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Are women rated lower than men in evaluations of their leadership capabilities because of lingering gender bias? No, according to an analysis of thousands of 360-degree assessments collected by Insead's executive education program. That analysis showed that women tend to outshine men in all areas but one: vision. Unfortunately, that exception is a big one. At the top tiers of management, the ability to see opportunities, craft strategy based on a broad view of the business, and inspire others is a must-have. To explore the nature of the deficit, and whether it is a perception or reality, Insead professor Ibarra and doctoral candidate Obodaru interviewed female executives and studied the evaluation data. They developed three possible explanations. First, women may do just as much as men to shape the future but go about it in a different way; a leader who is less directive, includes more people, and shares credit might not fit people's mental model of a visionary. Second, women may believe they have less license to go out on a limb. Those who have built careers on detail-focused, shoulder-to-the-wheel execution may hesitate to stray from facts into unprovable assertions about the future. Third, women may choose not to cultivate reputations as big visionaries. Having seen bluster passed off as vision, they may dismiss the importance of selling visions. The top two candidates for the Democratic nomination for U.S. president in 2008 offer an instructive parallel. The runner-up, Hillary Clinton, was viewed as a get-it-done type with an impressive, if uninspiring, grasp of policy detail. The winner, Barack Obama, was seen as a charismatic visionary offering a hopeful, if undetailed, future. The good news is that every dimension of leadership is learned, not inborn. As more women become skilled at, and known for, envisioning the future, nothing will hold them back.

If you're on the way to becoming CEO, take care. Many anointed successors find their path to the corner office unexpectedly blocked. The obstacle is usually a mismanaged relationship with any of six kinds of stakeholders: the current chief executive, the successor's peers, his or her direct reports, customers, analysts and shareholders, and the board of directors. Succession isn't an entirely rational process, explains veteran executive coach Goldsmith. Personal issues, egos, and emotions influence succession decisions just as much as business logic. Look at what happened in 1978 to Lee Iacocca, considered by many the obvious candidate to become head of Ford. Iacocca didn't just fail to get the job - he was fired. In explaining why, Henry Ford II famously remarked, "Sometimes you just don't like somebody." To secure their promotion, prospective heirs must strengthen relationships with the stakeholders whose commitment they'll need to succeed as CEO. That involves striking a delicate balance in a number of areas. For instance, candidates must project readiness to lead while supporting the current CEO, showing respect for peers, and demonstrating that they can make tough decisions without alienating their reports. It's also critical for them to determine if they've made past missteps that call for a change in personal style or relationship-building approach. The current CEO can provide invaluable guidance on areas ripe for improvement, as well as many other issues, such as which customers aspiring successors need to get to know or what the concerns of individual board members might be. Building better relationships with stakeholders takes time and effort, and treading so carefully may be wearying. But executives who do it before they become CEO stand a much better chance of making it across the finish line, and in the end will become much more effective leaders.

No one is in a better position to get an incoming CEO up to speed than his or her predecessor, whose insights and accumulated wisdom are uniquely valuable during the transition and even beyond. The outgoing leader can provide infor-mation about the expectations of high-ranking employees; short-term opportunities ripe for harvesting; how the board and others perceive the newcomer's reputation or personal brand; the strengths and foibles of internal allies and external partners; organizational bench strength; and the wisdom that comes from experience well-reflected upon. Organizations and their shareholders don't want intellectual capital like this to simply evaporate, which is why nearly every multinational corporation makes ongoing consultation a requirement in severance contracts and pays handsomely for it. Nevertheless, candid, in-depth discussions between outgoing and incoming CEOs rarely take place. Friel, formerly the chairman and CEO of Heidrick & Struggles, and Duboff, the CEO and a cofounder of HawkPartners, conducted numerous interviews with people who had been through at least one CEO transition to find out why those discussions don't happen as a matter of course and how best to draw on the knowledge of a departing leader. They clearly outline the steps that organizations can take, such as making golden parachutes contingent on debriefing conversations, having HR arrange the meetings to dispel any awkwardness, and creating a thorough agenda. And they advise the two executives to meet as equals, share the "first 90 days plan," and speak consistently about the past and future - to the media as well as to stakeholders. Much of an outgoing CEO's knowledge will be lost unless a conscious effort is made to capture it. As the average tenure of chief executives shrinks, it becomes increasingly imperative that they get off to a strong start.

Today's business leaders increasingly rely on coaches for help in understanding how to act in a demanding and volatile world. These confidants and advisers can earn up to $2,000 per hour. To understand what they do to merit that money, HBR conducted a survey of 140 leading coaches and invited five experts to comment on the findings. Commentators and coaches agreed that the reasons for engaging coaches have evolved over the past decade. Ten years ago, most companies hired a coach to help fix toxic behavior at the top. Today, most coaching is about developing the capabilities of high-potential performers or acting as a sounding board. As a result of this broader mission, there's a lot more fuzziness around coaching engagements, whether it be with regard to how coaches define the scope of engagements, how they measure and report on progress, and what credentials a company should look for when selecting a coach. Do companies and executives get value from their coaches? When we asked coaches to explain the healthy growth of their industry, they said that clients keep coming back because "coaching works." Yet the survey results also suggest that the industry is fraught with conflicts of interest, blurry lines between what is best handled by coaches and what should be left to mental health professionals, and sketchy mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness of a coaching engagement. The bottom line: Coaching as a business tool continues to gain legitimacy, but the fundamentals of the industry are still very much in flux. In this market, as in so many others today, we have to conclude that the old saw still applies: Buyer beware!

In 2006, General Electric launched its Leadership, Innovation, and Growth (LIG) program to support CEO Jeffrey Immelt's priority of achieving corporate growth primarily by expanding businesses and creating new ones. LIG represented a radical approach for GE's famed management development center in Crotonville, New York, because it was the first effort to train all the senior members of a GE business's management team as a group. Prokesch went through LIG with 19 senior managers of GE Power Generation, one of the company's oldest businesses, in October 2007. About a year later he revisited the "turbine heads," as Immelt affectionately calls them, to see how much impact the program had made. The answer was a lot. Team training accelerated the pace of change by giving managers an opportunity to reach consensus on the barriers they faced and how to overcome them. LIG participants were encouraged to consider both hard (organizational) and soft (behavioral) barriers. The training explicitly addressed how to balance the short term and the long term. The program created a common vocabulary of change - actual words that are used daily inside and across GE's businesses. And LIG was not an academic exercise: It was structured so that a team would emerge with the first draft of an action plan for instituting change. The author's firsthand experience in the four-day program, together with his follow-up interviews with GE executives, illuminates the effectiveness of this training approach. Power Generation's managers created a now ubiquitous vision statement, beefed up the leadership in their core business, expanded regulatory staff and project teams in emerging markets, revamped product development, put up a website where any employee can submit ideas for growth, and created a growth board to consider proposals and track their progress.

Yang Jianguo was recently promoted from country manager for China to global head of product development at a staid French perfume maker. He was chosen for his technical smarts and his knowledge of emerging markets - a critical avenue for growth, given that sales in the company's core markets have stalled. Eager to succeed in his new role in Paris, Jianguo has lots of fresh ideas, but they seem to be falling on deaf ears. Members of the executive team, for their part, find Jianguo to be largely indifferent to their input. Can Jianguo adjust to this new culture? And can he succeed without sacrificing his identity? Three experts comment on this fictional case study in R0901A and R0901Z. Katherine Tsang, the CEO of Standard Chartered Bank in Shanghai, explains the cultural differences between China and France and recommends that Jianguo push his thinking beyond the Chinese market. She also suggests that the company give all its executive team members multicultural training so they have the tools to understand one another and work together effectively. Mansour Javidan, the dean of research and a professor at Thunderbird School of Global Management, acknowledges that Jianguo's transition would be easier if he had the full support of the CEO, Alain Deronde. But since that isn't forthcoming, he advises Jianguo to work with Alain to develop targets for growth in emerging and traditional markets and a plan for building an infrastructure to achieve those goals. James Champy, the chairman of consulting for Perot Systems, is surprised that a family business would choose an "outsider" for this important post, but he recognizes it as a wise strategic move. He says that Jianguo needs a coach and should focus on learning the home market first, before trying to make inroads further afield.

Yang Jianguo was recently promoted from country manager for China to global head of product development at a staid French perfume maker. He was chosen for his technical smarts and his knowledge of emerging markets - a critical avenue for growth, given that sales in the company's core markets have stalled. Eager to succeed in his new role in Paris, Jianguo has lots of fresh ideas, but they seem to be falling on deaf ears. Members of the executive team, for their part, find Jianguo to be largely indifferent to their input. Can Jianguo adjust to this new culture? And can he succeed without sacrificing his identity? Three experts comment on this fictional case study in R0901A and R0901Z. Katherine Tsang, the CEO of Standard Chartered Bank in Shanghai, explains the cultural differences between China and France and recommends that Jianguo push his thinking beyond the Chinese market. She also suggests that the company give all its executive team members multicultural training so they have the tools to understand one another and work together effectively. Mansour Javidan, the dean of research and a professor at Thunderbird School of Global Management, acknowledges that Jianguo's transition would be easier if he had the full support of the CEO, Alain Deronde. But since that isn't forthcoming, he advises Jianguo to work with Alain to develop targets for growth in emerging and traditional markets and a plan for building an infrastructure to achieve those goals. James Champy, the chairman of consulting for Perot Systems, is surprised that a family business would choose an "outsider" for this important post, but he recognizes it as a wise strategic move. He says that Jianguo needs a coach and should focus on learning the home market first, before trying to make inroads further afield.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Historically, neither the creators nor the distributors of cultural products such as books or movies have used analytics -- data, statistics, predictive modeling -- to determine the likely success of their offerings. Instead, companies relied on the brilliance of tastemakers to predict and shape what people would buy. Creative judgment and expertise will always play a vital role in the creation, shaping and marketing of cultural products. But the balance between art and science is shifting. Today companies have unprecedented access to data and sophisticated technology that allows even the best-known experts to weigh factors and consider evidence that was unobtainable just a few years ago. And with increased cost and risk associated with the creation of cultural products, it has never been more important to get these decisions right. In this article, the authors describe the results of a study of prediction and recommendation efforts for a variety of cultural products. They discuss different approaches used to make predictions, the contexts in which these predictions are applied and the barriers to more extensive use, including the problem of decision making pre-creation. They then discuss two aspects of the prediction market. First, the need for better prediction for distributors of cultural products, and second, the potential for business models around prediction techniques.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. When picking assessment tools to inform better decisions about future paths, executives are faced with a wide variety of options--some of which are well established, while others are in early stages of development. The authors provide an insider's guide to prediction and recommendation techniques and technologies. They cover prediction tools including attributized Bayesian analysis, biological responses analysis, cluster analysis, collaborative filtering, content-based filtering/decision trees, neural network analysis, prediction (or opinion) markets, regression analysis, social network-based recommendations and textual analytics. With each potential tool, they briefly describe the technique, who uses it and for what purpose, its strengths and weaknesses, and its future prospects as a prediction tool. Finally, the authors offer up an indication of the best time in the decision process to begin using the tool.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. One could argue that "what business are we really in" is the most important question a leader can ask about his company. But perhaps right up there with the classic Peter Drucker interrogatory is this one: What is your business model? So argue the authors, who correctly point out that firms searching for forms of competitive advantage -- sources of distinctiveness that are enduring, hard to copy and valuable in the marketplace -- should take a look at their management model. That is, they should examine the choices made by the top executives in how they define objectives, motivate efforts, coordinate activities and allocate resources. How they define the work of management, in other words. Not only do the authors provide a framework for this discussion -- dividing companies' business models into four possible choices -- but they supply a list of questions leaders can ask to determine which management model may be right for their company. Clearly, when it comes to management models, one size does not fit all. And it is equally obvious that even similar-size companies in the same industry may choose differing models, depending on their own particular circumstances. While the model they choose is of extreme importance, so, too, is the process they follow -- and the thinking they use -- to select it.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Companies have long used teams to solve problems: focus groups to explore customer needs, consumer surveys to understand the market and annual meetings to listen to shareholders. But the words "solve," "explore," "understand" and "listen" have now taken on a whole new meaning. Thanks to recent technologies, including many Web 2.0 applications, companies can now tap into "the collective" on a greater scale than ever before. Indeed, the increasing use of information markets, wikis, crowdsourcing, "the wisdom of crowds" concepts, social networks, collaborative software and other Web-based tools constitutes a paradigm shift in the way that many companies make decisions. Call it the emerging era of "Decisions 2.0." But the proliferation of such technologies necessitates a framework for understanding what type of collective intelligence is possible (or not), desirable (or not) and affordable (or not) -- and under what conditions. At a minimum, managers need to consider the following key issues: loss of control, diversity versus expertise, engagement, policing, intellectual property and mechanism design. By understanding such important issues, companies like Affinnova, Google, InnoCentive, Marketocracy and Threadless have successfully implemented Decisions 2.0 applications for a variety of purposes, including research and development, market research, customer service and knowledge management. The bottom line is this: For many problems that a company faces, there could well be a solution out there somewhere, far outside of the traditional places that managers might search, within or outside the organization. The trick, though, is to develop the right tool for locating that source and then tap into it.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Dan Ariely is one of the world's foremost experts in behavioral economics, the study of how people behave when making business and financial decisions. Ariely's insights should make executives think twice about the wisdom of the decisions they regularly make -- as well as the inner processes they rely on to make those decisions. Why, for example, will managers veto a 10% cost increase for a $1 million project while thinking nothing of a 1% overrun on a $10 million budget -- even though the actual amount is the same? Why will they often agonize trying to choose between two close alternatives when they're frequently better off just flipping a coin? In this wide-ranging interview, Ariely talks about how Apple Inc.'s initial decision to price the iPhone at $600 only to drop it to $400 soon after might not have been a mistake but instead a very shrewd marketing maneuver. He also explains why a product monopoly might not necessarily be desirable because it can lead to consumer confusion, resulting in slow sales. With regards to hiring practices, Ariely strongly questions the interviewing processes routinely used and asserts that some companies might be better off hiring graduates from reputable colleges at random. Toward the end of the interview, he describes his research that has investigated ways in which teams might be better able to make group decisions. Lastly, Ariely explains one of his most valuable managerial insights -- that adding even just a little meaning to employees' work will often increase their motivation enormously.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. That is a question that has long puzzled marketers who have heard from customers that they want to do business with ethically based firms -- defined as companies that produce products under conditions of progressive stakeholder relations, advanced environmental practices and respect for human rights. Marketers had no reason to doubt that sentiment, but they have always wondered if consumers would be willing to pay a higher price for ethically produced goods (since they tend to be more expensive to create.) It turns out that a series of controlled experiments proves that consumers will, in fact, pay a premium for ethically produced goods. But perhaps of equal interest is the fact that they will punish (by demanding a lower price) companies that are not seen as ethical. That relationship is not symmetrical. The punishment exacted is greater than the premium customers are willing to pay. How ethical do you have to be? Perhaps not as much as you might think. The research shows that a small degree of ethicalness "pays off" It is not necessary for a company's product to be "100% pure" in order to receive a price premium. This research is the first to find that consumers use price to punish unethical companies more than they use price to reward ethical companies, and that the ethicality of a company's behavior is, indeed, an important consideration for consumers (as demonstrated in their willingness-to-pay decisions).

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Managers and directors alike face tough choices as they decide on the quality and quantity of information that the board receives and uses in its governance and fiduciary roles. As the fallout from recent crises such as the subprime mortgage debacle illustrates, both sides must address the problem of "information asymmetry" -- the gap between the information available to management and to the board. The authors' research suggests that tomorrow's boardroom will be reshaped by three related forces: First, they face a thorough rethinking, brought on by concerned stakeholders, of directors' information needs. In responding to these pressures, boards and management must overcome several impediments: caution about altering the dynamics of the present manager-director relationship; directors' lack of needed skills for interpreting the new information; and the inertia of cultural norms. Second, they face dramatic improvements in the performance assessment approaches used to guide boards' decision making. The core of a healthy information relationship between managers and directors is their agreement on the most useful performance metrics to track and assess. This selection enables the building of trust and an eased and more pertinent workload for the board (having been freed from the need to decode reams of data while also gaining some independence from management's sometimes self-serving evaluations). Finally, boards and managers face the adoption of technologies that support critical board functions. Once access to such information is granted, new technologies can help directors obtain and use it. Board members may apply tools that, for example, enable improved visualizations and helpful alerts. And directors may engage in electronic "what-if" analyses, using company data as well as outside information -- related, say, to competing firms -- which is becoming increasingly available online.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Although top managers must project an image of professionalism and strength, they still require networks of individuals they can trust. The development of trust depends on the degree to which the executives perceive the presence of three critical attributes -- ability, benevolence and integrity -- within their support networks, and on their ability to match these qualities with the type of support they are seeking in any particular situation. We model the support being sought as having high or low informational complexity and high or low emotional demand. The combinations correspond to four types of support requested: raw information (low, low), actionable advice (high, low), emotional support (low, high), and strategic or political help (high, high). Meanwhile, the three critical attributes (each with either a high or low rating) translate into eight kinds of support providers: Trustworthy Partner, Harsh Truthteller, Moral Compass, Loyal Supporter, Star Player, Average Joe, Dealmaker and Cheerleader. Executives in need of actionable advice will most often turn to Trustworthy Partners or Harsh Truthtellers, given their high levels of ability and integrity. For strategic or political help, Trustworthy Partners will be sought because of their high levels of ability, benevolence and integrity. Seekers of emotional support will look to Loyal Supporters and Trustworthy Partners because they offer high levels of benevolence and integrity. And when the three facets of trust are less critical, executives will be willing to go to virtually any of their contacts for raw information, though most often they seek out Average Joes. These and other matches were observed, useful data was gathered and valuable insights were obtained when we tested our model on vice presidents, directors, general managers and other executives at a Fortune 50 technology firm.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. One could argue that "what business are we really in" is the most important question a leader can ask about his company. But perhaps right up there with the classic Peter Drucker interrogatory is this one: What is your business model? So argue the authors, who correctly point out that firms searching for forms of competitive advantage -- sources of distinctiveness that are enduring, hard to copy and valuable in the marketplace -- should take a look at their management model. That is, they should examine the choices made by the top executives in how they define objectives, motivate efforts, coordinate activities and allocate resources. How they define the work of management, in other words. Not only do the authors provide a framework for this discussion -- dividing companies' business models into four possible choices -- but they supply a list of questions leaders can ask to determine which management model may be right for their company. Clearly, when it comes to management models, one size does not fit all. And it is equally obvious that even similar-size companies in the same industry may choose differing models, depending on their own particular circumstances. While the model they choose is of extreme importance, so, too, is the process they follow--and the thinking they use--to select it.

Kudremukh is a breathtaking mountain range in Chickamagalur District, Karnataka, India. Three rivers originate here and form an important lifeline for South India; the is ecologically very sensitive. The National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) conducted prospecting surveys in 1967 and obtained a mining license from the government of Karnataka for an area of 5218 hectares. In 1969, the government of India floated a public-sector undertaking, the Kudremukh Iron Ore Company (KIOCL), and NMDC turned over its 30-year mining lease to KIOCL. The majority of the surrounding communities were apprehensive about the possible impacts of massive mining operations in the virgin forest area. KIOCL's mining activities flourished, making it into Asia's largest mining and pelletization company. However, in 1985, the government of Karnataka declared Kudremukh region as a National Park under the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, in order to provide effective protection to the rich flora and fauna in the region. The area leased to KIOCL was an enclave within the southern half of the national park and the mining operations started witnessing opposition in 1995, with wildlife conservationists and environment protection organizations staging rallies and agitations against KIOCL's operations. Activists filed numerous petitions in the Supreme Court, asking the court to end the activities of KIOCL in order to protect Kudremukh from the ravages of mining. The case focuses on important issues relating to shareholder vs. stakeholder responsibility in the context of ongoing ecological degradation, increased environmental awareness in Indian society, and consequent changes in legislation.

Berkshire Hathaway is known to many as the investment vehicle of Warren E. Buffett. To some extent, this reputation is well founded, given the investment success that the company has enjoyed under his leadership. Less attention, however, has been paid to the management success of Berkshire Hathaway. By 2008, the array of companies that Berkshire Hathaway owned was unique in its diversity. Even more unique was the operating structure that the company employed to manage these operations. It was a model based on extreme decentralization of operating authority, with responsibility for business performance placed entirely in the hands of local managers. While many public corporations implemented strict controls and oversight mechanisms to ensure management performance and regulatory compliance, Berkshire Hathaway moved in the opposite direction. Many of the company's operating principles were in stark contrast to those generally employed by most public corporations. Company shareholders would have to decide for themselves whether these operating principles posed a risk to long-term performance or whether, contrary to expert opinion, they were a source of competitive advantage that could be sustained in the future.

What do followers want? A leader with a compelling vision of the future - which is not usually that leader's personal view. New research shows that followers respond to a leader who can articulate a vision that reflects their own aspirations.

Whether you want to or not, you need to start networking within the first couple of months after a promotion, when people in the new organization are deciding whether you're dependable - or a loser who should never have been hired.