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Among the tests of a leader, few are more challenging--and more painful--than recovering from a career catastrophe. Most fallen leaders, in fact, don't recover. Still, two decades of consulting experience, scholarly research, and their own personal experiences have convinced the authors that leaders can triumph over tragedy--if they do so deliberately. Great business leaders have much in common with the great heroes of universal myth, and they can learn to overcome profound setbacks by thinking in heroic terms. First, they must decide whether or not to fight back. Either way, they must recruit others into their battle. They must then take steps to recover their heroic status, in the process proving, both to others and to themselves, that they have the mettle necessary to recover their heroic mission. Bernie Marcus exemplifies this process. Devastated after Sandy Sigoloff fired him from Handy Dan, Marcus decided to forgo the distraction of litigation and instead make the marketplace his battleground. Drawing from his network of carefully nurtured relationships with both close and more distant acquaintances, Marcus was able to get funding for a new venture. He proved that he had the mettle, and recovered his heroic status, by building Home Depot, whose entrepreneurial spirit embodied his heroic mission. As Bank One's Jamie Dimon, J.Crew's Mickey Drexler, and even Jimmy Carter, Martha Stewart, and Michael Milken have shown, stunning comebacks are possible in all industries and walks of life. Whatever the cause of your predicament, it makes sense to get your story out. The alternative is likely to be long-lasting unemployment. If the facts of your dismissal cannot be made public because they are damning, then show authentic remorse. The public is often enormously forgiving when it sees genuine contrition and atonement.

Every leader gets off track from time to time. But as leaders rise through the ranks, they have fewer and fewer opportunities for honest and direct feedback. Their bosses are no longer monitoring their actions, and by the time management missteps have a negative impact on business results, it's usually too late to make course corrections that will set things right. Therefore, it is wise to go through a self-assessment, to periodically step back from the bustle of running a business and ask some key questions of yourself. Author Robert S. Kaplan, who during his 22-year career at Goldman Sachs chaired the firm's senior leadership training efforts and cochaired its partnership committee, identifies seven areas for self-reflection: vision and priorities, managing time, feedback, succession planning, evaluation and alignment, leading under pressure, and staying true to yourself. The author sets out a series of questions in each of the areas, illustrating the impact of self-assessment through vivid accounts of real executives. Although the questions sound simple, people are often shocked-even horrified-by their own answers. Executives are aware that they should be focusing on their most important priorities, for instance, but without stepping back to reflect, few actually know where they are allocating their time. Kaplan advocates writing down what you do every working hour for a week and checking how well your actions match up with your intentions. As for feedback, managers should ask themselves whether they're getting truthful evaluations from their subordinates. (In all likelihood, they aren't.) It takes time and discipline to persuade your employees to tell you about your failings.

Businesses hoping to survive over the long term will have to remake themselves into better competitors at least once along the way. These efforts have gone under many banners: total quality management, reengineering, rightsizing, restructuring, cultural change, and turnarounds, to name a few. In almost every case, the goal has been to cope with a new, more challenging market by changing the way business is conducted. A few of these endeavors have been very successful. A few have been utter failures. Most fall somewhere in between, with a distinct tilt toward the lower end of the scale. John P. Kotter is renowned for his work on leading organizational change. In 1995, when this article was first published, he had just completed a ten-year study of more than 100 companies that attempted such a transformation. Here he shares the results of his observations, outlining the eight largest errors that can doom these efforts and explaining the general lessons that encourage success. Unsuccessful transitions almost always founder during at least one of the following phases: generating a sense of urgency, establishing a powerful guiding coalition, developing a vision, communicating the vision clearly and often, removing obstacles, planning for and creating short-term wins, avoiding premature declarations of victory, and embedding changes in the corporate culture. Realizing that change usually takes a long time, says Kotter, can improve the chances of success.

When some managers take over a new job, they hit the ground running. They learn the ropes, get along with their bosses and subordinates, gain credibility, and ultimately master the situation. Others, however, don't do so well. What accounts for the difference? In this article, first published in 1985, Harvard Business School professor John J. Gabarro relates the findings of two sets of field studies he conducted, covering 14 management successions. The first set was a three-year study of four newly assigned division presidents; the second consisted of 10 historical case studies. The project comprised American and European organizations with sales varying from $1.2 million to $3 billion. It included turnarounds, normal situations, failures, and triumphs. According to the author, the taking-charge process follows five predictable stages: taking hold, immersion, reshaping, consolidation, and refinement. These phases are characterized by a series of alternating periods of intense learning (immersion and refinement) and action (taking hold, reshaping, and consolidation). The study's results put to rest the myth of the all-purpose general manager who can be dropped into any situation and emerge triumphant. Understanding a situation and effecting change do not occur overnight, says Gabarro, and human variables such as managerial styles and effective working relationships make a difference.

A leadership crisis has erupted at Barker Foods. Doug Lothian, the national sales director of the chocolates and confections division, was just fired for making some bad marketing choices, engaging in questionable selling behaviors, and, ultimately, losing the confidence of his customers and his staff. As a result, there's a schism in Sales. Senior managers are wondering whether a competency model would help the company replace Doug with the right kind of leader and prevent other leadership problems from cropping up. HR director Anne Baxter thinks Doug's situation is the perfect example of why Barker Foods needs to define exactly what it's looking for from its top people. Colin Anthony, the CEO, has given Anne the go-ahead to work with a special task force on a framework that would not only highlight the critical values, knowledge, and skills necessary to lead any of the company's divisions but also identify the corresponding tasks, behaviors, and measures of success. Colin has asked Anne and her team to present their findings to the executive committee, which has voiced mixed opinions about competency modeling. On the one hand, it makes sense to hire and develop the right people to execute the company's strategy; on the other, it doesn't seem wise to oversimplify the work that senior executives do--and boiling down great leadership to a checklist of qualities could be a step in that direction. Should the executive committee go forward with plans for competency modeling? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0701B and R0701Z are: Reuben Mark, chairman of Colgate-Palmolive; Rebecca Ray, senior vice president for global learning and organizational development at MasterCard Worldwide; George Manderlink, a partner in Heidrick & Struggles Leadership Consulting; and Dave Ulrich, a cofounder of the RBL Group, a leadership consultancy.

A leadership crisis has erupted at Barker Foods. Doug Lothian, the national sales director of the chocolates and confections division, was just fired for making some bad marketing choices, engaging in questionable selling behaviors, and, ultimately, losing the confidence of his customers and his staff. As a result, there's a schism in Sales. Senior managers are wondering whether a competency model would help the company replace Doug with the right kind of leader and prevent other leadership problems from cropping up. HR director Anne Baxter thinks Doug's situation is the perfect example of why Barker Foods needs to define exactly what it's looking for from its top people. Colin Anthony, the CEO, has given Anne the go-ahead to work with a special task force on a framework that would not only highlight the critical values, knowledge, and skills necessary to lead any of the company's divisions but also identify the corresponding tasks, behaviors, and measures of success. Colin has asked Anne and her team to present their findings to the executive committee, which has voiced mixed opinions about competency modeling. On the one hand, it makes sense to hire and develop the right people to execute the company's strategy; on the other, it doesn't seem wise to oversimplify the work that senior executives do-- and boiling down great leadership to a checklist of qualities could be a step in that direction. Should the executive committee go forward with plans for competency modeling? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0701B and R0701Z are: Reuben Mark, chairman of Colgate-Palmolive; Rebecca Ray, senior vice president for global learning and organizational development at MasterCard Worldwide; George Manderlink, a partner in Heidrick & Struggles Leadership Consulting; and Dave Ulrich, a cofounder of the RBL Group, a leadership consultancy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Because of two trends--rising R&D costs and decreased product revenues (due to shorter product life cycles)--companies are finding it increasingly difficult to justify investments in innovation. Business models that embrace open innovation address both issues. The development costs of innovation are reduced by the greater use of external technology in a firm's own R&D process. This saves time as well as money, and the firm no longer restricts itself to the markets it serves directly. Now it participates in other segments through licensing fees, joint ventures, and spin-offs, among others. These different streams of income create more overall revenue from the innovation. To partake more fully in the benefits of open innovation, companies need to develop the ability to experiment with their business models, finding ways to open them up. Building that capability requires the creation of processes for conducting experiments and assessing their results. Although that might seem obvious, many companies simply do not have such processes in place. In most organizations, no single person short of the CEO bears responsibility for the business model. Instead, business unit managers (who are usually posted to their jobs for just two to three years) tend to take the business model for granted. To understand how an organization can open its business model, the author provides case examples of IBM, P&G, and Air Products, three companies that operate in different industries with vastly different technologies and products. Each used to function with a very internally focused, closed business model, and each has since migrated to a business model that is substantially more open.

Many technology-intensive companies today depend on employees with specialized technical skills, and managers may not fully understand the work these employees do. Moreover, managers and technical employees may have very different worldviews, and their worldviews may conflict during the process of business innovation. After researching the movement of Internet and computing pioneers among various organizations during a period between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, the authors identified two personality types (stewards and creators) that are vital to successful technological innovation--but whose mindsets often clash. Stewards are usually managers; their goal is the careful allocation of the organization's resources, with an aim of achieving an optimal return on investment. Creators are often skilled, specialized employees whose have a grand vision and mission; they frequently view business concerns as secondary. According to the authors, conflict between stewards and creators is, to some extent, inevitable. However, when such conflict is managed poorly, the organization's capacity to innovate effectively may be impaired. The authors suggest eight guidelines for managing steward-creator conflict. These guidelines include: (1) keep talented creators around, although they can be difficult to manage; (2) balance the influence of stewards and creators in the organization, so neither group always wins; (3) cultivate people who have credibility with both creators and stewards and can help resolve conflicts; (4) use peer review to more accurately evaluate creators' specialized technical work; (5) structure the innovation process so that creators produce tangible results regularly; (6) realize that there will always be some conflict between an organizations' creators and its stewards; (7) avoid overly prescriptive control mechanisms that may alienate creators; and (8) ensure that closure on projects is achieved neither too quickly nor too slowly.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Contrary to the beliefs of many managers, their companies' products and corporate brands cannot truly be managed, much less owned. That much has become clear in recent years as many well known brands have seemed to take on lives of their own, changing in the minds of many even though management may think of them as immutable. In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "brand manifold" in order to bring out two overlooked factors: first, that brands have multiple dimensions depending on who is valuing them, and second, that those dimensions change in space and time. Drawing on automotive industry examples such as Maybach, Morgan, and BMW's Mini, the authors demonstrate the importance of managing a brand's evolution so that the brand does not lose its roots in the past. They go on to highlight the importance of understanding that brands have a life and meaning independent of what their initiators intended--as embodied by the thriving user community around Apple Computer's long-obsolete Newton handheld and evident in the influence of Harley-Davidson owners over many of the company's strategic decisions.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Today, as consumer choices on one side of the planet affect living conditions for people on the other side and complex supply chains span the globe, businesses are facing a host of "sustainability" problems--social and ecological imbalances created by that globalization. Beginning in the late 1990s, organizational members of the Society for Organizational Learning (SOL--including Shell, Harley-Davidson, HP, Xerox, and Nike, among others) began a series of initiatives focusing on collaborative solutions to a variety of sustainability issues. The group's goals have included the application of systems thinking, working with mental models, and fostering personal and shared vision to face these complex sustainability issues. Through its work, SOL (of which two of the authors are founding members) has learned that successful collaborative efforts embrace three interconnected types of work--conceptual, relational, and action-driven--which together build a healthy "learning ecology" for systemic change. In this article, the authors offer examples from particular projects in which learning ecology provided an important foundation for substantive progress, and they draw lessons for companies and managers regarding each of the three types of work. Ultimately, the authors conclude that conceptual, relational, and action-driven work must be systemically interwoven and that there is little real precedent for that. They offer several guidelines for how it can be accomplished, emphasizing leadership and transactional networks. Finally, they pose three questions that must be answered if systemic solutions are to be successful: (1) How can we get beyond benchmarking to building learning communities? (2) What is the right balance between specifying goals and creating space for reflection and innovation? and (3) What is the right balance between private interest and public knowledge?

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Many multinational companies attempt to monitor working conditions in suppliers' factories in developing countries through corporate codes of conduct, along with monitoring to determine compliance. There is considerable debate about the merits of this approach. As part of a larger research project on globalization and labor standards, the authors conducted a comparison of two Mexican garment factories that supply Nike. Both plants (referred to as Plant A and Plant B) received very similar scores on a Nike factory audit, and both manufacture T-shirts for Nike and other companies. Workers in both plants are unionized. However, a closer examination reveals that working conditions in the two factories are in some respects quite different. Compared to workers in Plant B, those in Plant A earn more per week, report greater job satisfaction, and have greater say in workplace decisions. Furthermore, in Plant A overtime is voluntary and kept within Nike workweek limits, but in Plant B both forced overtime and excessive overtime occur. What factors contribute to these differing working conditions? The authors conclude that, while there are a number of differences between the factories, a key variable is the way each plant is managed. Plant A has made the transition to lean manufacturing and, in the process, workers received training and were empowered to participate in more decisions on the shop floor. Quality, worker productivity, and worker salaries all increased at Plant A. The authors conclude that global brands could help improve working conditions in supply chain factories by working with suppliers to help them introduce new management systems.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For several years now, marketers have been urged to embrace one-to-one marketing and to offer micro-segmented consumers customized products and services through targeted outreach. While the "market of one" approach can pay off, say the authors, it requires a significant upfront investment, including: implementing customer relationship management software applications; filtering, enhancing, and cleaning customer data; and personalizing interactions (e-mail, billing, offers, and so on). These activities take time and the coordination of multiple parts of the organization (marketing, customer service, sales, information technology), which can be daunting for companies trying to react quickly to a changing environment. In addition, those systems have often produced disappointing results because their use was not well integrated with corporate strategy. Also, micro-marketing strategy, on its own, is too narrow. Companies still need to reach broad groups of people with messages that are not dependent on an individual's decision to open an envelope (whether virtual or physical), pick up the phone, or click on a box. But broad-based, broadcast media is ineffective and expensive. Fortunately, there are alternative solutions, such as one-to-one targeting and the broadcasting of 30-second television spots. The author's research on trends in marketing spending and consumer attitudes about advertising reveals four strategies available to companies that want to reach broad groups of people without breaking their marketing budget. The strategies are liberally illustrated with examples from Nike, Microsoft, UBS, Delta, Sony, Procter & Gamble, Citibank, Nextel, Honda, Nokia, and McDonald's, among others.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Organizations often try to include as many people as possible in the decision-making process, but sometimes it's just not possible to involve anyone beyond a small group. The need for confidentiality and speed are constraints, as is the sheer difficulty of polling an entire organization regarding decisions that will affect an entire company. Managers or executives must sometimes "download" a decision to their people after the fact--and this is where many a decision crashes on rocky shoals. Mergers fail as key employees leave and others resist change; union contracts are rejected after months of negotiation; and changes in employee benefits meet with strident protest. What's behind these failures, and what can be done to avert them? The authors lay out reasons for ineffective downloading: a disconnect between the two sides as the negotiating parties fails to see the negatives of a decision; a failure to clarify responsibilities, which results in rumor and word-of-mouth being the primary channels of communication; a desire to inform people quickly--which often means superficially; and a paternalistic desire to protect members of an organization when people would prefer to just hear the truth. Against this record of mistakes and misguided notions, the authors set their four-stage process for robust decision downloading. Their process is informed by survey research of several hundred employees in a variety of organizations, as well as interviews with dozens of executives.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. As companies are increasingly taking on the challenge of global sustainable development, they are forced to rethink the standard business plan based on increasing consumption of products. Drawing from case studies involving Gage Products, PPG Industries Inc., and Xerox Corp., the author shows that some companies are already building their business plans around services and a few key products, and that they are seeing benefits both to the bottom line and in customer retention and acquisition. The author identifies six keys to the new model: building on existing service strengths, redesigning contracts to redefine the basis of profit to create win-win situations when product consumption is reduced and services are improved, communicating the new business plan to current customers, changing sales incentives, acquiring new organizational skills to ensure a better understanding of consumption, and learning to highlight the potential benefits of taking steps to improve the environment.

In 1992 Joe Jackson, former manager of DuPont Motorsports for twelve years, was angling to get the paint business at Rick Hendrick's sixty-five automotive dealerships across the United States. In order to win the Hendrick car dealership paint contract, Jackson and Hendrick met to discuss the possibility of sponsoring Hendrick's new team and rookie NASCAR driver-Jeff Gordon. As a result of that meeting, DuPont signed on to be the primary sponsor. By 2006 Gordon was a NASCAR superstar, and the DuPont logo-viewed by millions-was a household brand. While this level of exposure was exciting for the company, executives at DuPont could not help but wonder if they were fully leveraging this tremendous marketing opportunity. Gordon was on fire-but was DuPont maximizing the heat? The DuPont-NASCAR case tasks students and executives with designing a creative marketing campaign to activate the NASCAR sponsorship opportunity and maximize value beyond conventional sponsorship marketing. This open-ended challenge encourages students and executives to think outside of the traditional marketing tactics typically employed by business-to-consumer (B2C) NASCAR sponsors. Additionally, the nature of DuPont creates the need to develop a multi-dimensional plan that caters to a breadth of brands. Beyond designing a new marketing campaign, a key objective of the case is to focus students and executives on designing metrics for measurement of the return on investment (ROI) into a campaign plan. As a first step, it is important to clearly articulate the campaign, business strategy, and key business objectives mapped to the strategy.

The case simulates the experience of a private equity investor evaluating a potential investment, requiring the student to: (1) determine the risks and merits of an investment in Toys "R" Us, (2) evaluate the spectrum of returns using multiple operating model scenarios, and (3) identify strategic actions that might be undertaken to improve the risk/return profile of the investment. The case also discusses trends and participants in the private equity industry.

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Bruce-Alfred Technologies (BAT) has built a successful business selling packaged software. Its marketing has long promised free technical support to all customers, a key point of differentiation from BAT's competitors. However, the call center providing tech support is now in crisis. Wait times for callers are unacceptably high, leading to low customer satisfaction and negative press. BAT managers are evaluating the Fast Track Proposal, which would create two classes of calls. Fast Track calls would be promised a one-minute wait but pay for service. Standard calls would still be free but be given lower priority and have no wait time guarantee. Considers both the operational impact of this change and the strategic considerations of backing away from free tech support.

Trend Micro, an antivirus and Internet content security software provider, accidentally releases a flawed pattern file update that disables users' computers. The primary impact is on users in Japan, where 150,000 customers are affected. As the media press for answers and the stock price plummets, Eva Chen (CEO) and Akihiko Omikawa (president of Trend Micro Japan) must decide how to respond.

An abstract is not available for this product.