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How Dole beat Chiquita by working around a restrictive EU trade policy instead of struggling against it.

When a crisis forces outside directors to navigate major changes, investors and directors must adopt new roles. The case of Royal Dutch/Shell provides useful lessons.

Espionage expert H. Keith Melton shows how executives can best guard their company secrets.

By centralizing oversight of business travel and transportation, companies can improve efficiency, raise employee satisfaction, and reduce costs.

Sun Microsystems President and COO Jonathan Schwartz explains how blogging has enhanced public perception of his company and fostered loyalty within.

The best solution to the looming shortage of nurses and doctors may be to move chronic disease monitoring and care out of hospitals and into people's homes.

Stress is an essential response in highly competitive environments. Before a race, before an exam, before an important meeting, your heart rate and blood pressure rise, your focus tightens, you become more alert and more efficient. But beyond a certain level, stress overloads your system, compromising your performance and, eventually, your health. So the question is: When does stress help and when does it hurt? To find out, HBR talked with Harvard Medical School professor Herbert Benson, M.D., founder of the Mind/Body Medical Institute. Having spent more than 35 years conducting worldwide research in the fields of neuroscience and stress, Benson is best known for his 1975 best seller The Relaxation Response, in which he describes how the mind can influence stress levels through such tools as meditation. His most recent research centers on what he calls "the breakout principle," a method by which stress is not simply reduced but carefully controlled so that you reap its benefits while avoiding its dangers. He describes a four-step process in which you first push yourself to the most productive stress level by grappling intently with a problem. Next, just as you feel yourself flagging, you disengage entirely by doing something utterly unrelated--going for a walk, petting a dog, taking a shower. In the third step, as the brain quiets down, activity paradoxically increases in areas associated with attention, space-time concepts, and decision making, leading to a sudden, creative insight--the breakout. Step four is achievement of a "new-normal state," in which you find that the improved performance is sustained, sometimes indefinitely. As counterintuitive as this research may seem, managers can doubtless recall times when they've had an "aha" moment at the gym, on the golf course, or in the shower. What Benson describes here is a way to tap into this invaluable biological tool whenever we want.

What's the number of product or service offerings that would optimize both your revenues and your profits? For most firms, it's considerably lower than the number they offer today. The fact is, companies have strong incentives to be overly innovative in new product development. But continual launches of new products and line extensions add complexity throughout a company's operations, and as the costs of managing that complexity multiply, margins shrink. To maximize profit potential, a company needs to identify its innovation fulcrum--the point at which an additional offering destroys more value than it creates. The usual antidotes to complexity miss their mark because they treat the problem on the factory floor rather than at its source: in the product line. Mark Gottfredson and Keith Aspinall of Bain & Co. present an approach that goes beyond the typical Six Sigma or lean-operations program to root out complexity hidden in the value chain. The first step is to ask, What would our company look like if it made and sold only a single product or service? For Starbucks, it might be a medium-size cup of coffee; for a bank, a simple checking account. Then determine the cost of producing that baseline offering. Next, add variety back into the business system, product by product, and carefully forecast the resulting impact on sales as well as the cost implications across the value chain. When the analysis shows the costs beginning to overwhelm the added revenues, you've found your innovation fulcrum. By deconstructing their companies to a zero-complexity baseline, managers can break through organizational resistance and deeply entrenched ways of thinking to find the right balance between innovation and complexity.

Senior executives typically delegate responsibility for managing a firm's derivatives portfolio to in-house financial experts and the company's financial advisers. That's a strategic blunder, argues this Nobel laureate, because the inventiveness of modern financial markets makes it possible for companies to double or even triple their capacity to invest in their strategic assets and competencies. Risks fall into two categories: either a company adds value by assuming them on behalf of its shareholders or it does not. By hedging or insuring against non-value-adding risks with derivative securities and contracts, thereby removing them from what the author calls the risk balance sheet, managers can release equity capital for assuming more value-adding risk. This is not just a theoretical possibility. One innovation--the interest rate swap, introduced about 20 years ago--has already enabled the banking industry to increase dramatically its capacity for adding value to each dollar of invested equity capital. With the range of derivative instruments growing, there is no reason why other companies could not similarly remove strategic risks, potentially creating billions of dollars in shareholder value. The possibilities are especially important for private companies that have no access to public equity markets and, therefore, cannot easily increase their equity capital by issuing more shares. The author describes how derivative contracts of various kinds are already being employed strategically to mitigate or eliminate various risks. He also shows how companies can use the risk balance sheet to identify risks they should not bear directly and to determine how much equity capacity they can release for assuming more value-adding risk.

Yes, it's nice when a leader is charismatic and confident. And a great resume can tell you a lot about a person's knowledge and experience. But such assets are no substitute for sheer business intelligence, and they reveal very little about a leader's ability to reach the "right" answer consistently. How can hiring managers flag individuals with such smarts? Historically, the only reliable measure of brainpower has been the standard IQ test, which is rarely used in business settings because of the specific subjects it tests for--math, reading, and spatial reasoning--and because of its multiple-choice format. Despite its shortcomings, the standard IQ test is still a better predictor of managerial success than any other assessment tool companies currently use, Justin Menkes argues. It's true that there isn't a version of IQ testing that applies to the corporate world, but in rejecting IQ tests altogether, hiring managers have thwarted their own attempts to identify true business stars. The author defines the specific subjects that make up "executive intelligence"--namely, accomplishing tasks, working with people, and judging oneself. He describes how to formulate questions to test job candidates for their mastery of these subjects, offering several examples based on real situations. Knowledge questions, such as those used in standard behavioral interviews, require people to recite what they have learned or experienced; intelligence questions call for individuals to demonstrate their abilities. Therefore, the questions in an executive intelligence test shouldn't require specific industry expertise or experience; any knowledge they call for must be rudimentary and common to all executives. And the questions should not be designed to ask whether the candidate has a particular skill; they should be configured so that the candidate will have to demonstrate that skill in the course of answering them.

Marketers planning promotional campaigns ask questions to boost the odds that the messages will be accepted: Who should receive each message? What should be its content? How should we deliver it? The one question they rarely ask is: When should we deliver it? That's too bad, because in marketing, timing is arguably the most important variable of all. Indeed, there are moments in a customer's relationship with a business when she wants to communicate with that business because something has changed. If the company contacts her with the right message in the right format at the right time, there's a good chance of a warm reception. The question of when can be answered by a new computer-based model called "dialogue marketing," which is, to date, the highest rung on an evolutionary ladder that ascends from database marketing to relationship marketing to one-to-one marketing. Its principal advantages over older approaches are that it is completely interactive, exploits many communication channels, and is "relationship aware," that is, it continuously tracks every nuance of the customer's interaction with the business. Thus, dialogue marketing responds to each transition in that relationship at the moment the customer requires attention. Turning a traditional marketing strategy into a dialogue marketing program is a straightforward matter. Begin by identifying the batch communications you make with customers, then ask yourself what events could trigger those communications to make them more timely. Add a question or call to action to each message and prepare a different treatment or response for each possible answer. Finally, create a series of increasingly urgent calls to action that kick in if the question or call to action goes unanswered by the customer. As dialogue marketing proliferates, it may provide the solid new footing that Madison Avenue seeks.

Companies often face new rivals, technologies, regulations, and other environmental changes that seem to come out of left field. How can they see these changes sooner and capitalize on them? Such changes often begin as weak signals on what the authors call the periphery, or the blurry zone at the edge of an organization's vision. As with human peripheral vision, these signals are difficult to see and interpret but can be vital to success or survival. Unfortunately, most companies lack a systematic method for determining where on the periphery they should be looking, how to interpret the weak signals they see, and how to allocate limited scanning resources. This article provides such a method--a question-based framework for helping companies scan the periphery more efficiently and effectively. The framework divides questions into three categories: learning from the past (What have been our past blind spots? What instructive analogies do other industries offer? Who in the industry is skilled at picking up weak signals and acting on them?); evaluating the present (What important signals are we rationalizing away? What are our mavericks, outliers, complainers, and defectors telling us? What are our peripheral customers and competitors really thinking?); and envisioning the future (What future surprises could really hurt or help us? What emerging technologies could change the game? Is there an unthinkable scenario that might disrupt our business?). Answering these questions is a good first step toward anticipating problems or opportunities that may appear on the business horizon. The article concludes with a self-test that companies can use to assess their need and capability for peripheral vision.

There has been a lot of research on marketing as an offensive tactic--how it can help companies successfully launch new products, enter new markets, or gain share with existing products in their current markets. But for nearly every new product launch, market entrant, or industry upstart grabbing market share, there is an incumbent that must defend its position. And there has been little research on how these defenders can use marketing to respond to new or anticipated threats preemptively. John H. Roberts outlines four basic types of defensive marketing strategies: positive, inertial, parity, and retarding. With the first two, you establish and communicate your points of superiority relative to the new entrant; with the second two, you establish and communicate strategic points of comparability with your rival. Before choosing a strategy, you need to assess the weapons you have available to protect your market position--your brand identity, the products and services that support that identity, and your means of communicating it. Then assess your customers' value to you and their vulnerability to being poached by rivals. The author explains how Australian telecommunications company Telstra, facing deregulation, used a combination of the four strategies (plus the author's customer response model) to fend off market newcomer Optus. Telstra was prepared, for instance, to reach deep into its pockets and engage in a price war. But the customer response model indicated that a parity strategy--in which Telstra would offer lower rates on some routes and at certain times of day, even though its prices, on average, were higher than its rival's--was more likely to prevent consumers from switching. Ultimately, Telstra was able to retain several points of market share it otherwise would have lost. The strategies described here, though specific to Telstra's situation, offer lessons for any company facing new and potentially damaging competition.

All companies value leadership--some of them enough to invest dearly in cultivating it. But few management teams seem to value one engine of leadership development that is right under their noses, churning out the kind of talent they need most. It's the complicated, overburdened but very rich lives of their minority managers. Minority professionals--particularly women of color--are called upon inordinately to lend their skills and guidance to activities outside their jobs. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, who heads the Center for Work-Life Policy, and her co-authors, Carolyn Buck Luce of Ernst & Young and Cornel West of Princeton, present new research on the extent to which minority professionals take on community service and other responsibilities outside the workplace and more than their share of recruiting, mentoring, and committee work within the workplace. These invisible lives, argue the authors, can be a source of competitive strength if companies can learn to recognize and further cultivate the cultural capital they represent. But it's hard to convince minority professionals that their employer respects and values their off-hours responsibilities. A lack of trust keeps many people from revealing much about their personal lives. The authors outline four ways companies can leverage hidden skills: Develop a new level of awareness of minority professionals' invisible lives; appreciate the outsize burdens these professionals carry and try to lighten them; build trust by putting teeth into diversity goals; and, to finish the job of leadership development, help minorities reflect on their off-hours experiences, extract and generalize the lessons, and apply what's been learned in other settings.

Companies and leaders don't succeed or fail in a vacuum. When it comes to long-term success, the ability to understand and adapt to changing business conditions is at least as important as any particular personality trait or competency. A clear picture of how powerful the Zeitgeist can be emerges from the authors' comprehensive study of the way the business landscape in the United States evolved, decade by decade, throughout the 20th century. Six contextual factors in particular, they found, most affected the prospects for business: the level of government intervention in business, global events, demographics, shifts in social mores, developments in technology, and the strength or weakness of the labor movement. A lack of contextual sensitivity can trip up even the most brilliant executive. No less a luminary than Alfred P. Sloan was relieved of General Motor's day-to-day management in the 1930s because he was unwilling to meet with the new UAW. Conversely, an understanding of the Zeitgeist can play a crucial but unheralded role in business performance. To understand better this connection between business performance and context, the authors studied 1,000 great U.S. business leaders of the 20th century and identified three distinct archetypes: Entrepreneurs, often ahead of their time, overcame dire challenges to build something new. Managers excelled at reading and exploiting the existing Zeitgeist to grow their businesses. Leaders defied context to identify latent potential in businesses others considered mature, stagnant, or in decline. In every decade, all three archetypes were vital. It is the ongoing regeneration of this pattern in the business life cycle that ultimately sustains development and progress.

Traditionally, corporate boards have left leadership planning and development very much up to their CEOs and human resources departments--primarily because they don't perceive that a lack of leadership development in their companies poses the same kind of threat that accounting blunders or missed earnings do. That's a shortsighted view, the authors argue. Companies whose boards and senior executives fail to prioritize succession planning and leadership development end up experiencing a steady attrition in talent and becoming extremely vulnerable when they have to cope with inevitable upheavals--integrating an acquired company with a different operating style and culture, for instance, or reexamining basic operating assumptions when a competitor with a leaner cost structure emerges. Firms that haven't focused on their systems for building their bench strength will probably make wrong decisions in these situations. In this article, the authors explain what makes a successful leadership development program, based on their research over the past few years with companies in a range of industries. They describe how several forward-thinking companies (Tyson Foods, Starbucks, and Mellon Financial, in particular) are implementing smart, integrated, talent development initiatives. A leadership development program should not comprise stand-alone, ad hoc activities coordinated by the human resources department, the authors say. A company's leadership development processes should align with strategic priorities. From the board of directors on down, senior executives should be deeply involved in finding and growing talent, and line managers should be evaluated and promoted expressly for their contributions to the organizationwide effort. HR should be allowed to create development tools and facilitate their use, but the business units should take responsibility for development activities, and the board should ultimately oversee the whole system.

There is a disconnect in most companies between strategy formulation and strategy execution. On average, 95% of a company's employees are unaware of, or do not understand, its strategy. If employees are unaware of the strategy, they surely cannot help the organization implement it effectively. It doesn't have to be like this. For the past 15 years, the authors have studied companies that achieved performance breakthroughs by adopting the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and its associated tools to help them better communicate strategy to their employees and to guide and monitor the execution of that strategy. Some companies, of course, have achieved better, longer lasting improvements than others. The organizations that have managed to sustain their strategic focus have typically established a new corporate-level unit to oversee all activities related to strategy: an office of strategy management (OSM). The OSM, in effect, acts as the CEO's chief of staff. It coordinates an array of tasks: communicating corporate strategy; ensuring that enterprise-level plans are translated into the plans of the various units and departments; executing strategic initiatives to deliver on the grand design; aligning employees' plans for competency development with strategic objectives; and testing and adapting the strategy to stay abreast of the competition. The OSM does not do all the work, but it facilitates the processes so that strategy is executed in an integrated fashion across the enterprise. Although the companies that Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton studied use the BSC as the framework for their strategy management systems, the authors say the lessons of the OSM are applicable even to companies that do not use it.

Passive-aggressive organizations are friendly places to work: People are congenial, conflict is rare, and consensus is easy to reach. But, at the end of the day, even the best proposals fail to gain traction, and a company can go nowhere so imperturbably that it's easy to pretend everything is fine. Such companies are not necessarily saddled with mulishly passive-aggressive employees. Rather, they are filled with mostly well-intentioned people who are the victims of flawed processes and policies. Commonly, a growing company's halfhearted or poorly thought-out attempts to decentralize give rise to multiple layers of managers, whose authority for making decisions becomes increasingly unclear. Some managers, as a result, hang back, while others won't own up to the calls they've made, inviting colleagues to second-guess or overturn the decisions. In such organizations, information does not circulate freely, and that makes it difficult for workers to understand the impact of their actions on company performance and for managers to appraise employees' value to the organization correctly. A failure to match incentives to performance accurately stifles initiative, and people do just enough to get by. Breaking free from this pattern is hard; a long history of seeing corporate initiatives ignored and then fade away tends to make people cynical. Often it's best to bring in an outsider to signal that this time things will be different. He or she will need to address every obstacle all at once: clarify decision rights; see to it that decisions stick; and reward people for sharing information and adding value, not for successfully negotiating corporate politics. If those steps are not taken, it's only a matter of time before the diseased elements of a passive-aggressive organization overwhelm the remaining healthy ones and drive the company into financial distress.

Ever since the Y2K scare, boards have grown increasingly nervous about corporate dependence on information technology. Since then, computer crashes, denial of service attacks, competitive pressures, and the need to automate compliance with government regulations have heightened board sensitivity to IT risk. Unfortunately, most boards remain largely in the dark when it comes to IT spending and strategy, despite the fact that corporate information assets can account for more than 50% of capital spending. A lack of board oversight for IT activities is dangerous, the authors say. It puts firms at risk in the same way that failing to audit their books would. Companies that have established board-level IT governance committees are better able to control IT project costs and carve out competitive advantage. But there is no one-size-fits-all model for board supervision of a company's IT operations. The correct approach depends on what strategic "mode" a company is in--whether its operations are extremely dependent on IT and whether it relies heavily on keeping up with the latest technologies. This article spells out the conditions under which boards need to change their level of involvement in IT decisions, explaining how members can recognize their firms' IT risks and decide whether they should pursue more aggressive IT governance. The authors delineate what an IT governance committee should look like in terms of charter, membership, duties, and overall agenda. They also offer recommendations for developing IT policies that take into account an organization's operational and strategic needs and suggest what to do when those needs change. Given the dizzying pace of change in the world of IT, boards can't afford to ignore the state of their IT systems and capabilities. Appropriate board governance can go a long way toward helping a company avoid unnecessary risk and improve its competitive position.

Everyone agrees that managing change is tough, but few can agree on how to do it. Most experts are obsessed with "soft" issues, such as culture and motivation, but, say the authors, focusing on these issues alone won't bring about change. Companies also need to consider the hard factors-like the time it takes to complete a change initiative, the number of people required to execute it, and so forth. When the authors studied change initiatives at 225 companies, they found a consistent correlation between the outcomes of change programs (success versus failure) and four hard factors, which they called DICE: project duration, particularly the time between project reviews; integrity of performance, or the capabilities of project teams; the level of commitment of senior executives and staff; and the additional effort required of employees directly affected by the change. The DICE framework is a simple formula for calculating how well a company is implementing, or will be able to implement, its change initiatives. The framework comprises a set of simple questions that help executives score their projects on each of the four factors; the lower the score, the more likely the project will succeed. Companies can use DICE assessments to force conversations about projects, to gauge whether projects are on track or in trouble, and to manage project portfolios. The authors have used these four factors to predict the outcomes and guide the execution of more than 1,000 change management programs worldwide. Not only has the correlation held, but no other factors (or combination of factors) have predicted outcomes as successfully.