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This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Business schools and others interested in management education and development have vigorously debated how best to teach strategy to future leaders. Some experts have questioned whether the topic should be taught at all--or at least whether it should be taught to managers. Often missing from the debate, however, has been any in-depth discussion of how individuals learn to think strategically in the first place. What specific experiences are important and how do they contribute? Moreover, what are the different ways in which people absorb those experiences to develop the ability to think strategically? To answer these and other questions, conducts a study that identified executives who were considered the top strategic thinkers in their industries. The study then investigated the totality of experiences (educational, job related, or other) that contributed to the high ability of those individuals. In addition, the research investigated the different ways in which the executives acquired their expertise in strategic thinking--a process that typically took more than a decade. The data showed that strategic thinking arises from 10 specific types of experiences--for instance, spearheading a major growth initiative or dealing with a threat to organizational survival. Moreover, executives appear to gain their expertise in strategic thinking through one of three developmental patterns. These findings help demystify the process by which strategic thinking is learned, offering important implications for management development and the practice of strategy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. When consumers resist adopting an innovation because it requires them to alter established habits, the innovation is called a resistant innovation. Uses a study involving the diffusion of screwcap wine closures in three countries--Australia, New Zealand, and the United States--to analyze strategies for marketing a resistant innovation. For winemakers, screwcap closures represent a solution to "cork taint," a quality problem that can be caused by poor-quality corks and that can affect wine flavor. But consumers have shown resistance to screwcap closures, associating them with cheap wines or preferring the tradition associated with cork. However, among wine consumers in Australia and New Zealand, screwcaps have now achieved widespread acceptance. But 2005 wine industry statistics showed that less than 5% of U.S. wineries used screwcaps on fine wines. What is the reason for this difference? Earlier research in 2004 had found few differences between U.S. wine consumers and those in Australia and New Zealand--except in their attitudes toward screwcaps. Interviews decision makers at more than two dozen wineries in the three countries, and concludes that winemakers in Australia and New Zealand had generally taken a different approach to marketing screwcap wine closures than United States wineries did. Concludes that under certain circumstances coopetition strategies, which involve some cooperation among competitive firms, can be an effective strategy for marketing a resistant innovation. Suggests that managers should analyze the marketing problem the new innovation faces and the resources available to address it; consider the kind of specific resources and knowledge that might be exchanged during coopetition; and evaluate the industry climate, including the role of trade associations and industry experts.

When getting a company ready to sell in the short term, it turns out, PE firms employ many of the best strategy practices--use debt aggressively, focus on cash flow, reduce costs, concentrate on the dominant part of the business and sell the rest--that make for success in the long term. They just do it in months, not years.

Singapore is the most future-oriented country in the world, new research from Thunderbird business school reveals, whereas Russia is the least. Yet people the world over aspire to plan for the future, a fact global managers can use to inspire workers in present-oriented cultures to look ahead.

Four times more CEOs are being fired today than in 1995, a Booz Allen Hamilton study finds. That's good news. It's not that CEOs are being pressured to think more in the short term; it's that boards are finally clearing away the dead wood.

Scenario-planning tools are getting better, and companies are using them more effectively to prepare for an uncertain future, according to the latest results from Bain & Company's ongoing 14-year survey of corporate tool use.

A study of 2,859 firms shows that companies unwisely cutting costs to artificially improve performance are fooling no one for long. Their stock rises sharply right afterward but falls precipitously in the next few years, as poor management comes home to roost.

The oldest family-run business in the U.S., the Zildjian Company has been making cymbals, first in Turkey and then in America, since 1623. As a 14th-generation leader of the company, Craigie Zildjian sees innovation in collaboration with customers as her best path to continued success.

When they cut R&D, underinvest in their brands, and--worse--cut worker and middle management ranks, leaders are merely punishing their employees (and stockholders) for their own inability to create real value, says this McGill University professor. Productivity improvements come from better management or applying new technologies, not from making fewer people do more work.

Companies are expecting to spend more on R&D this year, but they're putting it in the wrong place--too much on new project development and not enough on the basic research that will produce tomorrow's revenues.

Business projects with very long time horizons--such as those involving product R&D, workplace design, and total compensation planning--have to contend with a crucial question: What will be the needs, demands, and desires of consumers and employees decades from now? If you think the answer is "Just more of the same," you're in for a surprise. Howe and Strauss, the authors of "Generations", "The Fourth Turning", "Millennials Rising", and other books, have studied the differences among generations for some 30 years. Their extensive research has revealed a fascinating pattern--one so strong that it supports a measure of predictability. On the basis of historical precedent, they say, we can foresee how the generations that are alive today will think and act in decades to come. Three of those generations will still be vital forces in American society 20 years from now: Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. Their attitudes and behaviors will have profound effects on the economy, the workplace, and social institutions in general. For example, as aging Boomers eschew high-tech medicine in favor of holistic self-care, natural foods, and mind-body healing techniques, some hospitals are opening new wings featuring alternative medicine and spiritual counseling. Gen Xers, having grown up in an era of failing schools and marriages, will remain alienated, disaffected, and pragmatic as they enter midlife. Already the greatest entrepreneurial generation in U.S. history, they will be highly effective at pushing innovation, efficiency, and mass customization. In contrast, young adult Millennials will favor teamwork, close family relationships, job security, and a bland popular culture. Their unprecedented digital empowerment and talent for organizing will create a political powerhouse and may even revitalize the union movement.

Day-to-day management is challenging enough for CEOs. How do they manage for the long term as well? We posed that question to four top executives of global companies. According to Maurice Levy, chairman and CEO of Publicis Groupe, building the future is really about building the present and keeping close to the front line--those who deal with your customers and markets. He also attributes his company's success in large part to knowing when to take action: In a market where clients' needs steer your long-term future, timing is everything. UPS Chairman and CEO Mike Eskew emphasizes staying true to your vision and values over the long run, despite meeting obstacles along the way. It took more than 20 years, and many lessons learned, to produce consistent profits in what is today the company's fastest-growing and most profitable business: international small packages. Wulf H. Bernotat, CEO of E.ON, examines the challenges facing business leaders and politicians as they try to balance energy needs against potential environmental damage. He calls for educating people about consumption and waste, and he maintains that a diverse and reliable mix of energy sources is the only way to ensure a secure supply while protecting our environment. Finally, Marianne Barner, the director of corporate communications and ombudsman for children's issues at IKEA, discusses how the company is taking steps to improve the environment and be otherwise socially responsible. For example, it's partnering with NGOs to address child labor issues and, on its own, is working to help mitigate climate change. IKEA's goals include using renewable sources for 100% of its energy needs and cutting its overall energy consumption by 25%.

When your company is doing well, and money is pouring in, how do you know if it could be doing better? How can you tell which management practices are making the difference--and which are merely not doing obvious harm? To find out, Professor Stadler and a team at Innsbruck University's business school conducted a massive benchmarking study comparing nine pairs of European companies over 50 years. Each pair was from the same industry (and, preferably, the same country) and included one exceptional performer and one less impressive, but solid performer. The project yielded four main findings, which Stadler calls the four principles of enduring success: Exploit before you explore: Great companies don't innovate their way to growth--they grow by efficiently exploiting the fullest potential of existing innovations. Diversify your business portfolio: Good companies, conscious of the dangers of irrational conglomeration, tend to stick to their knitting. But the great companies know when to diversify, and they remain resilient by maintaining a wide range of suppliers and a broad base of customers. Remember your mistakes: Good companies tell stories of success, but great companies also tell stories of past failures to avoid repeating them. Be conservative about change: Great companies very seldom make radical changes--and take great care in their planning and implementation. How much difference do these principles make? An investment of $1 in 1953 in the group of companies in the study that consistently applied them--insurers Allianz, Legal & General, and Munich Re; financial services firm HSBC; building materials maker Lafarge; high-tech firms Nokia and Siemens; oil giant Shell; and pharmaceutical firm GlaxoSmithKline--would be worth $4,077 today. A $1 investment in the comparison companies--Aachener und Munchener, Prudential Limited, and Cologne Re; Standard Chartered; Ciments Francais; Ericsson and AEG; BP; and Wellcome--would have yielded $713.

Last December the Toyota Motor Corporation officially forecast that it would sell 9.34 million cars in 2007--which could make it the world's largest automaker. However, rapid growth and globalization have created many pressures for the company, and the strain of success is already beginning to show. Two HBR editors interviewed Toyota's president, Katsuaki Watanabe, and several top executives to learn about the strategies they're developing to cope in the future. For well over a decade, J.D. Power and other research firms have consistently rated Toyotas among the top automobiles for quality, reliability, and durability. But in 2006 a series of problems with its cars threatened to sully the company's reputation. What's more, speedy expansion to meet demand and the struggle to keep pace with technological change have combined to challenge Toyota's grand ambitions and its famed "Toyota Way." For Watanabe, being number one means "being the best in the world in terms of quality." If Toyota's quality continues to improve, he says, volume and revenues will follow. If problems arise from overstretching, he wants them made visible, because then his people will "rack their brains" to solve them--and if that means postponing growth, so be it. Toyota's long-term strategy involves developing both global and regional car models in order to compete worldwide with a full line of products. Watanabe aims to achieve his goals through a combination of kaizen ("continuous improvement") and kakushin ("radical innovation"). One of his visions for the future is a "dream car": a vehicle that cleans the air, prevents accidents, promotes health, evokes excitement, and can drive around the world on a single tank of gas.

When a mature company fails to endure over the long term, it's often due to the "Horizon 2 vacuum," argues Geoffrey Moore, author of "Crossing the Chasm" and several other books on innovation strategy, and managing director of the consulting firm TCG Advisors. The reference is to the strategic horizons outlined by McKinsey's Mehrdad Baghai and colleagues in "The Alchemy of Growth": Horizon 1 is today's cash-generating business, Horizon 2 is the set of innovations just being commercialized, and Horizon 3 consists of forward-thinking R&D. Most companies understand they must invest in their future, so the funding and management of Horizon 3 is not the problem. The trouble starts when those innovations are brought to market and must compete with the mainstay business for company resources. They disappear from top management's radar screen and suffer a level of neglect few ventures could survive. Cisco Systems is one company that has recognized the problem and tried to address it. To begin with, CEO John Chambers has insulated Horizon 2 projects from many of the pressures of Horizon 1--for example, by re-orchestrating sales coverage so that emerging markets won't be neglected. He has also kick-started some Horizon 2 businesses by augmenting them with acquisitions, increasing their scale, and giving them more management attention. For the same reason, he has challenged his head of product development to think in terms of new businesses, not simply new products--knowing that the latter tend to get lost in salespeople's bags. Most important, Cisco is handicapping its Horizon 2 projects so that they need not compete head-to-head with established businesses. Their success is judged by metrics that are appropriate to new businesses, and they are given the benefit of Cisco's best managerial talent.

How do some firms produce a pipeline of consistently excellent managers? Instead of concentrating merely on strengthening the skills of individuals, these companies focus on building a broad organizational leadership capability. It's what Ulrich and Smallwood--co-founders of the RBL Group, a leadership development consultancy--call a leadership brand. Organizations with leadership brands take an "outside-in" approach to executive development. They begin with a clear statement of what they want to be known for by customers and then link it with a required set of management skills. The Lexus division of Toyota, for instance, translates its tagline--"The pursuit of perfection"--into an expectation that its leaders excel at managing quality processes. The slogan of Bon Secours Health System is "Good help to those in need." It demands that its managers balance business skills with compassion and caring. The outside-in approach helps firms build a reputation for high-quality leaders whom customers trust to deliver on the company's promises. In examining 150 companies with strong leadership capabilities, the authors found that the organizations follow five strategies. First, make sure managers master the basics of leadership--for example, setting strategy and grooming talent. Second, ensure that leaders internalize customers' high expectations. Third, incorporate customer feedback into evaluations of executives. Fourth, invest in programs that help managers hone the right skills by tapping customers to participate in such programs. Finally, track the success of efforts to build leadership bench strength over the long term. The result is outstanding management that persists even when individual executives leave. In fact, companies with the strongest leadership brands often become "leader feeders"--firms that regularly graduate leaders who go on to head other companies.

Brands are on the wane. Many consumer goods companies blame the big-box discount retailers, but the Wharton School's Leonard Lodish and the Fuqua School's Carl Mela have a different explanation. Their research suggests that companies have damaged their brands by investing too much in short-term price promotions and too little in long-term brand building. To rescue their brands and increase profitability, corporate managers must arm themselves with long-term measures of brand performance and use them to make smarter marketing decisions. Several factors explain the shortsightedness of brand management: the increased availability of weekly, or even hourly, scanner data, which show a clear link between discounts and immediate boosts in sales; the relative difficulty of measuring the effects of advertising, new product development, and distribution--all of which can contribute to a brand's long-term health; the short tenure of most brand managers; and the near-term orientation of Wall Street analysts. Although discounts do increase sales in the short term, they ultimately lower profit margins. If a product is often discounted, consumers learn to buy it only when it's on sale. Moreover, when one firm increases its discounts, others usually follow suit, lowering everyone's margins. Executives can monitor a brand's long-term performance by watching a dashboard of measures. Only after examining such measures, for example, did managers at Clorox discover that the company's heavy discounting and decreased advertising had caused a steady decline in overall bleach sales and profit margins. In response, Clorox reduced discounting and increased television advertising, moves that ultimately strengthened the brand and reversed the firm's downward trends.

Popular lore tells us that genius is born, not made. Scientific research, on the other hand, reveals that true expertise is mainly the product of years of intense practice and dedicated coaching. Ordinary practice is not enough: To reach elite levels of performance, you need to constantly push yourself beyond your abilities and comfort level. Such discipline is the key to becoming an expert in all domains, including management and leadership. Those are the conclusions reached by Anders Ericsson, a professor of psychology at Florida State University; Michael Prietula, a professor at the Goizueta Business School; and Edward Cokely, a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, who together studied data on the behavior of experts gathered by more than 100 scientists. What consistently distinguished elite surgeons, chess players, writers, athletes, pianists, and other experts was the habit of engaging in "deliberate" practice--a sustained focus on tasks that they couldn't do before. Experts continually analyzed what they did wrong, adjusted their techniques, and worked arduously to correct their errors. Even such traits as charisma can be developed using this technique. Working with a drama school, the authors created a set of acting exercises for managers that remarkably enhanced executives' powers of charm and persuasion. Through deliberate practice, leaders can improve their ability to win over their employees, their peers, or their board of directors. The journey to elite performance is not for the impatient or the faint of heart. It takes at least a decade and requires the guidance of an expert teacher to provide tough, often painful feedback. It also demands would-be experts to develop their "inner coach" and eventually drive their own progress.

The primary goal of forecasting is to identify the full range of possibilities facing a company, society, or the world at large. In this article, Saffo demythologizes the forecasting process to help executives become sophisticated and participative consumers of forecasts, rather than passive absorbers. He illustrates how to use forecasts to at once broaden understanding of possibilities and narrow the decision space within which one must exercise intuition. The events of 9/11, for example, were a much bigger surprise than they should have been. After all, airliners flown into monuments were the stuff of Tom Clancy novels in the 1990s, and everyone knew that terrorists had a very personal antipathy toward the World Trade Center. So why was 9/11 such a surprise? What can executives do to avoid being blindsided by other such wild cards, be they radical shifts in markets or the seemingly sudden emergence of disruptive technologies? In describing what forecasters are trying to achieve, Saffo outlines six simple, commonsense rules that smart managers should observe as they embark on a voyage of discovery with professional forecasters: Map a cone of uncertainty, look for the S curve, embrace the things that don't fit, hold strong opinions weakly, look back twice as far as you look forward, and know when not to make a forecast.

This article was controversial when first published in 1980. At the time, American business was suffering from marked deterioration in competitive vigor and economic well-being, which most economists and business leaders attributed to factors such as the virus of inflation, the limitations imposed by government regulation and tax policy, and the feverish price escalation by OPEC. Not quite right, say the authors. In their judgment, responsibility rests not with general economic forces alone but also with the failure of American managers to keep their companies technologically competitive over the long run. Drawing on their extensive work in the manufacturing sector, as well as their association with Harvard's International Senior Managers Program in Vevey, Switzerland, the authors prescribe some strong medicine for American business. They compare the U.S. system of management with those of Europe and Japan and call for fundamental shifts in management attitudes and practices. In advocating change, they also reaffirm the importance of following business basics: to invest, innovate, lead, and create value where none existed previously. The original article now includes a sidebar by Robert Hayes, who summarizes what has--and what has not--changed in American management over the past 27 years. He encourages managers to go beyond the traditional fundamentals to implement a new set of essentials for today's networked, virtual world.