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In November 2021, US Foods CEO Pietro Satriano must decide his company's trajectory following the COVID-19 pandemic. US Foods suffered due to business closures and social distancing during the height of the pandemic. While the situation improved following the return of indoor dining and in-person learning, an industry-wide shortage of truck drivers and warehouse selectors threatened to dampen its post-pandemic recovery. The US Foods team must determine the appropriate strategy for attracting and retaining new drivers and selectors. Meanwhile, the company planned to build additional locations for CHEF'STORE, its cash-and-carry warehouse brand, which promised to increase its geographic footprint and product offerings. Satriano must decide how to support the CHEF'STORE expansion in light of the foodservice distribution industry's continued supply chain challenges.

In May 2021, Matt Sigelman, CEO of Burning Glass Technologies, a company that provided labor market analytics for a variety of markets, navigates his company's transition from data company to product company. Burning Glass originated as a service that used artificial intelligence to match resumes to job postings, then expanded to offer a comprehensive map of the labor market, and then ultimately developed models to provide insight into specific market segments, skills, geographies, college majors, and career paths. However, Sigelman believed that the company could have greater impact if it transformed from a company that sold data to a company that sold products based on its data. Rather than providing reports, the new products offered client companies specific suggestions based on their own labor force. After pivoting from a data company to a product company, Sigelman faced strategic decisions regarding scale, new product development, and competition. At the conclusion of the case, he must decide whether to continue licensing the company's data or focus exclusively on developing and selling their new suite of products.

In 2020, Amazon, the $386 billion online retail behemoth, built an eight-story shelter for women and families experiencing homelessness on its expanding headquarters in Seattle, Washington. The shelter, operated in partnership with a non-profit organization known as Mary's Place, was designed to address what had become a searing problem for Seattle and many other wealthy American cities: although urban areas like New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco were thriving economically from a recent influx of major tech companies and their well-heeled, well-educated work forces, poorer populations in these cities were being simultaneously hit by the declining availability and surging cost of what was once affordable housing. Amazon's partnership with Mary's Place was a novel experiment in addressing this problem at its core, using some of the firm's own resources to fund and create attractive living space for families struggling with homelessness. Yet, critics of the firm argued that its apparent charity was misplaced. Rather than trying to fix homelessness, many held, Amazon and other tech giants should stop acting in ways that were only making the problem worse. Hitting Home: Amazon and Mary's Place is an opportunity for students to understand the problem of homelessness in American cities and to investigate business's role in both causing and addressing it.

In November 2020, Henry Wilde, co-founder and CEO of Acelero, Inc., must decide whether to change his company's program model for delivering early childhood education to low-income children. One of the only for-profit Head Start providers in the United States, Acelero provided direct services through neighborhood childcare centers and operated a consulting arm to improve the services of other Head Start centers. The company had developed a reputation for excellence and was profitable, pleasing its investors. However, Senior Vice President of Family Engagement Lori Levine urged Wilde to change the company's process for interacting with parents. While Levine's preferred model had the potential to drive deeper social impact, it was not yet a proven success and did not have the potential to make Acelero's business more profitable. Further, if the new model failed, Wilde risked losing the credibility that he and his team had build in the early childhood education field over the company's 19-year history. Wilde and Levine had piloted the model at a single Acelero center, and the early results were promising. At the conclusion of the case, the CEO must decide whether to scale the program model to other centers, or whether to stay the course with his company's existing operations.

In October 2018, fashion, wellness, and beauty retailer Sylvarella implemented a Buy Online, Pickup in Store (BOPS) program in an attempt to counteract a sales decline. While BOPS had the potential to meet customer expectations for a seamless order and fulfillment experience, it also posed operational and financial risks. After six months, CEO Sylvia Coparella decided to meet with her vice president (VP) of store operations and VP of e-commerce to evaluate the impact that the program had on their respective departments, as well as the impact to the store overall. Coparella must decide whether to continue the program, continue the program with significant changes, or discontinue the program and instead adopt a different omnichannel retail model.

In April 2019, Sylvarella CEO Sylvia Coparella must assess the impact of the company's Buy Online, Pickup in Store (BOPS) program on her company's overall sales. To do so, she must review analyses of both e-commerce and brick-and-mortar sales data and compare the results to the company's sales prior to the program implementation. At the same time, she must consider the program's impact on intangible factors within her company, including organizational culture, equitable compensation, and employee morale. Coparella must determine whether to continue the BOPS program, continue the program with significant changes, or discontinue the program and instead implement a different omnichannel retail program.

In April 2019, Sylvia VP of Store Operations Axley Vega must review an analysis of her department's sales data to determine the impact of the company's Buy Online, Pickup in Store (BOPS) program. BOPS implementation created significant problems for the store operations team, including an increased workload for store associates without additional compensation, difficulties managing the fulfillment demands of the program, and declining customer satisfaction. As she prepares for a meeting with CEO Sylvia Coparella and VP of E-commerce Charla Limont, Vega must determine whether BOPS has helped or harmed her department. She must also decide whether to recommend the program continue, continue with significant changes, or discontinue.

In April 2019, Sylvarella VP of E-Commerce Charla Limont must review an analysis of her department's sales data to determine the impact of the company's Buy Online, Pickup in Store (BOPS) program. The program implementation created significant problems for the e-commerce team, including difficulties with the inventory management system, a high volume of abandoned shopping carts, and disgruntled social media influencers. As she prepares for a meeting with CEO Sylvia Coparella and VP of Store Operations Axley Vega, Limont must determine whether BOPS has helped or harmed her department. She must also decide whether to recommend the program continue, continue with significant changes, or discontinue.

This case addresses the events that took place following the conclusion of the case "Facebook's Libra (A): The Privatization of Money?" In October 2019, several months after the conclusion of the A case, multiple members of the Libra Association announced that they were leaving the project. Observers speculated that the departures were due to Libra's inability to meet regulatory scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Libra Association formed a board and formalized its governance structure with 21 founding members. Through the remainder of 2019 and 2020, Libra made significant changes to its product in an attempt to win regulatory approval. It also changed its name to Diem to distance itself from the controversies surrounding the original Libra product. By December 2020, the proposed cryptocurrency was a stablecoin pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Diem Association planned to launch the new currency in early 2021; however, it had yet to secure regulatory approval, even as political skepticism toward the product endured.

Florian Hillen, co-founder and CEO of VideaHealth, a startup that used artificial intelligence (AI) to detect dental conditions on x-rays, spent the early years of his company laying the groundwork for an AI factory. A process for quickly building and iterating on new AI products, Hillen believed that the AI factory would prove a competitive advantage when he took his company to market. The AI factory consisted of four stages: the data pipeline, which required labeling dental pathologies on x-rays; algorithm development, which required writing computer programs that learned to recognize the presence of dental conditions and identify them in un-labeled x-rays; an experimentation platform, which tested the accuracy of Videa's diagnoses and determined the appropriate sensitivity of the AI models; and software infrastructure, which deployed the company's AI programs and managed the process for cleaning, storing, and transmitting data. Hillen knew that his company's technology would appeal to individual dentists or dental service organizations (DSOs), who could use AI to make diagnoses more accurate and improve patient trust. Yet Videa would also benefit insurance companies, who could use the technology during the claims review process. Poised to take the company to market, Hillen must decide which customer segment to pursue.

In April 2020, Alisha Moopen, Deputy Managing Director of Aster DM Healthcare, a network of clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies in the Middle East and India, must create her company's budget for the 2021 fiscal year in light of the onset of Covid-19. The pandemic had forced Aster to indefinitely cancel elective procedures, which represented 70% of the company's revenue. Meanwhile, materials costs increased as the Aster team had to procure enough personal protective equipment (PPE) to keep frontline staff safe from the virus, even as revenue from clinics and pharmacies declined. To offset the impact of the pandemic, Alisha and her team must decide whether to implement austerity measures, such as temporary salary decreases, whether to request temporary rent reductions from their landlords, and whether to renegotiate their debt covenants with their lenders. They must also decide what assumptions they can make about revenue: when elective procedures will resume, whether their new telehealth practice will gain traction, and when clinic and pharmacy revenue will recover.

In March 2020, Chris Abkarians and Nikhil Agarwal were in the midst of preparing the annual auction for their student loan assistance startup, Juno. Both current MBA students at Harvard Business School, the duo founded Juno in 2018 to leverage student bargaining power to negotiate better student loan terms with private lenders. Their business model involved soliciting bids from banks through an annual auction; the lender who submitted the best terms then received the right to exclusively market their loan products to Juno's members. The co-founders held their first official auction in 2019, and anticipated receiving several competitive bids from large banks in 2020. However, several weeks before the auction was scheduled to begin, a new entrant to the private student loan market, Eager Bank, expressed a strong desire to become Juno's 2020 loan partner. Eager requested that Abkarians and Agarwal cancel the auction and negotiate directly with them. In exchange, Eager offered several attractive terms, such as involving Juno in the underwriting process. Abkarians and Agarwal must decide whether to partner with Eager, hold the auction as originally planned, or pursue both options simultaneously.

In March 2020, Juno co-founders Chris Abkarians and Nikhil Agarwal decided to pitch banks in anticipation of their annual auction while negotiating directly with private lender Eager. Responses from the majority of private lenders-including Juno's 2019 partner-were not encouraging, yet Eager remained keenly interested in an exclusive partnership. The co-founders faced additional pressure following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the uncertainties of the pandemic and its economic impact, the co-founders gravitated towards the Eager partnership. However, they must decide whether to cancel the auction, and whether Eager has the stability to withstand the pandemic.

In May 2020, Juno co-founders Chris Abkarians and Nikhil Agarwal decided to hold the annual auction for their student loan assistance startup. Five lenders submitted bids, and the co-founders ultimately opted to select Eager Bank as their partner for the 2020-2021 academic year for fixed-rate loans. However, a significant portion of Juno's membership expressed interest in variable-rate loans, prompting them to seek out another partner for the variable-rate product. They secured a deal with a major private lender through an intermediary, but are forced to quickly adapt their strategy when the lender refuses to pay for Juno's loan volume. The case concludes with the co-founders considering whether Eager Bank might be a potential long-term partner, and once again wondering whether they should make changes to their auction-based strategy for the coming year.

Zameer Kassam Fine Jewelry (ZKFJ) designs custom engagement rings that tell the story of a couple's relationship. The case describes the company's process for engaging clients, which has historically been a relatively offline, high-touch experience. Obliged by social-distancing guidelines with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, Zameer Kassam and his team had been forced to take many facets of the business online. Although clients still seemed delighted by their rings, Kassam wondered what might be being lost for his clients and employees in this new virtual medium. On the other hand, perhaps there were aspects of the process that could be improved through online delivery? Such a transition could represent an opportunity to grow the business.

Since its founding, Getaway's service offering - tiny, modern cabins in the woods, located within a two-hour drive of major metropolitan areas - had been met with tremendous demand. Overworked and overconnected city dwellers reveled in the opportunity to take a break from their hectic lives, disconnecting in nature, and savoring meaningful moments with the people closest to them. What began with a fixed, nightly cabin rate of $99 a night had graduated over time to daily yield management, and a steady increase in prices to match rising demand. $159.. $179... $199.. With the onset of the global pandemic in March of 2020, the prospect of getting away to the woods, in rigorously-cleaned, socially-distanced cabins, became even more appealing to homebound consumers, and there was a step change in demand, and prices skyrocketed, crossing $369 in some markets. Should the company make as much money as quickly as possible to fund further growth, or does that risk that consumers will determine Getaway is too expensive and either never come, or never come more than once?

Since its launch in 1998 as "the Amazon.com of DVDs," Netflix had evolved from a DVD rental company to a video streaming platform and producer of original films and television shows. As the company matured, it regularly increased prices and adjusted its product offerings while continuing to add new subscribers. However, between late 2019 and mid-2020, competition within the streaming industry intensified with the launch of new entrants such as Disney+, Apple TV+, and HBO Max, jeopardizing Netflix's position as the industry leader. In spite of the heightened competition in the streaming industry, some analysts and customer willingness-to-pay surveys suggested that Netflix had the opportunity to implement another rate hike in the near future. By May 2020, Netflix must decide whether to increase prices again, or whether it should consider a different pricing model altogether.

In November 2019, Sandra Richter, co-founder and CEO of Soofa, a network of advertising-supported digital bulletin boards, must decide between two different fundraising and expansion plans for her company. One plan entails raising $15 million in a Series A round and pursuing an aggressive expansion strategy, while the other represents a more modest $3 million raise to bring the company to operating profitability. Richter had developed the $15 million plan with an executive introduced to her by her venture capital board members with extensive fundraising and startup experience; however, after months of pitching to investors, the aggressive expansion plan had failed to produce a term sheet. Richter must decide whether the rapid expansion is the right course of action for the company as she begins to question whether her business could realistically meet the plan's projections even if she could secure the financing to fund it. Meanwhile, Soofa's capital was rapidly dwindling. Richter must raise another round of capital by early 2020, or will be forced to lay off the majority of her staff and close her operations. Should she continue pursuing the aggressive expansion plan, pivot to the more modest plan based on operating profitability, or attempt to pursue both plans simultaneously? And how should she navigate the growing tension on her board given the company's struggles?

In 2012, Reshma Saujani founded Girls Who Code (GWC) with the mission of closing the technology (tech) industry's gender gap. While GWC offered coding education programs to middle- and high-school-aged girls, the organization also sought to alter cultural stereotypes surrounding women in tech through books, advertisements, and social media campaigns. Saujani remained active in promoting her organization's message through a TED Talk, a best-selling book, and frequent media appearances and interviews. By 2019, GWC had served approximately 185,000 girls, expanded its programs to all 50 U.S. states, and reached hundreds of millions of individuals through its advertising and media campaigns. However, the tech gender gap was still significant. Saujani claimed that the organization was on track to close the gender gap among entry level tech roles by 2027. Would GWC reach its goal? If not, were there new initiatives that it should consider to increase its effectiveness?

Beginning in 2017, technology (tech) company Google faced a series of employee-relations issues that threatened its unique culture of innovation and open communication. Issues included protests surrounding Google's contracts with the U.S. government, restrictions of employee speech, mistreatment of contract and temporary workers, allegations of sexual misconduct and gender inequality, and claims of retaliation against labor organizing. While Google employees felt an obligation to dissent against morally questionable practices, embodying the company's informal motto "don't be evil," the company struggled to respond to employees' concerns while preserving its unique culture.