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Employees in stigmatized occupations can be helped with an array of techniques to cope with or even feel proud of their jobs, including developing an occupational ideology to confer a more positive image on the work; creating social buffers such as professional associations; and avoiding specifics in conversation with outsiders.

Failing to reduce poverty by supporting the wrong microcredit program can tarnish a company's good name. Executives in charge of corporate social responsibility should insist on clearly defined measures of success, invest in improving microcredit's effectiveness, and support the growth of small companies in regions of poverty.

For customers, value has two components: benefits received and price paid. After gauging their customers' perceptions of value, managers can plot a simple chart that reveals any misalignment and use it to balance the benefit-price equation.

Companies are beginning to use their brand-enhancing sponsorship of teams and events internally, to motivate employees or facilitate major structural change. Sports-related communications and incentives can create cohesion and foster pride in the company.

Chris Van Dyke, the CEO of the outdoor apparel start-up Nau, offers some intriguing ideas about how to engage a generation of customers who are comfortable shopping online and eager to enter into a dialogue with the companies they buy from.

The Delphi technique involves recruiting panels of experts from a variety of fields and asking them to iteratively evaluate predictions about the future of, say, an emerging innovation until they reach consensus. Shaping the strongest predictions into several possible scenarios prepares managers to act quickly when one begins to unfold.

CEOs tend to have a rosier view of senior management's performance than other top team members do, according to new research--and it looks like the former need a reality check. The authors offer three simple questions that can provide one.

If designers are brought into the innovation process at the very beginning, they can test prototypes and share users' responses even as the business case is being developed, enabling companies to nimbly adjust to changes in market opportunities.

As the chief financial officer of The Walt Disney Company, Tom Staggs was responsible not only for the financial management of the company, but also for the communication of the company's financial and strategic objectives to its investor base. Because of Disney's stature as the world's most iconic entertainment brand, the company had a particularly broad investor base: over 991,000 common shareholders in fiscal year 2006 compared with 51,400 for Time Warner. Staggs had to develop and implement a communication strategy that was appropriate for the diversity of this investor base, which included individual, institutional, brokerage house, and mutual fund investors. In doing so, he had to be mindful of the fact that these constituencies often had different time horizons and investment perspectives. In addition, Staggs had to bear in mind several other factors. First, he had to consider that any message delivered was perceived by investors as a direct reflection of management's capability and credibility. Second, he had to consider how the company's stated objectives influenced the behavior of its employees. Third, he had to decide how to implement the communication strategy across a wide array of channels, keeping in mind the purpose of the forum, regulatory requirements, and investor expectations.

In June 2007, the governor of Pennsylvania, was negotiating with the state's legislative leaders about his proposal to lease the Pennsylvania Turnpike to private investors. Leasing public highways to private companies was unheard of in the United States until the City of Chicago leased the Chicago Skyway, an 8-mile toll expressway, for $1.83 billion in 2005 and the State of Indiana leased the 157-mile Indiana Toll Road for $3.85 billion in 2006. The sums astonished state and local governments around the country, and encouraged many, like Pennsylvania, to consider leasing as a means of covering budget shortfalls. This case is designed to support a discussion of the pros and cons of leasing assets as a means of raising public resources and of having the private sector finance and operate infrastructure. HKS Case Number 1878.0

In the United States, the president has the Constitutional authority to negotiate international trade agreements. But the Congress has the ultimate authority over trade. This arrangement blunts the negotiating power of the United States in trade talks because other countries know that any commitments made at the table could be altered or rejected by Congress. Therefore, from 1974 to 1993, Congress granted the president fast track authority by committing to an expeditious yes-or-no vote on trade implementing egislation with no amendments or changes in return for regular consultations and timely notification on the part of the administration. However, beginning in the early 1990s, fast track became the subject of fierce political debate and a focal point for concerns about global trade liberalization. HKS Case Number 1660.3

In 2006 planners in the City and County of San Francisco were promoting an overhaul of the city's parking policy that they claimed would correct unfair and unwise subsidies for automobile users. The effort was designed to allow market forces to play a greater role in determining parking costs by, among other things, raising the price of residential on-street parking in neighborhoods where it was scarce, and raising parking meter rates on downtown streets, and amending zoning provisions that specified the minimum numbers of off-street parking spaces that developers of new residential and commercial projects had to provide. The parking reform proposals are controversial and can be used to support a discussion of the nature of economic efficiency and the possibilities for making efficiency-minded reforms politically acceptable. HKS Case Number 1877.0

Those familiar with transatlantic trade relations are well aware of the longstanding US-EU dispute over trade in beef. This note traces the history of the quarrel, beginning with the introduction of the use of growth-promoting hormones for raising beef cattle. In 1989, Europe banned the use of these hormones. The ban covered all beef, including meat imported from the United States where growth-enhancing hormones were widely used. In retaliation, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $100 million worth of European food imports. In the years that followed, the rules changed. New multilateral institutions and agreements were put in place to govern disputes like the beef quarrel such as the SPS Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Despite these changes, the story was very much the same a decade later. Though the new World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled against the European ban, the EU continued to refuse beef raised with growth-promoting hormones. In 1999, once again, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $117 million on foods imported from Europe. The rules had changed, but the endgame remained much the same. At the core of the dispute lay fundamental disagreements about trade in food. The United States argued that the European regulatory process had been captured by politics. US officials were frustrated by what they saw as a political move to protect the EU beef market by invoking scientifically unsupported claims about the detrimental health effects of hormones. The real issue, Europe retorted, was that the US trade system had been captured by industry-the United States had soured the entire transatlantic trade relationship by capitulating to the demands of the corporate beef lobby. Furthermore, some consumer groups argued that it was not the role of a group of trade lawyers and diplomats at the WTO to make decisions related to health and safety. HKS Case Number 1677.3

Examines some parts of Stryker Corporation's systems and procedures for approving and authorizing capital spending of many different types, including buildings, machinery, and working capital for existing businesses, as well as transactions with third parties such as acquisitions, joint ventures, and licensing agreements. Set in early 2007, nearly two years after significant modifications in these systems and procedures. Stryker has compiled a remarkable track record of consistently high growth in profitability over more than 20 years. The modifications to its capital budgeting procedures are partly intended to support the company's efforts to continue this success.

In April 2007, Grand Central's publisher Jamie Raab and editor Karen Kosztolnyik were involved in a frantic bidding war for a proposed book on the life of cat Dewey, billed as the feline answer to the best-selling "Marley & Me: Life and Love with the World's Worst Dog." Literary agent Peter McGuigan, who represented the author and ghost writer, had just notified them that a second publisher seeking to close the deal was "shadowing" Grand Central's every move and a preemptive offer of well over a million dollars would be required to secure the acquisition--an exceedingly high amount for a book by a first-time author. Should Grand Central continue to bid for Dewey, wait for the scheduled auction with several interested publishers, or pull out of the race? Allows for an in-depth examination of new-product acquisition, development, and launch strategies in the context of the book publishing industry. Provides rich insights into how media and entertainment firms aim to replicate success, and how they find, foster, and sell potential blockbuster products. Also illustrates how similar efforts by competitors increase each firm's dependence on a handful of hits. Contains detailed unique economic data that illustrate the high level of concentration in the distribution of sales and profits across products. By enabling an analysis of the book acquisition, development, and marketing process from the perspective of the publisher, author, and agent, serves as a vehicle for contrasting different approaches to the new product development process.

Explores the opportunities and threats to Unilever's global business in 1978 based on the commercial and political challenges faced by three of its subsidiaries, Lever Brothers in the United States, Hindustan Lever in India, and United Africa Company in West Africa. Management faced several problems: criticism of multinational companies, anti-trust legislation, expropriations, and rising competition from international and local rivals. Focuses on developing a new global strategy for a company that placed a premium on a consensual management style and local autonomy.

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Riding the early morning Metro North train from Grand Central to Greenwich in late December 2004, the euro dominated Luke Anthony's thoughts. After bottoming out at about 0.85 $/€, in 2000 and 2001, the euro had appreciated sharply and now stood at 1.35 $/€ (Exhibit 1). Luke, an FX Strategist at a hedge fund, had to form a view about the likely path of the euro going forward. The evidence was in no way clear cut. Of the traditional factors, some were pointing toward further euro appreciation, but others seemed to favor the dollar. And there were a host of "new" factors to sift through. Sorting through the evidence would require both relatively standard thinking about forex markets and the more recent emphasis on prospective capital flows. And Luke had only this quiet week between Christmas and New Year's to form a cohesive plan for early 2005.

In December 2006, Sinchong Property Investment Pte Ltd (SPIPL), a Singapore-based property investment firm, signed a letter of intent to take over a partially completed hotel project from the Wuxi City Authority for consideration of a sum of RMB45 million. The original property development called for a 22-storey three-star hotel building with 220 rooms and a four-storey staff building. The concrete structure had already been built, but due to financial difficulties, the Chinese owner had to relinquish the project. Within 60 days prior to the signing of the final agreement to take over the project, SPIPL was keen to ensure that the project was feasible and that the new hotel, its first such project in China, would succeed. During this period, Liang Chee-Sian, the Chief Executive Officer of SPIPL must assess the business challenges of developing and operating the new Hotel Wuxi International.