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When it comes time to hire or promote, top executives routinely overvalue certain skills and traits while overlooking others. Intuitively, for example, they might seek out team players, people who shine operationally, dynamic public speakers, or those who are demonstrably hungry for greater responsibility. But some attributes that seem like good indicators of leadership potential are, paradoxically, just the reverse. Team players and those who excel operationally often make better seconds in command. Unfortunately, few organizations have the right procedures in place to produce complete and accurate pictures of their top prospects. Assessments are often based on hearsay, gossip, and casual observation. A new evaluation process will help you avoid that trap. Candidates are assessed by a group of people who have observed their behavior directly over time and in different circumstances.

There was a time when CEOs weren't celebrities, but that was before Jack Welch. Over the past 20 years, Welch, more than any other business leader, has changed the way people view the role of the CEO. There was no General Electric separate from Welch and no Welch separate from General Electric. Through his bold and sweeping reinvention of the company--thanks in no small part to the force of his personality--Welch created the CEO not just as public figure but as icon. Indeed, Welch's legacy and life have been analyzed, lauded, and excoriated by the public and the media alike. Small wonder, then, that his recent book--Jack: Straight from the Gut--has garnered the same degree of publicity. In this frank and wide-ranging interview with HBR senior editors Harris Collingwood and Diane Coutu, Welch replies to his critics and offers a detailed look at his theory and practice of business. Candidly answering questions about his personal style and his upbringing, Welch also gives readers a detailed glimpse of the practices that shape the distinctive GE culture: the meetings, the "deep dives" and, most important, the transmission of powerful ideas throughout GE's far-flung organization.

If you want to understand how much business has changed in the past 50 years, set Alfred P. Sloan's 1963 classic, My Years with General Motors, beside Jack Welch's current bestseller, Jack: Straight from the Gut. Proper, reserved, more Brahmin than baron, Mr. Sloan (never "Al") managed to conceal one of the most creative minds of the first half of the twentieth century beneath a quiet belief in painstaking consensus building. Brash and audacious, a guy's guy, everywhere in the press, Jack (never "Mr. Welch") is the embodiment of the CEO as icon--the epitome of individual star power. But for all their differences, the two are both, essentially, organization men. Sloan invented the concept of the modern corporation; Welch made it work. The question when it comes to Welch is, "How did he do it?" Was it through his oft-publicized strategy of selecting, trusting, and funding the right people and then setting them afloat in a sea of ideas? Or was it through the force of his personality--his preternatural passion, his total dedication to the organization to the exclusion of any private pursuits? In the answer lie the seeds of Welch's legacy. The next generation of CEOs will be quick to emulate the strategy, but not the monomaniacal passion. Nor should they. Tomorrow's leaders, operating in more uncertain times, should seek breadth in their perspectives, openness in their thinking, and roundness in their lives.

Customer relationship management is one of the hottest management tools today. But more than half of all CRM initiatives fail to produce the anticipated results. Why? And what can companies do to reverse that negative trend? The authors--three senior Bain consultants--have spent the past 10 years analyzing customer-loyalty initiatives, both successful and unsuccessful, at more than 200 companies in a wide range of industries. They've found that CRM backfires in part because executives don't understand what they are implementing, let alone how much it will cost or how long it will take. The authors' research unveiled four common pitfalls that managers stumble into when trying to implement CRM. Each pitfall is a consequence of a single flawed assumption--that CRM is software that will automatically manage customer relationships. It isn't. Rather, CRM is the creation of customer strategies and processes to build customer loyalty, which are then supported by the technology. This article looks at best practices in CRM at several companies, including the New York Times Co., Square D, GE Capital, Grand Expeditions, and BMC Software. It provides an intellectual framework for any company that wants to start a CRM program or turn around a failing one.

There's no doubt that companies can benefit from workplace surveys and questionnaires. Good surveys accurately home in on the problems the company wants information about. They are designed so that as many people as possible actually respond. And good survey design ensures that the spectrum of responses is unbiased. In this article, the author, a former research scientist at the University of Michigan and currently the president of a survey design firm, explores some glaring failures of survey design and provides 16 guidelines to improve workplace assessment tools. Applied judiciously, these rules will not only make a tangible difference in the quality and usefulness of the data obtained, but will also produce an increased response rate. The guidelines--and the problems they address--fall into five areas: content, format, language, measurement, and administration. Following the guidelines in this article will help you get unbiased, representative, and useful information from your workplace survey.

George Caldwell, cofounder of Advaark, a cutting-edge ad agency, was listening hard to his biggest client, John McWilliams, CEO of GlobalBev. McWilliams ran a multibillion-dollar holding company for an assortment of food and beverage brands but was giving credit to Advaark for his latest product line. "We were completely blindsided by this whole 'energy drink' craze," McWilliams was saying, clearly delighted that Advaark had steered his company into the business. Then he enthused, "I'd love to get your thinking about our snack lines." "Oh, no," George thought. He hadn't realized that his partner, Ian Rafferty, had made this foray into strategic consulting. Traditionally, their agency focused only on the creative execution of ad campaigns. In fact, they'd disagreed before about whether it was wise to follow customers' needs into areas where they had no skills advantage. George thought Advaark should stick to its core competence. Ian saw a source of easy revenue and an enhanced offering to clients who, he claimed, wanted one-stop shopping. The potential was appealing, but for George, it hardly outweighed the downsides. They'd risk alienating the strategy companies that now referred clients to Advaark. They'd need to recruit or develop new kinds of talent and create a methodology and training. George was just deciding to nix the expansion when a chance meeting with a former client made him pause. She'd heard about GlobalBev's success and wanted the same kind of help. Eager to win back a lapsed account, George was tempted. Should Advaark meet more of its customers' needs by expanding its services or stay focused on what it does best? In R0202A and R0202Z, commentators Gordon McCallum, John O. Whitney, Roland T. Rust, and Chris Zook weigh in on this fictional case.

George Caldwell, cofounder of Advaark, a cutting-edge ad agency, was listening hard to his biggest client, John McWilliams, CEO of GlobalBev. McWilliams ran a multibillion-dollar holding company for an assortment of food and beverage brands but was giving credit to Advaark for his latest product line. "We were completely blindsided by this whole 'energy drink' craze," McWilliams was saying, clearly delighted that Advaark had steered his company into the business. Then he enthused, "I'd love to get your thinking about our snack lines." "Oh, no," George thought. He hadn't realized that his partner, Ian Rafferty, had made this foray into strategic consulting. Traditionally, their agency focused only on the creative execution of ad campaigns. In fact, they'd disagreed before about whether it was wise to follow customers' needs into areas where they had no skills advantage. George thought Advaark should stick to its core competence. Ian saw a source of easy revenue and an enhanced offering to clients who, he claimed, wanted one-stop shopping. The potential was appealing, but for George, it hardly outweighed the downsides. They'd risk alienating the strategy companies that now referred clients to Advaark. They'd need to recruit or develop new kinds of talent and create a methodology and training. George was just deciding to nix the expansion when a chance meeting with a former client made him pause. She'd heard about GlobalBev's success and wanted the same kind of help. Eager to win back a lapsed account, George was tempted. Should Advaark meet more of its customers' needs by expanding its services or stay focused on what it does best? In R0202A and R0202Z, commentators Gordon McCallum, John O. Whitney, Roland T. Rust, and Chris Zook weigh in on this fictional case.

This note introduces the student to the dynamics of the hostile takeover setting and characterizes the decision problem as a "game." In this context, it is necessary to understand other players and their modes of thought, defensive tactics, and rules (laws and court precedents) by which players compete. The survey covers these considerations and discusses the probabilistic analysis by which players can assess the possible actions of various parties. The paper was prepared to supplement case discussions on hostile takeovers.

This case is based on an actual investment decision made by a major paper-products company, and is primarily designed to be a straightforward exercise in assessing cash flows, cost of capital, and net present value of a capital-investment decision. The case works well for all audiences who are learning the basics of discounted cash flow and investment analysis, including the estimation of relevant cash flows (both cost savings and increased revenues), the effect of taxes on cost savings and revenues, the change in net working capital as a cash flow, and the weighted average cost of capital as the discount rate for the average investment.

In January 2001, the chief executive of this small yarn-production company in India must resolve a surprising cash shortage. The task for students is to evaluate the causes of the shortage (using a completed "base-case" forecast given in the case) and assess the usefulness of various possible remedies suggested by company managers. In essence, the company is unable to liquidate a seasonal working capital loan for the requisite 30 days each year. This difficulty arises from two classic causes: (1) secular growth of the company, and (2) declining profitability. Possible remedies include reducing inventory through more efficient transportation and warehousing, reducing credit terms to customers, having raw materials supplied on a just-in-time basis, switching from seasonal to level production, improving profitability, decreasing dividends, and reducing sales growth.

Martin Smith, a recent HBS graduate, has just begun working with a leveraged buyout firm. His first assignment is to evaluate three different deals and make recommendations to the partners. As he studies the deals, he realizes that each has different merits and drawbacks and that his recommendation must take into account not only the specifics of each target company but also the situation of his firm. Also, he must consider the stage of his career and that of the senior partner.

The Liquid Gold cases are an adaptation of the original Calambra Olive Oil cases (UV3774 and UV3777). This version has been written to support a modified classroom experience. The cases describe the start-up of Calambra, a company built to sell a premier brand of olive oil. Frank Lockfeld, the founder, has to determine how much olive oil to make for the second year's production. Unfortunately, he has to make this decision before learning the results of the first year's sales. Thus, there is enormous uncertainty around the decision. The A case (UV3849) tells the start-up story and presents enough information for students to do a sensitivity analysis to decide which of the many uncertainties are most important. This leads to a discussion of tornado diagrams. The B case provides information on those critical uncertainties. This leads to a class on spreadsheet modeling and simulation modeling, searching for an optimal order quantity, adjusting for risk, etc. It also enables a discussion of a key general business issue: the difference between make-to-order and make-to-inventory businesses and the fundamental flaw in most business plans that leads to gross overestimates of potential profitability.

Spreadsheet for case UV2282

The Liquid Gold cases (see also the B case, UVA-QA-0588) are an adaptation of the earlier Calambra Olive Oil cases (UVA-QA-0440 and UVA-QA-0442). This version supports a modified classroom experience. The cases describe the start-up of Calambra, a company built to sell a premier brand of olive oil. Frank Lockfeld, the founder, has to determine how much olive oil to make for the second year's production. Unfortunately, he has to make this decision before learning the results of the first year's sales. Thus, there is enormous uncertainty around the decision. The A case tells the start-up story and presents enough information for students to do a sensitivity analysis to decide which of the many uncertainties are most important, which leads to a discussion of tornado diagrams. The B case provides information on those critical uncertainties, which leads to a discussion of spreadsheet modeling and simulation modeling, searching for an optimal order quantity, adjusting for risk, etc. It also affords a discussion of a key general business issue: the difference between make-to-order and make-to-inventory businesses and the fundamental flaw in most business plans that leads to gross overestimates of potential profitability. Student spreadsheet files are available.

Spreadsheet for case UV6224

Spreadsheet supplement for case 702-428.

Surveys scholarship on democracy and democratization. Describes the relationship between democracy and the environment of business, including capitalist economic institutions, economic growth, economic reform, and international relations.

Discusses one of General Electric's flagship divisions--the world's leading provider of medical diagnostic imaging equipment. Provides an opportunity to examine a multinational confronting massive technological and demographic changes around the world. Genomics has created a global opportunity by making personalized medicine seem possible--medical intervention that caters to the genetic makeup of the individual and emphasizes prevention more than cure. Yet, the pursuit of this opportunity requires fundamental changes in the business model at a time when the model is being stressed by the idiosyncratic needs of catering to the large Chinese market and adapting to the needs of an aging population around the world. Demonstrates how multinationals can create value both by replicating their business models worldwide and by adroitly splitting the value chain across national boundaries.

The mere mention of the term "merger and acquisition" (M&A) can send messages of misinformation or half-truths. Clarity about motives and intent, as well as timing the release of information during a merger, requires strategic information management. But when is the right time to tell employees about a pending merger? Who should make the announcement, and what communication channels should they use? A recent survey of managers conducted by the Darden Graduate School of Business explored communication practices that companies use to communicate internally during their firms' merger or acquisition. This note reveals the findings and makes communication recommendations.