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Since the 1980's, Procter & Gamble had leveraged its purpose, values, and principles (PVP) to create a global company. When P&G faced difficult times in 2000, the new CEO, A.G. Lafley, leveraged the PVP to drive P&G's turnaround, integrate global operations, and guide decision-making in all facets of the business. But the Gillette acquisition posed a new challenge.

A.G. Lafley and P&G leaders decided to approach the Gillette integration differently from previous mergers. Using P&G's purpose, values, and principles (PVP) it treated the acquisition as a merger which sought to take the "best of both" from each company. In the integration's first phase, prior to the change of control, the strategy achieved successes while creating some unexpected challenges. How should the integration leaders address these challenges moving forward?

P&G had used its purpose, values, and principles (PVP) to prepare for the physical integration of Gillette prior to the change of control. The execution of these plans posed numerous challenges in global business units as well as in individual country organizations. While managers sought to maintain business momentum during the transition, corporate leaders were intent on continuing to use Gillette as a catalyst of change.

After arriving in 2001 as the first outsider Chairman and CEO in Gillette history, Jim Kilts had led a remarkable turnaround. But by late 2004 he had to make a difficult decision. To better position the 104-year-old, Boston-based company, he opted to sell it to Cincinnati-based Procter & Gamble. How should Kilts lead the transition?

Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak are best friends who enjoy pulling pranks together and talking about electronics. After several small collaborations, Jobs pitches Wozniak on starting a company together to sell computers based on Wozniak's design for a personal computer. Wozniak faces decisions about whether to quit the job he loves at Hewlett-Packard to join Apple Computer, how to define his role within Apple, whether to take on Jobs as his co-founder, whether to accept a third co-founder proposed by Jobs, and how to split equity with his co-founders. Early on, they add an outside investor who changes the company's trajectory and who brings in a new chief executive. Later, tensions rise between the two founders as their strategic visions diverge and as the company grows. Wozniak has now learned some disturbing news about his co-founder and has to decide whether that news will affect his continuing collaboration with Jobs.

PlanetTran is an environmentally-friendly car service that utilizes a fleet of hybrid cars in providing livery service to corporations and individuals. The founder, Seth Riney, is evaluating outside funding options in order to expand the company, and has met several local venture capital (VC) firms, Riney must decide if the dilution he would have to undergo in order to accept a substantial capital investment was worth the added upside to the company that both he and the VCs envisioned.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence. Instead of improving the company's position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving. Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy. Students will take the view that Paul "Flip" Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence. Instead of improving the company's position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving. Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy. Students will take the view that Paul "Flip" Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The IBM Innovation Jam was the largest-ever event to promote networked idea generation. More than 150,000 IBM employees, stakeholders and vendors participated in two three-day online events to foster innovation and help IBM bring products to market faster. Using Web sites, wikis, forums and other online tools, Jam participants generated literally hundreds of thousands of new business ideas. From those ideas, IBM focused on several major topics for the second part of the Jam and invited its employees to build on the ideas within those topics. As a result of this process, 10 distinct businesses were funded. However, it wasn't these successes that make the Jam interesting, argue the authors; it was the difficulties that IBM faced in implementing the Jam. Given unique access to the Jam, the authors discuss the complications inherent in collaborating with so many people. In particular, it was hard to sustain individual "conversations" in the collaborative process. Rather than building on each other's ideas, many participants -- because of excitement about their own ideas -- would "hijack" a thread or take it in an unintended direction. Some great ideas were left to wither on the vine. The authors discuss other attempts at large-scale collaboration, including some by Dell and Starbucks. These include the use of promotion tools to ensure that "good" ideas are seen and captured by as many eyes as possible. The pros and cons of these methods are discussed as well, and the authors provide a framework for thinking about how an organization can collaborate with its stakeholders.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Past research is clear on the benefits of high-performing, or "star," workers. Star computer programmers, for example, are more productive than average ones by a ratio of eight to one. But reaping the benefits of such talent is not so simple. Say you hire a number of stars. How can you guarantee that they will be able to replicate their success in a new environment -- in short, how portable are they? In the past, portability has been viewed as an attribute of a person, team or organization, but it can also be looked at as an attribute of a position. Specifically, certain jobs do require different levels of company-specific human capital, thus making some workers less portable than others. Consequently, organizations should not think of talent management as a simple "build versus buy" dichotomy. Rather, there are some positions for which they can buy, and others for which they must build. Within investment banks, for example, the retail brokers (who handle individual clients) work primarily on their own. In contrast, institutional salespeople (who sell to major institutional investors such as Putnam, Vanguard and Fidelity) are more likely to perform their jobs in teams. Thus, retail brokers are more portable and can easily be hired from the outside. Institutional salespeople, however, should be developed from within, and efforts should be made to retain them. Understanding such differences is crucial for companies attempting to attain sustainable competitive advantages that derive from human capital. The authors' research, which has probed the application of human capital theory to talent portability, should help companies recognize that an entire class of factors -- specific roles within an organization -- greatly determines the portability of performance. With that knowledge, executives can gain a deeper understanding of the pros and cons of hiring certain star employees.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Abstract not available.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The way we think about strategy is woefully incomplete, the authors contend. The traditional idea of focusing on the positioning of products (or services) underplays much of what most would agree makes a company truly competitive. Not only does it give short shrift to what a company knows, it ignores completely the fact that in today's dynamic economy, organizations have to continually reinvent who they are and what they do in large and small ways. And one important means of doing so is through innovation. An effective strategy, then, is comprised of three key components: product/market, knowledge and innovation positions. But even if a company masters the three strategic positions of product/market, knowledge and innovation independently, it is still at risk. Only when all three positions are aligned and mutually reinforcing can a strategy succeed. In adopting the notion of alignment, organizations need to view each position -- product/market, knowledge and innovation -- as aspects of an organization's overall strategy. Creating an integrated strategy thus requires focusing not on each position separately, but rather on all three positions simultaneously. The authors introduce the notion of competing based not only on what an organization makes or the service it provides, but on what it knows and how it innovates. Each aspect represents a competitive position that must be evaluated relative to the capabilities of the organization and to others in the marketplace battling for the same space. And each component must not only be aligned with the other two, but it needs to be adjusted as circumstances warrant. When done correctly, organizations -- such as Buckman Laboratories, which is profiled here -- thrive. When done badly, the company can suffer, and perhaps fatally so, as the history of Polaroid points out.

Despite research showing that mergers and acquisitions rarely provide significant shareholder value, there is no sign of any slowing in the trend toward M&A. One of the major reasons why M&A tend, to fail, argue the authors, is that the process often puts extreme stress on senior management teams. By nature, the process is an adversarial one, with management on both sides advocating for their stakeholders. When the dust clears at the end of the process, management is left, as the authors say, "to navigate the challenging segue from ' 'tough negotiator' to ' 'trusted colleague.'" The authors draw on the experience of Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, General Electric and Adobe to propose six guidelines for improving relations between the senior management teams of both sides of the M&A equation. The first three guidelines should be undertaken as soon as possible in the integration process. The authors advise that you can reduce the defection of talented personnel by reducing role ambiguity as quickly as possible. They also urge due diligence about the talent you are acquiring as early in the process as possible, and preferably before the deal is finished. Third, they recommend allowing some "habits to die hard."Employees often rely on habits and long-standing procedures to remain comfortable, and many of them are what made the company successful in the first place. As the integration process continues, there are three more important guidelines to follow. First, acquirers should not tolerate "bad behavior" that can sabotage the integration process. Second, it is important to have patience with the new management team, as many of them will be in unfamiliar roles. Finally, the authors suggest that it is important to remember to celebrate the value of the deal for all involved. By trumpeting the value of the new team, you can increase communication and trust. Ultimately, this trust may lead to increased shareholder value for all involved.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The role of procurement within global companies has changed dramatically over the past 25 years from that of simply buying goods and services to overseeing an integrated set of management functions. This brings new challenges and opportunities to procurement. Offshoring and the increased emphasis on specialization and fragmentation of production enhance the strategic character of procurement decisions. Increasingly, procurement decisions have become intertwined with strategic management in general. In this article, the authors discuss the changes in procurement from the perspective of transaction cost economics. They separate transaction costs into "soft" and "hard" costs and differentiate between the internal and external factors that affect these costs. In making procurement decisions, the authors argue, managers need to consider the full range of cost elements. In addition to traditional transaction costs such as transport costs and tariffs, managers need to recognize such elements as cultural and legal differences, government regulation, social preferences, environmental issues, political stability and risks involved in unethical business behavior. The authors argue that knowing the risks and opportunities of the different exposures is a critical management competence. Although management decisions originate in many different parts of the company, procurement managers need to keep a close eye on the various cost exposures and flag concerns as they arise. Procurement, therefore, will need to become more closely connected with strategic decisions throughout the company. This broader view represents a major extension of the concept of total cost of ownership in procurement decisions. Global sourcing creates many new opportunities for value creation, which well-run companies must learn to take advantage of.

Ruffin CEO Bill Bronson is on a mission. Counterfeits of his company's adventure gear and clothing are on the rise, and Bronson is hell-bent on stopping them. He has hired top-notch investigators to track down the criminals, invested in technology that will help distinguish his products from look-alikes, and pushed online vendors to stop selling fakes. All of that has cost a lot of money, however, and the problem seems to be getting worse. How far should Bronson take his campaign? Three experts comment on this fictional case study in R0810A and R0810Z. Giorgio Brandazza, a professor at SDA Bocconi School of Management, fought a similar battle as an executive at Calvin Klein. He advises Ruffin to mitigate the effects of copycats by building up the strength of its brand. For one thing, the company should increase its retail presence in countries where it is plagued by fakes. Single-brand stores will allow Ruffin to guarantee customers they're getting authentic goods, showcase its products in distinctive ways, and build strong relationships with consumers. J. Merrick "Rick" Taggart, president of Victorinox Swiss Army in North America, recommends zeroing in on the worst counterfeiting offenders. A resource Ruffin should take advantage of, he says, is customs and border patrol officers; if the company frequently communicates with them about ports of entry and consignee and consignor data, these officials can more easily sniff out illegal activity. The foundation for any good defense against counterfeiters, says Candace S. Cummings, general counsel of VF Corporation, is instituting tight controls over the company's supply chain and distribution process. That means, among other things, choosing manufacturing partners carefully and having strict contracts with distribution partners that, for example, prohibit products from going anywhere but outlets the company trusts.

After Kaufman became a CEO, he was struck by how perfunctory the board was in its feedback on his performance. The chair of the compensation committee would pop by his office following the year-end board meeting, congratulate him on the company's making its numbers, and then hand him an envelope containing the details of his comp package before walking out the door. The entire exchange would last no more than 10 minutes. That sort of review was a big contrast from the intense evaluations Kaufman received as a senior executive--assessments based on input from many sources and on multiple dimensions of his performance. As chief executive, all of sudden his total worth was summed up in just three or four financial measures. Although CEOs should have autonomy, reducing performance management to only financial measures makes little sense. All the financial incentives in the world won't transform CEOs into better decision makers. And bad decisions can bring companies down. Boards have an obligation to shareholders to ensure that companies are led well, and the sooner they can spot problems with leaders' performance, the better. With that in mind, Kaufman encouraged Arrow Electronics, where he was CEO for 14 years, to adopt a formal process that obliged independent directors to talk to executives and observe operations firsthand. Directors considered CEO performance in five key areas: leadership, strategy, people management, operating metrics, and relationships with external constituencies. As a result, they picked up on problems Kaufman might not have noticed, provided counsel that made him a stronger leader--and avoided disasters along the way.

Many internet superstars owe much of their success to the active and passive contributions made by countless people from outside their organizations. Think, most obviously, of Facebook profiles, eBay goods, YouTube videos, Wikipedia entries, and, less obviously, of the aggregated buying behavior underlying Amazon recommendations and the donated use of personal-computer resources underpinning Skype's internet-based phone network. Cook, the founder of Intuit (maker of financial software products such as Quicken and TurboTax), challenges traditional companies to tap this emerging source of value by actively creating what he calls user contribution systems. The user can be a customer, employee, sales prospect - or someone with no previous connection to the company at all. The contribution can be actively offered work, expertise, or information, as well as passive or even unknowing contributions, such as behavioral data that are gathered automatically as a by-product of a transaction or an activity. The system is the method, usually internet based, by which contributions are aggregated and made useful to others. Such a system creates value for a business as a consequence of the value it delivers to customers. In this article, Cook describes the personal journey that led him to see the tremendous value in user contributions. He creates a taxonomy of the systems that can capture user contributions and shows the variety of ways in which companies from Honda to Procter & Gamble to Hyatt Hotels are leveraging them. And, drawing on his successes and failures in trying to put them to work at Intuit, he offers advice on how business leaders can catalyze action to create user contribution systems in their own organizations.

In the face of the recent institutional breakdown of trust in business, managers are losing legitimacy. To regain public trust, management needs to become a true profession in much the way medicine and law have, argue Khurana and Nohria of Harvard Business School. True professions have codes, and the meaning and consequences of those codes are taught as part of the formal education required of their members. Through these codes, professional institutions forge an implicit social contract with society: Trust us to control and exercise jurisdiction over an important occupational category, and, in return, we will ensure that the members of our profession are worthy of your trust - that they will not only be competent to perform the tasks entrusted to them, but that they will also conduct themselves with high standards and great integrity. The authors believe that enforcing educational standards and a code of ethics is unlikely to choke entrepreneurial creativity. Indeed, if the field of medicine is any indication, a code may even stimulate creativity. The main challenge in writing a code lies in reaching a broad consensus on the aims and social purpose of management. There are two deeply divided schools of thought. One school argues that management's aim should simply be to maximize shareholder wealth; the other argues that management's purpose is to balance the claims of all the firm's stakeholders. Any code will have to steer a middle course in order to accommodate both the value-creating impetus of the shareholder value concept and the accountability inherent in the stakeholder approach.

Redefining the terms of competition for a market sector, an industry, or an entire global ecosystem is a tall order. It means attracting thousands of participants, galvanizing their efforts, and retaining their commitment for the long haul. Hagel, Brown, and Davison, of the Deloitte Center for Edge Innovation, provide a blueprint for this daunting task of shaping strategy as technology-driven infrastructures constantly change. The authors discuss three elements that, no matter the industry, are vital in shaping strategy. A shaping view, or rallying cry to potential participants, clarifies the market opportunity, makes sense of fundamental forces, identifies rewards, and highlights the shared nature of risk. Bill Gates, of course, succeeded with his view of desktop computing, and more recently Salesforce.com's Marc Benioff has held out a new model for delivering enterprise software. A shaping platform, like that of Google's AdSense, clearly defines standards and practices that help organize and support the activities of many participants, enabling them to do more with less. Specific shaping acts and assets convince participants that the shaper has the muscle to pull off its initiatives, as Facebook has done by showcasing its relationship with Microsoft. The three elements together allow a shaper to quickly mobilize a critical mass of participants and, thereby, unleash powerful network effects that can yield big rewards during periods of rapid change. Almost any company will benefit from an attempt to shape strategy, say the authors, but they recognize that not every business is ultimately a shaper. By participating in other firms' shaping strategies, they show, a company can still find plenty of opportunities to create value.

Most corporations are not as skilled at selling off assets as they are at buying them, often divesting at the wrong time or in the wrong way. Either is a very expensive mistake. A Bain & Company study has found that over the last 20 years, corporations that took a disciplined approach to divestiture created nearly twice as much value for shareholders as the average firm. In this article, Bain partners Mankins, Harding, and Weddigen set out the four straightforward rules those effective divestors follow. First: Just as they have acquisition teams, smart divestors have full-time divestiture groups, which continually screen their companies' portfolios for likely businesses to sell off and think through the timing and implementation steps needed to maximize value in each particular case. Second: They choose their divestiture candidates objectively. Too many firms rush to sell in economic downturns, when prices are low. Thoughtful divestors will sell only those businesses that do not fit with the corporation's core and are not worth more to themselves than they are to any other company. Third: Successful divestors consider how to structure a deal and to whom they will sell as carefully as they consider what units to sell and when. And they are as meticulous about planning the implementation of a deal as savvy acquirers are about postmerger integration. Fourth: They make a compelling case for how, and how quickly, the deal will benefit the buyer, and they make sure the selling unit's employees will be motivated to stay on and realize that value. Using these four rules, companies as diverse as Textron, Weyerhaeuser, Ford, Groupe Danone, and Roche have become "divestiture ready": consistently able to sell at the right time and in the right way to create the most value for their shareholders.