they can do to improve a business's performance. (In 2006, for instance, about 40% of CEOs who left their jobs had lasted an average of just 1.8 years - and many of them were ushered out the door.) Within a few months at most, leaders must find ways to boost profitability, increase market share, overtake a competitor - whatever the key tasks may be. But they can't map out specific objectives and initiatives until they have accurately assessed their companies' distinctive strengths and weaknesses and the particular threats and opportunities they face. In this article, Bain consultants Gottfredson, Schaubert, and Saenz provide a diagnostic template to help organizations figure all that out so they can decide which goals are reasonable and where to focus performance-improvement efforts. The template is built on four widely accepted principles. First, costs and prices almost always decline; second, your competitive position determines your options; third, customers and profit pools don't stand still; and fourth, simplicity gets results. Along with each principle, the authors offer diagnostic questions and analytic tools. Of course, each manager will emphasize certain elements of the template and de-emphasize others, based on his or her business situation. This process will show incoming CEOs and general managers where they are starting from (their point of departure) and help them establish their performance objectives (their point of arrival) as well as the change initiatives that will take them where they want to go.