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This article examines the characteristics and applications of 3-D printing and compares it with mass customization and other manufacturing processes. 3-D printing enables small quantities of customized goods to be produced at relatively low costs. While currently used primarily to manufacture prototypes and mockups, a number of promising applications exist in the production of replacement parts, dental crowns, and artificial limbs, as well as in bridge manufacturing. 3-D printing has been compared to such disruptive technologies as digital books and music downloads that enable consumers to order their selections online, allow firms to profitably serve small market segments, and enable companies to operate with little or no unsold finished goods inventory. Some experts have also argued that 3-D printing will significantly reduce the advantages of producing small lot sizes in low-wage countries via reduced need for factory workers.

Trust is at the heart of a collaborative innovation capability. Without a foundation of trust, collaborative alliances can neither be built nor sustained. Using a two-stage qualitative research method, we discovered that managers understand neither the nature of trust nor the dynamics of trust building. To help alleviate these knowledge gaps, we herein develop a definition of collaborative trust, describe a trust maturity framework, and discuss the competitive power of trust. We conclude by presenting a dynamic systems model that elaborates on the process of building trust to improve collaboration, innovation, and competitive performance.

The service sector is dependent upon customers' willingness to contribute their knowledge, skills, and abilities to co-produce the service experiences they want and expect. Service organizations therefore seek to employ strategies that will enhance their customers' ability to do whatever they must to be successful in co-producing those experiences. Applying the concept of self-efficacy, we offer a theory-based approach to developing these strategies that firms may utilize. These strategies involve focusing both employee training and environmental cues on how to enhance the self-efficacy of the customer in performing whatever tasks are necessary toward a successful service experience.

While the impacts of culture on international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been much discussed, the influence of languages has been underappreciated in international business. We address this paucity by integrating literature from international economics, international business, Chinese business history, and linguistics to examine the transaction costs of languages. While we recognize that languages represent both a tool in international economic transactions and a vehicle to transmit cultural values, our results point out that this tool is employed differently in international trade and in FDI. Communication costs for both FDI and international trade show a hierarchy, with English the most inexpensive among major trade languages; however, we find that communication costs are much more important in FDI than in international trade. Herein, we offer practical suggestions corporations may implement regarding the matter.

A strategy called software product line engineering, or SPLE, is taking hold in industries in which software is an integral part of product offerings. Where it has found a foothold, SPLE has brought about remarkable results such as unprecedented product variation, substantial production cost savings, slashing of time to market, and massive productivity gains. SPLE is the software version of an old manufacturing concept: building a suite of products from common parts assembled under a common design in a common production facility. The special properties of software make SPLE a particularly high-payoff proposition. SPLE exploits the commonalities among products to achieve economies of scale, by creating core assets-assets that will be applied to multiple products in the product line. SPLE accommodates the differences among products by explicitly identifying and planning for those variations in product behavior and qualities. This management of variation allows the organization to achieve economies of scope and provides the capability of mass customization where every market is treated as a niche. Management ensures that core asset developers create effective core assets and product builders efficiently build products by using them. This requires oversight, coordination, and melding of purpose of groups that have slightly different inherent goals.

Nawaal Motlekar is the managing director of Kwenta Media and founding editor of Mamas & Papas, a recently launched parenting magazine in Southern Africa. From her early entrepreneurial experiences, Motlekar developed a personal and professional interest in parenting magazines. As a Black South African women, married to an Indian man, in an increasingly multi-racial and multi-cultural society, Motlekar recognized a gap for a parenting magazine that would appeal to a wider and more racially and culturally inclusive target market. After extensive research and development, she launched the Mamas & Papas magazine in early 2009. The case charts Motlekar's journey as an entrepreneur, as well as her efforts between 2006 and 2009 to bring the magazine to life. The case explores the quantitative and qualitative research approaches employed by Motlekar, as well as her marketing and branding initiatives towards building a Mamas & Papas brand beyond just the physical magazine. With the magazine having been on the shelves for 12 months, Motlekar and her board faced a number of decisions. These included options to increase advertising revenues and circulation, as well as choosing how to extend the Mamas & Papas brand into related categories.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

This case is a two-part series on Dunia. Case A is set in 2008, where founder CEO Rajeev Kakar has just spent 20 months setting up Dunia, a finance company in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The enterprise originated from a partnership between his former employer, Fullerton Financial Holdings (FFH) and a couple of key entities in the UAE that were keen on building a financial presence in the region. On September 15, 2008 - as the Dunia team is preparing to announce the opening of its first branch in Abu Dhabi - news breaks on the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. For Kakar, it means that the product programmes he has lined up, as well as his funding assumptions for Dunia, have crashed. Dunia A deals with the time frame before the launch of the company and covers factors such as pricing risk and uncertainty, along with a broader view that covers the struggles presented with new ventures and entrepreneurship.

This case focuses on organizational transformation in an accounting firm in South Africa. The case describes how the impact of both globalization and the transformation that the country had undergone since the advent of democracy in 1994 steered StratAFin Inc. towards a process of building a new identity. The case describes how senior management realized the need for transformation based on the many new challenges that were being faced in the changing environment. Change was experienced at many levels within the organization: from the construction of a new building as a symbol of the change to corporatizing and growing the firm, changing the management structure, investing heavily in technology and human capital development, focusing on continuous improvement and driving major diversity transformation. The case offers insights into the many change drivers that had to be considered in the process, how the organization had to manage any resistance to change and the resultant need for flexibility during the process, and the importance of measurement of the many dimensions within a transformation process. The case concludes with the challenge of how the firm's leadership could ensure that the continuing transformation maintained its momentum.

North American and European branded hotel chains in their quest to maximize shareholder wealth have recently shed ownership of assets and freed up capital to focus on their core businesses with the help of strenuous contracts. The ensuing pursuit of further business development has expedited the internationalization process and a new business model of franchising the brand/value proposition in international locations has evolved. Globally accepted brands hold the promise of global quality. It is widely believed that Western brands deliver more value than brands from emerging nations, such that they can charge global prices to global customers. Service delivery failure is encountered frequently in the accommodation and food services industry. Such failures can act as an important performance measurement criteria. Managers are taught how to recover from service delivery failure and address loyalty issues of existing customers. They fear losing them as the cost of acquiring new customers may exceed the cost of keeping existing customers. The case illustrates how a globally branded North American hotel chain disregarded the basic tenets of maintaining the global brand promise, ignored generally accepted North American customer service standards, failed to instigate delivery failure recovery and leveraged firm specific capabilities to maximize shareholder wealth. The reaction of the local counterpart, the reaction to countermand the imbalance in the ensuing business relationship and adaptation of the value proposition are told from the perspective of a vacationing couple that experienced the diluted brand firsthand.

The head of the branded private investment company owner of the Virgin brand reflected on the group's new pillars of growth. Since the 1970s when Richard Branson created the Virgin record retailing company, Virgin had developed from scratch six companies worth more than $1 billion each and changed their focus from record retailing and music production to a broader one based on airlines, health, financial services, mobile and media businesses. In addition, Virgin had been able to apply the Virgin brand to several different products without harming the brand. Their challenge had been finding the capital to finance the new ventures rather than the brand. Since 2005, Branson was dedicating more and more time to a charitable organization, Virgin Unite, and had appointed Stephen Murphy the new CEO of the Group. As Murphy contemplated their growth strategy for the next decade he faced a number of difficult decisions. First, how should he fund new ventures? While growing, the Group had sold stakes in its companies and had signed with them licensing agreements for the use of the Virgin brand name. The Virgin Group was today a loose group of companies some linked to Virgin only by brand licensing agreements. Should they expand by signing new licensing agreements? Second, what kind of opportunities should he seek? Should they keep acting as a venture capital firm, nurturing new ventures as in the past or should they invest in larger and more established companies? What would be the consequences of their choices on the brand and on the Group? Would they always be able to inject the Virgin culture and turn around companies?

Clarks at a Crossroads (A) describes how this venerable British shoe company falls behind its competition and into financial trouble. The case ends with a pivotal vote by shareholders on whether to sell this family company.

Clarks (B) summarizes the results of the shareholders vote described in the (A) case.

Clarks (C) describes the turnaround of C&J Clarks Ltd., 1993-2002. It describes the roles of family chairman Roger Pedder, and CEO Timothy Parker, in this successful effort.

This case narrates the development of the Republic of Korea from 1960 to 1990. The case discusses three broad issues. First, the case provides a discussion of industrial policy in Korea. Second, the case explains the relationship between industrialization and inequality and how Korea developed without increasing inequality. Finally the case has a brief discussion of the role of education in industrialization and development.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 212-051.

The case is about a software development company, Telerik, which was based in Sofia, Bulgaria, with offices in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Germany. The company was founded in 2002 and had become a world-leader in user interface (UI) components for Microsoft's .NET framework. The company was still managed by its original four founders and had grown to 400 employees. In response to rapid growth and to retain its rapid development product process, Telerik adopted agile development in 2006. Agile development is a values-driven process that includes the elements of decentralization, rapid development cycles, intense customer service, teamwork and face-to-face communication. Telerik has fully implemented this process, including the software development components, communication, coordination and management tools that are collaborative and rely heavily upon communication and widespread team interaction and responsibility. Telerik had moved into a new and modern building that included game and quiet rooms, and its physical environment was designed specifically to facilitate agile development. The company's management style was informal, hands-on, consultative and development-driven, and their culture was youth-focused. Telerik's human resource ("human capital") practices were innovative and flexible and its benefits and compensation package had allowed Telerik to attract a high quality workforce. Its recent innovations in benefits, including concierge services and stock options, had given Telerik an edge in human capital with an employee turnover rate of under five per cent. The founders had worked diligently to create a high performing, cohesive organization that was an exciting place to work. They had built a company with an excellent reputation, both in technical achievements and product development, and as an employer. Their success was based upon the rapid deployment of committed human capital in a culture of teamwork and custom.

This six part video case series features social entrepreneur Craig Kielburger as he faces pivotal moments in his life and the remarkable evolution of his organization. The primary dilemmas are strategic in nature and the solutions rely on leadership character and social entrepreneurship. Students are able to walk in the shoes of Craig Kielburger in each case which begins with a video set up, followed by a short one or two page case and associated discussion and concluding with Craig describing what happened in a video clip.