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This case follows two ex-McKinsey consultants, Magnus Olsson and Mudassir Sheikha, who in search of finding their true purpose decide to found Careem, a Dubai-based ride-hailing service. Following its launch in July 2012, Careem experiences rapid growth of 30 percent per month in the UAE and other countries in the MENA region, surpassing the co-founders' expectations. However, as a result of such immense growth, the startup struggles with various operational and cultural organizational tensions. These challenges are described from the perspective of the founders and through the eyes of Deepika Thakur, one of the early employees. By 2014, in order to succeed in Saudi Arabia, the largest and most complex market in the Gulf, Olsson and Sheikha recognize the importance of finding a strong leader to head the Saudi operations. They have their sights on a specific German-Saudi entrepreneur, Abdulla Elyas, but he has so far declined both of their initial proposals to join Careem. In the backdrop, Uber has developed a successful track record in the West, raising close to $2 billion dollars globally, and has a growing presence in the UAE following its launch there in August 2013. Finding themselves at a crossroads, Olsson and Sheikha must figure out how to address several critical organizational issues, decide how to bring Elyas on board, and ensure a robust strategy to maintain its leadership position in the region.

This case is about Tinder. It discusses different business models and ways of structuring the initial team. With a $6 million investment from IAC/Interactive in 2010, Dinesh Moorjani founded Hatch Labs to build mobile apps. His mission was to attract entrepreneurial talent to work on Lab projects which, after gaining traction, could be acquired by IAC or spun out as independent companies. To pitch talent to work at Hatch, Moorjani laid out a framework to compare the expected returns to founding an independent company versus joining an incubator. While Hatch provided lower levels of equity ownership in a single company, Moorjani argued that the complementary inputs provided by the Lab and the diversification from holding equity in the portfolio of Lab projects made the incubator structure attractive. After growing several projects from different teams, at the end of the case, Moorjani faces two critical choices: Should he support a B2B merchant services business or a dating app, Glow (a disguised name for Tinder). Second, should he go forward with a second Hatch Labs? Was the success of the first Hatch experiment replicable? The case can be supplemented with a startup valuation Exercise (#818-705), and a technical/background note on "Valuing Employee Equity at Early Stage Ventures" (#819-167).

The Coco-Mat case tracks the development of the bedding brand from its initial concept in 1989 to the iconic status it had achieved by 2016. During that time, it went through a progressive refining of its customer proposition and brand values, developed a global retail network and expanded into hotels and wood bikes, among other areas. Back in 1989, Paul and Mike Efmorfidis embarked on a wild journey to develop an original, Greecebased sleeping system company. At the end of 2015, Coco-Mat was running stores in 14 countries, employed 250+ people, most of them in Greece, and this was nowhere close to the end of the story, barely an appetizer. They had started on a beach with virtually nothing, invented new concepts in an industry they knew little about and they could only be described as fairly resistant to change. They withstood one of the worst economic crises ever seen by a country, and they were now discussing further international expansion and accelerating growth. Could they continue to operate with their initial business model? Was it time to solidify the company and install more systems and structure? How could they retain their agility? What kind of culture did they want to establish for the company and leave behind as a legacy? The past had been nothing short of amazing but where should they take the company next?

In early 2012, the chair of the board of directors of Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) had to determine how to respond to demands made by the company's largest shareholder, Pershing Square Capital Management (Pershing), an activist hedge fund. Pershing's chief executive officer (CEO) claimed that CP was underperforming, and expressed his desire to replace two board members and appoint a new CEO. The chair of the board of directors had to determine the best means to fight the proxy battle and serve the interests of shareholders. Pershing was not likely to back down easily. With a shareholders' meeting expected to occur in the next few months, the chair had to resolve the matter quickly. Because shareholder activism was relatively new in Canada, the outcome of this conflict would send a message to other activists interested in Canadian organizations.

In 2016 Andrew Rose, CEO of Compare.com, an online price comparison website for car insurance shoppers, faced a troubling problem. Completion rates for the site's detailed online questionnaire were at an alarming low. Site visitors, increasingly accessing the site on mobile devices, were proving they did not have the time or incentive to answer the site's requisite questions and thus were dropping off the site before purchasing policies from the site's partner insurance carriers. As Rose and his management team struggled to lift the completion rates, they narrowed their options to three potential solutions. A task for Kyle Brodie, a summer intern, was to design and run an experiment that could yield valuable insights from an estimates display, including which customer groups, if any, responded best to the estimates, and where the estimates should be included in the questionnaire. In the A case of the series, readers are faced with selecting the best solution for lifting Compare.com's completion rate. In the B case, readers must design an experiment to test the selected option, and decide on the location and content of an estimate display test. In the C case, readers are presented with the design implemented by Brodie and a summary of the results of that experiment. They must then figure out the implications of those results for Compare.com. This case was originally written for an MBA marketing class examining Marketing Analytics. It would also be suitable for similar classes in undergraduate, Executive MBA, and Executive Education programs.

CyberArk was the recognized leader in the Privileged Account Management (PAM) space, a cybersecurity subsegment it had essentially created to secure organizations' IT systems and sensitive data. Over 17 years, the Israeli company had grown to a market capitalization of over $1.6 billion, with sales exceeding $217 million and 900 global employees with a strong corporate culture. In May 2017, Udi Mokady, founder, chairman, and CEO, debated how best to drive growth. He mulled over whether he should stay the course and remain focused on providing best-of-breed PAM for enterprises, both on-premise and in the cloud, or expand into new markets. Cyber threats were on the rise, which afforded numerous growth opportunities such as entering the broader identity management space, creating new products to protect critical infrastructure, and securing the burgeoning world of the Internet of Things (IoT). This case explores the company's competitive position, the challenges of sustaining its advantages in a highly competitive and consolidating industry, and whether it should pursue organic or inorganic growth, while maintaining company culture.

In late 2015, Crystal Call Maggelet, president and CEO of FJ Management, is working with her investment committee to help set the company's strategic direction. Maggelet, daughter of the company's founder, has led FJ Management since 2009 when she stepped in as CEO following an unexpected bankruptcy. At that time, FJ Management was known as Flying J. Flying J owned and operated hundreds of truck stops-which it called Travel Plazas-nationwide and was a growing multi-billion dollar business, but broader problems in the oil and credit markets in late 2008 forced it to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Maggelet, who had been serving on Flying J's board, became its new CEO and was able to successfully manage competing stakeholder demands, keep the business running, and ultimately paid back every dollar it owed to its creditors by selling the company's core assets-its travel plazas-to its main competitor in 2010. Since that time, the company had returned to a healthy financial position, diversified its holdings, and made investments in diverse industries to determine how to grow the company, since renamed FJ Management. In 2015, Maggelet now wants to set a clear path forward for the company.

This case is set on the verge of Microsoft initiating a TV white-space pilot in the Philippines in the summer of 2013; the uncertainty surrounding the new technology's performance in the region provides a view of the risks organizations face early on in the innovation process, particularly when decisions are decentralized and overseen at a local level. MS and its public partners in the Philippines were excited about the possibility of setting up the country's first TV white space-enabled broadband network in a remote area that required the connectivity for fisher registrations and government biodiversity initiatives. The technology had proven its success in a few other pilots in Singapore and the UK. In the Philippines, however, risks loomed. Unprecedented complications from an untested hardware supplier and a lack of an essential database arose as the launch date approached. A key decision MS had to make was whether to proceed with the pilot or focus on TV white space pilots elsewhere. The case introduces students to methods through which they can identify the sources and types of uncertainty associated with a project. Through this they can better evaluate the tradeoff between undertaking a project with a high risk of failure and the benefits that could be obtained through learning about unknown unknowns within such a setting despite the outcome. Moreover, students uncover the necessary conditions for projects to achieve their objectives within this setting. The public-private partnership setting allows students to analyze the type of uncertainty associated with a project; the project, product, and organizational complexity; stakeholder objectives; and discuss the role escalation of commitment could play when an organization seeks to pilot a new technology.

This case follows John Fernandez, CEO of Massachusetts Eye and Ear, as he evaluates whether or not his organization should join Partners HealthCare, the state's largest healthcare provider. Starting in the mid-2000s, there was a growing trend towards provider consolidation in health care. Many physician practices joined larger groups or hospitals, while independent hospitals integrated into larger health systems. The case explores the causes and consequences of health care consolidation, including the impact of policy reform. It then identifies key costs and benefits for an independent hospital considering an acquisition offer from a major health system. In doing so, it highlights the challenges and opportunities that managers of small providers face in a changing regulatory environment.

BY-HEALTH Co., Ltd. (BY-HEALTH), a Chinese dietary supplement company founded in 1995, had a first-mover advantage as a contemporary health supplement provider in Mainland China. It had successfully utilized this advantage to conquer a significant portion of the market. However, by early 2017, maintaining this leadership position in the market had become increasingly difficult, largely due to deteriorating public perception of consumables originating in China. BY-HEALTH had sought to differentiate itself by actively making its sourcing and production processes fully transparent to stakeholders, most notably by opening a transparent factory in Guangdong Province. While BY-HEALTH's transparent factory and corporate social responsibility activities developed consumer trust and positively contributed to the environment within which the company operated, they were also prohibitively expensive to maintain. It was also difficult to determine how they affected the company's bottom line. As he prepared for a company shareholders' meeting in January 2017, the company's chief operating officer was faced with difficult questions. What programs should the company continue to invest in for the future? Should some of these initiatives have an end date? If they were ended, what effect would this have on the community? How could he communicate the value of the transparent factory to consumers and shareholders?

In late 2016, the executive director of Free Geek Toronto faced a challenge. Free Geek Toronto was a social enterprise based in Toronto, Ontario. It focused on recycling electronics waste and aimed to use its business profits to expand its scope of operations and deliver on its social mission of both reducing electronics waste going to landfill and employing at-risk and marginalized individuals. As a result, the executive director purposely hired individuals who had severe physical or mental disabilities, or both, and who had recently received, or were currently receiving, disability benefits, had poor health, or experienced general struggles with regular employment. The executive director's challenges included juggling the financial and social goals of running a work integration social enterprise. In view of the constraints he faced, the executive director began considering whether to call on the assistance of volunteers-people who, despite their well-meaning intentions, might unwittingly disrupt the operation of the enterprise. Should he move forward with recruiting volunteers? If so, how could he ensure that doing so would not adversely affect the organization's current culture or demoralize the current employees?

CEO Hubert Joly has successfully tackled BBY's two main problems - declining comps and margins - and engineered a financial turnaround within his first five years on the job. Now Joly must develop and implement a strategic plan to create a sustainable competitive advantage for Best Buy in the highly competitive, electronic retail industry. With less than 20 percent of revenues coming from online sales, Best Buy is still predominantly a bricks-and-mortar store with an online presence and has not yet transformed into a "bona fide, multi-channel retailer." The case provides an overview of Best Buy's main competitors: Circuit City (now defunct), Walmart, Target, Apple, and Amazon.com. It further highlights the threat emanating from the continuous shift to online retailing.

For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis, Lenovo, the world's largest PC maker, not only fails to increase its revenues and profits, but it has a net loss. Lenovo's market share is still growing, but the PC market itself is shrinking about 5% annually. Lenovo had hoped that the US$2.91 billion acquisition of the Motorola Mobility handset business in 2014 would prove as fruitful as the company's acquisition of IBM's Personal Computing Division a decade earlier. Such hopes proved to be too optimistic, however, as Lenovo faces strong competition in local and international markets. Its position in the Chinese smartphone market dropped from 2nd to 11th between 2014 and 2016, while its worldwide market share shrank from 13% to 4.6%. In 2016, its smartphones group showed an operational loss of US$469 million. At the same time, the global smartphone market quickly lost steam. In response, Lenovo devised a two-pronged strategy of consolidating its core PC business while broadening its product portfolio. The PC group, which focused on desktops, laptops and tablets, aims for improved profitability through market consolidation and product innovation. The smartphones group focuses on positioning the brand, improving margins, streamlining distribution channels and expanding geographical reach. It is not clear, however, how the company could thrive with PCs in decline. Nor is it obvious how it could compete in a tough smartphone market dominated by the international juggernauts Apple and Samsung, and strong local players such as Huawei, Oppo, Vivo and Xiaomi. How could Lenovo best deploy its vast resources?

Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) was a medical technology firm headquartered in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey, with 43,000 employees and 2016 revenues of $12.5 billion. For several years, the company had pursued development of products that created shared value, defined as those that both generated profits and created positive social impact. One of the primary ways the company advanced such products was through establishing and maintaining public-private partnerships (PPPs) with governmental or non-governmental organizations. In June 2017, Gary Cohen, an Executive Vice President of BD, and Renuka Gadde, Vice President of BD's Global Health function, were deeply engaged in a six-year PPP to bring a new low-cost labor and delivery tool called the Odon Device to market. This device had the potential to avert hundreds of thousands of maternal and newborn deaths, primarily in low-resource settings. Although they had faced many challenges in bringing together multiple organizations to develop and launch the device, Cohen and Gadde were convinced that BD's ability to collaborate with governments and international agencies to address urgent global health needs was a source of competitive advantage for the company. Through these collaborations, BD had strengthened important external relationships and developed a distinctive corporate strategy for its expansion in emerging markets. Cohen, Gadde, and the BD Global Health team were also working to construct a framework for measuring both the social and financial impact of the company's shared value initiatives, starting with the BD Odon Device. Cohen believed that creating shared value was "fundamentally a better way to do business," but he wanted hard data to demonstrate the full economic and social benefit of BD's shared value initiatives. The competition for internal capital and the challenges of taking on new types of products meant that any shared value initiative required a rigorous business case and clear indicators

This case explores the long-term relationship between Tempur Sealy (TPX, a mattress manufacturer) and Mattress Firm (MFRM, a bedding retailer and TPX's largest customer). For almost 20 years, the firms enjoyed a mutually beneficial and commercially prosperous relationship. Yet in August 2016, Steinhoff (a large, South African retailer) made an offer to acquire MFRM. Whether this acquisition will affect the symbiotic relationship that had existed between TPX and MFRM was the subject of intense speculation. While some industry observers believed it would increase MFRM's bargaining power vis-à-vis TPX, others argued it would not alter the balance of power, and that the incentives to collaborate would remain intact.

In summer of 2010, Murat Çavuşoğlu (HBS MBA 1994) led private equity firm Actera Group's investment in Mars Cinema Group (Mars), the leading movie exhibitor in Turkey. Immediately after acquiring Mars and merging it with the second larger player in the market, AFM, Çavuşoğlu focused on institutionalizing and implementing value creation work streams in Mars. While transforming an entrepreneurial company into an institutionalized firm, Çavuşoğlu established adjacent businesses such as movie advertising and ticket sales. The most recent step in transforming Mars was to establish a movie distribution arm, which would help the company to monitor and manage the seasonal cycles, enhance the appeal for investors in the exit, and improve the valuation. However, while Çavuşoğlu was laying out the plans for his next move with movie distribution in 2014, Turkey's Council of State, the highest administrative court in the country, had decided to cancel the approval for the merger of Mars and AFM, putting all of Actera's efforts on Mars at risk. Should Çavuşoğlu push the stop button for distribution? If Çavuşoğlu decided to move forward with distribution, should he do it now or wait until the process with Turkey's judiciary and regulatory authorities cleared out?

This case describes the process BorgWarner Transmission Systems undertook when an increase in demand required that it create new production lines in another country. To minimize inventory costs, the company engaged with a graduate student team from the University of Michigan's Tauber Institute for Global Operations for assistance with creating optimal operating procedures. The student team was tasked with developing a prediction tool to ensure a high probability that BorgWarner friction plate samples would pass pre-production verification testing. The case provides students with an overview of the production and quality assurance processes for friction plate manufacture, as well as data classification models for machine learning. Students then develop a reliable forecasting methodology to systematically evaluate process parameters and maximize test pass rates for friction plates.

The "LEGO IN THE AGE OF DIGITIZATION" case is in two parts. Part A provides an opportunity to follow the developments of the LEGO Group in the digital gaming arena. It focuses on the "failure" of LEGO Universe, the LEGO Group's first Massive Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG), versus the success of Minecraft, launched by the start-up Mojang. The LEGO Group followed the traditional waterfall process of sequential phases: design, development, testing and commercialization. The company experienced the issues of partnering with a development studio located in Colorado, far away from the Lego Group's HQ. That caused problems in aligning on the image, branding and safety of the game versus the LEGO Group's values and selling proposition. After years of development, LEGO Universe was finally launched in 2010, but failed to meet the Group's ambition for it to become a second core business. By the end of 2011, a decision had to be made on whether to continue LEGO Universe or to close it. In contrast, Minecraft followed a very different development pattern that could be described as agile, where early users did testing and provided ideas for further development. In addition, the start-up followed a more usual digital pricing scheme of initial low price and add-on purchases. The success of Minecraft is even more in contrast to LEGO Universe because both development projects started around the same time, building on a very similar gaming concept and user experience, but with very different means and development approaches. Part B is an epilogue to Part A. It describes the LEGO Group's decision to close the LEGO Universe game, its learnings on how to embark on digital together with partners, the need to internally develop a unit to manage these partnerships and the conclusion to adopt a "hybrid" approach between waterfall and agile development.

This is a three-part case. Case A introduces Rahzi Putera, a product manager at Samudera Pharma Corporation (SPC), one of Indonesia's largest manufacturer and distributor of generic pharmaceuticals. SPC had earlier that year entered into an agreement with Braxton Biotech Corporation (Braxton) in India, to distribute Epogex, a drug used for the treatment of anaemia. The regulators at the Ministry of Health gave a conditional registration that Epogex could be sold in the country, but only to the private sector, until SPC conducted a clinical study to monitor the safety and adequacy of the drug. Rahzi was tasked to manage the clinical study. When the Epogex shipment arrived, temperature readings showed that it had been frozen. Epogex's product leaflet very clearly stated that the product should be discarded if frozen. However, when Rahzi recommended throwing away the supply, he faced great resistance from both his colleagues and superiors at SPC, and Braxton. Braxton provided data from a quality assurance study it had conducted in 2012, which concluded that the product remained stable despite the temperature excursions. Rahzi now had to make a decision whether to commercially sell the once-frozen shipment of Epogex, which would not be used in the clinical study. Case B sees Rahzi sending an email to all the key decision makers at SPC, stating his concerns about selling the frozen shipment stock to the public, and strongly recommending that it be destroyed. However, he is once again pressured to approve the frozen batch of Epogex for commercial sale. In Case C, Rahzi speaks to his boss, Alia Iman, again to support him in destroying the stock. Alia agrees and convinces her boss, Bobby Suharto, to do so. Unhappy about how the incident was managed, Rahzi quits SPC shortly thereafter.