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The problems with traditional approaches to strategic planning have long been recognized: they attempt to make a 'science' of planning, with its subsequent loss of creativity; there is an excessive emphasis on data; the drive for administrative efficiency at the expense of substance; and the dominance of single techniques, inappropriately applied. Yet today's strategists continue to struggle to propose clear alternatives to traditional processes. Design offers a different approach and suggests processes that are more widely participative, dialog-based, issue-rather-than-calendar-driven, and conflict-using rather than conflict-avoiding, all aimed at invention and learning, rather than control. The author describes the elements of the 'design approach' and ten steps organizations can take if they want to take design seriously.

Coming up with fresh ideas for new or existing products, services and processes is widely recognized as the key to enduring economic advantage, and as a result, employee creativity has taken center stage in discussions of innovation. But how can creativity be actively fostered and sustained in the workplace? Paying attention to employee emotions is critical, say the authors. Organizations are emotion-laden environments, and while research has begun to validate affective (i.e. emotional) influences on a number of work outcomes (including task quality, productivity and efficiency), little is known about how naturally-occurring affective experiences in the flow of our daily work lives relate to creative thinking on the job. The authors show that the emotion-creativity system is a cycle, whereby influences at any point can begin a dynamic pattern of increasing or decreasing positive affect and creativity.

Something is tragically missing from modern management practice and education, say the authors: an image of the manager as an idea generator who gives form to new possibilities with a well-developed vocabulary of design. Achieving this requires the development of a 'design attitude', which goes beyond default solutions to create new possibilities for the future. The authors describe the differences between a 'design attitude' and the 'decision attitude' that is so prevalent in business today. They explain why creativity needs the guiding energy of a design attitude in order to focus our efforts on results that will be truly innovative and produce long-lasting organizational betterments. This article is excerpted from Managing as Designing (Stanford Business Books, 2004), edited by the two authors.

The paradigmatic shift taking place in economic value creation requires organizations to move away from an obsession with reliability and towards a more welcoming environment for validity. A reliable process is one that produces a consistent and predictable result, over and over. To enhance the reliability of any process, one has to reduce the number of variables considered and use quantitative, bias-free measurement. On the other hand, to increase the validity of any process, one must consider a much wider array of relevant variables and use intuition and gut instinct. Ultimately, reliability and validity anchor down opposite ends of a spectrum: more reliability requires fewer variables and therefore less validity, and vice versa. How does this trade-off relate to design, and why should it matter to today's business leaders? Because design possesses an inherent bias toward validity: great designers seek deep understanding of the user and the context, which entails the consideration of many variables; they don't limit their considerations to aspects that can be thoroughly quantified; they worry less about whether they can replicate a particular process, and more about producing a valid solution to the problem before them. The author presents five strategies for being effective in a reliability-obsessed organization.

This month, all of Harvard Business Review's Forethought contributions address avian influenza, its potential to become a pandemic, and the red flags this possibility raises for businesses. Jeffrey Staples warns that the H5N1 strain of the avian flu represents a new class of global threat and urges companies to plan accordingly. Scott F. Dowell and Joseph S. Bresee show how mutations of the virus could boost its ability to spread from person to person. If a human pandemic does strike, Nitin Nohria explains, the most adaptive organizations have the best chance of surviving. Warren G. Bennis says that such times call for a leader who can articulate the common threat and inspire people to overcome it together. Baruch Fischhoff, too, emphasizes the importance of risk communication, warning that managers who dismiss it may endanger the people they're responsible for and force stakeholders to look elsewhere for information. Fischhoff also demonstrates, in another article, how managers can map out their companies' vulnerabilities. Larry Brilliant tells us what people worldwide can expect from their governments. Peter Susser views the threat of a pandemic from a legal perspective, examining several HR-related issues businesses could face. Sherry Cooper points out the social and economic lessons we should have learned from Toronto's 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome. William MacGowan explains how Sun Microsystems is building a continuity plan to keep its global workforce healthy in the event of a pandemic. Wendy Dobson and Brian R. Golden caution that if a pandemic begins in China, as many scientists expect, the global impact will be immediate because China is so integral to the world economy. HBR also provides pandemic planning guidelines adapted from a checklist compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as a list of recommended avian flu resources.

Health care in the United States--and in most other developed countries--is ailing. Medical treatment has made astonishing advances, but the packaging and delivery of health care are often inefficient, ineffective, and user unfriendly. Problems ranging from costs to medical errors beg for ingenious solutions--and, indeed, there have been enormous investments in innovation. But too many efforts fail. To find out why, it's necessary to break down the problem, look at the different types of innovation, and examine the forces that affect them. Three kinds of innovation can make health care better and cheaper: One changes the way in which consumers buy and use health care, another taps into technology, and the third generates new business models. However, the health care system erects an array of barriers to each type of innovation. More often than not, organizations can overcome the barriers by managing the six forces that have an impact on health care innovation: players--the friends and foes who can bolster or destroy; funding--the revenue-generation and capital-acquisition processes, which differ from those in other industries; policy--the regulations that pervade the industry; technology--the foundation for innovations that can make health care delivery more efficient and convenient; customers--the empowered and engaged consumers of health care; and accountability--the demand from consumers, payers, and regulators that innovations be safe, effective, and cost effective. The analytical framework the author describes can also be used to examine other industries.

Asking the question, "What makes a great COO?" is akin to asking "What makes a great candidate for U.S. vice president?" It all depends on the first name on the ticket-the CEO. New research sheds light on this most contingent, and most mysterious, of C-suite jobs. After in-depth conversations with dozens of executives who have held the position and with CEOs who have worked with COOs, the authors have concluded that different views of the COO role arise from the different motives behind creating the position in the first place. There are seven basic reasons why companies decide to hire a COO: to implement the CEO's strategy; to lead a particular initiative, such as a turnaround; to mentor a young, inexperienced CEO; to complement the strengths or make up for the weaknesses of the CEO; to provide a partner to the CEO; to test out a possible successor; or to stave off the defection of a highly valuable executive, particularly to a rival. This tremendous variation implies that there is no standard set of great COO attributes, which makes finding suitable candidates difficult for companies and recruiters alike. Still, certain common success factors came up consistently in the interviews, the most important being building a high level of trust between CEO and COO. Trust comes from meeting obligations on both sides: The COO must truly support the CEO's vision; keep ego in check; and exhibit strong execution, coaching, and coordination skills. The CEO must communicate faithfully, grant real authority and decision rights, and not stymie the COO's career. It's surprising that COOs are not more common. They would be, the authors contend, if there were less confusion surrounding the role. As we continue to demystify that role, more companies will benefit from more effective leadership.

Sooner or later, most companies can't attain the growth rates expected by their boards and CEOs and demanded by investors. To some extent, such businesses are victims of their own successes. Many were able to sustain high growth rates for a long time because they were in high-growth industries. But once those industries slowed down, the businesses could no longer deliver the performance that investors had come to take for granted. Often, companies have resorted to acquisition, though this strategy has a discouraging track record. Over time, 65% of acquisitions destroy more value than they create. So where does real growth come from? For the past 12 years, the authors have researched and advised companies on this issue. With the support of researchers at Harvard Business School and INSEAD, they instituted a project titled The CEO Agenda and Growth. They identified and approached 24 companies that had achieved significant organic growth and interviewed their CEOs, chief strategists, heads of R&D, CFOs, and top-line managers. They asked, "Where does your growth come from?" and found a consistent pattern in the answers. All the businesses grew by creating new growth platforms (NGPs) on which they could build families of products and services and extend their capabilities into multiple new domains. Identifying NGP opportunities calls for executives to challenge conventional wisdom. In all the companies studied, top management believed that NGP innovation differed significantly from traditional product or service innovation. They had independent, senior-level units with a standing responsibility to create NGPs, and their CEOs spent as much as 50% of their time working with these units. The payoff has been spectacular and lasting. For example, from 1985 to 2004, the medical device company Medtronic grew revenues at 18% per year, earnings at 20%, and market capitalization at 30%.

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors' findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can contribute significantly to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.

In the complex sport of American football, teams rely on playbooks as thick as the Manhattan phone directory. But when it comes to creating innovative growth businesses--which is at least as complicated as professional football--most companies have not developed detailed game plans. Indeed, many managers have concluded that a fog enshrouds the world of innovation, obscuring high-potential opportunities. The authors believe that companies can penetrate that fog by developing growth strategies based on disruptive innovations, as defined by Clayton Christensen. Such innovations conform to a pattern: They offer an entirely new solution; they perform adequately along traditional dimensions and much better along other dimensions that matter more to target customers; and they are not initially appealing to powerful incumbents. Companies can develop customized checklists, or playbooks, by combining this basic pattern with analysis of major innovations in their markets. The key early on is to focus not on detailed financial estimates--which will always guide companies toward the markets most hostile to disruptive innovations--but on how well the innovation fits the pattern of success. It's also crucial to encourage flexibility: Companies must be willing to kill projects that are going nowhere, exempt innovations from standard development processes, and avoid burdening project teams with extra financing, which can keep them heading in the wrong direction. Companies can create competitive advantage by becoming champions at defining the pattern of successful innovations and executing against it. But as that pattern becomes obvious--and others emerge--building a sustainable advantage on innovation competencies will again prove elusive.

If you want to know why so many organizations sink into chaos, look no further than their leaders' mouths. Over and over, leaders present grand, overarching--yet fuzzy--notions of where they think the company is going. They assume everyone shares their definitions of "vision," "accountability," and "results." The result is often sloppy behavior and misalignment that can cost a company dearly. Effective communication is a leader's most critical tool for doing the essential job of leadership: inspiring the organization to take responsibility for creating a better future. Five topics wield extraordinary influence within a company: organizational structure and hierarchy, financial results, the leader's sense of his or her job, time management, and corporate culture. Properly defined, disseminated, and controlled, these topics give the leader opportunities for increased accountability and substantially better performance. For example, one CEO always keeps communications about hierarchy admirably brief and to the point. When he realized he needed to realign internal resources, he told the staff: "I'm changing the structure of resources so that we can execute more effectively." After unveiling a new organization chart, he said, "It's 10:45. You have until noon to be annoyed, should that be your reaction. At noon, pizza will be served. At one o'clock, we go to work in our new positions." The most effective leaders ask themselves, "What needs to happen today to get where we want to go? What vague belief or notion can I clarify or debunk?" A CEO who communicates precisely to 10 direct reports, each of whom communicates with equal precision to 40 other employees, aligns the organization's commitment and energy with a well-understood vision of the firm's real goals and opportunities.

Ever since businesses started offering solutions instead of products, they have acknowledged that selling spare parts and after-sales services could be a lucrative source of profits. So why do so many companies still treat aftermarket services as an afterthought? One reason is that after-sales support is so hard to manage. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) often subject their customers to unnecessary delays when problems arise, and many OEMs outsource customer service. As a result, customers are dissatisfied with the level of service they receive, and companies don't benefit from the aftermarket's potential. Only businesses that provide services efficiently can truly benefit. Focusing on after-sales services can pay off in a number of ways. For example, it's cheaper for businesses to increase sales of parts and service-related products than to find new customers. And when companies provide aftermarket support, they gain unique insight into their customers' businesses that's difficult for rivals to acquire. The authors, who have studied after-sales service networks for more than 20 years, have developed a six-step approach to help companies improve after-sales service quality levels, reduce investments in service assets, and cut operating costs. To be successful, firms must identify the products they want to support, design a portfolio of service products, use multiple business models, determine after-sales organizational structures, create an after-sales supply chain, and monitor performance. Companies that ignore these steps, say the authors, are doomed to mediocrity.

Since the days of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, the American public's regard for the competence of public agencies and the value of the services they perform has steadily declined. During that time, innovations in management practice and thinking have mostly originated and been tested in the private sector. But recent events, such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the engulfment of New Orleans, have demonstrated how essential it is for public agencies to be well run, too. Unfortunately, few public administrators have a background in change management, and a variety of factors--such as civil service rules, political considerations, and the limited tenures of agency heads--have combined to make true reform a rare event. These facts of public life may never go away. But some agency leaders have figured out how to court important stakeholders, rededicate staffers to an agency's true mission, undertake reform so comprehensively that resistant elements are unable to subvert it, and lay the groundwork for next steps clearly and systematically. Consultant Frank Ostroff has studied turnarounds at the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Government Accountability Office, and Special Operations Forces--the fast-response, clandestine arm of the military. From these examples and others, he has distilled five principles that underlie successful change efforts: Improve performance against agency mission; win over external and internal stakeholders; establish a road map; recognize the connections among all the organizational elements; and be a leader, not a bureaucrat. Change programs that follow these principles are more likely to survive when leadership changes hands.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Robert A. Caro shares his insights about the nature of power, the complexity of ambition, and the role that the greater good can play in the making of a leader. Power doesn't always corrupt, he insists. But what it invariably does is reveal a leader's true nature. "Today, when CEOs have acquired more and more power to change our lives," Caro says, "they have become like presidents in their own right, and they, too, need to align themselves with something greater than themselves if they hope to become truly great leaders."

What could be harder than turning around a seemingly wildly successful company by imposing a centralized framework on a heretofore radically decentralized, antiestablishment, free-spirited organization? That was the challenge GE alumnus Robert Nardelli faced when he abruptly succeeded Home Depot's popular founders, Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, as the top executive in December 2000. Talk about a shock: No one expected Marcus and Blank, both in their 50s, to leave. And, as Nardelli himself acknowledges, the last thing anyone wanted was an outsider who would "GE-ize their company and culture." But despite its glossy high-growth exterior, Home Depot was standing on shaky financial footings. Rapid expansion had stretched cash flow, inventory turns, profits, and store manager ranks thin. Each store's vaunted independence was making the company as a whole highly inflexible, unable to take advantage of economies of scale. What so effectively got Home Depot from zero to $50 billion in sales wasn't going to get it to the next $50 billion. The story of the vision, strategy, and leadership skills Nardelli used to move Home Depot to the next level has been told. But vision, strategy, and leadership alone--while necessary--are not enough. Typically, culture change is unsystematic and, when it works, is based on the charisma of the person leading the change, Ram Charan says. "But Home Depot shows--in perhaps the best example I have seen in my 30-year career--that a cultural transition can be achieved systematically." In this article, Charan lays out the panoply of tools that, wielded in a coordinated and systematic fashion, enabled Home Depot to get a grip on its freewheeling culture so that the company could reap--and sustain--the advantages inherent in its size. Many an up-and-coming company would do well to look to this model to gain similar advantage when the time comes to exchange the thrill of entrepreneurial spirit for the strength of established power.

When corporate leaders or the organizations they represent mess up, they face the difficult decision of whether to apologize publicly. A public apology is a risky move. It's highly political, and every word matters. Refusal to apologize can be smart, or it can be suicidal. Readiness to apologize can be seen as a sign of character or one of weakness. A successful apology can turn enmity into personal and organizational triumph--whereas an apology that's too little, too late, or too transparently tactical can open the floodgates to individual and institutional ruin. Because the stakes are so high, Barbara Kellerman says, leaders should not extend public apologies often or lightly. One or more of the following conditions should apply: The apology is likely to serve an important purpose; the offense is of serious consequence; it's appropriate that the leader assume responsibility for the offense; the leader is the only one who can get the job done; and the cost of saying something is likely lower than the cost of staying silent. The author draws her conclusions from hard data and abundant anecdotal evidence, examining notoriously bad apologizers as well as exceptionally good ones. While selectivity is key, good apologies usually do work. What constitutes a good apology? Acknowledgment of the mistake or wrongdoing, acceptance of responsibility, expression of regret, and assurance that the offense will not be repeated.

Standardization has been a powerful strategy in consumer markets, but it's reached the point of diminishing returns. And diversity is not the only chink in standardization's armor: Attempts to build stores in remaining attractive locations often meet fierce resistance from community activists. From California to Florida to New Jersey, neighborhoods are passing ordinances that dictate the sizes and even architectural styles of new shops. Building more of the same--long the cornerstone of retailer growth--seems to be tapped out as a strategy. Of course, a company can't customize every element of its business in every location. Strategists have begun to use clustering techniques to simplify and smooth out decision making and to focus their efforts on the relatively small number of variables that usually drive the bulk of consumer purchases. The customization-by-clusters approach, which began as a strategy for grocery stores in 1995, has since proven effective in drugstores, department stores, mass merchants, big-box retailers, restaurants, apparel companies, and a variety of consumer goods manufacturers. Clustering sorts things into groups, so that the associations are strong between members of the same cluster and weak between members of different clusters. In fact, by centralizing data-intensive and scale-sensitive functions (such as store design, merchandise assortment, buying, and supply chain management), localization liberates store personnel to do what they do best: Test innovative solutions to local challenges and forge strong bonds with communities. Ultimately, all companies serving consumers will face the challenge of local customization. We are advancing to a world where the strategies of the most successful businesses will be as diverse as the communities they serve.

High-definition televisions (HDTVs) should, by now, be a huge success. Philips, Sony, and Thompson invested billions of dollars to develop TV sets with astonishing picture quality. From a technology perspective, they've succeeded: Console manufacturers have been ready for the mass market since the early 1990s. Yet, the category has been an unmitigated failure because critical complements such as studio production equipment were not developed or adopted in time. Underperforming complements have left console producers in the position of offering a Ferrari in a world without gasoline or highways--an admirable engineering feat, but not one that creates value for customers. The HDTV story exemplifies the promise and peril of innovation ecosystems--the collaborative arrangements through which firms combine their individual offers into a coherent, customer-facing solution. When they work, innovation ecosystems allow companies to create value that no one firm could have created alone. The benefits of these systems are real. But for many organizations, the attempt at ecosystem innovation has been a costly failure. This is because, along with new opportunities, innovation ecosystems also present a new set of risks that can brutally derail a firm's best efforts. Innovation ecosystems are characterized by three fundamental types of risk: initiative risks--the familiar uncertainties of managing a project; interdependence risks--the uncertainties of coordinating with complementary innovators; and integration risks--the uncertainties presented by the adoption process across the value chain. Firms that assess ecosystem risks holistically and systematically will be able to establish more realistic expectations, develop a more refined set of environmental contingencies, and arrive at a more robust innovation strategy. Collectively, these actions will lead to more effective implementation and more profitable innovation.

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Because so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.

Even as loyalty programs are launched left and right, many are being scuttled. How can that be? These days, everyone knows that an old customer retained is worth more than a new customer won. What is so hard about making a simple loyalty program work? Quite a lot, the authors say. The biggest challenges include clarifying business goals, engineering the reward structure, and creating incentives powerful enough to change buying behavior but not so generous that they erode margins. Additionally, companies have to sort out the puzzles of consumer psychology, which can result, for example, in two rewards of equal economic value, inspiring very different levels of purchasing. In their research, the authors have discovered patterns in what the successful loyalty programs get right and in how the others fail. Together, their findings constitute a toolkit for designing something rare indeed: a program that won't do you wrong. To begin with, it's important to know exactly what a loyalty program can do. It can keep customers from defecting, induce them to consolidate certain purchases with one seller (in other words, win a greater share of wallet), prompt customers to make additional purchases, yield insight into their behavior and preferences, and turn a profit. A program can meet these objectives in several ways--for instance, by offering rewards (points, say, or frequent-flier miles) divisible enough to provide many redemption opportunities but not so divisible that they fail to lock in customers. Companies striving to generate customer loyalty should avoid five common mistakes: Don't create a new commodity, which can result in price wars and other tit-for-tat competitive moves; don't cater to the disloyal by making rewards easy for just anyone to reap; don't reward purchasing volume over profitability; don't give away the store; and, finally, don't promise what can't be delivered.