個案總覽

In early 2005, the market for cement in Mexico was changing. The market, particularly in northern Mexico, had traditionally consisted primarily of sales of bagged cement, which was common in developing economies. There appeared to be a shift to bulk cement, more typical of developed economies. CEMEX, the third largest cement company in the world, and the dominant company in Mexico, had developed a strong brand identity for its bagged cement. Bulk cement, however, was harder to differentiate. Describes the Mexican cement industry and dramatic changes that CEMEX had made in 2000-2005 to focus on customer needs, particularly the needs of its distributors. These changes involved a wide range of activities, including dramatic improvements in logistics, creating a retail network among its distributors, and developing a suite of software applications to ensure that the right product was delivered to the right place at the right time. What lessons could the company adopt from its branded business and its success with building its distributor network, if the market turned more toward commodity bulk cement?

In 2000, Procter & Gamble Co. introduced Crest Whitestrips, a new, revolutionary product that allowed consumers to whiten their teeth at home. With Whitestrips, P&G created an entire new category in oral care, worth $460 million in 2002. Whitestrips sent P&G's main competitor in oral care, Colgate Palmolive Co., scrambling because several patents protected the strips, making it difficult for Colgate to copy the invention. But in September 2002, the tables turned. Colgate introduced Simply White, a favorably priced whitening product that consumers could simply paint on their teeth. One month after its introduction, Simply White had captured one half of the market, and Crest Whitestrips lost more than 50% of its share. However, P&G's tests of Simply White indicated that Colgate's new product was largely ineffective. Had Colgate just committed a major strategic blunder by introducing a product that did not work? And, if so, how could P&G best take advantage of the situation?

Focuses on Polaroid's attempt to respond to the changes to its competitive environment that are entailed by the rise of digital imaging.

In mid-September 2005, Ashley Swenson, the chief financial officer of this large CAD/CAM (computer aided design and manufacturing) equipment manufacturer must decide whether to pay out dividends to the firm's shareholders, or repurchase stock. If Swenson chooses to pay out dividends, she must also decide on the magnitude of the payout. A subsidiary question is whether the firm should embark on a campaign of corporate-image advertising, and change its corporate name to reflect its new outlook. The case serves as an omnibus review of the many practical aspects of the dividend and share buyback decisions, including (1) signaling effects, (2) clientele effects, and (3) finance and investment implications of increasing dividend payout and share repurchase decisions. This case can follow a treatment of the Miller Modigliani dividend-irrelevance theorem and serves to highlight practical considerations in setting dividend policy.

Focuses on one principal's efforts to staff her school in the context of a large-scale effort to reform instruction across an urban school district.

Introduces the concept and importance of coherence and the use of the Public Education Leadership Project coherence framework. Describes the challenges and opportunities facing Portland Public Schools Superintendent Vicki Phillips during her first seven months on the job.

In most organizations, the employee appraisal process causes more tension than any other aspect of personnel management. Despite the good intentions behind it, a 360º Feedback system does little to quell the fear that performance evaluation tends to instill. But is it possible to design a 360º Feedback system that is both comfortable and constructive for employees? This technical note discusses the challenges of and opportunities for creating a system that improves performance effectiveness and enhances career success.

Cyd Szymanski's cage-free egg business was threatened by large caged-hen companies that saw new profit potential in the industry she had helped build. Szymanski had based her company, Nest Fresh Eggs, on a strong personal belief that people deserved healthier alternatives for food and that animals deserved to be treated well. Not only had Szymanski remained true to her convictions, but she also saw financial success with what had begun as a very small family operation. Over time, more consumers understood the health and ethical benefits associated with cage-free eggs and were willing to pay a premium price to purchase them. But, during Nest Fresh's 14 years in business, the egg industry had undergone a number of changes. Large caged egg producers started to enter the cage-free market. Szymanski believed that these producers were motivated solely by profit. They were developing small cage-free production facilities side by side with their caged operations. They also had the financial clout to offer lower prices, something the small independent cage-free operators like Nest Fresh were far less able to do. Szymanski had to come up with alternatives, some of which might require back-pedaling on her convictions.

Star India, a subsidiary of Murdoch's News Corporation, and the leading TV network in India, is considering whether to acquire (or continue its arms-length relationship) with one of its major content providers, Balaji Telefilms. The case provides information on the industry context, regulatory environment, key competitors, and the Indian TV market. The case is a good vehicle to discuss value chain concepts and understand the relative strategic positions of different players within a value chain. The case also provides a good introduction to one of the largest television markets in the world.

Presents remarks by Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke on monetary policy, explicit inflation targets, and the relative merits of asset price targeting.

In the spring of 2005, CEO Jeff Leerink has called a meeting of the executive committee to formulate Leerink Swann's growth strategy over the next five years so that it accomplishes three goals: expand into a new business, reinforce the firm's legacy businesses, and maximize the synergies between different parts of the firm. Covers the history of the boutique investment bank, including the nature and source of its personnel and culture, the development of its competitive strategy, the leadership style of its founder, and the development of each department, product, and function.

Corning, with large investments in fiber optic technology, was hit particularly hard by the collapse of the telecommunications industry in 2001. With over $4 billion in debt, the firm's survival appears to rest on raising additional equity capital. The protagonist is considering whether to invest in Corning or in a new mandatory convertible preferred stock that is being offered to the public.

A local real estate developer has to decide how much to bid for a Boston office building in 2005.

It's the busiest time of year for North Pole Workshops. Production is in high gear, and the elves are on overtime in the sprint toward Christmas. But an unexpected spike in demand for one toy may leave children around the world disappointed on Christmas morning, whether they've been naughty or nice. At the same time, another toy's popularity threatens to plummet, leaving Santa and his elves faced with the prospect of millions of unloved playthings left in the warehouse. This is the third time in three years that Santa's elves have been caught off guard by a toy's sudden surge in popularity. Earlier in the season, even just a month ago, it would have been possible to find capacity, but now every line is running full tilt. "Oh, it used to be so simple," Santa ruminates. "Wooden blocks, a train set, a doll...Now we have more than a million SKUs....Trends jump across the oceans in an instant. I've asked the elves in the field to go beyond reporting on kids' behavior and start trend spotting. I've invested in software. But still I can't help thinking that one of these days we're not going to be able to do it." Santa and his staff are determined not to disappoint the children, but North Pole Workshops must find a way to improve its response to shifts in demand. Should Santa invest in better forecasting? Or does the answer lie in a more flexible supply chain? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0512A and R0512Z are M. Eric Johnson, the director of the Glassmeyer/McNamee Center for Digital Strategies at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business; Horst Brandstatter, the owner of Playmobil; Warren H. Hausman, a professor of operations management at Stanford University; and Anne Omrod, the CEO of the consulting firm John Galt Solutions.

Many sensational ideas have faded away into obscurity because they failed to reach the right people. A strong personal network, however, can launch a burgeoning plan into the limelight by delivering private information, access to diverse skill sets, and power. Most executives know that they need to learn about the best ideas and that, in turn, their best ideas must be heard by the rest of the world. But strong personal networks don't just happen around a water cooler or at reunions with old college friends. As Brian Uzzi and Shannon Dunlap explain, networks have to be carefully constructed through relatively high-stakes activities that bring you into contact with a diverse group of people. Most personal networks are highly clustered--that is, your friends are likely to be friends with one another as well. And, if you made those friends by introducing yourself to them, the chances are high that their experiences and perspectives echo your own. Because ideas generated within this type of network circulate among the same people with shared views, a potential winner can wither away and die if no one in the group has what it takes to bring that idea to fruition. But what if someone within that cluster knows someone else who belongs to a whole different group? That connection, formed by an information broker, can expose your idea to a new world, filled with fresh opportunities for success. Diversity makes the difference. Uzzi and Dunlap show you how to assess what kind of network you currently have, helping you to identify your superconnectors and demonstrating how you act as an information broker for others. They then explain how to diversify your contacts through shared activities and how to manage your new, more potent, network.

There are two kinds of businesses in the world, says the author. Knowing what they are--and which one your company is--will guide you to the right strategic moves. One kind includes businesses that compete on a complex systems model. These companies have large enterprises as their primary customers. They seek to grow a customer base in the thousands, with no more than a handful of transactions per customer per year (indeed, in some years there may be none), and the average price per transaction ranges from six to seven figures. In this model, 1,000 enterprises each paying $1 million per year would generate $1 billion in annual revenue. The other kind of business competes on a volume operations model. Here, vendors seek to acquire millions of customers, with tens or even hundreds of transactions per customer per year, at an average price of relatively few dollars per transaction. Under this model, it would take 10 million customers each spending $8 per month to generate nearly $1 billion in revenue. An examination of both models shows that they could not be further apart in their approach to every step along the classic value chain. The problem, though, is that companies in one camp often attempt to create new value by venturing into the other. In doing so, they fail to realize how their managerial habits have been shaped by the model they've grown up with. By analogy, they have a "handedness"--the equivalent of a person's right- or left-hand dominance--that makes them as adroit in one mode as they are awkward in the other. Unless you are in an industry whose structure forces you to attempt ambidexterity (in which case, special efforts are required to manage the inevitable dropped balls), you'll be far more successful making moves that favor your stronger hand.

Ted Levitt used to tell his Harvard Business School students, "People don't want a quarter-inch drill--they want a quarter-inch hole." But 35 years later, marketers are still thinking in terms of products and ever-finer demographic segments. The structure of a market, as seen from customers' point of view, is very simple. When people need to get a job done, they hire a product or service to do it for them. The marketer's task is to understand what jobs periodically arise in customers' lives for which they might hire products the company could make. One job, the "I-need-to-send-this-from-here-to-there-with-perfect-certainty-as-fast-as-possible" job, has existed practically forever. Federal Express designed a service to do precisely that--and do it wonderfully again and again. The FedEx brand began popping into people's minds whenever they needed to get that job done. Most of today's great brands--Crest, Starbucks, Kleenex, eBay, and Kodak, to name a few--started out as just this kind of purpose brand. When a purpose brand is extended to products that target different jobs, it becomes an endorser brand. But, over time, the power of an endorser brand will surely erode unless the company creates a new purpose brand for each new job, even as it leverages the endorser brand as an overall marker of quality. Different jobs demand different purpose brands. New growth markets are created when an innovative company designs a product and then positions its brand on a job for which no optimal product yet exists. In fact, companies that historically have segmented and measured markets by product categories generally find that when they instead segment by job, their market is much larger (and their current share much smaller) than they had thought. This is great news for smart companies hungry for growth.

Leaders and followers both associate authenticity with sincerity, honesty, and integrity. It's the real thing--the attribute that uniquely defines great managers. But while the expression of a genuine self is necessary for great leadership, the concept of authenticity is often misunderstood, not least by leaders themselves. They often assume that authenticity is an innate quality--that a person is either genuine or not. In fact, the authors say, authenticity is largely defined by what other people see in you. As such, you can to a great extent control it. In this article, the authors explore the qualities of authentic leadership. To illustrate their points, they recount the experiences of some of the authentic leaders they have known and studied, including the BBC's Greg Dyke, Nestle's Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, and Marks & Spencer's Jean Tomlin. Establishing your authenticity as a leader is a two-part challenge. You consistently have to match your words and deeds; otherwise, followers will never accept you as authentic. To get people to follow you, though, you also have to get them to relate to you. This means presenting different faces to different audiences--a requirement that many people find hard to square with authenticity. But authenticity is not the product of manipulation. It accurately reflects aspects of the leader's inner self, so it can't be an act. Authentic leaders seem to know which personality traits they should reveal to whom, and when. Highly attuned to their environments, authentic leaders rely on an intuition born of formative, sometimes harsh experiences to understand the expectations and concerns of the people they seek to influence. They retain their distinctiveness as individuals, yet they know how to win acceptance in strong corporate and social cultures and how to use elements of those cultures as a basis for radical change.

The leaders of such global powerhouses as GE, Wal-Mart, and Toyota seem to have grasped two crucial truths: First, far from becoming submerged by the rising tide of globalization, geographic and other regional distinctions may in fact be increasing in importance. Second, regionally focused strategies, used in conjunction with local and global initiatives, can significantly boost a company's performance. The business and economic data reveal a highly regionalized world. For example, trade within regions, rather than across them, drove the surge of international commerce in the second half of the 20th century. Regionalization is also apparent in foreign direct investment, companies' international sales, and competition among the world's largest multinationals. Harvard Business School professor Pankaj Ghemawat says that the most successful companies employ five types of regional strategies in addition to--or even instead of--global ones: home base, portfolio, hub, platform, and mandate. Some companies adopt the strategies in sequence, but the most nimble switch from one to another and combine approaches as their markets and businesses evolve. At Toyota, for example, exports from the home base continue to be substantial even as the company builds up an international manufacturing presence. And as Toyota achieves economies of scale and scope with a strong network of hubs, the company also pursues economies of specialization through interregional mandates. Embracing regional strategies requires flexibility and creativity. A company must decide what constitutes a region, choose the most appropriate strategies, and mesh those strategies with the organization's existing structures. In a world that is neither truly global nor truly local, finding ways of coordinating within and across regions can deliver a powerful competitive advantage.

Companies simply can't afford to have "A players" in all positions. Rather, businesses need to adopt a portfolio approach to workforce management, systematically identifying their strategically important A positions, supporting B positions and surplus C positions, then focusing disproportionate resources on making sure A players hold A positions. This is not as obvious as it may seem, because the three types of positions do not reflect corporate hierarchy, pay scales, or the level of difficulty in filling them. A positions are those that directly further company strategy and, less obviously, exhibit wide variation in the quality of the work done by the people who occupy them. Why variability? Because raising the average performance of individuals in these critical roles will pay huge dividends in corporate value. If a company like Nordstrom, for example, whose strategy depends on personalized service, were to improve the performance of its frontline sales associates, it could reap huge revenue benefits. B positions are those that support A positions or maintain company value. Inattention to them could represent a significant downside risk. (Think how damaging it would be to an airline, for example, if the quality of its pilots were to drop.) Yet investing in them to the same degree as A positions is ill-advised because B positions don't offer an upside potential. (Pilots are already highly trained, so channeling resources into improving their performance would probably not create much competitive advantage.) And C positions? Companies should consider outsourcing them--or eliminating them. We all know that effective business strategy requires differentiating a firm's products and services in ways that create value for customers. Accomplishing this requires a differentiated workforce strategy, as well.